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Preface
It is not often that academic books are published in a second edition
within less than two years from the date of first publication. Some-
times the reason is that a book turns out to be a bestseller and reaches
beyond a specific audience. Unfortunately, we cannot pretend that this
applies to the present volume. Why, then, did we still think that it was
worth putting out an expanded and thoroughly revised second edition?
Firstly, the European Union was enlarged again in 2007. We now in-
clude the newest Member States, Bulgaria and Romania, in our com-
parison. The analyses of these two countries further confirm the com-
plexity of citizenship arrangements in the post-communist countries of
Central and Eastern Europe, which use their citizenship legislations to
build and maintain external relations with ethnic kin populations and
diaspora groups in neighbouring states.
Secondly, we had already included Turkey in the first edition; the
new edition also contains a chapter on Croatia and thus fully covers
the official candidates for membership, which are currently negotiating
their accession to the European Union.1 This allows us to study the on-
going impact of enlargement on concepts and policies of citizenship.
Moreover, both Turkey and Croatia are major source countries of immi-
gration for the fifteen pre-2004 EU countries. These traditions as send-
ing countries are reflected in the Turkish and Croatian citizenship leg-
islations, which interact with the citizenship policies of countries
where the Turkish and Croatian emigrants have settled. Finally, the two
accession states both share several important features or historical con-
nections with the newer Member States. The conceptions of citizenship
in Turkey and Cyprus still show traces of the Ottoman legacy and Tur-
key also shares some Mediterranean commonalities with Malta, while
Croatia has had to cope with challenges of state formation in the post-
Yugoslavian context that are similar to those of Slovenia.
Thirdly, one of the main results of our comparative studies on the
acquisition and loss of nationality in the European Union is that citi-
zenship policies have become thoroughly politicised and are therefore
also subject to frequent changes. This increased volatility of reforms
means that published results can be quickly superseded by new events.
We have therefore offered all of the authors the opportunity to update
and revise their chapters so that they cover significant new develop-
ments.
Nevertheless, one of the basic rationales of this publication has re-
mained the same. While there has been a growing interest in compara-
tive research on citizenship policies in major countries of immigration,
both overseas and in Europe, most comparative studies are limited in
geographic scope to a small number of already well-researched coun-
tries. The present volume looks at countries that are rarely included in
these studies.2
Why concentrate only on the twelve new Member States plus Croatia
and Turkey. There are various reasons for this choice. The initial idea
for analysing the nationality regulations in this particular group of
countries originated in another EU-funded project called The Acquisi-
tion of Nationality in EU Member States: Rules, Practises and Quanti-
tive Developments, or ‘NATAC’ for short. NATAC provided the first
strictly comparative analysis of the rules and practices regulating the
acquisition and loss of nationality in the fifteen ‘old’ EU Member
States. Unlike earlier, similar studies, it was not limited to country re-
ports but used a new methodology that facilitates the comparison of
the regulations across countries. The results of this project are pub-
lished in two volumes (Baubo¨ck, Ersbøll, Groenendijk & Waldrauch
2006). Volume 1 contains comparative reports with chapters on the
modes of acquiring and losing nationality, the statistics on nationality,
the trends in nationality laws and the statuses of denizenship and qua-
si-citizenship in the fifteen states. Volume 2 supplies specific back-
ground information on the historical and political evolution of the na-
tionality legislation in each individual country, structured according to
a common grid in order to facilitate comparative analyses.
This book represents a first attempt at adapting the methodology de-
veloped in the NATAC project to the new Member States and the acces-
sion countries of the EU. The country reports included in this volume
are structured according to a common grid that is similar to the one
used for Volume 2 of the above mentioned publication. Each chapter
contains a historical outline of nationality policy since 1945 that pro-
vides a broad overview of developments with special emphasis on im-
portant reforms, breaks from basic principles of nationality acquisition
and loss and regulations for special groups of people (e.g. an ethnic
diaspora). Subsequently, the authors summarise the basic principles of
the most important current modes of acquisition and loss of nationality
in their respective countries. A third section looks at current political
debates and any changes planned for the future. Finally, the reports
present the statistical developments since 1985, describe which modes
of acquisition and loss of nationality are dealt with by the available sta-
tistics and explain important breaks in the numbers of acquisitions
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and loss of nationality in their country. Like the country reports gath-
ered for the NATAC project, the reports included in this volume do not
primarily aim at a legal comparison but concentrate on the historical
and political background of current regulations for the acquisition and
loss of nationality. A further question guiding our research was the im-
pact of the EU and other international bodies on the evolution of these
regulations.
Nevertheless, this book on citizenship in the new Europe is a publi-
cation in its own right with a very specific focus. The concepts of na-
tionality and citizenship in the fourteen countries under discussion in
this volume generally differ quite strongly from those prevalent in Wes-
tern Europe. By and large, citizenship in these countries is still closely
linked to an ethnic interpretation of nationality, transmission to subse-
quent generations is exclusively based on descent, there is greater hos-
tility towards multiple nationality, and greater emphasis is laid on citi-
zenship links with ethnic kin-minorities in neighbouring countries and
expatriates. Indeed, emigration has played a more important role for
recent citizenship reforms in these countries than immigration. Yet, a
few among them are already experiencing another transition, from a
sending country to a transit country and finally to a receiving country
of new immigration. Moreover, eleven of these countries have also un-
dergone a transition from communist to democratic rule. A final fun-
damental contrast with the old fifteen EU Member States is that none
of these countries has enjoyed continuous independence within the
present state borders for more than 60 years. In addition to dealing
with individual acquisition and loss of citizenship, these countries
therefore had to resolve the puzzling problems of initial collective citi-
zenship determination for large populations in the context of state re-
storation, of new establishment after partitioning or secession or of
geographic relocations of borders. Again, this has sometimes implied a
return to ethnic roots and the exclusion of long term residents and
their children for political reasons, such as the restrictive access to Es-
tonian and Latvian citizenship for Russian immigrants who settled
there after 1940.
This book does not include a detailed comparison of specific provi-
sions in nationality law, as provided by Harald Waldrauch in volume 1
of the NATAC project on the fifteen ‘old’ Member States. However, we
have added two comparative chapters to the fourteen case studies: a re-
vised and updated version of Andre Liebich’s introduction to the first
edition, which traces the historical trajectories of citizenship in the
post-communist states, and a new comparative overview of the main
features of current citizenship legislation by Wiebke Sievers that con-
cludes the present volume. Both chapters emphasise the specific chal-
lenge of new state formation and initial determination of citizenship.
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What we provide in this book is not a definitive account of compara-
tive citizenship studies in this European region, but a starting point for
further inquiries. There are four main areas where we see a need for
future research.
Firstly, in order to fully understand how citizenship policies affect
specific groups of migrants or minorities, we need to break down the
laws into their components and study then how they are implemented
and how the legislation of different countries interacts in generating le-
gal statuses or bundles of rights and obligations. The research line in-
itiated by the NATAC project should therefore eventually also be fully
applied to the new Member States and accession countries.3
Secondly, we need to go beyond comparing legislative output to pro-
mote studies of the policy formation process that leads to citizenship
reform. Political parties, associations lobbying for specific interests, in-
ternational organisations and public discourses in the mass media are
all important factors that need to be researched in order to better un-
derstand how and why citizenship issues enter the political agenda.
Thirdly, building on these solid empirical foundations, one can try to
condense the comparison into quantitative indices that measure how
open or closed a citizenship regime is for newcomers or for external af-
filiations of emigrants and kin minorities. In the past, such standar-
dised comparisons were often based on a few selected indicators, such
as provisions on ius soli, residence requirements for naturalisation and
toleration of dual citizenship. By studying the citizenship laws of the
new EU Member States we can see why this approach is often mislead-
ing. Formal residence requirements do not always tell us how easy ac-
cess to naturalisation is. Some countries only start counting residence
periods from the day the applicant has acquired a residence permit,
which may take several years depending on the status of the applicant
and the country of residence. In other countries, discretion regarding
naturalisation is fairly unlimited. Moreover, toleration of dual citizen-
ship often applies only to emigrants, not immigrants. We are happy to
report that recent attempts to standardise the comparison between citi-
zenship policies have improved, partly as a result of the findings of the
NATAC project. We want to mention here specifically the revised ver-
sion of Marc M. Howard’s Citizenship Policy Index (Howard 2010),
Sara Wallace Goodman’s CIVIX index that measures language, country
knowledge and value commitment requirements (Wallace Goodman
2010), as well as the new version of the Migrant Integration Policy In-
dex MIPEX (British Council 2008).
Fourthly, the point of standardised comparison is often to encourage
policy changes oriented towards best practices in other countries. From
a social science perspective, the main goal, however, is to explain why
countries adopt or change the policies they have. The NATAC volumes
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and the present book provide much material for contextual policy ex-
planation, but have not attempted a systematic comparative explana-
tion. Much of the older literature in this field is based on extrapolating
trends from a few case studies. Using NATAC results, recent studies
have revised some earlier hypotheses about a general trend towards lib-
eral convergence and have suggested some new ideas on how to ex-
plain variations between countries (see e.g. Joppke 2007, 2008; de
Groot & Vink 2010). Comparative analyses of larger numbers of cases
using quantitative indicators in order to identify causal variables for
policy change are still rare. The aforementioned recent studies by Ho-
ward and Wallace Goodman illustrate that citizenship policies are now
examined by the whole range of disciplinary and methodological ap-
proaches available in the social sciences.
We hope that the present volume will encourage many more re-
searchers to overcome the Western bias that has shaped the field of ci-
tizenship studies for such a long time by including the new Member
States and accession countries in their comparative studies. We also
hope that this book will alert policymakers to the fact that the common
citizenship of the European Union connects the citizenship regimes of
Member States. In Europe, distinct historic legacies and sovereign
powers of self-determination in matters of citizenship are increasingly
challenged through growing interdependence between states connected
through migration and supranational integration.
Rainer Baubo¨ck, Bernhard Perchinig and Wiebke Sievers
Vienna and Florence, August 2008
Notes
1 The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has also been a candidate since 9
November 2005, but accession negotiations have not commenced due to its conflict
with Greece over the name ‘Macedonia’.
2 The first edition of this book was based on papers presented at a conference held in
Vienna from 30 June to 2 July 2005. This conference was organised within the
framework of the EU-funded Network of Excellence IMISCOE (International
Migration, Integration and Social Cohesion in Europe) by a thematic research cluster
that focuses on migration and citizenship. We would like to thank the European
Committee for funding this meeting, the IMISCOE Editorial Committee and
Amsterdam University Press for providing a platform for the dissemination of our
work, all reviewers for their helpful comments and, last but not least, Karina Hof for
her meticulous work on the proofs.
3 This is one of the major aims of the project Access to Citizenship in Europe
(EUCITAC), which is financed by The European Fund for the Integration of Third
Country Nationals and coordinated by Rainer Baubo¨ck together with Jo Shaw from
the University of Edinburgh. EUCITAC aims to install a web-based observatory on
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citizenship in Europe within the European Union Democracy Observatory (EUDO),
which is currently being built by the Robert Schuman Centre of the European
University Institute.
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Introduction: Altneuländer or the vicissitudes of
citizenship in the new EU states
Andre Liebich
Altneuland is the title of a novel written over a century ago by the Zio-
nist leader Theodor Herzl. The old-new land Herzl had in mind was
Palestine but the term is apposite for the lands with which this volume
is concerned, in particular, the former communist states that have re-
cently joined the European Union. From the point of view of the issue
of citizenship, these countries display a peculiar blend of antiquity and
novelty that deserves careful consideration. In this introduction, I
therefore propose to make a survey of the preconditions and conditions
of citizenship in the new EU Member States through the prism of ‘old’
and ‘new.’ Applying these terms, I shall first consider the specificities
of statehood in this group of countries; I shall then look at the evolu-
tion of principles of political membership, and, finally, I shall consider
the efforts to incorporate the past into the present citizenship provi-
sions.
1 New states and old concerns, or why there is not much
plural citizenship in the Altneuländer
When the First World War broke out, less than a century ago, only two
of the twelve new members of the EU enjoyed statehood. Bulgaria had
acquired sovereignty barely six years earlier and Romania, though a
fully sovereign state for a generation, was to change boundaries so sub-
stantially as an outcome of the First World War that it was practically
recreated. Of the remaining countries, five (Poland, Hungary, Lithua-
nia, Latvia, Estonia) arose as a result of the Paris Peace Treaties (1919).
Only one (Hungary) has enjoyed uninterrupted statehood since 1918
and, in the case of the Baltic states, their statelessness in this period
has lasted longer than their statehood.1 Two European states (Cyprus
and Malta) acquired independence in the course of Cold War decolo-
nialisation.2 Three other countries (Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Slo-
vakia as well as potential EU Member State Croatia) have only become
states in the last fifteen years (though Slovakia and Croatia had a brief
and not very happy experience as states during the Second World War).
To be sure, at least two countries, Poland and Hungary, have long
been acknowledged, even when absent from the map and even by such
sceptics as Marx and Engels, as one-time historic states (Rosdolsky
1986; Connor 1984). Other countries, notably Bulgaria, Lithuania and
the Czech Republic, might make weaker claims to a distant statehood
in a more or less misty past. The contrast with the situation of the ‘old’
fifteen EU Member States could not be more striking. Although the
‘old’ EU also numbers three countries that only arose after the First
World War (Finland, Austria, Ireland) and one whose existence was in-
terrupted (Austria), twelve of the fifteen old EU countries have known
uninterrupted statehood for periods running from well over a century
(Germany, Luxemburg, Italy, Belgium, Greece) to many hundreds of
years (United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Spain, Portugal, Sweden,
Denmark, France).
The recent and discontinuous statehood that characterises the new
EU states has broad implications for political attitudes and identity.
The Hungarian public intellectual Istvan Bibo´ has spoken of the ‘dis-
tress of the small states of Eastern Europe’, by which he means ‘an-
guish at the perspective of the disappearance of one’s own people and
country’ (Bibo´ 1991 [1946]: 13-69). This anxiety is based on the histori-
cal realities noted above but it is reinforced by demography. Though
there are smaller states in the old EU, some of the new Member States
are very small indeed (Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania together
are smaller in population than Belgium or Portugal) and all of them
combined, excepting Poland, have the population of one of the larger
EU Member States, such as France or Italy. Even Poland, whose popu-
lation is larger than all the other new EU adherents put together, is it-
self only about the size of Spain. And, as though to underline that in
East Central Europe even a population of 38 million nationals does not
spare one from brooding on the survival of the state, Poland’s hymn
still begins, somewhat ominously, ‘Poland has not yet perished while
we are alive’ (further on these arguments, Liebich 2008).
The fragility of statehood in East Central Europe drives all these
countries in the direction of a state-reinforcing overcompensation. The
preambles to most constitutions or other foundational documents (see
annex) evoke ancient genealogies and historical continuities. Moreover,
the Baltic states’ insistence on the legal fiction of uninterrupted state-
hood, despite a half century of statelessness, leads them to adopt con-
stitutional and legislative dispositions that transform a fixed date into a
marker of timelessness. Legitimacy apparently reposes, at least in part,
upon antiquity and continuity and the search for these is a serious task
(Liebich 1995).
One would imagine that this kind of tenacious attachment to a re-
cent and therefore tenuous type of statehood would be reflected in the
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philosophy and provisions regarding plural citizenship (Liebich 2000).
This is indeed the case, though the variations are many and are them-
selves significant. Generally speaking, one sees a spectrum running
from qualified or court-imposed interdiction (Czech Republic and
Lithuania) to unqualified (Hungary) or almost unqualified (Slovakia)
acceptance of plural citizenship.3 In between, we find the countries
that tend strongly towards acceptance (Poland and Slovenia) and a
growing number of countries that do not allow plural citizenship for
naturalised citizens but authorise it for members of their own ethnic
group who repatriate in their country of origin, for citizens by birth
who naturalise abroad or even for co-ethnic kin groups residing
abroad.
The situation in many of these countries appears to be in flux. Three
countries (Latvia, Poland and Slovenia) stipulate either that nationals
will only be ‘considered’ citizens of the respective country or that na-
tionals will ‘not be recognised’ as citizens of another country. In the
cases of Poland and Slovenia, administrative authorities may require a
candidate for naturalisation to relinquish previous citizenships but they
apparently rarely do so. In Latvia, the courts have ruled that plural citi-
zenship can be prohibited, but this applies only for naturalised citi-
zens. Lithuania, where the Constitution states that no one may be a ci-
tizen of both Lithuania and another state (art. 12, para. 2), moved to-
wards the acceptance of plural citizenship for its pre-1940 nationals
and their descendants, even those who did not repatriate. These inno-
vations have since been struck down by the national courts as unconsti-
tutional and discriminatory, leaving Lithuania with no provision for
plural citizenship. Estonia, somewhat casuistically, does not accept
plural citizenship on the basis of the 1995 citizenship law but does ac-
cept it on the basis of its 1938 law. This effectively means that only nat-
uralised citizens are required to relinquish their previous nationalities.
Whether a country edges towards the position of accepting or limit-
ing plural citizenship, it generally looks out for its own ethnic kin,
waiving most requirements, sometimes including language or resi-
dency requirements, on behalf of expatriates and even their descen-
dants or on behalf of minorities abroad. In addition to the cases men-
tioned above, this policy of ethnic preference is particularly blatant in
the cases of Bulgaria and Croatia, where the purpose is to establish the
symbolic borders of the nation, beyond those of the state. This is also
the thrust of the Romanian policy of extending citizenship to those per-
sons and their descendants who were Romanian citizens before Roma-
nia’s territorial losses in 1940. In contrast to other cases, however, this
extension also includes non-Romanian ethnics living in these areas. All
three countries, but particularly Romania, which has thus offered its ci-
tizenship to many if not most of the inhabitants of Moldova and some
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inhabitants of Ukraine, have pulled back from this policy – a policy
that could be considered generous or imperialistic, as one would have
it – since these countries have found themselves swamped with ‘oppor-
tunistic’ applications that defeat the original ethnic in-gathering inten-
tion of the policy.
All in all, one may identify a tendency, however weak, towards the
relaxation of the injunctions against plural citizenship.4 States have ab-
rogated the communist-era bilateral conventions on elimination of
cases of dual nationality. This relaxation does not, however, bring these
states closer to the spirit of the most recent European Convention on
Nationality (1997), which accepts plural citizenship as much as earlier
conventions discouraged it. Most of these states reserve plural citizen-
ship for their own ethnic kin. They are therefore not reacting to pres-
sures for euro-compatibility but rather to pressures from their own
e´migre´ communities and from nationalist politicians. As a conse-
quence of the fall of communism, these countries have reconciled
themselves with their historical e´migre´ communities, just as these
communities abroad have reconciled themselves with their countries of
origin. A recent development is that these countries are producing a
significant new wave of emigration. Part brain drain, part cheap labour,
stimulated by globalisation as well as by EU enlargement, these new
emigrants are even more interested in maintaining ties with their
home countries than their predecessors.
The meanderings of policies regarding plural citizenship, which
have provoked intense public debate in many of these countries, bring
to the fore two characteristics of citizenship in the post-communist
states. First, the triumph of ethnic conceptions of citizenship over
others; second, the use of citizenship policy as a means to right histori-
cal wrongs. These are the themes of the following two sections of this
introduction.
2 Old categories and new principles, or how ethnicity has
trumped other grounds of citizenship
The classic distinction between civic and ethnic conceptions of citizen-
ship, as well as that between citizenship founded upon ius soli and ius
sanguinis, apply to the countries under discussion here too.5 Signifi-
cantly, what might be considered the more enlightened variant of citi-
zenship, civic citizenship (or at least a prototype of civic citizenship), as
well as the more progressive principle of membership, ius soli, belong
to these countries’ past rather than to their present.
In the two countries of the area under discussion that have the
strongest state tradition, Poland and Hungary, a medieval conception
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of political citizenship prevailed well after it had disappeared else-
where. In both countries, as in some other parts of Europe, the gentry
or equestrian estate was seen as constituting the nation, that is, the po-
litically enabled and active part of the population. If, from the perspec-
tive of global justice, ‘citizenship in Western liberal democracies is the
modern equivalent of feudal privilege’ (Carens 1987: 252), then feudal
privilege may well be the medieval equivalent of citizenship. The ori-
ginality of the Polish and Hungarian cases was that this estate, largely
made up of the landowning squirearchy or even the landless petty gen-
try, though still only a small minority, comprised a far broader section
of the overall population than it did, for example, in Western Europe.6
Here, as in pre-modern Western Europe, estate identity overrode lin-
guistic or ethnic criteria. In the vast multiethnic entities that were the
Polish and Hungarian kingdoms, referred to as the Polish-Lithuanian
Commonwealth and the Lands of the Crown of Saint Stephen, social
status thus trumped the multitude of potentially competing blood con-
nections. The Polish szlachcic (noble or gentleman) was proud to de-
clare himself natione polonus, gente ruthenus (or lituanus), thus affirm-
ing that Polish political identity was compatible with Ruthenian (that
is, Ukrainian, in modern terms) or Lithuanian primordial ties. As these
terms may recall, a neutral dead language, Latin, was the political lin-
gua franca of this class well into the eighteenth century in the case of
Poland and into the middle of the nineteenth century in Hungary (Wa-
licki 1994; Ba´ra´ny 1990: 201).
Political citizenship was thus a function of estate membership. In
Hungary, the crown was theoretically elective; in Poland, it was effec-
tively elective until the disappearance of the Polish state in 1795, with
the electorate consisting of the gentry estate. In spite of huge dispari-
ties of wealth and power, members of this estate cultivated a formal
equality to such an extent that in Poland all titles of nobility were out-
lawed (Davies 1982: 239ff). In both countries as well as in Bohemia,
Diets made up of members of the nation met regularly, deliberated vo-
ciferously and exercised power to various degrees (Schramm 1996).
In Bohemia, the estate system proved weaker and decayed earlier
than in Hungary and Poland. As in these two countries, the estate sys-
tem here did not originally differentiate among ethnic or linguistic
identities, in this case, between Germans and Slavs. It cultivated a Bo-
hemian ‘land patriotism [...] the patriotism of our aristocracy’ (Sayer
1998: 57ff). Only in the wake of the seismic events of 1848, did Bohe-
mian and local identities change into ethnic ones. Bohemians and Bud-
weisers became Czechs or Germans, to quote the title of a recent study
which emphasises that ‘ethnicity was only one form of nationhood
among several in Habsburg Central Europe, yet one that came to domi-
nate the others’ (King 2002: 10). However, in Bohemia, territorial-
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based identity remained strong. During the First World War, Thomas
Masaryk originally founded his case for Bohemian independence on
the state rights of the historic Kingdom of Bohemia. He put aside this
argument only when he saw that it did not impress British decision
makers, who were indifferent to antiquarian constitutional niceties in
countries other than their own. He also downplayed it as he realised
that it did not further the project of uniting Slovakia with the Czech
lands in a future Czechoslovak state (Agnew 2000; Galandauer 1993).
The territorial demarcation of political membership, intimately con-
nected to citizenship based on ius soli, was firmly anchored elsewhere
in East Central Europe as well.7 From the early Middle Ages, the Hun-
garian comitat gave local territorial content to the principle of gentry
self-government (Bak 1990: 66; Holub 1958). After 1848 the comitat
remained a fundamental and prestigious administrative unit. The Pol-
ish Dietines, assemblies of local gentry, were the effective units of gov-
ernment in pre-partition Poland from the fifteenth century to the late
eighteenth century (Davies 1982: 323). Polish exiles after 1830, having
abandoned the now obsolete idea of a Polish gentry nation, defined the
Polish nation in territorial terms, as consisting of all those who lived in
the territory of Poland before the first partition of 1772 (Kukiel 1955;
Liebich 2004). Restoration of the Polish state within these borders was
still the demand of Polish activists at the time of the First World War.8
Finally, until 1918, throughout the whole territory of the Austro-Hun-
garian empire (with the partial exception of Bosnia-Herzegovina), Hei-
matrecht (indige´nat, pertinenza), an original form of communal citizen-
ship, was the basic building block of state citizenship (Redlich 1907).9
This institution, which deserves the attention of historians of citizen-
ship, appears to have survived unto the present day only in Switzer-
land.10
The Allied and Associated Powers, victors in the First World War,
had fought, purportedly, for the rights of small nations and for the
principle of national self-determination. Their objective was the crea-
tion of national states, that is, states that were, if not ethnically homo-
geneous, at least responsive to the aspirations of ethnic nations in East
Central Europe. In setting down the rules for acquisition of citizenship
in the successor states, however, the victorious powers resorted to terri-
torial criteria. Anyone habitually resident (in the case of former Ger-
man or Russian territory) or possessing communal Heimatrecht (in the
case of former Austria-Hungary) within the new frontiers of a state
was entitled to that citizenship. The solution did not preclude citizen-
ship conundra for individuals who were not of the majority ‘race and
language’ and who did not possess – or could not prove – present or
past Heimatrecht in their state of residence – for example, some Hun-
garians in Slovakia (Napier 1932). This was perhaps the last time that a
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territorial principle predominated over ethnic criteria in determining
citizenship in the countries with which we are concerned. Henceforth,
territoriality, like social status in an earlier period, became a criterion
of the past and ethnicity took the lead in regards to citizenship.
In the post-First World War peace treaties the victors were thus ob-
liged to make concessions to the principle of ethnicity, at least as an al-
ternative criterion for the determination of citizenship. The treaties al-
lowed for a right of citizenship option. In the case of the Treaty of Ver-
sailles with Germany, individuals could determine their citizenship not
only on the basis of habitual residence but also by virtue of their place
of birth, on condition that their parents were domiciled in that place at
the time of their birth. As one commentator stated, ‘it [was] impossible
that there be any question of race or language [italics in original]’ in set-
ting criteria for optants ‘since Poland counts masses of Jews among its
nationals [ressortissants] speaking a special jargon, and more than one
third of the citizens of Czechoslovakia are of the German language’
(Brustlein 1922: 35). In fact, race and language were precisely the cri-
teria applied for the successor states of the Habsburg empire. Indivi-
duals having Heimatrecht anywhere in the former Austria-Hungary
could choose, instead of the citizenship of the state in which their com-
mune now lay, the citizenship of the state where the majority of the po-
pulation was made up of people speaking their language and was of
their ‘race’. In a sort of counterpart to the Treaty of Versailles provision
that citizenship could also be based on one’s place of birth in addition
to one’s current place of residence, the Treaty of Saint Germain and
the Treaty of Trianon allowed citizenship to be claimed on the basis of
an earlier Heimatrecht just previous to one’s current Heimatrecht (Sub-
botitch 1926; Brustlein 1922).
One is tempted to see in the differential dispositions with regard to
Germany and Austria-Hungary an expression of the different percep-
tions of these two countries, Germany being seen as governed by more
civic and Austria-Hungary by more ethnic considerations. Confirma-
tion of such an approach might be sought in the fact that the Treaty of
Versailles speaks of Czechoslovaks (art. 85) and Poles (art. 91) who are
German nationals, yet does not define a Czechoslovak or a Pole, unlike
Trianon and Saint Germain, which specifically evoke ‘race and lan-
guage’. It may be simply the logic of Heimatrecht that leads in this di-
rection. As Heimatrecht replaces birth place and encourages the cult of
a petite patrie or a spirit of subjective belonging, it may be expected that
Heimatrecht-based citizenship on a state scale would edge away from a
strictly impersonal basis of citizenship, such as birthplace, and seek
out other criteria for belonging.
Since 1918, the prevailing conceptions of identity in all of the coun-
tries in question have led them to look towards ethnic criteria in defin-
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ing those entitled to citizenship, as we have already seen in the discus-
sion about the selective authorisation of plural citizenship. On a formal
level, the governing principle of the citizenship laws presented in this
volume is descent without reference to ethnicity, albeit, in the case of
the Baltic states, with a strict time reference. Bulgaria even proclaims
an apparent ius soli principle that is, in fact, negated in the same
breath because, according to the Constitution, any child born on Bul-
garian territory is a citizen, unless it acquires another citizenship by origin
(art. 25, para. 1; my italics). Ius soli is, in fact, so marginalised that in
some countries (i.e. Latvia, Romania, Hungary), restrictions are made
on the naturalisation of foundlings, who, one might assume, would be
automatically granted citizenship.11 In addition to explicit ethnic criter-
ia with regard to naturalisation, the underlying ethnic concept of citi-
zenship can be found explicitly in schemes that attempt to establish a
quasi-citizenship or a special connection with co-nationals abroad.
The most famous recent case of such an attempt at quasi-citizenship
– ‘fuzzy’ citizenship as one scholar has called it – is that of the Hungar-
ian Status Law of 2001 (Fowler 2002). This measure provoked an enor-
mous storm in the states concerned, the countries of the Hungarian
diaspora. The question was examined by international bodies, notably
the Venice Commission12 and the Council of Europe. The Hungarian
Status Law was finally adopted in significantly modified form, having
served as a reminder of the passions that issues of citizenship can
arouse (see Ka´ntor, Majtenyi, Ieda, Vizi & Hala´sz 2004).
The Hungarian Status Law provides a certain number of advantages
to its beneficiaries. When in Hungary status holders enjoy the same
cultural and educational benefits as Hungarian citizens, as well as sub-
sidised travel, and some social security and health service benefits.
They can work for up to three months a year in Hungary without re-
striction. The Law provides additional advantages to Hungarian tea-
chers living abroad (not just teachers of Hungarian but those teaching
in Hungarian) and subsidies to families abroad who send their chil-
dren to local Hungarian schools. State subsidies are guaranteed for
Hungarian-language institutions and for Hungarian community orga-
nisations abroad.
The Hungarian Status Law is not unique. Overcoming lengthy bu-
reaucratic and political obstacles, Poland finally introduced a Polish
Card in 2007. Slovenia has adopted the Republic of Slovenia and Slove-
nians Abroad Act (2006), which serves a similar purpose. Slovakia has
adopted a full-fledged Law on Expatriate Slovaks (1997). The benefici-
aries can reside in Slovakia ‘for a long period’ of time and can be em-
ployed – apparently, for an unlimited period – without a work permit
and without permanent residence status. They receive assistance ‘to
maintain their Slovak identity,’ wherever they may be. There is some
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alleviation of provisions governing social security contributions while
elderly expatriates receive travel subsidies within Slovakia. Lithuania’s
citizenship law (2002) provides for a certificate of indefinite ‘retention
of the right to citizenship’ for pre-June 1940 Lithuanian citizens as well
as ‘persons of Lithuanian descent’ – the term is unspecified – residing
abroad.
Why did the Hungarian status law provoke a storm abroad whereas
there does not appear to have been any such adverse reaction to, say,
the corresponding Slovak law? The answer seems to lie in the respec-
tive definitions of prospective beneficiaries. Significantly, and perhaps
paradoxically, the Slovak law has not caused international concern be-
cause it defines its beneficiaries in ethnic terms whereas the Hungar-
ian law is vague on ethnic requirements and precise on territorial con-
ditions.
Slovak expatriate status may be granted to an individual without Slo-
vak citizenship who has ‘Slovak nationality or Slovak ethnic origin and
Slovak cultural and language awareness.’ Slovak ethnic origin is ob-
tained if at least one ancestor ‘up to the third generation had Slovak
nationality.’ ‘Cultural and language awareness’ depends on ‘at least pas-
sive knowledge of the Slovak language and basic knowledge of Slovak
culture or declaring himself/herself actively for the Slovak ethnic [sic].’
I do not propose to ponder the ambiguities of the expression ‘declaring
[oneself ] actively for the Slovak ethnic.’ Rather, let me cite, for pur-
poses of comparison, the definition contained in the Hungarian Status
law:
This Act shall apply to persons declaring themselves to be of
Hungarian nationality, who are not Hungarian citizens and who
have their residence in the Republic of Croatia, the Federal Re-
public of Yugoslavia, Romania, the Republic of Slovenia, the Slo-
vak Republic or the Ukraine and who have lost their Hungarian
citizenship for reasons other than voluntary renunciation. (art. 1,
para. 1)
Simply declaring oneself to be ‘of Hungarian nationality,’ as certified
by a recognised Hungarian community organisation abroad, is suffi-
cient to obtain the ‘Certificate of Hungarian Nationality’ provided for
in the Status Law. Note also that by referring only to persons of Hun-
garian nationality rather than Hungarian ancestry or descent, the Sta-
tus Law might be seen as thinking in terms of a state of affairs that
disappeared in 1920.
Underlying the difference in reactions provoked by the Hungarian
Status Law and the (non) reaction to the Slovak Expatriate Law, is his-
torical experience. For almost a millennium, Hungary, even when its
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own sovereignty was impaired, dominated the Danubian basin and out-
lying areas. All or parts of the countries mentioned in the Status Law
belonged to the Crown of Saint Stephen. For centuries, the Hungarian
nobility – the Hungarian nation in the feudal sense, as we have seen
above – owned and governed these territories. After having long ma-
gyarised local elites, in the nineteenth century the Hungarian state also
launched a sweeping campaign of general magyarisation. The Slovaks
have been, in contrast, a dominated nation par excellence (dominated,
in fact, by Hungarians). The subjects of the Slovak Expatriate Law are,
above all, Slovak emigrants in America and elsewhere. The law also
concerns Slovaks in the Czech Republic – the largest minority in that
state since the dissolution of Czechoslovakia – as well as the small, and
much assimilated, Slovak minority in Hungary, sometimes invoked by
Bratislava to counter Budapest’s complaints about the treatment of the
Hungarian minority in Slovakia.
The overwhelming importance of history in determining reactions to
the respective status and expatriate laws is confirmed by the Polish ex-
ample. While the project of a Polish Card was stalling, Poland promul-
gated a law on Repatriation (2000) that formalised a procedure pre-
viously adumbrated in the Nationality Act. I shall deal with other as-
pects of this law in the following section, but here let me point out
that although this Polish law does dwell on ethnicity, like the Slovak
law, it also has a determining territorial component, like the Hungar-
ian statute. Crucially, however, the territorial scope of the Polish law is
defined in such a way to exclude any former Polish territories. It con-
cerns Poles ‘in the Asian part of the former Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics’ – that is the three Caucasian Republics, the Asian part of
the Russian Federation and the Central Asian Republics (art. 9, para.
1). The Polish Sejm (Lower House of Parliament) specifically rejected
the senate’s proposed amendment that repatriation provisions be ex-
tended to Poles in all states of the former socialist bloc.13 The Repatria-
tion Law thus excludes Ukraine, Byelorussia and Lithuania, all of
which were integrated in the pre-1795 Polish Commonwealth (Rzecz-
pospolita) and parts of which were still included in the Polish ‘Second
Republic,’ i.e. the interwar Polish state. Although there are consider-
able numbers of Poles in these countries and, at least in the case of
Byelorussia, they may have not only economic but serious political rea-
sons for seeking repatriation, Poland seems to be bending over back-
wards to avoid the suspicion that it is thinking in terms of its imperial
past or historical boundaries. In the case of Hungary, there is a strong
suspicion that this is precisely the thinking behind the Status Law.14
In summary, the new EU states go to considerable lengths to include
those whom they consider their own. This is usually understood as fa-
cilitating naturalisation – sometimes to the extent of dropping virtually
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all standard requirements in exchange for a declaration of national con-
sciousness (as in the case of Bulgaria or EU candidate Croatia).
Whether ‘one’s own’ are co-ethnics, as is usually the case, or inhabi-
tants of lost territories, as in Romania, the twofold purpose is the
same. First, as we have argued, the purpose is to define the boundaries
of one’s imaginary community; and, second, the purpose is to rectify
the wrongs of the past. It is to the latter objective that we shall now
turn.
3 Old wrongs and new rights, or how to use citizenship to
correct history
A peculiarity of the new EU states is that citizenship laws and related
provisions are formulated with the intention of redressing past wrongs.
The compensatory or restitutional function – Wiedergutmachung, in the
literal sense of the term – is particularly strong with respect to the re-
cent communist past, though it extends to earlier periods as well.
The Polish Repatriation Act mentioned above is a prime example of
an attempt at such historical redress. The preamble to the Act begins
by ‘recognising that the duty of the Polish state is to allow the repatria-
tion of Poles who had remained in the East […] due to deportations, ex-
ile and other ethnically motivated forms of persecution.’ Repatriates
enjoy significant benefits. They acquire Polish citizenship on the day
they cross the Polish border (art. 4). Their costs of resettlement are un-
derwritten by the Polish state.
Repatriates are of ‘Polish extraction [and] declaring Polish national-
ity.’ Polish extraction is defined as having at least one parent or grand-
parent or two great grandparents who held Polish citizenship or who
cultivated ‘Polish traditions and customs’ (art. 5). Polish nationality is
ascertained by demonstrating ‘links with Polish provenance, in particu-
lar by cultivating Polish language, traditions, and customs.’ Knowledge
of Polish is, obviously, an advantage but it is not a requirement to the
same degree as ‘traditions and customs’, since the latter suffice to con-
firm the Polish nationality of one’s forbearers. These traditions and
customs remain undefined, allowing wide latitude for consular officials
who, according to the law, decide whether an individual meets criteria
for repatriation. One supposes that some of the most evocative tradi-
tions for the vast majority of today’s Polish population would be reli-
gious; for example, celebration of Christmas in the Polish style. This
might encompass non-Catholic Christian Poles and even non-believers
but it would exclude members of other faiths, such as observant Jews.
In spite of what one might expect from the preamble and spirit of
the law, proof of deportation, forced exile or persecution are not condi-
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tions for obtaining repatriate status. The law also covers, perhaps inad-
vertently, those individuals (and their descendants) who emigrated will-
ingly to some of the peripheries of the Russian Empire or of the USSR;
for example, as employees in Siberian development projects or in the
military or civil service of the Russian or Soviet state.15 The primary tar-
get of the law, however, are those families who were deported in 1939-
1940 from Soviet-occupied Eastern Poland (even though these areas
are no longer part of Poland) as well as earlier exiles and deportees;
members of the Polish minority in the USSR transferred in the Stali-
nist era to areas far from the Polish border; and Polish nationalists and
revolutionaries exiled under the tsar, especially after the 1905 Revolu-
tion in the Russian Empire and the 1863 Insurrection in the Polish
and Lithuanian lands, but perhaps even earlier and under other cir-
cumstances. The number of persons affected by the Repatriation Act is
insignificant. Between 1997 and 2006, the total number of the repa-
triated, including non-Polish spouses, was some five thousand, the lar-
gest number of whom came from Kazakhstan (see Go´rny & Pudzia-
nowska in this volume). However, the symbolic significance of the act
as an affirmation that the act of conferring citizenship may be used to
right the wrongs of history, far back into the past, is enormous.
Although attempts to replace the communist-era Polish citizenship
law (1962) bogged down in legislative paralysis, the bill proposed by
the Sejm to the senate in 2000 gives further insight into the hypoth-
esis formulated above regarding the objective of righting historical
wrongs through citizenship law.16
According to the proposed bill, the President may confer Polish citi-
zenship, upon his or her own decision, on foreigners who did military
service during the 1939-1945 war in the Polish army or in Polish mili-
tary formations attached to Allied forces on all fronts, or who served in
Polish underground formations and organisations, including those in
partisan units attached to such organisations. These individuals do not
need to have possessed Polish citizenship in the past (art. 17, paras. 1.1,
1.2, 2). The bill also provides for restitution of citizenship, without pre-
sidential intervention and simply on the basis of a declaration before a
consular official within a specified time period, for some individuals
who left Poland between 1 September 1939 and 4 June 1989 – the lat-
ter date being identified as the beginning of the end of communist
rule. Those reinstated include individuals who, in order to leave Po-
land, were forced to renounce their citizenship under threat of ‘repres-
sions and chicaneries’, including arrest, loss of work or dwelling, or ex-
pulsion from schools, including universities (art. 28, para. 1.1.b). The
specific victims of communist persecution covered in this provision
would seem to be, above all, those students, intellectuals and others
purged as ‘Zionists’ in 1968. Reinstatement is not granted to those
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who left Poland voluntarily on the basis of a declaration that they be-
longed to a non-Polish ethnic group and who ‘obtained the citizenship
of the native country of their nationality’ (art. 28, para. 2.4.). This pro-
vision is aimed at preventing ethnic Germans or others from benefit-
ing from the reinstatement granted to the victims of the 1968 purges.
Finally, the bill offers restitution of citizenship to those who had lost it
by enlisting in the armed forces of Great Britain, the US or France
after (!) 9 May 1945. In a sense, the bill appears to be saying that Po-
land – the real Poland which is now able to express itself – had never
taken a stand against its wartime allies during the Cold War.
The Czech Republic, also keen to underline and correct the injus-
tices of the communist era, adopted restitution laws. The Law on the
Citizenship of Some Former Czechoslovak Citizens (1999) opens with
the following, somewhat grandiose declaration:
Parliament, in order to assuage the legacy of certain wrongs that
occurred in the period 1948 to 1989, and realising that Czechs
and compatriots living abroad contribute to maintaining and cul-
tivating the national cultural heritage as well as to deepening
ties of common belonging with the Czech Republic and realis-
ing that Czech emigrants developed, in exile, notable spiritual,
political and cultural activity in favour of renewal of freedom
and democracy in its homeland and that this activity deserves ex-
traordinary recognition.
In fact, however, the law benefits all individuals and their descendants
who lost their Czechoslovak citizenship during this period for whatever
reason, including by virtue of the prohibition on plural citizenship in
Czechoslovakia or by virtue of naturalisation in a state that prohibited
dual citizenship but, presumably, no longer does so now. Restitution of
citizenship here may thus be seen as a favour or as a sort of citizenship
amnesty offered to all Czechs, whatever the circumstances of their loss
of citizenship. The law did have a cut-off period that expired in 2004;
however, the deadline was abolished (Seitlova´ 2005: 11; Barsˇova´ in this
volume). With regard to the numerically significant and politically vo-
cal Czech-American lobby, the bilateral convention dating back to 1928
between the US and Czechoslovakia prohibiting dual citizenship had
already been invalidated by a government decree in 1997, without re-
ference to the 1993 Czech Citizenship Law article (art. 17) prohibiting
dual citizenship in general. In practical terms, the 1999 law on former
Czechslovak citizens would therefore be superfluous for this important
group. This law, as well as other legal dispositions, takes care to in-
clude some categories of Slovaks among its beneficiaries and dual
Czech and Slovak citizenship is authorised, again as an exception to a
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general prohibition. One could argue, however, that the latter provi-
sions are no longer prompted by considerations of historical justice
but, rather, amount to housecleaning operations dealing with some of
the messy aspects of the Czech-Slovak divorce.
In the case of the Baltic states, the very reemergence of these coun-
tries is itself seen as a redress for historical injustice. Naturally, citizen-
ship laws also serve the purpose here of correcting past iniquities and
they do so largely by legally abolishing the time period during which
injustice was perpetrated. The Estonian Nationality Law (1995) does
not mention specific dates, yet this does not mean that it is neutral
with regard to them. At the time of registration for Estonian citizen-
ship in 1989, those who had an a priori legal claim to citizenship were
only those who were themselves, or one of those whose forbearers was,
an Estonian citizen on 16 June 1940, the date of the Soviet ultimatum
leading to occupation. In accordance with the thesis on state continuity,
in 1992 the Estonian Parliament voted to reapply the Citizenship Act
of 1938, as amended up to 16 June 1940 (Thiele 2002). The latter qua-
lification deprived a number of resident non-Estonian nationals of elig-
ibility for facilitated naturalisation. Like certain other countries, Estonia
specifically states that it will not grant or restore citizenship to those
who have acted against the interests of the state (art. 21, para. 3). Inde-
pendent of this provision, the Estonian law, until 2005, also denied citi-
zenship (by denying permanent residence status, which is a precondi-
tion for citizenship) to individuals and spouses of individuals who en-
tered Estonia ‘in conjunction with the assignment of military
personnel into active service, the reserve forces or retirement’ (art. 21,
para. 6). An exception was made in the law for individuals who had re-
tired from the armed forces of a foreign state and had been married
for at least five years (and were still married) to a natural-born Estonian
citizen. (One wonders how many such cases there may be.) Apparently,
historical injustices may be righted not only by conferring citizenship
but also by denying it.
Latvia’s Citizenship Law (1994) also identifies citizens, in the first
instance, as those who were citizens on 17 June 1940 and their descen-
dants, unless they had become citizens of another state after 4 May
1990 (art. 2, para. 1). Naturalisation by Latvians abroad during the peri-
od of occupation is thus distinguished from naturalisation since the re-
acquisition of independence. This is in accordance with the idea that,
since the occupation was illegal, no change of a citizen’s legal status
could occur in that period and thus those who were citizens in 1940
continued to be citizens in 1990, whatever they had done in the mean-
time. The law also considers as citizens women and their descendants
who lost Latvian citizenship by virtue of a law of 1919 concerning wo-
men who married foreigners. This provision too – variants of which
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may be found in other citizenship laws – represents the correction of a
historical injustice, though one related to gender rather than commu-
nist rule. Restrictions on who can obtain Latvian citizenship are more
severe in some respects than those in Estonia. Citizenship will not be
granted to those whom courts have identified as propagating, after 4
May 1990, racist or totalitarian ideas (the latter comprising communist
ideas) as well as those who, after 13 January 1991, acted against the Re-
public of Latvia through participation in the Communist Party (CPSU
[LCP]) or front organisations, including the Organisation of War and
Labour Veterans. In Latvia, neither retired Soviet military and police
personnel, albeit only those who came to Latvia directly after demobili-
sation, nor former employees or even informants for the Soviet security
services are eligible for citizenship. This also holds true for military
personnel who came to Latvia on active service. Brief mention is made
of persons who entered Latvia in accordance with the Mutual Assis-
tance Pact between Latvia and the USSR of 5 October 1939, the follow-
up to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, but this only seems to exclude the
possibility of exceptional rather than regular naturalisation (art. 13,
para. 1.3).
Lithuania adopted the earliest and most liberal policies of naturalisa-
tion among the Baltic states. It did, however, distinguish between citi-
zens by right and ‘potential citizens’, the latter being Soviet-era immi-
grants with no criminal record and with a legal income, who were en-
titled to opt for Lithuanian citizenship within two years upon adoption
of the law. Citizens by right, even according to the most recent Lithua-
nian Citizenship Law (2002), were considered to be those who held ci-
tizenship prior to 15 June 1940, and their descendants. The aim of his-
torical redress is revealed in an article (art. 14, para. 2) that makes it ea-
sier for deportees or political prisoners who married Lithuanian
citizens, as well as for their children born in exile, to become natura-
lised. In these cases, naturalisation is facilitated even further (com-
pared to other spouses of Lithuanian citizens) by shortening the resi-
dency period from seven to five years. Here legislators could also not
resist introducing historical memory into citizenship law.
In most countries, redressing historical wrongs and favouring co-eth-
nics are intimately connected matters and the issue of plural citizen-
ship is grafted onto this connection. In some cases, however, redres-
sing wrongs may inflect the ethnic connection while creating a breach
with regards to the issue of plural citizenship. The Bulgarian and the
Romanian cases illustrate this inter-relationship.
Bulgaria opened the door to plural citizenship when it naturalised or
renaturalised Bulgarian ethnic Turks who had been expelled in 1989,
in the last gasp of an increasingly chauvinistic but dying communist
regime. A newly de-communised Bulgaria thus sought to make
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amends for this brutal treatment of its citizens. In the meantime, how-
ever, these Turks had been granted Turkish citizenship, making them
ineligible for Bulgarian citizenship according to the provisions of the
communist-era Citizenship Law (1968) that was still in force and even
according to the new democratic Constitution (1991). Bulgaria’s new
Citizenship Law (1998), however, made provisions for allowing Turks
to reclaim their Bulgarian citizenship. Considerations of restitutive jus-
tice thus overrode the reluctance to tolerate plural citizenship for any-
one other than ethnic Bulgarians and, indeed, nudged Bulgaria towards
a more liberal naturalisation policy for ethnic Bulgarians. Even after
historical justice had been done, however, the question of the ethnic
Turks who had been driven out remained a burning political issue. The
dispute within the Bulgarian political spectrum became one that had to
do with the voting rights of ethnic Turks who had reacquired Bulgarian
citizenship but were not residing permanently within Bulgaria. There-
fore, it cannot be said, even after redress was achieved, that the matter
has been successfully closed with no further chance of sequels (see
Smilov & Jileva in this volume).
Romania, as we have seen, chose to redress the wrongs committed
by its dismemberment in 1940 by extending an offer of citizenship to
all individuals who had been or were descended from Romanian citi-
zens, as defined by the extended border that emerged in the wake of
the First World War. This was an offer that could be taken up via a sim-
plified procedure, without any obligation of repatriation or renuncia-
tion of other citizenships. There was, however, something paradoxical
about this initiative. Romania had been quick to recognise the sover-
eignty of the Republic of Moldova, whose borders correspond to a large
part of Romania’s lost Bessarabia. Romania did not, however, make ter-
ritorial claims against Moldova, nor against Ukraine, which, during the
time it was a Soviet republic, acquired part of Bessarabia and part of
the province of Bukovina that had been Austrian before it became Ro-
manian in 1919. This curiously subdued form of irredentism mirrors,
to some extent, the Bulgarian position regarding the naturalisation of
Macedonians. Bulgaria instantly recognised the sovereignty of the new
post-Yugoslav Macedonian state but refused to recognise the Macedo-
nian language (creating difficulties for the authentication of bilateral
agreements) and thus, given the importance of language in defining
nationality in this part of Europe, took an ambiguous stance with re-
gard to the existence of a Macedonian nation. Romania explained its
extension of citizenship not as a negation of Moldovan or Ukrainian
sovereignty but as a protest against – and redress of – the iniquity of
the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939, which made the dismemberment
of Romania possible.
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The Romanian effort to redress historical wrongs also provoked un-
desired consequences, as did the corresponding Bulgarian policy de-
scribed here. Perhaps the Romanian government believed that its offer
of citizenship would not be taken up, inasmuch as both Moldova (at
the time) and Ukraine did not authorise dual citizenship? Somewhat
cynically, the expected result would be that the inhabitants of these two
‘lost lands’ would regret the change of borders and would yearn for
their former homeland! In fact, the Romanian offer was taken up so
enthusiastically that somewhere between 100,000 and 300,000 indivi-
duals, mostly Moldovans, became Romanian citizens. Apparently, Ro-
manian naturalisation became something of a business, involving du-
bious third-party brokers. In the face of an avalanche of applications,
Romania at first suspended the process (2001) and then tightened its
requirements (2003). A further cause of this change must have been
the realisation that the policy of naturalisation was not doing anything
to promote Romanian consciousness or any other Romanian interests
in Moldova. The modifications transformed the restitution of citizen-
ship to former citizens (irrespective of their ethnicity) into a policy that
involves the repatriation of ethnic Romanians into Romania. Thus,
even when there is the initial desire to right wrongs in territorial terms,
without regard to ethnicity, the issue is eventually still defined in eth-
nic terms.
4 Conclusion: The historical past, the ethnic present and the
immigrant future
All of the countries surveyed in this introduction, with the exception of
Poland, have adopted new citizenship laws in the post-communist era.
All citizenship laws and related instruments, including Poland’s, have
been subject to substantial tinkering or, indeed, fundamental revisions.
From the studies collected in this volume we may tentatively suggest
that the issue of redressing historical wrongs, especially those dating
from the communist period, is now losing its saliency. This concern
with the historical past has now blended with a powerfully asserted
emphasis on ethnic identity. It is this emphasis that has cleared away
the earlier barriers to plural citizenship, thus confirming the tenet that
one’s kin will always remain one’s own, wherever they may be and
whatever other allegiances they may have.
The new Europe has not, however, turned its attention to any of the
future issues regarding citizenship, notably those raised by what will
undoubtedly be a rising wave of immigration in the years to come. A
number of countries, perhaps most acutely among the Baltic states, are
already experiencing a labour shortage caused by widespread emigra-
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tion, whether it is temporary or permanent. All of the countries, with-
out exception, are undergoing a demographic decline of more or less
drastic proportions. This vacuum is most likely to be filled by immi-
grants from further East or even from the former colonial world. This
will be a completely unprecedented situation for countries that have al-
ways been exporters of labour and have never possessed colonial em-
pires.
The countries of the new Europe are barely completing the process
of updating their understandings of citizenship from those that existed
in the pre-communist and communist periods to ones that correspond
to their present self-image. One wonders how they will undertake the
transition to yet another conception of citizenship encompassing a new
reality that is only now emerging.
Annex: Constitutional preambles (extracts)
Croatia (1990) The millennial national identity of the Croatian nation
and the continuity of its statehood, confirmed by the course of its en-
tire historical experience in various political forms and by the perpetua-
tion and growth of state-building ideas based on the historical right to
full sovereignty of the Croatian nation, manifested itself:
– in the formation of Croatian principalities in the 7th century;
– [twelve other historical dates follow to confirm Croatian statehood].
Czech Republic (1993) We, the citizens of the Czech Republic in Bohe-
mia, Moravia, and Silesia, at the time of the renewal of an independent
Czech state, being loyal to all good traditions of the ancient statehood
of Czech Crown’s Lands and the Czechoslovak State.
Estonia (1992) Unwavering in their faith and with an unswerving will
to safeguard and develop a state which is established on the inextin-
guishable right of the Estonian persons to national self-determination
and which was proclaimed on February 24, 1918 […] which shall guar-
antee the preservation of the Estonian nation and its culture through-
out the ages, the Estonian people adopted, on the basis of art. 1 of the
Constitution which entered into force in 1938, by Referendum held on
June 28, 1992 the following Constitution.
Hungary (1989) In order to facilitate a peaceful political transition to a
constitutional state, establish a multi-party system, parliamentary de-
mocracy and a social market economy, the Parliament of the Republic
of Hungary hereby establishes the following text as the Constitution of
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the Republic of Hungary, until the country’s new Constitution is
adopted.
Latvia (1990)17 The independent state of Latvia, founded on 18 Novem-
ber 1918, was granted international recognition in 1920 and became a
member of the League of Nations in 1921. The Latvian Nation’s right to
self-determination was implemented in April 1920, when the people of
Latvia gave their mandate to the Constituent Assembly chosen by uni-
versal, equal, direct and proportional elections. In February 1922, the
Assembly adopted the Constitution of the Republic of Latvia, which is
still in effect de iure.
Lithuania (1992) The Lithuanian Nation having established the State
of Lithuania many centuries ago […] having for centuries defended its
freedom and independence […] having preserved its spirit, native lan-
guage, writing, and customs.
Poland (1997) Recalling the best traditions of the First and the Second
Republic […] Obliged to bequeath to future generations all that is valu-
able from our over one thousand years’ heritage, bound in community
with our compatriots dispersed throughout the world.
Slovakia (1992) mindful of the political and cultural heritage of our
forebears, and of the centuries of experience from the struggle for na-
tional existence and our own statehood, in the sense of the spiritual
heritage of Cyril and Methodius and the historical legacy of the Great
Moravian Empire.
Slovenia (1991) [Proceeding …] from the historical fact that in a centu-
ries-long struggle for national liberation we Slovenes have established
our national identity and asserted our statehood.
Notes
1 One might group Poland along with Hungary as being a state with uninterrupted
continuity since 1918. Poland was partitioned in 1939 and its demise was decreed by
the partitioning (and occupying) powers, Germany and the USSR. Its disappearance
was not acknowledged by the other Great Powers who recognised its government in
exile until the restoration of the country in 1945.
2 This chapter focuses on comparing the histories of post-communist countries of East
Central Europe. The post-colonial states Cyprus and Malta as well as Turkey require
separate treatment. They are, however, included in the comparative overview of
migration and citizenship (see Sievers in this volume).
3 In the Czech Republic, the fundamental principle of exclusive citizenship has been
breached by a number of exceptions, notably the acceptance of dual citizenship for
ex-Czechoslovaks who have become Slovaks as well as for repatriates (see below). In
INTRODUCTION 39
Slovakia, the provision that renouncement of former citizenship is ‘in favour’ of
naturalisation is so weak as to be self-negating.
4 As we see from the chapter by Eugene Buttiegieg, this tendency, conceived in ethnic
terms and directed at a diaspora, encompasses Malta as well.
5 I take the point that the civic-West/ethnic-East stereotype ‘when true is only weakly
true, and according to several measures is false’ (Shulman 2002: 554). With respect
to conceptions of citizenship, however, the civic/ethnic distinction seems to me a
useful heuristic device in tracing a historical evolution.
6 In Poland, 11-13 per cent of the population belonged to the equestrian estate in the
sixteenth century, 9-10 per cent in the eighteenth century. In France, under the July
Monarchy (1830-1848), 1.5 per cent of the population was enfranchised. In Britain,
the corresponding figure at that time (1828) was 3.2 per cent (figures cited by
Walicki 1982: 16). In Hungary, the gentry numbered 3-5 per cent of the population
by the fifteenth century (Engel 1990: 43).
7 The two new Balkan states of the EU present contrasting situations. As soon as
Bulgaria acquired autonomy in 1878 it conferred citizenship on all of its inhabitants.
At approximately the same time, Romania instituted a citizenship policy based on
ethnicity that also applied for naturalisation (see Smilov & Jileva as well as Iordachi
in this volume).
8 According to Soubbotitch (1926: 55), many (unnamed) Polish jurists argued that
Poland had never ceased to exist because the partitions were in fact occupations. The
analogy with present-day Baltic positions is striking (see section 3 of this chapter). I
have not found examples of such Polish arguments but their existence is confirmed,
a contrario, through a vehement attack on such arguments by Scha¨tzel (1921).
9 It might be noted, too, that there was no Austro-Hungarian citizenship. Austrian and
Hungarian citizenship laws (the legal regimes were entirely separate) did not require
candidates for naturalisation to prove that they had lost their previous nationality but,
as of 1870, they did require such proof of Hungarians seeking to become Austrians
and vice versa (Soubbotitch 1926: 15).
10 A recent reference source refers to indige´nat as ‘a second-degree nationality preserved
by nationals of a federal entity’ – which neither Hungary nor Austria ever was – and
describes it as ‘vieilli’ or archaic (Salmon 2001). Even today, however, to ‘be a Swiss
citizen implies a cantonal indige´nat and a communal citizenship. The three levels are
inseparable. No one can be a national (ressortissant) of a canton without communal ci-
tizenship or Swiss without a cantonal indige´nat’ (http://etat.geneve.ch). The same
document refers to ‘nationalite´ (indige´nat) genevoise’. In addition to a droit de cite´
communal there is also a concept in some localities of bourgeoisie communale that im-
plies a co-proprietorship of communal assets.
11 Latvia restricts citizenship to foundlings born on Latvian territory after 21 August 1991,
the date of the Moscow coup that might be seen as the last gasp of the USSR (see Kru¯ma
in this volume). Romania grants foundlings citizenship not on the basis of birth on
Romanian territory but under the assumption that their parents (or at least one of them)
held Romanian citizenship (see Iordachi in this volume). Hungary grants foundlings
nationality on a conditional basis; the presumption of statelessness or Hungarian
parentagemay be rebutted without any time limit (Kova´cs & Toth in this volume).
12 The European Commission for Democracy through Law, an advisory commission of
the Council of Europe.
13 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, ‘Polish Repatriation to Focus ‘‘Mainly’’ on
Compatriots from Kazakhstan’, Daily Report, 9 November 2000.
14 Countering the claim that Hungary defines the scope of its Status Law in terms of
its historic boundaries, one might note that the Status Law does not extend to
Austria, though part of historic Hungary today lies within Austria. This exception is
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not sufficient to alleviate suspicions. In fact, it nourishes other grounds for
resentment: the Status Law does not cover Austria because one of the tacit intentions
of the Law is to minimise the effects for expatriate Hungarians of Hungary’s entry
into the EU. The resulting inequality of status for citizens of Romania (until 2007),
Serbia, Ukraine, etc. was one of the principal grounds for international reservations
vis-a`-vis the law.
15 Some such individuals would be covered by the provision that repatriation cannot be
offered to anyone who ‘during their stay outside the Republic of Poland acted against
the vital interests of the Republic of Poland or participated in human rights
violations’ (arts. 8.3 a and b). The law also excludes those who repatriated from
Poland between 1944 and 1957 to some Soviet Republics. Presumably, however,
descendants of all these individuals are still eligible for repatriation if they meet
other requirements.
16 Ustawa z dnia 29 czerwca 2000 r. o obywatelstwie polskim, Tekst ustawy przekazany
do Senatu zgodnie z art. 48 regulaminu Sejmu (nie zakon´czony proces legislacyjny)
[Statute of 29 June 2000 regarding Polish citizenship, text of statute transmitteed to
Senate according to article 48 of the Senate Regulation (uncompleted legislative
process)]. http://orka.sejm.gov.pl.
17 Declaration on the Renewal of Independence.
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Part I
Restored states

1 Estonian citizenship: Between ethnic
preferences and democratic obligations
Priit Ja¨rve
The most important reform in the nationality policy of Estonia after
1945 was the restoration of the pre-1940 nationality in 1992 by reintro-
ducing the 1938 Citizenship Act with slight changes. In 1995, Estonia
adopted a new Citizenship Act which did not change the basic princi-
ples of the acquisition and loss of Estonian nationality but established
more demanding requirements for the acquisition of nationality by nat-
uralisation.
1.1 History of Estonian nationality
1.1.1 Nationality policy since 1945
The Republic of Estonia was established in 1918. In 1940, it was an-
nexed to the Soviet Union as the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic un-
der threat of military force. As a result, the citizens of the Republic of
Estonia were incorporated into the Soviet citizenry. Estonian nationality
was replaced by Soviet nationality. Between 1941 and 1944, Estonia
was occupied by Nazi Germany. In 1944, Estonia was re-conquered by
the Red Army, and Soviet nationality was once again imposed upon
the people on its territory. Estonian nationality ceased to exist de facto.1
Instead, the Soviet passports, which were issued in Estonia after the
Second World War, included a mandatory line with ethnic identifica-
tion of the carrier. ‘Estonian’ became one of such identifications to be
used in Soviet internal passports (Soviet passports for travel abroad did
not mention ethnicity). In Estonia, as opposed to many internal re-
gions of the USSR, everyone was issued Soviet internal passports upon
reaching the age of sixteen. These passports, not valid for travel abroad,
gave the holders relative freedom to travel within the Soviet Union.
The authorities stamped the carrier’s domicile registration (propiska)
and marital status into the passport.
The Soviet Union sought to merge the different ethnic nations and
groups living in the country into a new civic identity – the Soviet peo-
ple. While the Soviet authorities claimed that such an identity was
emerging, and some citizens reported that they already regarded them-
selves as ‘Soviets’, the official registration of different ethnic identities
was not discarded. Thus, Estonians had the inscription ‘Estonian’ in
their passports until the dissolution of the Soviet Union,2 though, this
inscription could not be automatically converted into Estonian national-
ity after independence. Since 1992, only pre-1940 nationals and their
descendants, regardless of their ethnic identification, were entitled to
acquire Estonian nationality by registration. Those Estonians who
settled in Estonia after 1940 and their descendants (with ‘Estonian’ in
their Soviet passports) could not acquire Estonian nationality by simple
registration but had to take the path of naturalisation. At the same
time, pre-1940 nationals and their descendants of non-Estonian ethnic
origin (with ‘Jew’, ‘Russian’, ‘Latvian’, ‘Pole’, etc. in their Soviet pass-
ports) could acquire Estonian nationality by registration. In new Esto-
nian passports the registration of ethnic identity was dropped.
The debate on nationality between liberal and conservative camps
started in Estonia at the end of the 1980s when the national indepen-
dence movement was gathering momentum. In 1989, the campaign of
registering the citizens of the pre-war Republic of Estonia and their
descendants was carried out by the Estonian Citizens’ Committees, vo-
luntary associations established during the perestroika era to sustain the
idea of the legal continuity of the pre-war Estonian state. On the posi-
tive side, this campaign helped restore the awareness of the link
between the individual and the state. At the same time, being led by
national conservatives, it firmly introduced the exclusive approach
towards Estonian nationality. The conservatives pointed at drastic
changes in the ethnic composition of the population of Estonia due to
a considerable influx of Russian-speaking immigrants under the Soviet
regime. These settlers had pushed the share of non-Estonians in the
population up from around 10 per cent in 1940 to unprecedented 38.5
per cent in 1989.
In 1992, the conservatives emerged as winners in the debate on na-
tionality. As a result, the Citizenship Act of 1992 was based on the
principle of the restitution of the pre-1940 nationality. Only those who
were citizens in 1940 and their descendants (regardless of ethnicity)
were granted Estonian nationality by registration, those who settled in
Estonia after 1940 were offered the possibility of becoming Estonian
nationals through naturalisation. As an immediate consequence of this
Act the majority of non-Estonians as well as a small number of Esto-
nians were not granted the right to participate in the national referen-
dum on the country’s new Constitution in 1992 and in the first parlia-
mentary elections after independence later the same year. Estonia’s
new political leadership considered the great number of non-Estonian
settlers as a threat to the nation. Under these conditions, nationality
became an instrument for the attainment of national homogeneity and
for the political containment of Soviet era settlers. The interests of the
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Estonian ethnic nation, as then understood, were given priority over
full democratic participation.
In Estonia these exclusionary policies enjoyed relatively wide support
as a reaction to the changes in the ethnic composition of the popula-
tion. A survey of public opinion, carried out in the Baltic states in
1993, showed that the principle of limiting nationality to descendants
of the pre-1940 citizens was supported by 44 per cent of Estonian, 52
per cent of Latvian and 12 per cent of Lithuanian respondents (Rose &
Maley 1994: 31-34). These differences among the Baltic respondents
correlated very clearly with the demographics of the respective coun-
tries: the bigger the share of non-titular groups in a given state, the
stronger the reluctance to let them participate in political life.
The restoration of pre-1940 nationality had profound political conse-
quences. The exclusion of the majority of non-Estonians from the for-
mation of state institutions and from the process of adoption of crucial
legal documents, including the Constitution, enabled Estonians to en-
trench themselves firmly in all the major posts of the state avoiding
power-sharing with minorities. During the referendum on indepen-
dence in Estonia in March 1991 there were 1,144,309 persons with the
right to vote. During the referendum on the Estonian Constitution in
the summer 1992, after the adoption of the first Citizenship Act, the
reported number of eligible voters was 689,319, or only about 60 per
cent of the 1991 figure. Consequently, 454,990 adults had been disen-
franchised (Semjonov 2000: 15). It was therefore not surprising that
the Parliament elected in 1992 was 100 per cent Estonian.
The restoration of pre-1940 nationality caused mass statelessness of
non-Estonians, which harmed the relations between different ethnic
communities inside Estonia, caused tension in the relations with Rus-
sia (the absolute majority of non-citizens were Russians), and evoked
criticism, usually disguised as ‘recommendations’, from prominent in-
ternational and regional organisations such as the United Nations, the
OSCE, the Council of Europe and the European Union.
Between 1992 and 1 January 2008, the share of stateless residents
in Estonia declined from 32 to 9 per cent (see Figure 1.1). However, the
inability and/or the lack of motivation of older cohorts of non-citizens
to master the Estonian language at the necessary level raises doubts of
whether the problem of statelessness will be easily overcome in the
near future if the conditions of naturalisation remain the same.
1.1.2 Restoration of Estonian nationality3
On 26 February 1992, the Supreme Council of the Republic of Estonia
put the version of 16 June 1940 of the Citizenship Act of 1938 into
force. The main features of this nationality regulation were the ius san-
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guinis principle and the avoidance of dual nationality. Pursuant to art.
3 of this Law, every person who possessed or whose parents possessed
Estonian nationality before 16 June 1940 – the day of the Soviet ulti-
matum followed by the annexation of Estonia – had a legal claim to Es-
tonian nationality. About 80,000 non-Estonians thereby acquired Esto-
nian nationality.
Russians and others who came to Estonia after 16 June 1940, all in
all almost one third of the entire population in 1992, were automati-
cally excluded from Estonian nationality. In essence, they were mostly
immigrant workers but perceived by many as colonial settlers with no
right to automatic acquisition of Estonian nationality. The only way for
them to acquire Estonian nationality was through naturalisation. As a
precondition for naturalisation, the applicant had to have his or her
permanent place of residence in the Estonian territory (as proved by
propiska) for at least two years before and one year after the application
date (residence census ‘two plus one’) and had to prove their knowl-
edge of the Estonian language. The earliest date for establishing the
permanent place of residence was set at 30 March 1990. The required
time period was counted only from that day onwards, so that 30 March
1993 was the earliest date when one could acquire Estonian nationality
by naturalisation. Thus, a large part of the population, especially Rus-
sians, did not have the right to vote or the right to run for office in the
parliamentary election of 20 September 1992 and were therefore ex-
cluded from political participation, giving rise to further tensions in a
Figure 1.1 Estonian citizens and stateless persons in Estonia, 1992-1 January 2008, per cent of
total population
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situation that was already strained. These tensions were somewhat
eased by the right of non-citizens to vote at the local elections after
1996.
After some changes in the 1992 Citizenship Act, a new Citizenship
Act was passed on 19 January 1995 and entered into force on 1 April
1995.4 The new Act integrated all regulations on nationality and intro-
duced some new conditions for naturalisation (residence in Estonia on
the basis of a permanent residence permit issued at least five years
prior to the date of written application for Estonian nationality and at
least one year after the registration of the written application; and a test
on the knowledge of the Estonian Constitution and the Citizenship
Act).
According to the initial version of the 1995 Citizenship Act, children
of stateless parents born in Estonia could not acquire Estonian nation-
ality after birth. This was in violation of the International Covenant of
Civil and Political Rights (art. 24(3)) and the Convention on the Rights
of the Child (art. 7(1)), both of which Estonia had ratified. These provi-
sions proclaim the right of the child to acquire a nationality. This con-
troversy triggered a heated discussion. Some politicians and lawmakers
saw the danger of compromising the governing principle of nationality
acquisition (ius sanguinis) by adding the ius soli principle to it.
After political and academic debates, in which the role of recommen-
dations issued by international actors should not be underestimated,
an amendment to the Citizenship Act was finally adopted in December
1998, which entered into force on 12 July 1999. Pursuant to this
amendment, children under the age of fifteen born on Estonian terri-
tory after 26 February 1992 can acquire the Estonian nationality on the
basis of a declaration if their parents are stateless and have been legal
residents of Estonia during the previous five years. This new regulation
did not include children between the ages of fifteen and eighteen who
are under the protection of art. 1 of the Convention on the Rights of
the Child and children born before 26 February 1992. Thiele (1999) ar-
gues that this domestic regulation was not fully in line with Estonia’s
international obligations.
Some changes in the legislation on nationality have made the natur-
alisation process easier for certain groups of applicants. For example,
in June 2002, the Estonian Parliament adopted amendments to the
Citizenship Act, which created special conditions for acquisition of
Estonian nationality through naturalisation by persons with severe or
moderate disabilities (such as a visual, hearing or speech impairment).
Disabled persons who have appropriate medical certificates are not ob-
liged to pass exams on knowledge of the language or of the Estonian
Constitution and the Citizenship Act. There are also other measures
being taken to facilitate naturalisation such as free-of-charge language
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courses since the beginning of 2009 (financed by the European Com-
mission) and recognition of Estonian language and civics exams taken
by students of Russian-language schools as valid for naturalisation.
1.2 Basic principles of the most important current modes of
acquisition and loss of nationality
The basic principles of Estonian nationality are stipulated in art. 8 of
the Constitution as follows: every child with at least one parent who is
an Estonian national shall have the right, by birth, to Estonian nation-
ality; any person who as a minor lost his or her Estonian nationality
shall have the right to have his or her nationality restored; no person
may be deprived of Estonian nationality acquired by birth; no person
may be deprived of Estonian nationality because of his or her beliefs.
As further specified by art. 8, the conditions and procedures for the ac-
quisition, loss and restoration of Estonian nationality shall be estab-
lished by the Citizenship Act. The basic constitutional principles of na-
tionality are reiterated in arts. 5(1), 16(1), 28(3) and 28(2) of the 1995
Citizenship Act respectively.
1.2.1 Acquisition of nationality
Acquisition of Estonian nationality is stipulated by Chapters 2 and 3
(arts. 5 through 15) of the 1995 Citizenship Act. This includes acquisi-
tion of nationality by birth, by naturalisation and for achievements of
special merit. Nationality by naturalisation and for achievements of
special merit shall be granted by a decision of the Estonian govern-
ment.
According to art. 5, nationality is acquired by birth if at least one of
the child’s parents holds Estonian nationality at the time of the child’s
birth. Nationality is also acquired by birth if the child is born after the
death of his or her father and if the father held Estonian nationality at
the time of his death. If a child of unknown parents is found in Esto-
nia, a court can declare that the child has acquired Estonian nationality
by birth upon application by the guardian of the child or a guardian-
ship authority, unless the child is proven to be a citizen of another
state. According to art. 5, nobody shall be deprived of Estonian nation-
ality acquired by birth.
Arts. 6 through 15 establish conditions for acquisition of Estonian
nationality by naturalisation and for achievements of special merit. The
conditions for acquisition of nationality by naturalisation differ depend-
ing on whether a person is at least fifteen years of age or under that
age.
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An alien5 who is at least fifteen years of age and wishes to acquire
Estonian nationality by naturalisation shall have stayed in Estonia on
the basis of a permanent residence permit for at least five years prior
to the date on which he or she submits an application for Estonian na-
tionality and for one year from the day following the date of registra-
tion of the application. Additionally, he or she must have knowledge of
the Estonian language and of the Constitution of the Republic of Esto-
nia and the Citizenship Act. In accordance with the requirements pro-
vided for in this Act, he or she must also have a permanent legal in-
come which ensures his or her own subsistence and that of his or her
dependants, be loyal to the Estonian state, and take the following oath:
‘In applying for Estonian citizenship, I swear to be loyal to the consti-
tutional order of Estonia.’
For a minor to acquire Estonian nationality by naturalisation, an ap-
plication by his or her parents, or by a single or adoptive parent of Es-
tonian nationality, accompanied by specific documents, is required.
After the amendments to the Citizenship Act, which entered into force
on 12 July 1999, a minor’s stateless parents and stateless single or
adoptive parent(s) also have the right to apply for nationality by natura-
lisation for a minor.
Estonian nationality can be acquired for achievements of special
merit to the Estonian state, which are defined as ‘achievements which
contribute to the international reputation of Estonia in the areas of cul-
ture or sports or in other areas’ (art. 10). Proposals for the granting of
nationality for achievements of special merit may be submitted by
members of the Estonian government. The government is required to
approve the granting of citizenship for achievements of special merit.
According to the amendment which entered into force in November
1995 (seven months after the Citizenship Act entered into force), Esto-
nian nationality for achievements of special merit may be granted to
not more than ten persons per year.
However, in some cases, naturalisation is ruled out. According to art.
21 of the 1995 Citizenship Act, Estonian nationality shall not be
granted to or resumed by a person who:
1. submits false information upon application for Estonian nationality;
2. does not observe the constitutional order and laws of Estonia;
3. has acted against the Estonian state and its security;
4. has committed a criminal offence for which a punishment of impri-
sonment of more than one year was imposed and whose criminal
record has not expired or who has been repeatedly punished under
criminal procedure for intentionally committed criminal offences;
5. has been employed or is currently employed by foreign intelligence
or security services;
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6. has served as a professional member of the armed forces of a for-
eign state or who has been assigned to the reserve forces thereof or
has retired there from, nor shall Estonian nationality be granted to
or resumed by the spouse of such a person.
Thus, art. 21(6) clearly targets those non-Estonians (together with their
spouses) who are not Estonian nationals by birth and who remained in
Estonia after they retired from the Soviet Army.6 However, the same
art. 21 also offers them one possibility of acquiring Estonian national-
ity. It stipulates that Estonian nationality may be resumed by, or
granted to, a person who has retired from the armed forces of a foreign
state if the person has been married for at least five years to a person
who acquired Estonian nationality by birth and if the marriage has not
been terminated by divorce.
1.2.2 Loss of nationality
Conditions and procedures for loss of Estonian nationality are stipu-
lated in Chapter 6 of the 1995 Citizenship Act (arts. 22 through 30).
According to these stipulations, a person shall cease to be an Estonian
national 1) through release from Estonian nationality; 2) through depri-
vation of Estonian nationality, and 3) upon acceptance of the citizen-
ship of another state.
A person who wishes to be released from Estonian nationality shall
submit an application, identification documents, a certificate which
proves that he or she has acquired the citizenship of another state or
will acquire the citizenship of another state in connection with his or
her release from Estonian nationality, and pay the state fee.7 According
to art. 26, release from Estonian nationality may be refused to a person
if: 1) the person would become stateless as a result; 2) he or she has
unfulfilled obligations towards the Estonian state; 3) he or she is in ac-
tive service in the Estonian Defence Forces. Decisions on release from
Estonian nationality shall be taken by the government.
According to art. 28, a person shall be deprived of Estonian nation-
ality by an order of the Estonian Government if he or she 1) as an Es-
tonian national, enters state public service or military service of a for-
eign state without permission from the Estonian Government; 2)
joins the intelligence or security service of a foreign state or foreign
organisation which is armed or militarily organised or which engages
in military exercises; 3) forcibly attempts to change the constitutional
order of Estonia; 4) upon the acquisition of Estonian nationality by
naturalisation or upon resumption of Estonian nationality submits
false information and thereby conceals facts which would have pre-
cluded the granting of Estonian nationality to him or her or which
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would have precluded him or her from resuming Estonian nationality;
5) is a citizen of another state but has not been released from Esto-
nian nationality. This latter provision makes it possible to deprive nat-
uralised dual citizens of their Estonian nationality if they have ac-
quired another nationality. Since Estonian law is in principle opposed
to dual nationality, such persons are obliged to apply for release from
their Estonian nationality.
Art. 28(3) establishes an important difference between nationals by
birth and by naturalisation. It stipulates that the reasons for depriva-
tion of nationality listed in art. 28 do not apply to persons who acquire
Estonian nationality by birth. It means that those who have acquired
nationality by naturalisation are vulnerable – they can be deprived of
their newly obtained nationality.
Art. 29 addresses the loss of Estonian nationality upon acceptance
of citizenship of another state or renunciation of Estonian nationality.
It stipulates that a person is deemed by the government agency
authorised by the Estonian Government to have ceased being an Esto-
nian citizen upon acceptance of the citizenship of another state or
upon renunciation of Estonian nationality in favour of the citizenship
of another state. Nevertheless, in light of these stipulations, it remains
unclear what happens if an Estonian national by birth does not de-
clare his or her wish to be released from Estonian nationality after he
or she has acquired, or is going to acquire another nationality. While
the 1995 Citizenship Act rules out multiple nationality (arts. 2 and 3)
the state has been quite tolerant in cases of the resumption of Esto-
nian nationality by emigrants under art. 16(1) which grants everyone
who loses Estonian nationality as a minor the right to resume Esto-
nian nationality. Several such Estonians holding multiple nationalities
have been members of the Estonian Government and elected to Par-
liament.
1.3 Current debates on nationality
1.3.1 The focus of the debate
From the very outset of Estonian nationality policy in 1992, the ap-
proaches of Estonians and Russian-speakers to the issue of nationality
have been almost diametrically opposed to each other. The approach
characteristic of the Estonians draws heavily on history and underlines
that the changes in the ethnic composition during the Soviet years,
when the share of Estonians fell from 90 per cent to almost 60 per
cent between 1940 and 1989, were dangerous for the survival of the
Estonian nation. Therefore, refusal to grant nationality to Soviet-era set-
tlers by registration was regarded by many Estonians as an adequate re-
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action to these changes in the population. The Estonian side also ar-
gues that in comparison with the citizenship laws of other countries
the Estonian requirements for nationality are quite liberal by current
international standards.
The opposite approach, taken by the Russian-speaking minorities
and by several international actors, maintains that history and nation
do not matter as much as the Estonians think they do. Rather, one
should start with the present multi-ethnic situation and think about in-
dividuals. As a characteristic example of this view, Helsinki Watch
pointed out that it ‘rejects the argument that all those who came to Es-
tonia after 1940 did so illegally and therefore were never citizens. Their
residency was legally established under the applicable law at the time
they entered the territory of Estonia. Those who settled in Estonia after
1940 must be treated as individuals, not as instruments of state policy,
however reprehensive that policy may have been’ (Helsinki Watch
1993: 14).
According to the proponents of this view, stateless people are a se-
curity risk, since the interests of these individuals are not properly re-
presented at the state level, and their behaviour can be unpredictable.
The underlying implication of this argument is usually that Estonia
should grant nationality more generously by further simplifying its
conditions for naturalisation, especially the language requirements.
Most of the ensuing debate has been about the political acceptability
of such simplifications, and in most cases the Estonian legislators have
rejected the proposals to that end. After more than fifteen years of de-
bates, the opposition between the two approaches has somewhat sof-
tened but is still far from having disappeared. As long as there remain
many tens of thousands of stateless persons, the debate will probably
continue.
1.3.2 International debate
Estonia was regularly encouraged by international actors to speed up
naturalisation to reduce the proportion of non-citizens in the popula-
tion, especially during the country’s accession to the European Union.
Estonia had to discuss its nationality issues with international partners
and to even make changes in its Citizenship Act to bring it into align-
ment with the country’s international obligations and to promote nat-
uralisation. Several international and regional organisations, foreign
embassies in Estonia, and international NGOs not only participated in
the debate but also provided necessary know-how and financial assis-
tance to their Estonian interlocutors. However, under the conditions
set by the 1995 Citizenship Act naturalisation slowed down for several
years. In 1997, international partners persuaded the Estonian authori-
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ties to launch a policy of integration for non-Estonians. A special gov-
ernment agency (Bureau of the Minister of Population Affairs8) and a
special foundation for the integration of non-Estonians9 were estab-
lished, which started to work out and to implement integration pro-
grammes and action plans to resolve the problem of statelessness.10
After several years of modest yields, the numbers of naturalised citi-
zens briefly surged after Estonia joined the EU in 2004. Estonia inter-
preted the admission to the EU as the ultimate international approval
of its nationality policies. The EU and other international actors vir-
tually stopped issuing recommendations on how Estonia should devel-
op its nationality policy. Only Russia has not dropped the problem of
statelessness in Estonia from its political agenda. It remains to be seen
to what degree Russia can internationalise this issue in its contacts
with the EU, in the framework of the OSCE and in the Council of Eur-
ope.
In the wake of Estonia’s admission to the EU, inputs from interna-
tional actors have ceased to inform the domestic debate on nationality
issues. Since then, this debate has been shaped more than ever before
by internal incentives.
1.3.3 Domestic debate
Estonian policy on nationality has remained conservative ever since in-
dependence, without major ‘home-made’ debates after the Citizenship
Act of 1992 was adopted. Instead, the mainstream political parties have
regularly declared prior to national elections that, regardless of the elec-
tion results, the Citizenship Act and the corresponding policies will not
be changed.
The Estonian political elite deemed that the initial non-inclusion of
Soviet-era settlers into the citizenry served the interests of the survival
of the Estonian ethnic nation and its culture. According to a statement
by a former Estonian minister, the ultimate hope for the future of the
non-Estonians was ‘that a third or so will become Estonian citizens, a
third may remain here with Russian citizenship, and at least a third
will leave’ (Lieven 1993: 377). By 2000, these hopes had only partially
materialised, mainly because the formation of a persistent contingent
of stateless residents had not been anticipated. The results of the popu-
lation censuses of 1989 and 2000 showed that 29 per cent of non-Es-
tonians from 1989 had become Estonian citizens by 2000 and 14 per
cent had obtained Russian citizenship, while the total number of non-
Estonians had decreased from 602,381 to 439,833, or by 27 per cent be-
tween the two censuses.11 In 2000, 173,539 non-Estonians, or 39 per
cent of their number in 2000, were Estonian citizens, 86,067 non-Es-
tonians, or 20 per cent, were Russian citizens and 170,349 non-Esto-
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nians, or 39 per cent, were stateless residents (Statistical Office of Esto-
nia 2001: 13-14). By the end of 2007, the number of stateless residents
had fallen to 116,248, which was 19 per cent of the number of non-Es-
tonians in 1989 and 26 per cent of their number in 2000.12
In 1995, minority members won six seats of the 101 in the Estonian
Parliament, for the first time since independence, as representatives of
the so-called Russian parties (minority parties). They organised a sepa-
rate faction which tried to initiate changes in the Citizenship Act in or-
der to make the acquisition of nationality easier for stateless Russian-
speakers. However, all those attempts were systematically aborted by
firm resistance from the Estonian majority in the Parliament. As a re-
sult, the minority parties were compromised in the eyes of Russian-
speaking voters and during the 2002 national elections these parties
were unable to surpass the 5 per cent threshold to get into the Parlia-
ment. In 2002, nine and in 2007 eight candidates of minority origin
were elected to the Estonian Parliament on the lists of the so-called Es-
tonian parties, which have started to compete among themselves for
the votes of naturalised non-Estonians. As members of mainstream
parties, minority MPs hope to be more successful than before in de-
fending the interests of non-Estonians, by promoting naturalisation,
minority education and the public use of minority languages.
1.3.4 Changes in public opinion
Many Estonians, influenced by history, came to perceive Russia and
Russians as threats. Surveys of public opinion and sociological research
of the early 1990s showed that Estonians tended to support the official
nationality policies which sought to control the participation of Rus-
sians in Estonian politics with the help of the Citizenship Act. Approxi-
mately one fifth of Estonians thought that the official policies, includ-
ing the language requirements for obtaining nationality were not harsh
enough. In 2000, 46 per cent of Estonians believed that Estonia would
benefit if non-Estonians left the country (Kruusvall 2001).
The majority of Russian-speakers in Estonia have considered the of-
ficial policies on nationality, let alone the more radical views reflected
in various media outlets, internet chat-rooms and elsewhere, as unfair
and discriminatory. Nevertheless, the data from integration monitoring
in 2000 showed that non-Estonians were predominantly oriented to-
wards acquiring Estonian nationality: it was desired by 80 per cent of
the family members of Estonian citizens who were without nationality,
by 62 per cent of the family members of non-citizens, and by 61 per
cent of the family members of Russian citizens. Estonian nationality
was desired in the first place for children, but also for spouses and par-
ents. At the same time, 12 per cent of the family members of non-citi-
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zens did not want citizenship, and 16 per cent had not made up their
minds. It might well be that a certain number of non-citizens had re-
signed themselves to their status and did not see any particular reason
(or possibility) to change it (Hallik 2001).
While the official Estonian view on nationality has remained basi-
cally the same since 1992, the public opinion of Estonians has changed
due to an increase in overall tolerance and the proliferation of related
values. Most remarkably, the integration monitoring of 2005 showed
that already as much as 54 per cent of Estonians have agreed to grant
nationality to Russians born in Estonia on simplified terms. Only about
one third of Estonians held this view in 2000 (37 per cent in 2002).13
Thus, by 2005, the majority of Estonians no longer perceived the Rus-
sians as a grave threat. Moreover, ordinary Estonians were more toler-
ant with regard to nationality issues than official policies. These
changes in public opinion might have facilitated new policy initiatives
to overcome the problem of statelessness. However, in 2007, the situa-
tion took a different turn.
On 27 April 2007, just two weeks before the Russians traditionally
celebrate the anniversary of the defeat of Nazi Germany, the Estonian
government clumsily relocated a Soviet-era war memorial from the
centre of Tallinn, provoking street riots by mostly Russian-speaking
youths who felt insulted. Approximately 1,200 people were arrested,
while many were injured and one Russian citizen was stabbed to
death. Attitudes of the Estonians and the Russian speakers towards
each other hardened and various integration efforts seemed to be se-
verely compromised. The riots and their aftermath, such as the siege
of the Estonian Embassy in Moscow by a youth organisation, drew
broad international attention.
In March 2008, the Russian Embassy in Tallinn reported a doubling
in the number of applicants for Russian citizenship between August
2007 and March 2008 compared with the same periods in 2006 and
2007. According to embassy officials, many applicants noted that they
had ‘lost confidence in Estonian democracy’. The applicants were also
motivated by the opportunities of visa-free travel and of finding jobs in
both the Schengen area and Russia.14 This change in non-Estonians’
attitudes had already been detected by a July 2007 Estonian survey,
which showed that after the relocation of the war memorial, the trust
that non-Estonians had in Estonian state institutions had fallen to 24
per cent (among non-Estonian youths to 11 per cent; while among Esto-
nians it remained as high as 62 per cent). This is in sharp contrast
with figures from 2005, when trust in Estonian institutions among
non-Estonians was similar to that of Estonians (Heidmets 2008: 59).
Given these changes, the numbers of stateless residents in Estonia
may continue to decline, as it is predicted, but it is hard to see how in-
ESTONIAN CITIZENSHIP 57
creasing numbers opting for Russian nationality can be perceived as in
Estonia’s best interests, particularly in light of the August 2008 armed
conflict in Georgia.
1.4 Statistics on acquisition of nationality since 1992
Estonian statistics on acquisition of nationality date from after the 1992
Citizenship Act was adopted. The introduction of this Act granted Esto-
nian nationality by registration to 68 per cent of the population who, or
whose predecessors, were Estonian nationals before 17 June 1940. The
rest of the population (32 per cent) who, or whose predecessors, were
not Estonian nationals before that date, were given the status of aliens.
Over 95 per cent of those aliens were not of Estonian descent.
In 1993, after several reorganisations at governmental level, the Esto-
nian Citizenship and Migration Board (CMB) was established.15 The
CMB is a government agency acting within the administrative area of
the Ministry of Internal Affairs and its main tasks include: determin-
ing the status of persons living in Estonia either as Estonian citizens or
as aliens and issuing identity documents to the residents of Estonia, as
well as receiving and processing applications for acquiring and restor-
ing Estonian nationality, as well as for exemptions from Estonian na-
tionality, and preparing the respective material for the government of
the Republic to decide on these applications (CMB 2003: 4).
Currently, the CMB provides the most reliable statistics on national-
ity and naturalisation in Estonia. According to these data, between
1992 and 2005 as many as 138,246 persons acquired Estonian nation-
ality via naturalisation (CMB 2006: 19).16 Two special categories of ap-
plicants account for more than one-third of that number. Between
1992 and 1995, a simplified fast-track procedure for naturalisation
without a language exam was available for those aliens (Soviet-era set-
tlers) who had participated in the elections of the Estonian Citizens’
Congress in 1990 and had registered as applicants for nationality prior
to March 1990 (of those, 24,102 were naturalised), as well as for Esto-
nians living outside Estonia, of whom 25,293 used this simplified pro-
cedure (CMB 2006: 20).
Besides those two special categories, the CMB has provided statistics
on the following categories of persons naturalised between 1992 and
2005:
1. those who acquired Estonian nationality based on general condi-
tions, i.e. who passed all of the exams (58,016 persons);
2. minors under fifteen years of age (29,461);
3. those without active legal capacity and the disabled (648);
4. those granted nationality for achievements of special merit (726).
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Moreover, 2,679 persons lost their Estonian nationality, while the gov-
ernment also refused to grant nationality to 605 applicants during this
same period (CMB 2006: 20).
The process of naturalisation has not been a homogeneous flow of
applications and their approval. After the Citizenship Act of 1992, the
tempo of naturalisation was much higher than in the wake of the 1995
Citizenship Act, which changed the conditions of naturalisation by
making the language exam more rigorous and by adding an exam on
the Constitution and the Citizenship Act which also had to be taken in
the Estonian language. Thus, between 1992 and 1996, as many as
87,712 persons naturalised under the conditions set by the first Citizen-
ship Act, or 60 per cent of all persons who have naturalised between
1992 and 2007 (see Figure 1.2). In 1996, 16,740 persons passed the ci-
tizenship language exam, which followed the old rules and require-
ments. In 1997, only 2,099 persons passed an upgraded language
exam (UNDP 1999: 42).
However, in spite of the complications related to naturalisation, such
as language exams which are considered difficult by the applicants,
and the growing share of non-Estonians among the citizens, who are
eyed with suspicion by ethnic conservatives, no political force in Esto-
nia has proposed stopping the process. As a result, in November 2005,
the overall number of naturalised persons (137,199) finally surpassed
the number of stateless persons (136,533).17
Figure 1.2 Naturalisation in Estonia, 1992-2007, persons naturalised per year in thousands
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1.5 Conclusions
The current naturalisation process in Estonia is a politically sensitive
and cautious inclusion of non-citizens in which international ‘suppor-
tive pressure’ has played an important role. Naturalisation has brought
new members to Estonian citizenry, made it ethnically more diverse
and moved the country closer to full democratic participation. It is esti-
mated that about 20 per cent of all Estonian nationals are non-Esto-
nians. More than half of them acquired nationality after 1992 through
naturalisation. However, 116,000 permanent residents of Estonia still
had no nationality by the end of 2007. This means that sustained prac-
tical efforts to promote integration and naturalisation are still needed
in Estonian society for years to come. Both non-Estonians and Esto-
nians should be targeted in order to promote better mutual under-
standing and cultural accommodation. Further attempts at prudent sta-
tesmanship are required to reduce the negative effects of the events of
April 2007 and to restore the image of Estonian nationality in the Rus-
sian-speaking community.
Steps should also be taken in developing legal instruments and stan-
dards concerning nationality and statelessness. While Estonia has
signed and ratified the majority of international instruments aimed at
combating racial and ethnic discrimination,18 it has so far failed to sign
and ratify a number of international treaties dealing with issues of na-
tionality and statelessness such as the UN Convention of the Status of
Stateless Persons (1954); the UN Convention on the Nationality of Mar-
ried Women (1957); the UN Convention on the Reduction of Stateless-
ness (1961); the Convention of the International Commission of Civil
Status to Reduce the Number of Cases of Statelessness (1973); and the
European Convention on Nationality (1997).
One is inclined to hope that membership in the EU and the prolif-
eration of democratic values will motivate Estonia to sign and ratify
more international treaties in the near future to help overcome state-
lessness and promote the political participation of minorities through
citizenship.
Chronological list of citizenship-related legislation in Estonia
Date Document Content Source
1992 Constitution of Estonia www.legislationline.org;
www.legaltext.ee
(in Estonian)
1992 Citizenship Act www.legaltext.ee
(in Estonian)
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Date Document Content Source
1993 Aliens Act (consolidated in
2003)
Regulates the entry of
aliens into Estonia, their
stay, residence and
employment in Estonia
and the bases for legal
liability of aliens
www.legislationline.org;
www.legaltext.ee
(in Estonian)
1995 Citizenship Act (adopted
19 January 1995, entered
into force 1 April 1995)
Replaces the Citizenship
Act of 1992; does not
change the basic principles
of acquisition and loss of
nationality but establishes
more demanding
requirements for the
acquisition of nationality
by naturalisation
www.legislationline.org;
www.legaltext.ee
(in Estonian)
1995 Citizenship Act
Amendment Act of 18
October 1995 (entered into
force 20 November 1995)
Establishes that
citizenship for
achievements of special
merit may be granted to no
more than ten persons per
year
www.legislationline.org;
www.legaltext.ee
(in Estonian)
1995 Language Act Establishes the Estonian
language as the only
official language of
Estonia; regulates the
requirements for
proficiency in the Estonian
language and the use of
Estonian and foreign
languages in Estonia
www.coe.int;
www.legaltext.ee
(in Estonian)
1997 Aliens Act Amendment Act Establishes new conditions
for issuing permanent
residence permits (at least
three years residence
within the last five years on
the basis of a temporary
residence permit)
www.legislationline.org;
www.legaltext.ee
(in Estonian)
1998 Citizenship Act
Amendment Act of 8
December 1998 (entered
into force 12 July 1999)
Provides for acquisition of
citizenship for children of
stateless single or adoptive
parents; introduces
deprivation of citizenship
in case of submission of
false information in the
process of application and
loss of citizenship upon
acceptance of the
citizenship of another state
ww.legislationline.org;
www.legaltext.ee
(in Estonian)
1999 Identity Documents Act Establishes an identity
document requirement
and regulates the issue of
www.legislationline.org;
www.legaltext.ee
(in Estonian)
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Date Document Content Source
identity documents to
Estonian citizens and
aliens by the Republic of
Estonia
2000 Citizenship Act
Amendment Act of 14 June
2000 (entered into force
10 July 2000)
Amends the requirements
for naturalisation for a
person with a severe,
profound or moderate
disability
www.legislationline.org;
www.legaltext.ee
(in Estonian)
2001 Penal Code Article 174 Establishes penalties for
the alteration of a child’s
descent by substituting a
child with a child of
another person for
personal gain, or if causing
alteration of the child’s
citizenship
www.legislationline.org;
www.legaltext.ee
(in Estonian)
2001 Citizenship Act
Amendment Act of 14
November 2001 (entered
into force 1 February 2002)
Revises the wording of
some articles as a result of
changes in other civil laws
www.legislationline.org;
www.legaltext.ee
(in Estonian)
2002 Citizenship Act
Amendment Act of 5 June
2002 (entered into force 1
July 2002)
Specifies rules for the
naturalisation of children
whose parents are dead,
missing or have restricted
active legal capacity or
whose parents are
deprived of their parental
rights
www.legislationline.org;
www.legaltext.ee
(in Estonian)
2002 Citizenship Act
Amendment Act of 19 June
2002 (entered into force 1
August 2002)
Rules that the government
of the Republic shall
substantiate the granting
of citizenship for
achievements of special
merit (but not the refusal
to grant citizenship on
these grounds); regulates
the fees for the acquisition
of citizenship by
naturalisation, for
resumption of and for
release from citizenship
www.legislationline.org;
www.legaltext.ee
(in Estonian)
2002 Citizenship Act
Amendment Act of 15
October 2002 (entered
into force 10 November
2002)
Regulates the
naturalisation of persons
with a severe, profound or
moderate disability
www.legislationline.org;
www.legaltext.ee
(in Estonian)
2003 Citizenship Act
Amendment Act of 29
January 2003 (entered into
force 1 March 2003)
Regulates the procedures
for acquisition of
citizenship for adopted
children
www.legislationline.org;
www.legaltext.ee
(in Estonian)
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Date Document Content Source
2003 Citizenship Act
Amendment Act of 10
December 2003 (entered
into force 1 January 2004)
Establishes the procedures
for reimbursement of
language training expenses
to persons who passed the
citizenship exams
www.legislationline.org;
www.legaltext.ee
(in Estonian)
2004 Citizenship Act
Amendment Act of 11
February 2004 (entered
into force 20 March 2004)
Specifies residence periods
required for naturalisation
(five years on the basis of a
permanent residence
permit prior to application
and six months from the
day following the date of
registration of the
application); establishes
time limits and obligations
for the applicants and
authorities in processing
applications
www.legislationline.org;
www.legaltext.ee
(in Estonian)
2004 Citizenship Act
Amendment Act of 23
November 2004 (entered
into force on 1 April 2005)
Specifies conditions for
disabled applicants at the
naturalisation exams
www.legislationline.org;
www.legaltext.ee
(in Estonian)
2005 Citizenship Act
Amendment Act of 19
October 2005 (entered
into force on 1 January
2006)
Simplifies the definition of
legal income
www.legislationline.org;
www.legaltext.ee
(in Estonian)
2006 Citizenship Act
Amendment Act of 15 June
2006 (enacted 8 July 2006)
Shortens the waiting time
after the registration of
citizenship application
from one year to six
months; allows, as an
exception, acquisition and
restoration of citizenship
by a person who has been
repeatedly punished under
criminal procedure for
intentionally committed
criminal offences
www.legaltext.ee
(in Estonian)
Notes
1 Although the 1977 Constitution of the Estonian SSR used the term ‘citizens of the
Estonian SSR’, it was merely a synonym for the mandatory Soviet registration of
domicile (in Russian: propiska).
2 In this chapter the terms ‘Estonian’, ‘Russian’, etc. designate ethnicity. The term
‘non-Estonians’ refers to all individuals whose ethnic origin is different from that of
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Estonians. The term ‘Russian-speakers’ stands for those non-Estonians whose
mother tongue, or predominantly used language, is Russian.
3 This subsection draws on Thiele (1999: 14-16).
4 An English translation is available at www.legislationline.org.
5 Estonian law uses the term ‘alien’ rather than ‘foreign national’ to categorise a person
who is not an Estonian citizen (Aliens Act of 1993, art. 8). The category of ‘aliens’
also applies to stateless persons who form a large group among Estonia’s non-
citizens. The Estonian identification document issued to a stateless person is called
an ‘Alien’s passport’ which many stateless persons who were born in the country
consider as inappropriate, if not insulting. In Estonian political discourse the
stateless persons are characterised differently from the legal jargon as individuals
‘who have undetermined citizenship’ which gives the whole issue a slightly more
positive twist.
6 According to some estimates, this group, which the authorities consider to be a
threat to state security, is comprised of approximately 30,000 persons (including
family members). Their pensions and health insurances are paid by the Russian
Federation. Many of them are also citizens of the Russian Federation. Until 2006,
before the new EU regulations were enacted, Estonia provided Soviet Army retirees
with temporary residence permits. Now, they enjoy the right to permanent residence
permits as nationals of third states who have legally resided in an EU Member State
for five years or more. Paradoxically, after Estonia was fully integrated into the
Schengen area in 2008, those permanent residents who hold a Russian passport can
travel without a visa from the Pacific Ocean to the Atlantic Ocean, while Estonian
citizens still need a visa to travel to Russia.
7 In May 2008, the state fee for naturalisation as well as for release from Estonian
nationality was 200 Estonian kroons (13 euros), while the minimum monthly salary
was 3,600 Estonian kroons (230 euros). Applicants do not usually consider this fee
to be a significant obstacle.
8 See www.rahvastikuminister.ee.
9 See www.meis.ee (Non-Estonians’ Integration Foundation).
10 In 2000, the government of Estonia adopted the state programme ‘Integration in
Estonian Society 2000-2007’; in April 2008, the government adopted the second
state programme of integration for 2008-2013 (see www.rahvastikuminister.ee).
11 After 1991, depopulation became a firm trend in Estonia. The censuses of 1989 and
2000 show that while all minority groups diminished in size, only the Ukrainians,
Byelorussians, Tatars, Jews and Germans lost more than one third of their
population. At the same time, the most numerous group – the Russians in Estonia –
had decreased from 475 to 351 thousand, or only by one fourth. All in all, the
absolute number of non-Estonians went down 27 per cent between the two censuses
while the absolute number of Estonians decreased by only 12 per cent. As a result,
the share of Estonians in the total population went up 6.4 percentage points from
61.5 to 67.9. According to the census of 2000, the total population of Estonia was
1,370,052 (in 1989: 1,565,622) (Statistical Office of Estonia 2001: 14).
12 See www.rahvastikuminister.ee.
13 See the results of Integration Monitoring 2000, 2002, and 2005 at www.meis.ee.
14 See ‘Huvi vene kodakondsuse vastu on kasvanud [Interest in Russian citizenship has
grown]’, www.delfi.ee, 23 March 2008; Madis Taras, ‘Vene kodakondsust taotletakse
varasemast aktiivsemalt [People apply for Russian citizenship more actively than
before]’, Eesti Pa¨evaleht [Estonian Daily], 24 March 2008. www.epl.ee.
15 Estonians, worried by growing immigration, had already started introducing
measures during the pre-Gorbachev era to bring this process under control. Thus, in
the early 1980s, the municipality of Tallinn, the capital of Estonia, started to limit the
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number of workers that industries and other enterprises were allowed to bring into
Estonia, charging them considerable fees for every worker who eventually settled in
Tallinn. It is interesting that the legality of these improvised methods was not
challenged by Moscow, possibly because the growing inter-ethnic tensions had
already sparked public unrest among the youth in Tallinn in the autumn of 1980.
However, a more systemic foundation for the immigration policy was laid in 1990,
when the Supreme Council of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic (Estonian SSR)
established the National Migration Board of the Estonian SSR, the predecessor of the
CMB. This agency’s task was to carry out state control of migration and issue
residence and work permits. For that purpose the Supreme Council adopted the
‘Immigration Law of the Estonian SSR’, which entered into force on 1 July 1990.
This law established the requirement that any alien who wanted to settle in Estonia
must apply for a residence permit. The first permits were issued in January 1991.
16 Between 1992 and 31.12.2007, 147,228 persons were naturalised in Estonia
according to updates available at www.rahvastikuminister.ee.
17 Source: www.rahvastikuminister.ee.
18 These documents include the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (entry into force in Estonia 19 January 1992), the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (20 November
1991), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (21
January 1992), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (21 January
1992), the Optional Protocol to the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (21
January 1992), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women (20 November 1991), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (20
November 1991), the Framework Convention for the Protection of National
Minorities (1 February 1998).
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2 Checks and balances in Latvian
nationality policies: National agendas and
international frameworks1
Kristı¯ne Kru¯ma
Latvia, upon the restoration of its independence in 1991, strictly fol-
lowed the principle of state continuity. This has also been reflected in
nationality policies which followed the ex iniuria ius non oritur princi-
ple. However, Latvia had to take the framework of international law
that existed when independence was restored into account and had to
deal with a large number of Soviet-era settlers. This led to the creation
of a specific category of persons in international law, namely so-called
non-citizens, which has become the main issue of international debates
on Latvian nationality policies.
2.1 History of nationality policy
2.1.1 Nationality policy prior to regaining independence
An important step in the process of consolidating the new statehood
proclaimed on 18 November 1918 was the adoption of the Law on Citi-
zenship in 1919. This Law was not repealed after the occupation of Lat-
via by the Soviet Union in 1940. At the same time, Latvian nationals
became nationals of the USSR by way of automatic imposition of the
latter’s nationality.
There were different views regarding the status of Baltic nationals
after the Second World War. In some of the lawsuits initiated by Baltic
nationals concerning their nationality they were still considered Baltic
nationals by the courts of other states. The varying treatment of Baltic
nationals by other states prevailed until 1991 when the Baltic states re-
gained their independence.
Upon the restoration of independence in 1990 the decision-makers
were faced with the dilemma of the two main options available regard-
ing nationality. Under the first option it was argued that the original
state had disintegrated or disappeared and that a new state had been
founded. The newly-founded state could therefore determine its na-
tionals on the basis of its territory – a ‘zero option’. As far as this op-
tion is concerned, one may add, however, that the codification efforts
of the International Law Commission at the United Nations concern-
ing the nationality of persons in situations of state succession showed
that awarding nationality to all residents by successor states that
emerged from the dissolution of a predecessor state is by no means an
automatic or established rule of international law.2 It would have been
a preferred solution, especially in view of the existing obligation not to
create statelessness, but state practices continue to vary.
The second option emanated from the concept of state continuity,
which implies the continuity of the nationality of the state in question
(Thiele 1999: 12).3 When adopting nationality legislation Latvia was
guided by the principle of the continuity of the state and the humani-
tarian principles prohibiting the imposition of the nationality of the oc-
cupying country upon nationals of the occupied country. It was argued
that automatic conferral of USSR nationality on the population of the
Baltic states as a consequence of their occupation in 1940 was unlaw-
ful under international law as long as the Baltic states were presumed
to exist (Kalvaitis 1998: 231; Ziemele 2001: 233).4 Therefore, Latvian
nationals recovered de facto rights and obligations deriving from their
Latvian nationality but those USSR nationals who arrived in Latvia as a
result of its foreign occupation were made subject to the naturalisation
procedure according to relevant legal provisions.
2.1.2 Restoration of nationality
During this period, the political institutions of the Soviet era were still
in place. However, their freedom to act was significantly restricted.
Since Latvia was guided by the principle of state continuity it had to re-
store not only nationality but also its pre-1940 institutions, including
its parliament. The post-Soviet institutions acting during this period
had a limited capacity. Their authority was only to preserve continuity
until the fifth legitimately elected Parliament started functioning.
According to the state continuity thesis, the aggregate body of Lat-
vian nationals was re-established in accordance with the 1919 Law on
Citizenship, as amended in 1927. It was again considered applicable
with the adoption of the 15 October 1991 Resolution on the Renewal of
the Republic of Latvia’s Citizens’ Rights and Fundamental Principles of
Naturalisation by the Supreme Council. The presumption was that Lat-
vian nationality had continued to exist, irrespective of the loss of inde-
pendence in 1940. The Decree on the Order in which the Citizens of
the Soviet Socialist Republics Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia are Granted
USSR Citizenship (1940) on the basis of which Soviet nationality was
imposed on Latvian nationals was declared null and void ab initio.
According to the Resolution, the following groups of individuals were
recognised as nationals: (1) those who were Latvian nationals on 17 June
1940 and their descendants, if they had lived in the country and had re-
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gistered by 1 July 1992; (2) persons who were Latvian nationals on 17
June 1940 and their descendants if they did not reside in Latvia or were
nationals of another state and had submitted an expatriation permit; (3)
persons born and residing in Latvia if their parents were unknown.
The process of naturalisation was also made easy for those living in
Latvia on 17 June 1940 without Latvian nationality. This approach was
based on the premise that if Latvia had not been occupied, these per-
sons could have acquired nationality (Ziemele 1998: 208).
It was considered that only the nationals proper, as defined by the
1919 Law, could legitimately restore the political system of Latvia and
thus take part in the elections for the Fifth Parliament in 1993. Others
who did not qualify for nationality could apply for naturalisation under
the 1919 Law and the Resolution. Since the requirements for naturali-
sation were high, including inter alia sixteen years of residence, natura-
lisation based on the Resolution never occurred (Ziemele 1998: 208;
Kalvaitis 1998: 255).
2.1.3 Basis for current nationality policy
During the parliamentary election campaign in 1993, nationality was
the most important issue. Proposals ranged from repatriation of all
Soviet-era settlers to a zero option. The elected Parliament in a way re-
presented the opinion of Latvian nationals as to how the state should
proceed in this matter. Initial proposals were very strict. According to
the first model adopted by Parliament, the first applications for
naturalisation would have been accepted in 2000 and then only at a
rate of 0.1 per cent of the previous year’s total number of nationals.
This would have resulted in approximately a thousand new nationals
annually. This draft was heavily criticised by Western democracies and
by international organisations. As a result, the President of Latvia re-
fused to sign the adopted law. Complex nationality issues became even
the reason for postponing Latvian membership of the Council of
Europe.
The new Law on Citizenship was adopted only on 22 July 1994. Ac-
cording to art. 2, as amended in 1995,5 nationals of Latvia are: (1) those
who were nationals on the date of occupation and their descendants,
unless they had acquired the nationality of another state after Latvia
proclaimed its independence on 4 May 1990; (2) Latvians and Livs6
who reside permanently in Latvia, do not hold the nationality of an-
other state or have received an expatriation permit; (3) women who re-
side permanently in Latvia and had lost their nationality according to
the Law on Citizenship of 1919 as well as their descendants unless they
had acquired the nationality of another state after 4 May 1990; (4) nat-
uralised persons; (5) children who are found in the territory of Latvia
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whose parents are unknown; (6) orphans living in an orphanage or a
boarding school in Latvia; (7) children born of parents both of whom
were nationals of Latvia at the time of such birth, irrespective of the
place of birth of the children; (8) those who permanently reside in Lat-
via and are duly registered and who have completed a full educational
course in general education schools in which Latvian was the language
of instruction, or in mixed language schools, if they are not nationals
of another state or have received an expatriation permit. As argued by
Ineta Ziemele, the latter category broadens the scope of Latvian na-
tionals in that it includes those former USSR nationals who may have
integrated into Latvian society, irrespective of their place of birth (Zie-
mele 2001: 235). The right of a child to acquire Latvian nationality was
ensured by providing that, if at least one parent is a Latvian citizen, the
child will acquire Latvian nationality, subject to mutual agreement by
the parents.
Those who did not belong to the abovementioned groups had to nat-
uralise according to the procedures established by law and the regula-
tions of the Cabinet of Ministers.7 Although naturalisation require-
ments were made easier, they were still exclusionary. The law provided
for gradual naturalisation, the so-called ‘window-system’, thus limiting
the rights of individuals to freely choose the timing for naturalisation.
It provided that persons will be naturalised in stages starting in 1996
and ending in 2003 (Kalvaitis 1998: 231). After 2003, anyone would
have the right to apply.8 This approach was adopted because it was ex-
pected that considerable numbers of non-citizens would apply for Lat-
vian nationality and civil servants would therefore be unable to ensure
proper application of the law. However, the number of applications
turned out to be much lower than expected. The reasons for the low in-
terest were only analysed after the law was adopted. The main reasons
identified were (1) lack of knowledge of the Latvian language; (2) un-
willingness to enter into obligatory military service; (3) the easier re-
quirements for obtaining a Russian visa for non-citizens; (4) the num-
ber of rights already granted; (5) political mistrust and disappointment
at not having been granted nationality automatically and (6) an identity
crisis after the collapse of the USSR.
2.1.4 Recent developments of nationality policy
There were many assessments on the compliance of Latvia’s laws with
applicable international standards in the area of nationality. These were
accompanied by numerous recommendations, in particular concerning
facilitation of access to nationality for Soviet-era settlers. In view of the
constant pressure of the UN Commission on Human Rights, the
Council of Europe, the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minori-
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ties and most notably the European Union,9 Latvia amended its Citi-
zenship Law in 1998 (Tomasˇevski 2000: 340). The amendments were
confirmed in a referendum and became effective in November 1998.10
These amendments abolished the ‘window-system’ and provided na-
tionality for children born in Latvia after 21 August 1991 to stateless
persons or non-citizens. In accordance with art. 3 of the Citizenship
Law, the parents of the child were required to submit an application
for the acquisition of nationality before the child reached the age of fif-
teen.11 In addition to these amendments, the naturalisation procedure
was simplified, i.e. several groups of individuals were identified for ex-
emption from the naturalisation process or who did not have to pass
the naturalisation exams. Thus, for instance, applicants over the age of
65 were exempted from the history test.12
Western countries and international organisations provided consider-
able assistance to Latvia with the objective of overcoming the main bar-
riers which kept the numbers of applications for nationality low. Spe-
cial attention was paid to language training. About 50 different sets of
learning and informational material were published and 45 projects to
facilitate naturalisation were initiated, an information centre was estab-
lished and a number of campaigns were organised.
Notwithstanding the amendments and campaigning, the numbers of
non-citizens are still quite high. By July 2008, there were about
365,164 non-citizens in Latvia (in 1995, the number was 735,000).
However, in the period between the start of the naturalisation process
in 1995 and 30 April 2008, only 128,825 persons were granted Latvian
citizenship, including 13,639 minors (the rest were either repatriated
or acquired Russian nationality while remaining residents of Latvia).
Various attempts to speed up the naturalisation of non-citizens have
had limited success. Within the last ten years the number of non-citi-
zens has not decreased very much.13 The reasons for the lack of inter-
est are changing however. For instance knowledge of the language and
military service are no longer mentioned in public opinion polls as im-
portant barriers to naturalisation. The Naturalisation Board expects that
naturalisation could be completed in five years but there will still be
about 130,000 persons who will choose to remain non-citizens for the
rest of their lives. However, this projection seems to be overly optimis-
tic, as the naturalisation process has almost come to a halt.
2.1.5 The status of non-citizens
When Latvia regained its independence in 1991 it inherited large Rus-
sian-speaking communities who had arrived there from the ex-USSR.
The Soviet central authorities had encouraged large-scale immigration
of the labour force, to meet the local demands of Soviet industrialisa-
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tion and ethnic politics. Consequently, the collapse of the Soviet Union
affected mostly the Russian people and other Eastern Slav groups such
as Byelorussians and Ukrainians (Berg & van Meurs 2001: 139). The
historical minorities of Slav origin living in the Baltic states before the
Soviet invasion were treated differently.
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the ensuing independence of
Latvia created problems for persons living in Latvia who suddenly rea-
lised that they were nationals of a state that no longer existed. Various
international organisations were criticising Latvia for having too many
inhabitants without nationality. This was due to the fact that former
USSR nationals were not automatically granted Latvian nationality, nor
did they apply for Russian nationality or the nationality of another
state. Western European countries and international organisations con-
sidered that a large number of persons without any factual nationality
could constitute a risk for internal stability and could provoke ethnic
conflicts. They could not be extradited as settlers from an occupying
state because this would be contrary to human rights law which prohi-
bits the expulsion of aliens en masse. Nor could these persons be classi-
fied as stateless because that would be against the principle on the re-
duction of statelessness.
Under the circumstances, a special status of non-citizen was intro-
duced. Non-citizens are those who were USSR nationals but who, after
1991, did not qualify for Latvian nationality and did not acquire Rus-
sian or any other nationality. The Former USSR Citizens Act in art. 1
states:
The persons governed by this Act – ‘non-citizens’ – shall be
those nationals of the former USSR, and their children, who are
resident in Latvia […] and who satisfy all of the following criter-
ia:
1. on 1 July 1992 they were registered as being resident within
the territory of Latvia, regardless of the status of their resi-
dence; or their last registered place of residence by 1 July
1992 was in the Republic of Latvia; or a court has established
that before the abovementioned date they had been resident
within the territory of Latvia for not less than ten years;
2. they do not hold Latvian nationality;
3. they are not and have not been nationals of any other state.
This provision recognises non-citizens as a special category whose legal
status in some areas provides them with more rights and guarantees
than, for example, proper permanent residents, however non-citizens
are not yet nationals of Latvia.
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Special rights given to non-citizens of Latvia can be summarised as
follows. Non-citizens are given a special passport. The passport not
only grants them the special status of belonging to the state, thus giv-
ing them the constitutional right to return, but it has also been recog-
nised by the EU as valid for visa-free travel (Regulation 1932/2006/
EC). Moreover, Russia has decided to provide holders of the non-citizen
passport with visa-free travel to Russia (see sect. 2.3 below). In accor-
dance with art. 2 of the Former USSR Citizens Act, non-citizens of Lat-
via cannot be deported, which is not the case with third-country na-
tionals. When ratifying international conventions, Latvia as a rule sub-
mits a declaration requesting the equal treatment of citizens and non-
citizens. For instance, upon ratification of the European Convention on
Extradition and its Protocols in 1997, Latvia stated that it shall apply to
both citizens and non-citizens. Non-citizens enjoy human rights
granted to nationals and this has been submitted by Latvia and ac-
cepted by a number of international treaty monitoring bodies. More-
over, in accordance with art. 2 of the Law on Diplomatic and Consular
Service, they enjoy diplomatic protection of Latvia.
Latvia does not allow non-citizens the right to be elected at national
and municipal levels or to hold public office. Moreover, non-citizens in
Latvia are restricted from practising certain professions like those of:
judge, court bailiff, notary, prosecutor, policeman, state security officer,
land surveyor, fireman, national guard, captain of a crew, private detec-
tive, attorney, or employee in diplomatic and consular service. There
are also restrictions on possessing land and repatriation. Although, un-
like immigrants in the EU, non-citizens are not nationals of any other
state, they are treated as long-term resident third-country nationals in
the EU framework in accordance with the provisions of Directive
2003/109/EC.14 This approach has been criticised by experts15 and
raises questions about the extent that Latvia can live up to its interna-
tional human rights obligations, i.e. especially those that fall under the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Up to now there have been several attempts to classify non-citizens
under a heading recognised by international law.16 Since Latvia’s acces-
sion to the European Union there has been little or no pressure from
international organisations regarding Latvia’s citizenship policy and the
issue of its non-citizens. Moreover, Latvian courts have recently given
an authoritative interpretation of the status of non-citizens, the most
important of which is the ruling of the Constitutional Court.17
The Constitutional Court had to review the amendments made to
the Former USSR Citizens Act which provided for the revocation of
the status of non-citizen for persons who acquired the status of perma-
nent residence in another country after 1 June 2004. Before these
amendments were instituted, the status could only be renounced on
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condition that a nationality had been acquired. The Court regarded the
amendments as unconstitutional. It started analysing the adoption of
the Former USSR Citizens Act in historical and political context and
concluded that the opinion that Latvia had a duty to grant nationality
automatically to those individuals and their descendants who have
never been Latvian nationals and arrived during occupation is un-
founded (para. 13). The Court acknowledged that the introduction of
the status of non-citizen was a complicated political compromise as a
result of which a category unknown in international law was created.
The Court has noted that Latvia has consistently defended its position
that non-citizens cannot be qualified as stateless persons and this view
has been accepted by the international monitoring bodies (Ziemele &
Kruma 2003).18 In its judgment (para. 17) the Court defined the status
of non-citizen in the following way:
The status of non-citizens is not and cannot be considered as a
mode of Latvian nationality. However, the rights given to non-ci-
tizens and the international obligations which Latvia has under-
taken in relation to these persons, signify that the legal link of
non-citizens to Latvia is recognised to a certain extent and based
on it mutual obligations and rights have emerged. This is de-
rived from art. 98 of the Constitution which inter alia states that
anyone who possesses a Latvian passport has a right to protec-
tion by the state and the right to freely return to Latvia.
The court therefore confirmed that non-citizens have a special link to
Latvia which entails mutual rights and obligations. Those are, however,
different from the ones that nationals have. It can be argued that non-
citizens possess ‘functional Latvian nationality’, i.e. they have many of
the same rights as nationals except for political rights and the right to
hold certain positions but they cannot be defined as nationals.
Latvia has adopted a so called ‘carrot-stick’ policy towards non-citi-
zens, i.e. if they want to enjoy the rights of EU nationals, then they
have to become nationals of a Member State. The current problem lies
in the fact that the number of non-citizens is considerable and it is not
decreasing fast enough.
2.2 Basic principles for the acquisition and loss of nationality
2.2.1 Acquisition of nationality
General principles
According to the Citizenship Law of 1994 Latvian nationality is ac-
quired on the basis of the ius sanguinis principle. Moreover, Latvian
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nationality legislation maintains the continuity of Latvian nationality,
as identified in 1919. This is evident in the 1991 Resolution which re-
fers to the restoration of the rights of Latvian nationals and not to a re-
storation of the institution of ‘nationality’, which is presumed to exist.
In addition to the ius sanguinis principle, there are groups of indivi-
duals who are granted nationality almost automatically.19 Firstly, cer-
tain ethnic groups: Latvians and Livs are nationals if they live perma-
nently in Latvia and hold no other nationality. However, if they immi-
grate from other countries they will be subject to a simplified
naturalisation procedure. Secondly, persons who completed education
in schools with Latvian as a language of instruction. Thirdly, women
who lost their nationality in accordance with the archaic rule on revoca-
tion of nationality upon marriage with a person of another nationality.
Fourthly, children, whose parents are unknown, and orphans.
Lastly, children born after 21 August 1991 to persons who are state-
less or non-citizens. In order to apply for nationality in the case of sta-
telessness a child should be: (1) a permanent resident; (2) stateless or a
non-citizen ‘for the entire time’ of its life prior to application; (3) fluent
in Latvian which is verified by a document from an educational estab-
lishment or by the Commission of the Naturalisation Board; (4) over
the age of fifteen. The applicant also should not have a criminal record
of more than five years of imprisonment. Until the child reaches the
age of fifteen, the application can be submitted by both parents jointly
or separately, or by the adoptive parents of a child, if they are stateless
or non-citizens and have resided in Latvia for at least five years. It shall
be noted that a certificate of language proficiency shall be submitted
only by those minors who have not been registered by their parents un-
til the age of fifteen. Moreover, after they have reached the age of eigh-
teen general naturalisation requirements apply.
Art. 13 provides for the admission to nationality for special meritor-
ious service beneficial to Latvia. A decision must be made by parlia-
ment on each individual case. A person cannot acquire dual nationality
by the application of art. 13, and the restrictions of art. 11 are applicable
(see below).
Dual nationality
Dual nationality is, in principle, not permitted in Latvia. The 1994 Citi-
zenship Law does not, however, exclude this possibility if the person
has registered his or her Latvian nationality. This means that Latvia will
not create dual nationality, while acknowledging that other states may
do so.
The Citizenship Law is indeed ambiguous in relation to dual nation-
ality. Art. 9 provides that a person who acquires Latvian nationality
cannot be a dual national. Para. 2 of the same article states that in the
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case where a person is considered to be a national of another state, in
his or her relations with Latvia the person is only considered to be a ci-
tizen of Latvia. Art. 24 provides the possibility to revoke nationality by
court decision if a person has acquired the nationality of another state
without renunciation of his or her Latvian nationality. The possibility
to hold dual Latvian nationality and that of another state is set out in
the Transition Regulations of the Citizenship Law. They provided that
those Latvian nationals who, during the period from 17 June 1940 until
4 May 1990, left Latvia as refugees or were deported and their descen-
dants could register as Latvian nationals until 1 July 1995. This provi-
sion is gender neutral meaning that descendants of either parent could
register. However, it does not mention that they have to renounce their
current nationality.
The Latvian Constitutional Court has ruled that dual nationality can
arise at birth and is prohibited only in cases of naturalisation. Moreover,
a child cannot be refused dual citizenship on the basis of formal require-
ments.20 However, the question as to whether children must renounce
their other citizenships when they come of age remains unclear.
Naturalisation
Individuals who have registered with the Residents’ Register are con-
sidered to reside lawfully in Latvia and are entitled to acquire national-
ity through naturalisation if they have received a permanent residence
permit. The naturalisation requirements are the following: (1) perma-
nent residence in Latvia for five years counting from 4 May 1990;21 (2)
knowledge of the Latvian language, the Constitution,22 the anthem and
the history of Latvia; (3) a loyalty oath to the Republic of Latvia; and (4)
legal source of income (art. 12).
The Law provides for a special naturalisation procedure in cases
where applicants have been nationals of Lithuania, Estonia or Poland
before the USSR intervention and have lived in Latvia for at least five
years. These rules also include their descendants (art. 14).23 The special
procedure also applies to persons married to Latvian citizens for not
less than ten years, who have been residing in Latvia for at least five
years, even if the spouse has passed away (art. 14). A special procedure
provides that these applications are considered expediently.
Upon application, a person shall declare that he or she does not hold
any other nationality and that none of the restrictions apply as speci-
fied in art. 11 of the Citizenship Law.
Article 11 establishes restrictions for naturalisation, if a person:
– has acted against the independence of Latvia and its powers, which
has been established by the courts;
– propagated totalitarian ideals or ethnic or racial hatred, which has
been established by the courts;
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– served in the institutions of another state, including the armed
forces;
– served in the USSR army and was called-up from outside Latvia;
– has been employed by the KGB, the security or the intelligence or
similar service of another state;
– has been sentenced in Latvia or another state for a crime that is also
a crime in Latvia;
– has, after 13 January 1991, worked in any organisations against
Latvia.24
This Article seems to follow a rather exclusionary approach. For in-
stance, if a person has been convicted for any crime (even if imprison-
ment was only for a year) he or she can never apply for Latvian nation-
ality. Also, the restrictions in relation to the affiliation with the KGB
could be challenged as to their legitimacy and proportionality since
there are nationals who have had the affiliation but who were nationals
or acquired nationality by registration.
Children up to the age of sixteen acquire nationality together with
the naturalised parent without undergoing the naturalisation process
as established in art. 12. This is also the case if the parents have not
reached an agreement but the child permanently resides in Latvia or in
cases of adoption. Nationality is granted to a minor from fourteen to
eighteen years of age only with his or her written consent (art. 16). If a
minor’s nationality has changed and his or her consent has not been
obtained, he or she can, within a year of coming of age, renew Latvian
nationality irrespective of the period of residence in Latvia (art. 16,
para. 2). If the nationality of a child has changed as a result of the mar-
riage of (one of) its parents, the naturalisation procedure will not be
applicable if the child wishes to renew his or her Latvian nationality.
In accordance with art. 4 of the Citizenship Law, all Latvian nationals
are equal irrespective of the way nationality has been acquired. This is
a constitutional principle confirmed by the Constitution in art. 91 stat-
ing that all are equal before the law and human rights shall be re-
spected without any discrimination.
The Naturalisation Board, working under the auspices of the Minis-
try of Justice, is responsible for the examination of applications for nat-
uralisation. During the naturalisation procedure the Board co-operates
with other institutions with the aim of verifying the information sub-
mitted by the applicants. Its decisions are subject to appeal in court.25
During court proceedings the naturalisation process is suspended until
the decision of a final instance or until the case is dropped. The proce-
dure of naturalisation is set out in detail in a number of regulations of
the Cabinet of Ministers. The Regulations on the Procedure of Accep-
tance and Review of Naturalisation Applications include application
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forms and specify the procedure for submission of applications and
the documents to be submitted.26 Naturalisation takes place in regional
units of the Naturalisation Board. In 2004, the procedure for submit-
ting documents was liberalised and the requirement that documents
must be submitted in the regional unit of the registered place of resi-
dence of the applicant was lifted. The naturalisation procedure is rela-
tively easy and takes no more than six months from the date of applica-
tion. The fee for naturalisation has also been lowered several times.
Since 2003, it has been set at 20 Lats (approximately 30 euros) and at
3 Lats (4 euros) for certain groups of applicants.27 Persons may with-
draw their applications at any stage of the naturalisation procedure.
The requirements for the examinations are set out in the Regula-
tions on the Examination of Proficiency in the Latvian Language and
the Examination of Knowledge of the Basic Principles of the Constitu-
tion, the Text of the National Anthem and the History of Latvia for Per-
sons Who Wish to Acquire the Citizenship of Latvia through Naturali-
sation. The regulations provide that knowledge of the language, of the
Constitution, the anthem and history shall be tested by an examination
commission established by the Naturalisation Board.28 Persons exempt
from the tests are those who: (1) have acquired primary, secondary or
higher education in educational institutions with Latvian as the lan-
guage of instruction, (2) have disabilities. Persons over the age of 65
shall be subject to the Latvian language test only.29
According to sect. 4, the employees of the Naturalisation Board, the
members of the Standing Committee on the Implementation of the Ci-
tizenship Law of the Parliament as well as representatives from other
organisations and institutions shall be allowed to be present in the ex-
aminations as observers if they have received permission from the
head of the Naturalisation Board. The examination of language profi-
ciency takes place within two months from the day when all the neces-
sary documents have been submitted, and the examination of the other
topics two months after passing of the language exam (sect. 6). If the
applicant does not attend or fails the exam he or she can retake the
exam after three months in the case of the language exam and after
one month in the case of the so-called knowledge exam (sect. 9).
The language proficiency exam has a written and an oral part (sect.
11). According to sect. 22, the examination commission shall assess the
applicant’s ability to read, write, listen and understand talks on topics
of everyday life. Applicants above the age of 65 only take the oral lan-
guage test (sect. 21).
Language proficiency has often been mentioned as the main obstacle
to naturalisation. Therefore, in 1996, the State Programme for Latvian
Language Learning was initiated. In the framework of the programme
a number of language courses and information campaigns on naturali-
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sation were conducted by the Naturalisation Board with financial assis-
tance from various international organisations and Western countries.
Overall figures for the success rate remain high; between 1996 and
May 2008 only 12 per cent of the applicants failed the exam. However,
over the past four years, the passing rate has shown a steady decline.
In 2007, for instance, 21 per cent of the applicants failed the language
test.
The applicant can choose whether to take the knowledge exam orally
or in writing (sect. 23). The success rate is similar to the language
exam. The overall failure rate is about 4 per cent. However, in 2007,
10 per cent of those who took the exam failed.
The decreasing success rates can no longer be explained in terms of
numbers of applicants, which skyrocketed in 2004 (when Latvia ac-
ceded to the EU), but fell back to 1998 levels thereafter.
2.2.2 Loss of nationality
Latvian nationality is lost in cases of renunciation or revocation. Ac-
cording to art. 23, renunciation can take place if a person has been
guaranteed the nationality of another state except if he or she has un-
fulfilled obligations towards the state or has not fulfilled mandatory
military service. The clause on the fulfilment of obligations towards
the state is unclear, i.e. whether it involves fiscal or other obligations.
Such a broad formulation may make it possible to arbitrarily deny the
right to change nationality (Ziemele 1998: 248). Moreover, since 2004
Latvia has a professional army and mandatory military service has been
abolished.
Art. 24 provides for three cases when nationality can be revoked by a
decision of a regional court, namely, if a person (1) has acquired the na-
tionality of another state without renouncing Latvian nationality; (2)
continues to serve in foreign armed forces or similar institutions with-
out permission from the Cabinet of Ministers; or (3) has acquired na-
tionality by fraud. The provision applies equally to all nationals, except
for those who hold dual nationality and are thus exempted from the ap-
plication of art. 24 (Ziemele 1998: 247). Family members are also not
affected by such proceedings. These grounds comply with those identi-
fied in the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. If a person
continues to reside permanently in Latvia for five years then this revo-
cation does not affect future naturalisation (art. 25, para. 2).
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2.3 Current political debates
The nationality issue still appears in public debates and is referred to
by both left-wing and right-wing parties, although in different contexts.
Recent studies by Latvian scholars conclude that the so-called Compa-
triots Policy, which was established by the Russian Federation, seeks to
minimise non-citizen interest in naturalising and integrating into Lat-
vian society. The Compatriots Policy supports Russian-speakers resid-
ing abroad, which is a concept that has been successfully ‘sold’ to the
West. Other common designations used by the state authorities of the
Russian Federation include ‘Russian compatriots’ or ‘Russian dias-
poras’. Since 1992, Russia has continuously tried to introduce ‘issues
involving Russian Compatriots’ onto the agendas of all the major regio-
nal and international organisations (Muizˇnieks 2006: 121-122). The
Russian Compatriots Policy was first outlined by the so-called Karaga-
nov Doctrine, conceived by Sergey Karaganov, an adviser to the Presi-
dent of the Russian Federation, on 6 October 1992. The doctrine per-
ceives the territory of the former USSR as a region of special interest
and mandates for Russia.30 Recently it has been reconfirmed officially
by the Russian Foreign Policy Concept (adopted by the Russian Presi-
dent on 12 July 2008). The Concept distinguishes a separate foreign
policy dimension called the ‘humanitarian trend’ of Russian foreign
policy, which inter alia includes the protection of the interests of ethnic
Russians living abroad. The approach was even further sharpened after
the conflict in Georgia. Thus, the so-called Medvedev Doctrine refers to
protection of lives and dignity of Russian citizens, wherever they may
be.31 The Presidential Administration, the Russian Foreign Affairs Min-
istry and the Russian State Duma (the parliament) are the key institu-
tions that provide support for non-citizen organisations in Latvia (Ler-
his & Kudors 2008: 72).
Another factor that increases divisions within Latvian society is the
growing importance of the Russian media, which have become largely
self-sufficient and in terms of their size have (for some time now)
eclipsed the Latvian-language media. The most popular and influential
media for non-citizens in Latvia is television, which broadcasts pro-
grammes produced and transmitted in Russia. The main Russian TV
channels, censored by the Kremlin, are available in every cable TV
package. Print media and the internet, however, play a less significant
role in the Russian socialisation of non-citizens (Zepa 2005: 5). Due to
the popularity of Russian TV channels in Latvia, the local editions of
Russian-language newspapers and magazines have to follow general
information protocol from Russia. Announcements and proclamations
made by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation and
other Russian institutions are published via the official news agencies
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‘ITAR-TASS’ and ‘Interfax’, and routinely reprinted in Latvia by the
Russian-language newspapers Chas and Vesti Segodnya. Four attempts
to produce bilingual newspapers have thus far failed because they were
unable to meet the needs of their various audiences.
Russia has also decided to simplify the entry procedure for former
USSR citizens currently living in Latvia and Estonia who have not ob-
tained the citizenship of any country. The decree, signed by President
Dmitry Medvedev on 18 June 2008, grants these persons visa-free tra-
vel to Russia provided they have a valid travel document – a non-citizen
passport in the case of Latvia and an aliens passport in the case of Esto-
nia. Minors must present either a valid travel document or a birth certi-
ficate if they are listed in the passport of an accompanying guardian.
The decree became effective upon signing and the government has
adopted all the necessary measures for its implementation.32 The Lat-
vian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has protested this decision as it may
bring the naturalisation of non-citizens to a halt.33
Latvian right-wing parties are discussing the need to amend the Citi-
zenship Law for two main reasons. Firstly, it has been acknowledged
that certain technical amendments are necessary. This holds true for
the so-called ‘forgotten children’, i.e. children whose parents have nat-
uralised but have forgotten to naturalise their children. Other proposals
concern state security considerations with regard to terrorists and those
working in the security services of other states. However, these propo-
sals have not been specific enough and the debate remains general.
Secondly, the proponents of amendments identify a need to liberalise
Latvia’s dual citizenship policy.34 This debate was provoked by numer-
ous studies by Latvian researchers and claims made by Latvian citizens
who have made use of their free-movement rights after Latvia joined
the EU (Kru¯ma 2006; Strategic Analysis Commission 2006). The
strict policy regarding dual citizenship has been criticised by Latvian
citizens living abroad, especially those in other EU Member States. Ac-
cording to recent estimates, about 86,000 Latvian citizens have left
Latvia since 2004 and the numbers continue to steadily increase
(Indans & Kru¯ma 2007: 165). The depopulation problem is further
aggravated by the fact that Latvia has Europe’s lowest birth rate. The
Latvian government has responded to these demographic changes by
establishing a working group to draft proposals for a new regulation re-
garding dual citizenship. The debate initially concerned only children.35
However, the Minister of Integration has suggested that those who
were forced to leave or were deported during the occupation period
and those who acquired another citizenship while residing in another
state should also be granted the right to hold dual nationality.36 He
thus proposed extending the initial deadline envisaged in the Transi-
tional Regulations of the Citizenship Law, which required that the for-
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mer group register by 1 July 1995. In the course of the debate, the pos-
sibility of holding dual citizenship was also suggested, mentioning in
particular those former Latvian citizens who hold the citizenship of an-
other EU Member State. Yet another discussion concerns a method to
establish whether a person has acquired another nationality without in-
forming Latvian authorities. One of the main problems is that verifica-
tion requires the cooperation of other states. The Office of Citizenship
and Migration Affairs estimates that currently 30,793 Latvian citizens
also hold another citizenship. This number includes persons who have
been granted dual citizenship according to the Citizenship Law, i.e.
those who registered until 1 July 1995 irrespective of place of resi-
dence.37
Finally, further debates can be expected concerning two cases at the
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). The recent ruling of the
Grand Chamber in the Andrejeva case established that Latvia has dis-
criminated against non-citizens concerning the calculation of their pen-
sions. The ECHR considered it disproportionate to disregard employ-
ment periods of non-citizens in Russian or Ukrainian enterprises
before 1991 in pension calculations. It dismissed the Latvian govern-
ment’s argument that such pension claims shall be subject to interna-
tional agreements on social security. The Latvian judge present at the
hearing disagreed with this ruling, arguing that the ECHR disregarded
the historical context of the case. So far, only the Russian media have
extensively reported on this case but further debates are to be ex-
pected.38 The second case concerns Jurijs Petropavlovskis, who is a
non-citizen and a member of the radical group Headquarters for the
Protection of Russian Schools, which organised various protests
against an education reform requiring more subjects to be taught in
Latvian. He has declared that he would run as a candidate in local gov-
ernment elections after being naturalised. According to various media
sources, he publicly advocated the use of violence, bloodshed and ter-
rorism and threatened to act on these after his naturalisation.39 The
Cabinet of Ministers refused his application for nationality based on
the argument that he is not loyal to the state. This was a precedent con-
firmed by the Administrative Court Senate, which stated that the Cabi-
net of Ministers has wide discretion in granting citizenship and that
the decision is predominantly political.
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2.4 Statistics
2.4.1 Status and ethnic composition of Latvian inhabitants
The following tables on status and ethnic composition of Latvian inha-
bitants illustrates both Latvian national sentiments from the 1930s
when they were a considerable majority and the current situation
where Latvia is still hosting large numbers of non-citizens.40
As is evident from Table 2.1, the ethnic composition of Latvia’s resi-
dents changed considerably during the occupation.
Table 2.2 shows that, notwithstanding various efforts to liberalise
naturalisation requirements, the numbers of non-citizens have not de-
creased significantly since the beginning of the 1990s.
Table 2.3 illustrates that it was mainly residents of Russian or East-
ern Slav origin who became stateless or non-citizens after the restora-
tion of independence in 1990. The situation has not changed since
then and the naturalisation process is generally slow.
Table 2.3 Residents of Latvia on 1 July 2008 (by ethnic origin)41
Citizens Non-citizens Foreigners or stateless
individuals
Total %
Latvians 1,340,824 1,667 1,162 1,343,653 59.1
Russians 367,181 240,784 26,194 634,159 27.9
Byelorussians 31,207 49,085 2,734 83,036 3.7
Ukrainians 17,670 34,635 4,687 56,992 2.5
Poles 40,428 12,432 859 53,719 2.4
Lithuanians 18,388 9,943 2,272 30,603 1.4
Estonians 1,492 558 448 2,498 0.1
Other (including
undeclared or unkown)
41,528 16,060 9,369 66,957 2.9
Total 1,858,718 365,164 47,725 2,271,617 100.0
Source: Naturalisation Board, www.np.gov.lv.
Table 2.1 Changes in ethnic composition of Latvia’s population
1935 1995 2008
Latvians 75.5% 55.1% 59.0%
Non-Latvians 24.5% 44.8% 41.0%
Sources: Ziemele 2001: 236; Naturalisation Board, www.np.gov.lv
Table 2.2 Citizens and non-citizens of Latvia
1993 2008
Nationals 1,715,930 (71.8%) 1,858,718 (81.8%)
Non-citizens and foreign nationals ,673,398 (28.2%) 412,889 (18.2%)
Total 2,389,328 2,271,617
Sources: Ziemele 2005: 156, 365; Naturalisation Board, www.np.gov.lv; Register of Residents
of the Department of Citizenship and Migration, www.pmlp.gov.lv
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2.4.2 Acquisition of nationality by children
The discussions before the 1998 referendum on the possibility of
granting nationality to children of non-citizens and stateless persons
were heated and there were arguments that large numbers of children
would acquire nationality without being sufficiently integrated. Cur-
rently available statistics tell the opposite.
Table 2.4 Children of non-citizens and stateless persons born after 21 August 1991 who were
granted Latvian nationality (31 May 2008)
Ethnic origin Number
Latvians, Livs 2
Lithuanian 168
Estonian 33
Russian 5,386
Polish 293
Byelorussians 500
Ukrainian 549
Not indicated 235
Other 369
Recognised as citizens 7,394
Source: Naturalisation Board, www.np.gov.lv
In total 7,394 children, of whom 5,386 are of Russian origin, have
benefited from the amendments to the Citizenship Law in 1998. This
figure is unsatisfactory considering that there are altogether about
20,000 children who have the right to acquire nationality according to
the provisions of the Citizenship Law. In 2004, the Minister for Inte-
gration, together with the Minister for Children and Family Affairs,
conducted an information campaign sending information to the par-
ents of these children. As a result there was an increase in the number
of applications (Brands-Kehre & Puce 2005: 24).41 Experts have sug-
gested replacing the current system with the automatic registration of
children born to parents who are stateless or non-citizens as nationals.
2.4.3 Naturalisation
Naturalised persons per year
As argued above, naturalisation rates remain low but with positive ten-
dencies. The respective statistics allow some general conclusions to be
drawn regarding the motivation of the potential applicants for national-
ity to start on the naturalisation process.
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Table 2.5 Numbers of naturalisations in Latvia per year
Year Persons applying
for naturalisation
Naturalised
persons
1995 4,543 984
1996 2,627 3,016
1997 3,075 2,992
1998 5,608 4,439
1999 15,183 12,427
2000 10,692 14,900
2001 8,672 10,637
2002 8,370 9,844
2003 11,268 10,049
2004 21,297 16,064
2005 19,807 19,736
2006 10,581 16,439
2007 3,308 6,826
2008 2,601 3,004
Total 127,632 131,357
Source: Naturalisation Board, www.np.gov.lv
The biggest wave of naturalisation started after the window system was
abolished. In 1998, only 4,439 persons were naturalised; the number
rose to 12,427 persons in 1999. This increase might also be due to a
number of campaigns for naturalisation taking place at the time.
The second wave of naturalisations started after it became clear that
Latvia would become a member of the European Union. From 2003 to
2004, the number of naturalisations rose from 10,049 to 16,064. In
2005, 19,736 persons were naturalised. However, since 2005, the num-
bers of applications have decreased. Moreover, a growing number of
applicants have failed the naturalisation exams (see Table 2.6). The
authors of the report ‘Democracy Audit’ (Brands-Kehre & Pu¯ce 2005)
believe that the decrease in applications is due to a lack of motivation
to naturalise on the part of non-citizens. Firstly, non-citizens consider
that they automatically deserve nationality. Secondly, there are certain
benefits in retaining the status of non-citizen, mainly less travel restric-
tions to the CIS countries. Thirdly, there is the fear of the naturalisa-
tion exams. The last reason is the fee which, although it has been low-
ered, is still relatively high for many people in Latvia.
Ethnic origin of applicants for naturalisation
The ethnic origin of applicants for naturalisation is indicative of the
fact that Latvia is still dealing with its post-occupation legacies. The mi-
gration rates are insignificant and applicants for naturalisation are So-
viet-era settlers.
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Table 2.7 Ethnic origin of applicants for naturalisation in Latvia (31 May 2008)
Ethnic origin Total
Latvians, Livs 71
Lithuanians, Estonians 4,536
Russian 82,820
Polish 5,056
Byelorussian 12,542
Ukrainian 11,247
Not indicated 61
Other 5,154
Source: Naturalisation Board, www.np.gov.lv
During the Soviet-era, large numbers of ‘blue-collar socio-economic’
profile immigrants were sent to Latvia. At that time the Soviet central
government put emphasis on the promotion of economic industrialisa-
tion. Latvia has suffered under this policy because (1) Latvia hosted the
headquarters of the Soviet army for the Baltic region and (2) the Lat-
vian political elite was most sympathetic compared to other Baltic
states.
Age of applicants for naturalisation
Most applicants are found in the age groups of eighteen to 30 and 31-
40. These statistics exemplify that if the ‘window system’ had been
maintained the numbers would be different because the age groups
starting at 41 represent a considerable proportion of those who applied
for naturalisation.
Table 2.8 Age of applicants for naturalisation in Latvia (31 May 2008)
Age of applicants Number %
15-17 10,625 8.7
18-30 38,428 31.6
31-40 24,082 19.8
41-50 25,006 20.6
51-60 15,136 12.4
61 and older 8,310 6.9
Source: Naturalisation Board, www.np.gov.lv
Nationality granted for special meritorious service for the benefit of Latvia
With regard to granting of nationality for special meritorious service
two periods can be distinguished. From 1995 to 1998 there were 199
cases of naturalisation due to special services, whereas the number has
dropped to only twelve since 1999.
This decline is explained by changes in the Citizenship Law in 1998
when the so-called ‘window system’ was dropped. Therefore, those who
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want to become nationals can apply for naturalisation and they do not
have to rely on the special procedure for the extension of nationality by
parliament. This procedure most often is used for sportsmen.
2.5 Conclusions
Latvian nationality policy is based on the concept of state continuity.
The rights attached to nationality were therefore restored to those who
were nationals at the time of the occupation of Latvia in 1940 and their
descendants. This policy led to the situation that a large group of peo-
ple who settled in Latvia during occupation remained stateless. Due to
international pressure to comply with the international legal frame-
work, especially regarding the reduction of statelessness, Latvia intro-
duced the status of non-citizen. A so-called carrot-and-stick policy has
been adopted with regards to this group. Non-citizens are denied politi-
cal rights and the right to hold certain posts or to be employed in cer-
tain professions. In order to enjoy these rights they have to naturalise.
Taking into account that nationality is a politically sensitive topic in
Latvia, it is doubtful that radical changes will occur in the near future.
The difficult compromise made in 1998 is satisfactory for the ruling
centre-right parties. However, the question of the fate of non-citizens
in the framework of EU law remains unresolved.
Chronological list of citizenship-related legislation in Latvia
Date Document Content Source
1919 Law on Citizenship
(amended in 1927)
Defines the basic
principles of acquisition
and loss of nationality
during the interwar period
1922 Constitution of the
Republic of Latvia
(adopted 15 February 1922
with latest amendments
on 15 December 2005)
Is restored after
restoration of
independence
www.ttc.lv (in Latvian)
1940 Decree on the Order in
which the Citizens of the
Soviet Socialist Republics
Lithuania, Latvia and
Estonia are Granted USSR
Citizenship
Imposes Soviet nationality
on nationals of the three
Baltic states automatically
1990 Declaration on the
Renewal of Independence
of the Republic of Latvia (4
Restores the authority of
the 1922 Constitution and
suspends it immediately
88 KRISTI¯NE KRU¯MA
Date Document Content Source
May 1990) except for a few provisions
that could only be
suspended by a
referendum
1991 Resolution on the Renewal
of the Republic of Latvia’s
Citizens’ Rights and
Fundamental Principles of
Naturalisation
Aims at reconstituting the
body of nationals who
could elect a legitimate
parliament; based on the
1919 Law
1994 Law on Citizenship Provides a ‘window
system’ limiting the right
to naturalise on the basis
of age
www.coe.int;
www.ttc.lv (in Latvian)
1995 Amendments of
Citizenship Law
Provides for the right to
citizenship for Latvians
and Livs who have
registered domicile in
Latvia, persons who have
acquired education in
Latvian as well as women
who lost their citizenship
by marriage in accordance
with the 1919 Law
1995 Law on the Status of
Former USSR Citizens
Who Are Not Citizens of
Latvia or Any Other State
(amended in 1997, 1998,
and 2000)
Introduces the status of
non-citizen
www.humanrights.lv
(in Latvian)
1997 Amendments of
Citizenship Law
Makes technical
amendments
1998 Amendments of
Citizenship Law
Repeals ‘window system’;
liberalises access to
Latvian nationality for
children of non-citizens
and the stateless
1999 Regulation No. 32 on the
Procedure for the
Acceptance and Review of
the Application on the
Recognition of a Child as a
Citizen of Latvia
Specifies the procedure
and documents to be
submitted to the
Naturalisation Board with
an application for the
recognition of a child as a
citizen
www.legislationline.org
1999 Regulation No. 33 on the
Examination of Proficiency
in the Latvian Language
and the Examination of
Knowledge of the Basic
Principles of the
Constitution, the Text of
the National Anthem and
Provides for the procedure
to be followed during
examinations; identifies
the persons to be
exempted from tests;
specifies the competences
and obligations of the
examination commissions
www.np.gov.lv (in Latvian)
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Date Document Content Source
the History of Latvia for
Persons Who Wish to
Acquire the Citizenship of
Latvia through
Naturalisation (with
amendments 2000, 2001,
2003, 2004, 2006)
1999 Regulation No. 34 on the
Procedure for the
Acceptance and Review of
Naturalisation
Applications (with
amendments 2000, 2001,
2003, 2004, 2005, 2006)
Establishes the procedure
and documents to be
submitted for
naturalisation;
amendments bring the
Regulation in line with
other laws adopted in the
meantime, such as the
Immigration Law, the Law
on the Declaration of
Residence, the Law on
Personal Identity
Documents, the
Administrative Procedure
Law, etc.
www.legislationline.org
1999 Law on the Status of
Stateless Persons in the
Republic of Latvia
Does not apply to those
who hold non-citizen
status
www.ttc.lv (in Latvian)
2000 Regulation No. 410 on the
State Duty Payable for
Documenting
Renunciation of the
Citizenship of Latvia and
Restoration of the
Citizenship of Latvia
Introduces a fee of 15 Lats
for renunciation or
restoration of nationality
www.legislationline.org
2001 Regulation No. 234 on the
State Duty Payable for
Submission of a
Naturalisation Application
(with amendments 2002,
2003)
Provides for three different
categories of applicants
and the amount of state
duty each of these groups
has to pay (20 Lats, 3 Lats,
exempt from paying)
www.legislationline.org
2001 Regulation No. 13 on the
Procedure for
Documenting Loss and
Restoration of the
Citizenship of Latvia (with
amendments 2004)
Sets guidelines for the
procedure on loss and
restoration of citizenship;
specifies the documents to
be submitted by the
applicant and the
respective decisions to be
taken by the Naturalisation
Board; amendment brings
the Regulation in line with
the new Law on
Administrative Procedure
www.legislationline.org
2004 Regulation No. 378 Sets out the application www.ttc.lv (in Latvian)
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Date Document Content Source
Regarding Passports for
Latvian Citizens and Aliens
as well as Travel
Documents for Stateless
Persons
procedures for passports
and the contents of each
document
2004 Regulation No. 1011 on the
Procedure to Determine
the Status of Latvian Non-
citizens
Provides for the procedure
to be followed by
applicants and the Office
of Citizenship and
Migration Affairs regarding
decisions as to whether a
person satisfies all the
conditions to qualify for
the status
www.pmlp.gov.lv
(in Latvian)
2007 Regulation No. 353 on the
Examination of Proficiency
in the Latvian Language
and the Examination of
Knowledge of the Basic
Principles of the
Constitution, the Text of
the National Anthem and
the History of Latvia
provided in the Citizenship
Law
Replaces Regulation No.
33; consolidates the
amendments
Notes
1 I would like to thank Prof. Ineta Ziemele for her comments on the draft of this
article. The usual disclaimer applies.
2 UN Doc. A/RES/55/153 (Nationality of Natural Persons in relation to the Succession
of States), 30 January 2001.
3 For a detailed treatment of this principle, see Ziemele 2005.
4 Latvia, like the other Baltic states, was guided by the principle ex iniuria ius non ori-
tur, which has been seen as a rather inflexible approach.
5 In 1995, grounds (2), (3) and (8) were included.
6 Livs are a historic indigenous group of Finno-Ugric descent living near the Baltic sea.
7 See the part on naturalisation in section 2 in this chapter.
8 For instance a person who was 45 years of age and born in Latvia could apply for
naturalisation in 2000, while a person who was twenty could apply in 1996.
9 The European Union ‘expressed grave concern at certain aspects of the […] law on
citizenship adopted in Latvia’ (European Commission, General Report on the Activities
of the European Union 1994 Brussels/Luxembourg 1995, para. 759). See also the Opi-
nion No. 183 (1995) on Latvia’s application for membership in the Council of Europe;
stars.coe.fr. Latvia was also cited three times under the UN 1503 procedure concern-
ing gross and persistent violations of Human Rights (in 1995, 1997 and 2000).
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10 The amendments were adopted on 22 June 1998. The referendum was held on 3
October 1998 and about 53 per cent of the electorate voted for the adoption of the
amendments.
11 Only in exceptional cases can such an application be submitted by a single parent,
i.e. by a mother if there is no entry regarding the father in the birth record or by the
remaining parent if one parent is deceased.
12 Apart from that, the requirements of exams and the fee for naturalisation have been
lowered a number of times.
13 See the section on statistics at the end of this chapter.
14 The EU accession negotiations avoided the issues related to the status and rights of
non-citizens. The Commission of the European Union, when interpreting the scope
of the application of the so called Third-country Nationals’ Directive (Council
Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 Concerning the Status of Third-
country Nationals who are Long-term Residents, Official Journal, L 016, 23 January
2004, pp. 0044-0053) stated that ‘the expression ‘‘third-country national’’’ covers all
persons who are not citizens of the Union in the sense of Article 17 paragraph 1 of
the EC Treaty, that is to say those who do not have the nationality of an EU Member
State. This indicates that those with undetermined citizenship fall within the scope
of the directive. Letter from the Directorate-General of Justice and Home Affairs, Eur-
opean Commission to the Permanent Delegation of Latvia in the EU institutions, 23
June 2003. This places non-citizens at a disadvantage compared to the status they
have enjoyed so far.
15 See the conclusions by an EU Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental
Rights, Synthesis report for 2003, p. 88. The experts regret that the situation of non-
citizens has not been resolved during the entry negotiations between Latvia and the
EU.
16 For instance, Kees Groenendijk suggested calling them ‘denizens’, a term describing
residents enjoying a status between alien and citizen (Groenendijk 1993: 15).
17 See Constitutional Court Case 2004-15-0106, Official Gazette No. 40, 9 March 2005.
Most of the other rulings (approximately 200 during 2004-2008) were passed by the
administrative courts. The numbers of cases concerning access to status are limited.
The most illustrative case is that of Gal¸ina Bakriseva, who, in the Court’s opinion,
may have the right to non-citizen status notwithstanding her service in the Russian
armed forces. Other cases concern children whose parents – either one or both – are
foreign citizens who have agreed to register their child as a non-citizen of Latvia (see,
for example, the Zaharov case, No. A42348705 AA 934-06/10, 28 April 2006). More-
over, even if parents have acquired non-citizen status as a result of fraudulent meth-
ods, this is not a valid enough reason to deprive their children of their non-citizen
status (Case No. A42051204 SKA-24/2008, 14 February 2008). Most cases deal with
the revocation of the non-citizen status. The majority of these concern non-citizens
who have acquired another citizenship but failed to inform Latvian authorities. How-
ever, the courts have been cautious when confirming the authorities’ revocation deci-
sions. Thus, the Supreme Court Senate declared the following in the Saakjan case:
The link of a non-citizen to the Republic of Latvia is closer than is that of a stateless
person or alien. Therefore, the revocation of the status of non-citizen means a signifi-
cant limitation of the rights of the respective person (Decision of 2004, No. SKA-89,
C27261801).
18 See Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 9 of the
Convention. Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination, 55th Session 2-27 August 1999, CERD/C/304/Add.79 12 April 2001,
paras 12-14, and 63rd Session, 4-22 August, CERD/C/63/CO/7 10 December 2003,
paras 12-13. Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 40 of
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the Covenant, Human Rights Committee, 79th Session, CCPR/CO/79/LVA, 1 Decem-
ber 2003, paras 16-18.
19 Almost automatic acquisition means that a person shall approach the regional office
of the Naturalisation Board and submit documents testifying that the person
permanently resides in Latvia as well as supporting documents confirming that the
person belongs to one of the groups of persons qualifying for almost automatic
citizenship (for instance, diploma of secondary education in Latvian).
20 Decision of the Latvian Constitutional Court, Case No. 2007-07-01, 21 August 2007.
21 According to para. 4 of art. 24 of the Immigration Law, permanent residence can be
acquired after five years of residence in Latvia with a temporary residence permit.
This means that a person shall reside five years in Latvia in order to obtain
permanent residence and a further five years with permanent residence to acquire
the right to apply for citizenship. Exceptional cases provide for a shorter residence
requirement as permanent residence permits can be issued in certain cases
immediately after arrival (for instance, family reunification, former citizens and non-
citizens and alike).
22 The Law states that a person shall know the basic principles of the Constitution of
the Republic of Latvia and the Constitutional Law Rights and Obligations of a
Citizen and a Person. However, this law became obsolete on 6 November 1998 when
the Constitution was supplemented with a chapter on human rights.
23 In the cases of Estonia and Lithuania, they had to be citizens of the respective
countries on 17 June 1940, but in the Polish case on 1 September 1939.
24 These include the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Latvian Communist
Party, the Working People’s International Front of the Latvian SSR, the United
Council of Labour Collectives, the Organisation of War and Labour Veterans, the All-
Latvia Salvation of Society Committee or their regional Committees or the Union of
Communists of Latvia. Concerning the legality of similar limitations for running for
public office, see the case of Zˇdanoka v. Latvia, application No. 58278/00, Judgment
of Grand Chamber of ECHR, 16 March, 2006, especially paras. 119 and 120.
25 The Naturalisation Board is considered as one of the best performing institutions in
Latvia. In relation to court cases the statistics show that out of 338 court cases the
Naturalisation Board has lost only five.
26 A special procedure is provided by the Regulations on the Procedure for the
Acceptance and the Review of the Application on the Recognition of a Child to be a
Citizen of Latvia. The documents submitted are subject to verification by the Office
of Citizenship and Migration Affairs and the Ministry of the Interior if a child has
reached the age of fourteen (minimum age for criminal liability). Any other state and
self government institution can be approached by the Board (sect. 19).
27 Regulations on the State Duty Payable for Submission of a Naturalisation
Application, Regulations No. 234 (Record No. 26, para. 43), Riga, 5 June 2001. The
rate is lowered to 3 Lats for: (1) members of poor families or poor persons; (2)
unemployed; (3) members of families with more than three under age children; (4)
persons receiving old-age pension; (4) disabled persons with a certain degree of
disability; (5) pupils and students; (6) full-time students of tertiary education
establishments. Persons exempted are: (1) politically repressed; (2) severely disabled
persons; (3) orphans and children who are not under their parents’ charge; (4)
persons sheltered by social care institutions of the state or self-government. The fees
were changed in 1997, 2001 and 2002.
28 It was common practice that language proficiency had to be verified even after a
person had passed the exam in case he or she wanted to hold public office. This
practice was changed after the decision of the Human Rights Committee in the
Ignatane case (Communication No. 884/1999, 31 July 2001). Antonina Ignatane was
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deleted from the list of candidates for local government elections after language
inspectors conducted an unexpected language examination at her place of work
concluding that her level of language proficiency did not correspond to the highest
degree necessary to be elected to local government. See also Podkolzina v. Latvia,
application No. 46726/99 at the ECHR, 9 July 2002.
29 These exceptions were introduced in 1998.
30 The doctrine seeks to reintegrate this region by increasing Russia’s influence in the
former USSR Republics and does not rule out the use of force ‘within the limits of
the law’ if necessary. Other measures include: 1) promoting not the return of
‘Russian-speaking’ residents to Russia, but their stay in the former Soviet Republics,
since they can then be used to realise Russia’s long-term interests in the region; 2)
expanding Russian investments as a tool to increase political influence; 3) applying
economic sanctions and other means of pressure against ‘disobedient’ former USSR
Republics; 4) using human rights and ethnic minority rights with regard to Russian
minorities as a weapon against the former USSR Republics; 5) advocating a ‘zero
solution’ in the citizenship laws of the former Soviet Republics. i.e. an automatic
granting of citizenship in the respected states (for more detail, see Lerhis & Kudors
2008: 36-62).
31 The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation is available at www.kremlin.ru.
See also ‘Russia’s new foreign policy strategy will continue to defend Russian nationals’
interests in the Baltics’, LETA [National News Agency], 17 July 2008; and the report
on the Russian Federation Foreign Policy (ОБЗОР ВНЕШНЕЙ ПОЛИТИКИ
РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ) at www.un.int.
32 ‘Visa waiving for Latvia’s ‘‘non-citizens’’ jeopardizes Russia-EU talks’, Ria Novosti
[Russian national news agency], 18 June 2008. en.rian.ru.
33 ‘A¯rlietu ministrijas pazin¸ojums par Krievijas Federa¯cijas le¯mumu atcelt vı¯zu rezˇı¯mu
dal¸ai Latvijas iedzı¯vota¯ju [Announcement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
concerning the decision of the Russian Federation to lift visa regime for a group of
Latvia’s inhabitants]’, press release, Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 18 June
2008. www.am.gov.lv.
34 Z. Stankevicˇa, ‘Latvija zaude¯ izcilus pilson¸us likuma burta de¯l¸ [Latvia loses
outstanding citizens because of the strict law]’, Neatkarı¯ga¯ Rı¯ta Avı¯ze [daily newspa-
per], 15 October 2007.
35 I. Matisane, ‘Dubultpilsonı¯bu be¯rniem vare¯tu ieviest jau sˇogad [Dual citizenship
for children could be introduced already this year]’, Official Gazette, 25 July 2007.
www.lv.lv; G. Laganovskis, ‘Tieslietu ministrs: dubultpilsonı¯bai nepieciesˇams jauns li-
kums [Minister of Justice: dual citizenship requires new law]’, Official Gazette, 14
May 2008. www.lv.lv; G. Laganovskis, ‘Tieslietu ministrs piel¸auj dubultpilsonı¯bu
[Minister of Justice allows dual nationality]’, Official Gazette, 11 July 2008. www.lv.lv.
36 A. Erin¸a, ‘Turpina gatavot prieksˇlikumus par pilsonı¯bas piesˇk¸irsˇanu a¯rvalstı¯s
dzimusˇo Latvijas pilson¸u be¯rniem [Drafting of proposals for granting citizenship to
children of Latvian citizens born abroad continues]’, LETA, 24 October 2007; A. Eri-
n¸a, ‘Pilsonı¯bas likuma¯ rosina paredze¯t dubultpilsonı¯bu a¯rzeme¯s dzı¯vojosˇo Latvijas pil-
son¸u be¯rniem [Suggestion to make provisions in the Citizenship Law for dual citizen-
ship of children of Latvian citizens living abroad], LETA, 24 April 2004.
37 This data is available at www.pmlp.gov.lv.
38 Application No. 55707/00, Grand Chamber Judgment 18 February 2009.
39 There are several publications concerning these allegations, such as, ‘Sˇta¯ba
brı¯dina¯jumus par sadursme¯m uzskata par provoka¯ciju [Warnings from Stab about
clashes with police considered as provocation]’, Diena [daily newspaper], 14 August
2004. This publication refers to an earlier article where Petropavlovskis listed 160
combatants under his command (21 February 2004). See also the interview with Pet-
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ropavlovskis: Mu¯rniece I., ‘Intervija ar Juriju Petropavlovski: “Mums vajadzı¯gs starp-
tautisks skanda¯ls!” [Interview with J. Petropavlovskis: ‘We need International Scan-
dal’]’, Latvijas Avı¯ze [daily newspaper], 20 December 2004. Russian sources can be
found at: www.2004.novayagazeta.ru.
40 I. Rubule, ‘A¯rzeme¯s atbalsta dubultpilsonı¯bas ieviesˇanu’ [Outside Latvia there is
support for the introduction of dual citizenship], Portal of Latvians living abroad, 2
August 2008. www.latviesi.com.
41 The Table is based on data on ethnic origin as indicated by residents. At the
beginning of the 1990s, all residents were required to declare their ethnic origin
which was mentioned both in their passports and in the Register of Residents.
Current practice is that those applying for naturalisation are required to declare their
ethnic origin on an application form that they submit to the Naturalisation Board.
This requirement is optional as is the reference to ethnic origin in the passport.
42 The number of applications received during 2004 was equal to the numbers received
between 1998-2004.
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3 Lithuanian nationality: Trump card to
independence and its current challenges1
Kristı¯ne Kru¯ma
There are slight differences between the Latvian and Lithuanian ap-
proaches as far as the transition from the Soviet to democratic institu-
tions is concerned. Lithuania could be said to have used the Soviet le-
gal and institutional basis for the adoption of the decisions necessary
at the time more than Latvia did. However, it will be argued that these
differences do not challenge the underlying principle of ex iniuria ius
non oritur followed also by Latvia and Estonia.
In comparison to other Baltic states, Lithuania escaped close interna-
tional scrutiny of its nationality policies (see Ja¨rve and Kru¯ma in this
volume). Therefore, nationality has, until recently, not created any ma-
jor international controversies. Only after Lithuania encountered hur-
dles related to the presidential discretion for granting nationality has
the issue attracted attention, especially on the national political agenda.
Since then there have been heated debates on the need to change the
Lithuanian approach to dual citizenship.
3.1 History of nationality policy
3.1.1 General overview of nationality policy
The same scenario of imposing Soviet nationality upon their nationals
was applied in all three Baltic states, including Lithuania. However, So-
viet Citizenship Law did allow the Soviet republics much authority re-
garding nationality matters (Kalvaitis 1998: 240). This was seized by
Lithuania in 1989 when it enacted its first Citizenship Law.
Guided by the principle of ex iniuria ius non oritur, Lithuania, having
declared independence on 11 March 1990, first reinstated the 1938
Constitution and simultaneously suspended some of its articles as they
were incompatible with democratic principles or the institutions pro-
vided for no longer existed. Following the full suspension of the 1938
Constitution, the Provisional Basic Law was enacted, accounting for
present-day realities (Kalvaitis 1998: 243). The 1992 Constitution was
carefully drafted with reference to laws in force before 1940 and with
an emphasis on constitutional continuity (Ziemele 2005: 40). How-
ever, the enactment of the 1989 Citizenship Law before adoption of the
Constitution is the main difference to the approaches adopted in the
two other Baltic states because Lithuania was guided by the conflicting
principle ex factis ius oritur, at least to a certain extent. This means that
the new Constitution was adopted by an extended body of nationals in
comparison to the citizenship laws prior to 1940.
The development of Lithuanian nationality legislation can be divided
into three main phases. The first phase started with the Law adopted
in 1989 providing for liberal conditions upon which Lithuanian nation-
ality could be acquired. This phase ended with the Law of 1991 when
Lithuania had already restored its independence and stricter criteria for
the acquisition of nationality were introduced. This second phase is
problematic and confusing because there were various attempts to find
a balance between compliance with the principle of continuity of na-
tionality and the avoidance of double nationality. The third phase was
initiated by the new 2002 Law on Citizenship. It attempts to stream-
line provisions of the 1991 Law and its numerous amendments and to
liberalise the regulation of dual nationality.
3.1.2 The 1989 Citizenship Law
The first Lithuanian nationality law was adopted on 3 November 1989.
The Law identified four categories of persons who were or could be-
come nationals of Lithuania:
– Those who held Lithuanian citizenship prior to 15 July 1940 includ-
ing their children and grandchildren, as well as those who were per-
manent residents in the territory of the Lithuanian SSR on 15 July
1940 and their children and grandchildren provided that they are
or have been permanent residents of the Lithuanian SSR.
– Those who had a permanent place of residence in the Lithuanian
SSR if they were born in the territory of the Lithuanian SSR or can
prove that at least one of their parents or grandparents was born
there and if they are not citizens of another state.
– Other persons who at the time of the adoption of the Law were per-
manent residents for at least two years and had employment or
other legal source of support in Lithuania. Thus, the law allowed
those who arrived in Lithuania during the Soviet period to acquire
Lithuanian nationality (with some exceptions, such as Soviet army
officers). They had to declare their intention to become nationals
within two years following the entry into force of the law2, i.e. until
November 1991. Upon registration they had to swear an oath of al-
legiance to the Lithuanian Constitution and laws (Kalvaitis 1998:
244, 261). This principle applied irrespective of their nationality or
language abilities.
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– Those who had acquired the Lithuanian nationality in accordance
with the law.
According to the Constitutional Court of Lithuania in Case 7/94, the
Law differentiated between existing and potential holders of Lithuanian
nationality.3 Persons who were nationals prior to occupation, their des-
cendants and permanent residents on 15 June 1940 who continued to
reside in the country when the Law entered into force, were considered
nationals ipso facto. The same applied to persons born in the territory
of Lithuania and still residing there, and those whose parents were
born or resided in that territory. These persons were considered as hav-
ing a permanent legal relationship with Lithuania; a principle which
was considered particularly important in Lithuania for its nationality
policies (Ziemele 1998: 223). Finally, those who were deported from
the territory of Lithuania or emigrated after the occupation, as well as
their children and grandchildren, also retain the right to Lithuanian ci-
tizenship.
Soviet-era immigrants were only considered potential nationals as
they were guaranteed the right to freely decide on their nationality.
After they accepted nationality they all had to take a pledge of loyalty to
Lithuania (Kalvaitis 1998: 261). In case 7/94, the Constitutional Court
emphasised that there were differences between this category of per-
sons and other nationals. The latter never had permanent legal rela-
tions with Lithuania and they were immigrants holding Soviet nation-
ality. After the restoration of an independent Lithuania, they became
foreigners if they did not use the option provided for by the 1989 Law.
It has to be recalled that this choice was not obvious or easy at the
time. In 1989 or even 1990, it was still difficult to foresee the collapse
of the Soviet Union. Taking an oath of allegiance to Lithuania required
certain convictions. 90 per cent (87 per cent according to other
sources) of non-Lithuanian permanent residents registered as nationals
under these provisions. Only 1 per cent of the pre-independence electo-
rate chose not to become nationals of the Republic of Lithuania (Kalvai-
tis 1998: 261).
The law did not provide for dual nationality. This was confirmed in
the Provisional Basic Law in art. 13 which stated that as a rule, a citizen
of Lithuania may not at the same time be a citizen of another state.
The subsequent amendments on 16 April 1991 confirmed that Lithua-
nian nationality is lost upon the acquisition of the nationality of an-
other state. However, a number of exceptions existed at that time as
well. These concerned those who were nationals of Lithuania prior to
15 June 1940 and their descendants.
LITHUANIAN NATIONALITY 99
3.1.3 The 1991 Citizenship Law
The second Citizenship Law in Lithuania was adopted on 10 December
1991.4 It established who are to be considered Lithuanian nationals.
The new law ended the liberal period when any resident could apply
for nationality after two years of residence and introduced stricter re-
quirements. It was subsequently amended several times: 19 November
1992, 16 July 1993, 3 October 1995 and 6 February 1996. The follow-
ing comments on the 1991 Law take these amendments into account.
The law identified groups of individuals eligible for Lithuanian na-
tionality. Initially those included:
– nationals of Lithuania prior to 15 June 1940 including their children
and grandchildren if they had not acquired nationality of another
state;
– permanent residents of Lithuania between 9 January 1919 and 15
June 1940 within the territory of the present Lithuania, their chil-
dren or grandchildren, if they continue to reside in Lithuania and
are not nationals of another country;
– persons of Lithuanian origin who left Lithuania prior to 16 Febru-
ary 1918, if they have not acquired nationality of another state;5
– persons who acquired nationality in accordance with the Law on Ci-
tizenship effective prior to 1991;
– other persons who acquired nationality under the Law (naturalised).
The Supreme Council in the Resolution on the Procedure for Imple-
menting the Republic of Lithuania Law on Citizenship of 10 December
1991, clarified in sect. 5 that persons serving in the armed forces, inter-
nal troops and state security structures, as well as other law enforce-
ment and repressive structures of the Soviet Union must not be con-
sidered as permanently residing or employed in Lithuania. This was in
line with the Supreme Council Resolution on 1939 Treaties between
Germany and the USSR and Elimination of their Consequences for
Lithuania (7 February 1990) and the Supreme Council Declaration on
the Status of Soviet Armed Forces in Lithuania (19 March 1990). They
stated that servicemen of the occupation army were not entitled to the
right to participate in elections organised in Lithuania, with the excep-
tion of those who under the 1989 Law on Citizenship could be recog-
nised as nationals of Lithuania. A descendant of a Lithuanian citizen,
as identified prior to 15 June 1940, who had served in the Soviet army,
was not excluded from Lithuanian nationality. The USSR nationality
was declared null and void with respect to these individuals as it was
for all other Lithuanian nationals. The Constitutional Court stated:
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Such a decision meant that the consequences of occupation and
annexation with regard to citizens of Lithuania on whom citizen-
ship of the Soviet Union had been forced against their will, were
being undone. It goes without saying, that such a decision on
the part of the state could only be adopted regarding its citizens,
and the state could by no means resolve issues concerning the
citizenship of another state.
According to art. 12 of the 1991 Lithuanian Constitution, with the ex-
ception of cases established by law, no person may be a citizen of the
Republic of Lithuania and another state at the same time. The Citizen-
ship Law deals with the issue of dual citizenship in a confusing way
which is closely connected with a certain conflict between the princi-
ples of continuity of nationality and the principle of effective link that
the Law tries to accommodate. Relevant provisions of the Law have
been amended several times to clarify who can and who cannot acquire
dual citizenship. Concerns were expressed by the Lithuanian nationals
who could not obtain Lithuanian passports because they had in the
meantime acquired another nationality. They were therefore denied the
possibility to restore their nationality because dual nationality was pro-
hibited. The Council of Europe characterised this situation as unsatis-
factory (Ziemele 1998: 220).
Explanations were given by the Constitutional Court in Case 7/94
when it dealt with questions pertaining to the right of members of the
Soviet armed forces to acquire Lithuanian nationality. The Constitu-
tional Court was approached by a group of MPs who challenged the va-
lidity of the Resolution of the Parliament which provided that members
of the USSR army, who had terminated their service before 1 March
1992 and 4 November 1994, and had been issued a Citizen Certifica-
tion Card, could acquire citizenship. The Court declared the provisions
of the Resolution unconstitutional. It clarified that the 1989 Citizen-
ship Law ‘did not provide an option for a citizen of Lithuania to be at
the same time a citizen of another state’. This was supported by an-
other general principle of the 1989 Law, providing that Lithuanian na-
tionality is lost with the acquisition of another nationality (Ziemele
1998: 220). The Court noted that there is only one exception to this
general rule, i.e. those who were nationals of the Republic of Lithuania
prior to 15 June 1940 and their descendants. The latter explanation re-
lates to the application of the principle of continuity of nationality
while the prohibition of dual nationality is linked in principle to the
understanding of effective link by Lithuania as concerns its decisions
on nationality issues.
According to this ruling of the Constitutional Court, the Law was
amended in 1995. Art. I provided that nationals of Lithuania prior to 15
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June 1940 and their children are nationals of Lithuania if they have
not repatriated to their ethnic homeland (this new requirement was
not changed in response to the court decision. In fact, it was declared
unconstitutional by the court in 2006). The requirement that they are
not permitted to be nationals of another state was lifted. However, this
condition was still applicable to their grandchildren until the amend-
ments of 2 July 1997, which permitted these, too, to retain their other
nationality.
This amendment also affected arts. 17 and 18 of the 1991 Law. Art.
17 stated that the right to nationality of Lithuania shall be retained for
an indefinite period for (1) those who were nationals prior to 15 June
1940 and their children provided that they have not repatriated i.e. de-
parted to their ethnical homeland and (2) persons of Lithuanian origin
residing in other states.6 According to the 1995 amendments a person
with one Lithuanian parent or grandparent and who is Lithuanian him
or herself shall be considered a person of Lithuanian origin. The same
amendments provided for differentiation between the above mentioned
categories (1) and (2). While the first group could retain another na-
tionality, the second had to renounce the nationality of another state
and return to Lithuania for permanent residence in order to be granted
Lithuanian nationality. Thus, the Law grouped persons according to
their ethnic origin and according to whether they had departed for
their ethnic homeland or another country. In both cases, those who
were entitled to citizenship but resided abroad were not considered
Lithuanian citizens ex lege. They had to express the corresponding in-
tention and meet the requirements established by law.7
Art. 18 stated that all persons mentioned in art. 17 should renounce
the nationality of another state. Moreover, persons of Lithuanian origin
residing in other states shall become permanent residents as well as
take the oath to Lithuania in order to acquire nationality.8 Such a com-
plicated scheme reflects the problems caused by the prohibition of dual
nationality when the independence of a state, which was suppressed
for a considerable time, is restored. It was only when amendments
were made in 1993 that those who were deported or left Lithuania dur-
ing occupation and their children who had not acquired nationality of
another state by birth and lived in other states could recover Lithuanian
nationality by presenting a written notice to the authorities. Before
these amendments neither provisions of art. 17 or art. 18 provided pos-
sibilities to acquire dual nationality.
Therefore, on the one hand, the Law identifies nationals with respect
to whom the prohibition of dual nationality does not apply, i.e. groups
of individuals whose right to nationality is retained for an indefinite
period without renouncing their present nationality. On the other
hand, there are groups of persons who have the right to nationality but
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the right can only be exercised when they renounce their present na-
tionality (Ziemele 2001: 235-236).
Distinctions apply also to different categories of children, i.e. those
who are considered nationals by birth and those who have to acquire
nationality although they are born in Lithuania. A child born to parents
one of whom is a Lithuanian citizen shall be a citizen irrespective of his
or her place of birth if at least one parent has permanent residence in
Lithuania (art. 9). If, however, both parents reside outside Lithuania
they shall reach an agreement on the child’s nationality until he or she
is eighteen years of age. Foundlings shall be considered nationals while
children born to stateless persons who are permanent residents in
Lithuania shall acquire Lithuanian nationality (arts. 10 and 11). The arti-
cles do not specify whether these children have to be born in Lithuania,
which may imply that the Law means children who have arrived in the
country with their parents. Both articles draw a distinction between
children who shall be nationals by birth and those who have to acquire
nationality (Ziemele 1998: 237).
In relation to spouses of Lithuanian nationals art. 14 provided a sim-
plified procedure for the acquisition of nationality, i.e. three years of re-
sidence in Lithuania while married, the passing of exams on language
and the Constitution as well as the renunciation of their previous na-
tionality. The amendments of 1992 added another category of persons
subject to a simplified procedure. It stated that those who are married
to Lithuanian nationals who were deportees or political prisoners and
their children born in exile shall be granted Lithuanian nationality if
they are married for at least three years and have moved for permanent
residence to Lithuania together with their spouse. These persons would
only have to renounce their previous nationality and to pass an exami-
nation on the Constitution of Lithuania.
Lithuania’s general approach to the regulation of nationality, espe-
cially in the early 1990s, can be considered as more liberal compared
to the other Baltic states. First, most of the Soviet-era settlers acquired
nationality on the basis of the 1989 Law while Latvia and Estonia re-es-
tablished the body of nationals on the basis of the legislation of the
pre-occupation period. Second, Lithuania did not introduce any quota
system while Latvia only abolished its quota system in 1998.9 Third,
Lithuania included residence during the Soviet period as valid for na-
tionality purposes. Latvia and Estonia took into account only the resi-
dence after restoration of independence. Therefore, Lithuania managed
to avoid criticism which continues to be addressed to Latvia and Esto-
nia. This has often been explained by the different proportion of non-
indigenous populations residing in Lithuania when independence was
restored.
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The Lithuanian approach cannot be qualified as a ‘pure zero option’
because there were distinctions made between different groups of per-
sons. The principle of continuity of nationality remained the main point
of departure for deciding how to identify nationals. That is the reason
why some of the groups were not considered nationals ipso facto and
were subject to naturalisation according to the 1989 Law. However, the
procedure was very simple and a majority of the groups affected by this
clause, mainly former USSR nationals, naturalised. As a consequence,
the 1991 Law did not really have to address the issues concerning the
former USSR nationals, except when these did not use the 1989 Law
option (Ziemele 1998: 225). However, concerning nationals, a distinc-
tion was made between the execution of the right to nationality and
the restoration of nationality. Restoration concerns situations where the
original nationality was not retained throughout the occupation or
when some actions are needed to re-instate it (Ziemele 1998: 224).
3.1.4 The 2002 Citizenship Law
The third Law on Citizenship was adopted on 17 September 2002 and
entered into force on 1 January 2003. It repealed the 1991 Law and in-
corporated certain related laws (such as the Law on the Validity of Citi-
zenship Documents). The Law was subsequently amended in 2003
and 2004.10 One of the main issues which was publicly debated was
the question of Lithuanian e´migre´s holding dual nationality.11 Emi-
grants voiced their discontent with the fact that they were stripped of
their Lithuanian nationality when acquiring the nationality of another
state. The new Law accommodated their requests and in addition pro-
vided for possibilities to have their nationality status re-instated. How-
ever, some national minorities protested against the Law. They argued
that permitting dual nationality only to ethnic Lithuanians contravenes
the Constitution and international norms.
The new Law on the Implementation of the Republic of Lithuania
Law on Citizenship was adopted in 2003 (amended in 2004). One of
the main provisions stated that those who applied for nationality under
the 1989 Law, but did not receive a document confirming their status
and were residing abroad, lost their nationality on 31 December 2003.
This decision was made by the Minister of the Interior.
The new Citizenship Law slightly amended art. 1 defining the cate-
gories of nationals. It now includes references not only to children and
grandchildren of persons who were nationals prior to 15 June 1940 or
permanent residents from 9 January 1919 to 15 June 1940 but also to
their great-grandchildren. Moreover, those who were nationals prior to
15 June 1940 and their descendants (including great-grandchildren) do
not have an obligation to renounce a nationality held from another
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state. Reference to 16 February 1918 has been lifted and, thus, any per-
son of Lithuanian descent is a Lithuanian citizen if he or she does not
have any other nationality. Hence, the Law expands the category of per-
sons who have an inherent right to nationality of Lithuania up to the
fourth generation, and introduces conditions for simplified restoration
of nationality for those who lost their Lithuanian nationality but have
an inherent right to it. The former art. 17 has been simplified and art.
18 has been deleted altogether.
The conditions upon which a child is considered a citizen if only
one parent is a Lithuanian citizen have also been slightly changed. Ac-
cording to the new art. 9, a child shall be a citizen if born in the terri-
tory of Lithuania and one of the parents is a national. In the case of a
child born outside Lithuania, his or her nationality is to be determined
by an agreement between the parents (of whom one must be a Lithua-
nian national) until he or she reaches eighteen years of age. This shall
be done irrespectively of their place of permanent residence. Art. 10
provides ius soli acquisition of nationality for children whose parents
are stateless persons permanently residing in Lithuania.
The conditions for acquiring Lithuanian nationality were made stric-
ter for spouses (art. 14). Firstly, the 2002 Law provided that only those
spouses who had been married for at least five years and had been resi-
dent in Lithuania for that period were to be granted nationality. They
had to pass exams on language and the Constitution and were not al-
lowed to hold another nationality. Thus, stricter requirements were in-
troduced as previously only three years of residence were required.
With the amendments effective from January 2005, the residence re-
quirement for spouses of Lithuanian nationals has been raised even
further to seven years.12 Secondly, persons married to Lithuanian na-
tionals who were deportees or political prisoners and their children
born in exile are no longer exempt from the Lithuanian language
exam. They also have to reside in Lithuania for five, not three years as
before. Thirdly, the Law has introduced conditions upon which a per-
son can acquire nationality in the case of his or her spouse being de-
ceased, if they were married for more than a year with residence in
Lithuania. In these cases a person could acquire Lithuanian nationality
after three years of residence provided that he or she passes the exams
on language and the Constitution and renounces his or her previous
nationality. However, after the amendments effective from January
2005 the residence requirement was raised to five years.
It shall be noted that at least some amendments were introduced be-
cause of a ruling of the Constitutional Court of Lithuania in case No.
40/03 of 30 December 2003 regarding the granting of nationality by
way of exception.13 A Seimas resolution asked the Court’s ruling on the
possible violation of the constitutional principle of equality by the Pre-
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sident when he granted nationality by exception to one of his advisors,
Jurij Borisov. These events were heatedly debated and subsequently led
to an impeachment procedure against the President. In summary, the
Constitutional Court ruled that in cases where the President grants na-
tionality by way of exception he or she shall verify the service which
was given to Lithuania as a state, establish whether the person has per-
manent factual links with Lithuania, whether the applicant is not sub-
ject to any exceptions mentioned in the Law as well as his or her possi-
bilities to recover nationality on his or her own initiative in accordance
with the Law. Moreover, the Court emphasised that the legislator can-
not deny the nature and meaning of the institution of citizenship and
the relevance of the Constitution, which allows dual nationality only in
individual cases provided for by the law. This means that cases of dual
citizenship must be extraordinarily rare and exceptional.
Generally the Law streamlines the conditions for the acquisition and
retention of nationality of the previous Law which due to its numerous
amendments became too cumbersome. A number of provisions are ex-
cluded because they do not relate to the acquisition or retention of na-
tionality but rather dealt with the conditions for entry and residence in
the territory of Lithuania. The Law is clearer regarding the continuity
and restoration of nationality as well as dual nationality. Moreover, it
brings the conditions in line with the requirements of human rights
law (groups excluded from acquiring nationality, loss of nationality due
to invalid passport, etc.) and provides for stricter requirements in cer-
tain cases (spouses). Finally, the Law grants more authority to the Min-
ister of the Interior and clarifies a number of provisions in relation to
the naturalisation procedure. These latest provisions came into force
on 1 April 2006.14
3.2 Basic principles of the most important current modes of
acquisition and loss of nationality
3.2.1 General principles of the acquisition of nationality
Art. 12 of the Constitution proclaims that ‘citizenship of the Republic
of Lithuania shall be acquired by birth or on other grounds established
by law’. However, the Citizenship Law does not mention the principle
of reducing statelessness as a possible guideline for the nationality pol-
icy of the state (Ziemele 1998: 248). There is no support for the argu-
ment that Lithuania has adopted the ius soli principle in addition to
the ius sanguinis principle as basis for the acquisition of nationality in
the Law.
Art. 7 enumerates the grounds on which the nationality of Lithuania
can be acquired by: (1) birth; (2) exercising the right to nationality; (3)
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naturalisation; (4) international treaties; (5) reference to other grounds
provided in legislation. Reference to international treaties is unclear. It
can be argued that in cases where the Citizenship Law contravenes
Lithuania’s international obligations the norms of the treaties would
then be directly applicable.
3.2.2 Right to nationality
The Lithuanian Citizenship Law identifies a number of groups who
are considered Lithuanian nationals by birth and by exercising the
right to nationality. The Law provides for the retaining of the right to
citizenship. It was designed to prevent persons residing in foreign
states who had held citizenship prior to the occupation from losing
their link to Lithuania, irrespective of their ethnic origin. Those who re-
tained the right to citizenship could become citizens in two ways – by
claiming the right to citizenship or by restoring their citizenship.15 Na-
tionals are, firstly, those individuals who were nationals by right, i.e.
they were nationals before 15 June 1940 or are of Lithuanian descent.
However, a distinction is made within this category of people between
nationals ipso facto who do not have to renounce the nationality of an-
other state and those who have to do so in order to become nationals
of Lithuania. In both cases their right is preserved indefinitely. Sec-
ondly, nationals are people who were born in the territory and have
subsequently resided there (Ziemele 2001: 237). They are given the
right to acquire nationality on the basis of application because their
links with Lithuania are not considered as obvious (Ziemele 2001:
237). Otherwise, they are regarded as foreigners, albeit with the right to
permanent residence. In comparison with the first group, their right to
opt for nationality is not preserved indefinitely (Ziemele 1998: 222).
Thirdly, children born to Lithuanian parents and foundlings shall be
Lithuanian nationals while children born to stateless persons have the
right to acquire nationality. The provision is neutral regarding the gen-
der of the parents.
Nationals residing outside Lithuania can submit their applications to
diplomatic and consular missions. The Minister of the Interior has the
authority to submit a recommendation to recognise a person as having
lost nationality, and to receive applications for retention of nationality
by persons who were nationals prior to 15 May 1940 and those of
Lithuanian descent. According to art. 29 if a person fails to obtain the
necessary documents attesting Lithuanian nationality held prior to 15
June 1940 or his or her Lithuanian descent, the Minister of the Inter-
ior or Minister of Foreign Affairs and institutions authorised by them
may apply to the Presidential Citizenship Commission for a verifica-
tion of facts. The Commission presents its recommendatory findings
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to the Minister of the Interior or the institution authorised by him. Ac-
cording to art. 31, repeated applications shall be accepted no earlier
than one year after the adoption of the previous decision.
3.2.3 Naturalisation
Art. 12 lays down several requirements to be met in order to acquire
Lithuanian nationality.
The requirements are the following:
– passing the Lithuanian language exam (speaking and reading);16
– ten years of permanent residence in Lithuania;
– permanent employment contract or a constant legal source of sup-
port;
– knowledge of the Constitution;
– lack of any other nationality; and
– agreement to take the oath to Lithuania.
Amendments in 1995 lifted the requirements of the language exam
and the knowledge of the Constitution exam for persons over 65 years
of age, disabled persons of group I and II17 and the sick with grave
chronic mental diseases. These exceptions were upheld in the 2002
Law. In addition, this Law has lifted the requirement that refugees have
to be stateless or renounce their nationality prior to applying for
Lithuanian nationality.
Art. 12 provides that interests of the state have to be taken into con-
sideration when nationality is granted. The application of this provision
is unclear and open to discretion.
The terms ‘permanent residence in the territory of Lithuania’ and
‘constant legal source of support’ were clarified in sect. 3 of the Su-
preme Council Resolution on the Procedure for Implementing the Re-
public of Lithuania Law on Citizenship (adopted on 10 December
1991). A person shall be considered as permanently residing in Lithua-
nia if he or she has been registered in the register of permanent resi-
dents, has accommodation, and is employed in Lithuania under an em-
ployment contract or has another paid occupation in Lithuania and
pays taxes there. A person will also be considered as permanently resid-
ing if he or she is somebody’s dependent or is paid a pension legally
due to him or her in Lithuania. Residency is counted including the per-
iod 1940-1991 (Kalvaitis 1998: 264).
Lithuanian practice as confirmed by the Constitutional Court in Case
7/94 has established that neither an occupying army nor repressive
structures of a foreign state which resided in Lithuania without con-
sent of Lithuania’s authorities could be considered as lawfully residing
for the purpose of the permanent residence requirement of the Citizen-
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ship Law (Ziemele 2001: 236). Likewise, service in such foreign forces
cannot be considered as legal employment. Moreover, this interpreta-
tion is valid also in the context of the 1989 Law.
According to art. 16, the President has the right to grant nationality
by exception. The requirements for this option are, first, significant
contribution to strengthening of Lithuanian statehood by the person in
question. Second, the person has to contribute to Lithuania’s power
and its authority in the international community. Third, the person
should be integrated into the Lithuanian society, i.e. he or she must
have permanent factual links with Lithuania. Fourth, according to the
ruling of the Constitutional Court in Case 40/03, art. 13 is applicable
in these cases.
Art. 13 identifies the groups of persons precluded from acquiring na-
tionality. Those include persons who (1) have committed crimes against
humanity or acts of genocide; (2) have taken part in criminal activities
against Lithuania; (3) before coming to Lithuania have been tried for a
deliberate crime for which the criminal liability is imposed in Lithua-
nia or have been sentenced in Lithuania; (4) are chronic alcoholics or
drug addicts and (5) have especially dangerous infectious diseases.
The exclusion of alcoholics, drug addicts and criminals applied until
the adoption of the 2002 Law. Criminals who were convicted before
the adoption of the Law were subject to an ex post facto penalty to their
punishment. The exclusion from naturalisation of alcoholics and drug
addicts was particularly pernicious because it discouraged them from
seeking needed treatment.18
Since 1 January 2005, groups (1) and (2) have been broadened and
now include not only those persons who committed aforementioned
crimes but also those who were preparing or attempting to commit
those crimes and acts. Moreover, the amendments added that those
who do not have the right to reside in Lithuania cannot be granted na-
tionality.
Since then, art. 13 on conditions for withholding nationality has been
changed to bring it in line with human rights requirements. Firstly, it
no longer states that chronic alcoholics, drug addicts or those ill with
especially dangerous infectious diseases cannot become nationals. Sec-
ondly, the scope of persons who have had criminal charges against
them has been minimised. The Law no longer refers to persons who,
before coming to Lithuania, have been tried for a deliberate crime but
only to persons who, before coming to Lithuania, have had a custodial
sentence imposed on them for a premeditated crime. Also, in relation
to those convicted in Lithuania, reference is made to premeditated
crimes, not deliberate ones.
The procedures for resolving issues related to nationality are set out
in chapter V of the Law. The chapter includes detailed information as
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to what documents shall be submitted in each case when a person ap-
plies for nationality. According to para. 10 of art. 28 all applications for
the acquisition, renunciation and restoration of nationality shall be
submitted to the President through the executive institution of the mu-
nicipality. Applications for nationality are reviewed by the Citizenship
Commission which is established by the President. It submits propo-
sals for a decision to the President. Decrees by the President should be
co-signed by the Minister of the Interior. According to the Constitu-
tional Court, the responsibility for these decrees lies with the ministers.
The reason for this is that the President can be removed from office
only for grave violations of the Constitution. In the case of a denial, an
applicant is provided with a reasoned decision in writing. According to
art. 30, decrees by the President concerning the granting, retention, re-
storation or loss of nationality as well as declaring an act on the grant-
ing of nationality invalid are published in the Official Gazette.
3.2.4 Loss of nationality
The grounds for loss of Lithuanian nationality are outlined in art. 18. It
provides that nationality is lost (1) upon renunciation; (2) upon acquisi-
tion of nationality of another state; (3) on grounds provided for by inter-
national agreements to which Lithuania is a party.19 Paragraph 2 of the
same article states that nationality should not be lost in cases when a
person acquires the citizenship of another state with which Lithuania
has concluded a contract on dual citizenship. A person may be recog-
nised as having lost nationality if he or she is in the military service of
another state or is employed in the public service of a non-EU Member
State without permission of the Lithuanian authorities. According to
the amendments in 2004 (effective of 1 April 2006), a Lithuanian citi-
zen working in another state under the permission of the Lithuanian
authorities would lose Lithuanian nationality if he or she were to injure
the interests of Lithuania. The formulation is wide and it is unclear
what is meant by damaging Lithuanian interests. Acquiring the nation-
ality of another state does not result in loss of nationality for two
groups of persons, i.e. those who were nationals prior to 15 June 1940
and their descendants as well as persons of Lithuanian descent.20 A
person may be recognised as having lost nationality if he or she is in
the military service of another state or is employed in the public service
of another state without permission of the Lithuanian authorities.
Moreover, there are a number of grounds on which naturalisation
can be invalidated. Art. 21 provides that, firstly, naturalisation will be
deemed invalid if nationality has been acquired by fraud or if a person
has committed international crimes provided for by the international
treaties or customary law (aggression, genocide, crimes against human-
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ity, war crimes or crimes against Lithuania). Secondly, the act of natur-
alisation will be declared invalid if the court establishes that after 15
June 1940 a person has ‘organised or carried out deportation or exter-
mination of the residents, suppressed the resistance movement in
Lithuania’ (official translation). The same result would be reached if a
court establishes that a person took part in the actions against indepen-
dence and territorial integrity of Lithuania after 11 March 1990.
The act of invalidation applies to naturalised nationals and Lithua-
nian descendants, if they have opted for Lithuanian nationality (Ziemele
1998: 221). A declaration of invalidity may be used as an additional pen-
alty in relation to other criminal charges, e.g. if a person has committed
crimes against humanity, acts of genocide or crimes against the Repub-
lic of Lithuania, prior to or after acquisition of nationality, as determined
by the court decree. Original nationals cannot be subjected to such an
additional penalty in similar circumstances (Ziemele 1998: 250). The ar-
ticle does not set any precise time limit within which charges brought
against a person for crimes against Lithuania could affect naturalisation.
This again opens the possibility of arbitrary decisions which could result
in statelessness and would run contrary to the rule prohibiting arbitrary
deprivation of nationality (Ziemele 1998: 250).
Art. 30 provides that invalidation of nationality is enacted by the Pre-
sident of Lithuania who issues a decree to that effect. The decree is not
subject to judicial scrutiny. As the Lithuanian Citizenship Law is both
complex and cumbersome on a number of issues the right to appeal
decisions would be more than desirable (Ziemele 1998: 222).
According to art. 19, everyone has a right to renounce their national-
ity. However, the same article provides for exceptions. Thus application
for renunciation may not be considered if the person has been charged
with a criminal act or if a court judgement passed on the person has be-
come effective and enforceable. Setting the absence of criminal charges
as a condition for the renunciation of nationality may also raise human
rights considerations. The person may still be entitled to renounce na-
tionality, which would not affect procedures employed by the state as
long as the person remains within its jurisdiction (Ziemele 1998: 249).
The Law on Citizenship places additional safeguards in order not
to allow cases of statelessness to arise. Art. 20 provides that a person
who has lost nationality as a result of renunciation or on grounds
provided in an international treaty may be reinstated with Lithuanian
nationality if he or she submits an application while having perma-
nently resided in Lithuania for at least ten years, has a legal source
of support and is stateless. Special conditions are provided for those
who were nationals or permanent residents before 15 June 1940 and
their descendants as well as persons of Lithuanian descent. If they
have lost nationality as a result of renunciation or on the basis of an
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international treaty, Lithuanian nationality is restored automatically
on the basis of application.
3.3 Current political debates
The most recent proposals in the field of nationality policies aim to re-
solve issues concerning dual nationality. Over the years, the group en-
titled to dual citizenship has been considerably expanded.
According to the Citizenship Law, the right to nationality is retained
by, and dual nationality allowed for, those who were nationals prior to
15 June 1940, their children, grandchildren and great-grandchildren
who have not repatriated, as well as persons of Lithuanian descent.
Thus, several categories can be distinguished. Firstly, persons of Lithua-
nian origin are considered to be Lithuanian citizens and retain the right
to citizenship irrespective of where they reside abroad. Secondly, per-
sons of other ethnic origin are divided into two groups depending on
where they reside. If their place of residence is their ethnic homeland,
they are not considered citizens of Lithuania. For instance, if Poles
holding Lithuanian citizenship moved to Poland during the period of
Soviet annexation they no longer qualify for Lithuanian citizenship.
According to art. 12, para. 2 of the Lithuanian Constitution, no one
may be a citizen of both the Republic of Lithuania and another state at
the same time except in individual cases provided for by law. This arti-
cle forms part of Chapter One of the Constitution, which, according to
art. 147, can only be altered by referendum, meaning that more than
half of the electorate must vote in favour of a change. However, recent
amendments to the Citizenship Laws have provided large groups of
persons with the right to dual nationality. In response to a petition pre-
sented by an Israeli citizen who also claimed to be a Lithuanian citizen
this reform was challenged in the Constitutional Court by a group of
parliamentarians and by the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court.
The Court emphasised that art. 12 of the Constitution should be in-
terpreted narrowly, i.e. that cases of dual citizenship must be extraordi-
narily rare and exceptional, and that the Constitution does not permit
the widespread granting of dual citizenship. In cases involving the
granting of citizenship based on special merits, the Court has stressed
that candidates must prove permanent factual links to the state and
must be integrated into society before being granted citizenship. The
Court considers the provisions for dual citizenship in the Citizenship
Law to be highly controversial, inconsistent and confusing. Some provi-
sions are barely compatible with each other while others are phrased
ambiguously. As a consequence, the Court declared those provisions of
the Citizenship Law that could lead to dual nationality as unconstitu-
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tional. While the Court noted that it is not against the Constitution to
grant a right to Lithuanian citizenship, the relevant articles providing
for the right to retain another nationality when acquiring or regaining
Lithuanian nationality were found to be in violation of art. 12 of the
Constitution. This conclusion is confusing because in its earlier ruling
in case 7/94, the Court accepted the practice of dual citizenship in rela-
tion to pre-1940 nationals and their descendants. Moreover, the Court
declared that categorising people according to their ethnic origins to es-
tablish whether their right to citizenship has been retained or not (in
the case of repatriation) violates art. 29 of the Constitution, which pro-
vides for equality before the law.21
During the spring and summer of 2007, several proposals for
amendments were tabled. For instance, it was suggested that dual citi-
zenship should be allowed for children born abroad if at least one par-
ent is a Lithuanian citizen. The draft amendments were criticised by ex-
perts as being too general and ambiguous and became bogged down in
various parliamentary committees. Meanwhile, the Lithuanian parlia-
mentary Social Liberals successfully collected the 40 signatures of
members of parliament necessary to initiate a referendum on the legali-
sation of dual citizenship.22 This referendum was planned to coincide
with parliamentary elections in the fall of 2008 but did not take
place.23
However, the amendments were reconsidered in 2008 and adopted
by the Human Rights Committee on 4 June and subsequently by par-
liament on 30 June 2008. The amendments concerned seven groups.
Most notably among these amendments was the one that prevented
persons who had acquired citizenship of EU and NATO Member States
or of a country with which Lithuania has signed a mutual agreement
on dual citizenship from losing their Lithuanian citizenship.24 Seventy-
eight MPs voted in favour of the amendments, four against them and
nine abstained. Nevertheless, the Lithuanian legal scholar Dainius Zali-
mas has argued that these amendments violate the Constitution and
devalue the significance of Lithuanian citizenship. He has suggested
solving the problems that emigrants encounter by regulating the right
to citizenship rather than citizenship itself. He has also advocated for
the adoption of regulations similar to the Polish card system (see
Go´rny & Pudzianowska in this volume), which would allow for the pre-
servation of certain benefits for former Lithuanian citizens who have
acquired citizenship in another country.25
President Valdas Adamkus vetoed certain provisions in the amend-
ments, including the provisions on dual citizenship for those who hold
a passport of an EU or a NATO Member State. According to the Presi-
dent, the amendments broaden too widely the possibilities for granting
(retaining) dual citizenship and ‘create legal prerequisites for dual citi-
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zenship that allow a rare exemption to become a widespread phenom-
enon’. The parliament agreed with the President and amended the law
again on 15 July 2008. The vote was 66 parliamentarians approving
the President’s amendments, while ten voted against them and seven
abstained. The adopted amendments expanded the possibilities for
dual citizenship, e.g. for children who acquire Irish or Lithuanian citi-
zenship by birth. However, this is not the end of the story. With the
presidential veto, the current law became the provisional law, valid only
until 1 January 2010. Since neither the government nor interest groups
have come up with a new law, the president entrusted a group of law-
yers with the task of presenting solutions. The group concluded that it
is highly unlikely that a referendum on the amendment of art. 12 of
the Constitution would succeed (the law can only be changed if a ma-
jority of at least 50 per cent of all eligible voters agree). The group of
lawyers therefore drafted a new Law on Citizenship, presented to the
president on 9 February 2009.
3.4 Statistics
Taking into account that nationality and statelessness issues were not
high on the political agenda due to the liberal approach adopted in the
1989 Law, no exact statistics were maintained. Lithuanian statistical in-
formation is therefore rather poor.
Table 3.1 shows that the share of the titular ethnic group has been
rather high in Lithuania compared to Estonia and Latvia.
Table 3.1 Ethnic composition in Lithuania
1979 1989 2001 2007
Lithuanians 80% 79.6% 83.5% 84.7%
Non-Lithuanians 20% 20.4% 16.5% 15.4%
Sources: Statistikos Departmentas, 1979, 1989, 2001: population censuses, 2007: estima-
tion carried out based on the data of the Residents’ Register central database, www.stat.
gov.lt
Data for the period from 1993 onwards are not available because no ex-
act statistics were maintained during that period. Data on naturalisa-
tion has only become available since 2002. The statistics show that the
number of persons acquiring Lithuanian citizenship was insignificant
between 2003 and 2007. Most of the new Lithuanian citizens were for-
mer Russian citizens or stateless persons. For instance, out of the 370
persons granted Lithuanian citizenship in 2007, 113 were former Rus-
sian citizens and 184 were former stateless persons.
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Table 3.2 Number of naturalised persons, 2003-2007
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Number 389 610 435 467 370
Source: Migration Department 2008: 56
A relatively large number of persons lost nationality between 2003 and
2007. Moreover, the number increased over the years, especially due to
acquisition of nationality of another state (see Table 3.3).
Table 3.3 Number of persons who have lost Lithuanian citizenship, by reasons
Grounds for loss of citizenship Number of persons
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Withdrawal of Lithuanian citizenship 235 315 207 216 280
Acquiring citizenship of another state 372 386 265 485 610
The person lawfully decided on Lithuanian citi-
zenship by 4 November 1991 in accordance
with the Law on Citizenship of 3 November
1989, resides in a foreign state and has not,
before 31 December 2003, approached institu-
tions authorised by the Minister of the Interior
or Lithuanian consular offices in foreign coun-
tries for issue of a document evidencing
Lithuanian citizenship
- 96 283 197 123
Severance of actual ties with Lithuania 1 1 - - -
Children under fourteen, if both parents lose
citizenship
- - - - 2
Total 608 798 755 898 1,015
Source: Migration Department 2008: 58
The retention of the right to citizenship did not play a significant role
between 2003 and 2007. However, the numbers increased in 2007.
Most applicants are Russian and Byelorussian citizens.
Table 3.4 Retention of the right to Lithuanian citizenship
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Decisions on retention of the right of aliens to
citizenship
145 90 20 47 163
Number of certificates issued for retention of the
right to citizenship
99 67 35 49 201
Source: Migration Department 2008: 61
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3.5 Conclusions
The Lithuanian approach to nationality issues has been considered as
more liberal than the regulations in other Baltic states because it did
not apply pre-1940 citizenship laws in order to reconstitute its body of
nationals. The Citizenship Law of 1989 provided easy criteria for acqui-
sition of nationality. As a result of these liberal laws, most of its resi-
dents acquired Lithuanian nationality. However, the Citizenship Law of
1991, enacted immediately after restoration of independence, intro-
duced much stricter requirements for the acquisition of Lithuanian na-
tionality. These are still in existence and in certain cases are more strin-
gent than the regulations in other Baltic states, such as the conditions
on residence before applying for citizenship.
One of the major areas currently debated is the regulation of dual
nationality in Lithuania. Dual nationality became restricted ever since
the adoption of the 1991 Citizenship Law and Constitution. Although
it was extended over the years, Lithuania was still criticised for the ex-
clusionary nature and unclear application of dual citizenship. The si-
tuation has become even more acute since the Constitutional Court of
Lithuania delegitimised nearly 30 statutory and sub-statutory provi-
sions and omissions in the nationality legislation on dual citizenship.
The possible solutions remain unclear, but they will have to be found
by January 2010 when the now provisional Citizenship Law will be-
come invalid.
Another problem of Lithuanian nationality policy is the wide discre-
tion given to the president concerning the granting of nationality. Not-
withstanding the amendments introduced after the decision of the
Constitutional Court in the Paksas case, the judicial review of all deci-
sions related to nationality would be a welcome development. This
would also facilitate Lithuania’s ratification of the European Conven-
tion on Nationality which has not yet been signed.
Chronological list of citizenship-related legislation in Lithuania
Date Document Content Source
1989 Supreme Soviet of the
Lithuanian Soviet Socialist
Republic Law on
Citizenship (3 November
1989, No. XI-3329)
Reconstitutes the body of
nationals by restoring
nationality to those who
were nationals before the
1940 occupation and their
descendants; provides for
liberal naturalisation of
residents
www.uta.edu
1991 Republic of Lithuania Law
on Citizenship
Introduces stricter
naturalisation
www.uta.edu
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Date Document Content Source
(5 December 1991,
No. I-2072 as amended on
2 July 1997, No. VIII-391)
requirements and a
complicated system in
relation to dual nationality
1991 Supreme Council of the
Republic of Lithuania
Resolution on the
Procedure for
Implementing the Republic
of Lithuania Law on
Citizenship (11 December
1991, No. I-2080)
Clarifies the application of
the Citizenship Law in
relation to inter alia per-
sons who served in armed
troops and other state se-
curity structures of the So-
viet Union
www.litlex.lt
(in Lithuanian)
1991 Law on the Validity of
Citizenship Documents
issued by the Republic of
Lithuania and on the
Supplement to the Law on
Citizenship (void since 1
January 2003)
Confirms that Citizen’s
Certification Card and
Certification Testifying
Decision to Acquire
Citizenship shall be valid
until the person is issued
with new citizens’ passport
but no longer than 1 July
1993; supplements
Citizenship Law of 1991;
provides that new
Citizenship Law shall
replace 1989 Law on 11
December 1991
www.legislationline.org
(excerpts)
1992 Constitution of the
Republic of Lithuania
Confirms the basic
principles of acquisition of
Lithuanian nationality (ius
sanguinis) and a negative
position in relation to dual
nationality
www.litlex.lt
(in Lithuanian)
2002 Law on Citizenship (as last
amended by the Law of 3
April 2003, No. IX-1456)
Repeals the 1991 Law;
extends the category of
persons who have inherent
right to nationality and
simplifies the restoration
of nationality; clarifies
Lithuania’s position on
dual nationality; introduces
ius soli for children whose
parents are stateless and
reside in Lithuania;
introduces higher
requirements for spouses
of Lithuanian nationals
www.coe.int;
www.legislationonline.org
2002 Law on Implementation of
the Law on Citizenship (as
last amended by the Law of
21 January 2003, No. IX-
1298)
Clarifies the procedural
requirements in cases of
dual nationality
www.coe.int;
www3.lrs.lt (in Lithuanian)
LITHUANIAN NATIONALITY 117
Date Document Content Source
2003 Ruling of the
Constitutional Court of
Lithuania on the
Compliance of the
President of the Republic
of Lithuania with Decree
No. 40 on Granting
Citizenship of the Republic
of Lithuania by way of
Exception of 11 April 2003
States that citizenship of
the Republic of Lithuania is
granted to Jurij Borisov by
way of exception in
compliance with the
Constitution of the
Republic of Lithuania and
para. 1 of art. 16 of the
Republic of Lithuania’s
Law on Citizenship (30
December 2003)
www.lrkt.lt (in Lithuanian)
2004 Amendments to the Law
on Citizenship (12
September 2004, No. IX-
1078)
Brings the law in line with
human rights standards
(regarding refugees,
alcoholics, drug addicts);
takes into account the
ruling of the Constitutional
Court in the Borisov case
in relation to procedural
aspects of nationality
policies
www3.lrs.lt (in Lithuanian)
2004 Amendments to the Law
on the Implementation of
the Law on Citizenship (11
November 2004, No. IX-
1079)
Streamlines the
procedures for the
acquisition of nationality
attempting to address
problems as envisaged in
the Borisov case
www3.lrs.lt (in Lithuanian)
2006 Ruling of the
Constitutional Court of
Lithuania on the
Compliance of the
Provisions of Legal Acts
Regulating the Citizenship
Relations with the
Constitution of the
Republic of Lithuania of 13
November 2006
Repeals provisions in the
Citizenship Law
concerning dual nationality
2008 Amendments to the Law
on Citizenship (15 July
2008)
Provides for dual
citizenship for certain
groups as a result of the
2006 Constitutional Court
Ruling, which declared the
norms on dual citizenship
to be unconstitutional
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Notes
1 I would like to thank Prof. Ineta Ziemele and Prof. Egidijus Kuris for their
comments on the draft of this article. The usual disclaimer applies.
2 Permanent residence was determined by so-called propiska which is similar to a resi-
dence permit nowadays. It had to be obtained before individuals could move to an-
other place. This was applicable not only in between republics but also within repub-
lics. Report on Lithuania, European Commission against Racism and Intolerance.
Strasbourg, September 1997, ECRI (97) 56 para. 6.
3 Case No. 7/94 of 13 April 1994 (1994) 1 E.E.C.R.C.L.255. Available at www.lrkt.lt.
4 The texts used here are available at www.litlex.lt and www.minelres.lv.
5 This option was inserted with amendments of 3 October 1995.
6 This article was slightly amended on 6 February 1996. Prior to these amendments,
the law provided that citizenship shall be retained by children who had Lithuanian
citizenship until 15 June 1940 and who were born in Lithuania or in refugee camps
but are at present residing in other states.
7 Constitutional Court case No. 45/03-36/04
8 Before amendments of 7 December 1993, this condition was also applicable to
children of those who held Lithuanian citizenship until 15 June 1940.
9 See chapter 2 on Latvia in this volume.
10 Certain provisions of amendments have been effective since 1 April 2006, but some
since 1 January 2005.
11 For details on these debates, see the articles ‘Lithuanian e´migre´s unhappy with
citizenship loss’, ELTA [National News Agency], 6 June 2001, ‘New Law will entitle
Lithuanian emigrants to keep citizenship’, ELTA, 17 September 2002, and ‘Adamkus
signed controversial citizenship law’, ELTA 30 September 2002.
12 The proposed amendments were even stricter and debate was reopened after the
President of Lithuania intervened with proposals to liberalise the procedure for
naturalisation of spouses in Lithuania. The compromise reached was that the
required term of residency would be increased from five to seven years, but not to
ten years as foreseen in the draft law (86 in favour, five against, seven abstentions).
The President also opposed the additional requirement that the couple should have
minor children who are Lithuanian citizens. In his view, this would contradict the
principle of equality contained in the Constitution. The proposals made by the
President were harshly criticised by conservative members of parliament. They saw
the proposals as a threat to the survival of the Lithuanian nation and national
identity. Moreover, they were afraid that liberal citizenship procedures might
stimulate marriages of convenience, often referring to Denmark to illustrate this
point. See ‘Seimas approves more liberal procedures for admission to citizenship via
marriage’, ELTA, 9 December 2004.
13 Concerning this case, see also ‘Lithuanian Practice in International Law 2004’, as
reported in the Baltic Yearbook of International Law 5, 2005: 329-332.
14 In addition, on 1 April 2006 the authority on questions of citizenship, formerly
attributed to municipal institutions, was transferred to the Department of Migration
of the Ministry of the Interior.
15 Constitutional Court case No. 45/03-36/04.
16 On 11 February 2004, the Ministers of Education and Science and Justice confirmed
the programme of exams on the basics of the Lithuanian Constitution and language.
The procedure for the organisation and implementation of the exams was confirmed
by both ministers on 1 March 2004.
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17 There are three disability groups of which group I is the most serious. The group is
assigned by a special commission on the basis of a diagnosis. Assignments can be
for a defined period or for life. Group I is as a rule assigned for life.
18 Provisions at issue were closely monitored, at least, by Human Rights Watch, which
on a number of occasions condemned their application and advocated their abolition.
See the reports on human rights developments in Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia
available at www.hrw.org.
19 Before the 2002 Law was adopted, it was possible to lose one’s citizenship on the
basis of severance of actual links with Lithuania. A person who has lived abroad with
an invalid passport for more than three years or who has entered foreign military or
public service without the permission of the competent authorities was considered to
have severed links with Lithuania.
20 However, it is not entirely clear because according to art. 1, para. 3, persons of
Lithuanian descent can acquire Lithuanian citizenship if they are not citizens of any
other state. The only plausible explanation can be that according to art. 18 they do
not lose their right to acquire Lithuanian citizenship because they possess the
citizenship of another state.
21 Lithuanian Constitutional Court Ruling in Case No. 45/03-36/04, 13 November 2006.
22 ‘Lithuanian parliament collects signatures to initiate referendum on dual citizenship’,
BNS [National News Agency], 15 September 2007.
23 Radzevicˇu¯te A., ‘Lietuva¯ iespe¯jams referendums par dubultpilsonı¯bu [The
referendum on dual nationality in Lithuania is possible]’, Diena [Latvian daily news-
paper], 7 September 2007.
24 The other six groups are: (i) political deportees and prisoners and three generations
of their descendants; (ii) those who left Lithuania during the Soviet era as well as
three generations of their descendants; (iii) persons of Lithuanian descent living in
countries sharing a common border with Lithuania; (iv) persons already in
possession of passports from two other countries, granted by special decree of the
President; (v) offspring born to Lithuanian citizens anywhere in the world; (vi)
Lithuanians living in any nation that has signed an international agreement with
Lithuania on dual citizenship (‘Dual citizenship now allowed in Lithuania’, The Baltic
Times, 1 July 2008, www.baltictimes.com).
25 ‘Seimas’ Decision on multiple citizenship is unconstitutional and illogical’, ELTA, 30
June 2008.
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Part II
States with histories of shifting borders

4 Same letter, new spirit: Nationality regulations
and their implementation in Poland
Agata Go´rny and Dorota Pudzianowska
The development of the legal notion of Polish citizenship has gone
through twists and turns, shaped by the history of the country. Belong-
ing to the Polish nation has not always meant belonging to the Polish
state. Radical reconfigurations of Poland’s borders in the last century
explain this conceptual inconsistency as much as substantial political
and economic emigration from Poland does. Moreover, the Polish Peo-
ple’s Republic promoted the communist idea of a single socialist com-
munity comprised of inhabitants of Soviet Bloc countries. Thus, geo-
politics defined a concept of the nation that was far removed from how
many Polish people construed their own identity.
In the Polish case, it is, therefore, justified to differentiate between
the distinct concepts of ethnicity and nationality/citizenship. The latter
concept refers to the affiliation to the state and thus denotes the legal
bond between a citizen and the state. Ethnicity constitutes more of a
subjective feeling of belonging to an ethnic group or to a given nation,
along with concurrent objective criteria relating to a person’s ancestry.1
Such a distinction is necessary in an examination of Polish nationality
regulations and practice. In our opinion, ethnicity was very important
in the formulation of the law on nationality in the Polish People’s Re-
public and still plays a role in current Polish legislation.
The goal of this chapter is to demonstrate evolutions in the field of
Polish nationality, particularly focusing on its acquisition and loss. We
present changes not only in written law, but also in administrative
practice regarding Polish nationality. This is necessary because of the
high level of discretion that the Polish public authorities have in this
field. Analyses of regulations are further enriched with selected statis-
tics on the acquisition of Polish nationality in order to better represent
the nature of the phenomenon in Poland.
Apart from analysing legal acts and statistics, we also devote some
space to recently proposed bills on Polish nationality in order to indi-
cate the direction in which the approach towards Polish nationality has
been evolving since the 1990s. We argue that contemporary Polish na-
tionality policy (if we can talk about one) still puts the emphasis on
emigrants and the diaspora rather than on immigrants. Our argument
is supported by the debate and the work on new legislation relating to
matters of Polish nationality in the Polish Parliament during 1999-
2001. The focus on the diaspora is also evident when we consider the
two most recent acts adopted in the field related to nationality, namely
the Repatriation Act (2000)2 and the Act on the Polish Ethnicity Card
(2007)3 (Ustawa o Karcie Polaka).
The chapter opens with a historical overview of developments in na-
tionality legislation from the post-war era to the present. It then dis-
cusses basic rules governing the acquisition and loss of Polish national-
ity in contemporary Poland. The third section analyses debates regard-
ing new regulations and their underlying orientations as well as trends
in Polish nationality policy. Finally, selected statistics on the acquisition
of Polish nationality are provided and discussed.
4.1 Polish nationality in historical perspective
4.1.1 Introductory remarks
There have been three acts on Polish nationality – enacted in 1920,4
19515 and 19626 – that share important elements. First of all, the acqui-
sition of Polish nationality by birth has always been driven by the prin-
ciple of descent (ius sanguinis), with the territorial principle (ius soli)
merely playing an auxiliary role. Secondly, due to radical changes in
Poland’s international borders and long periods of emigration from Po-
land, establishing whether a given individual holds Polish nationality
has always been crucial to Polish legislation on this matter. Finally,
rules concerning foreigners’ naturalisation in Poland have been of sec-
ondary importance in the debates and legislation on Polish nationality,
despite considerable growth in immigration to Poland since the early
1990s.
4.1.2 Post-war arrangements (1945-1962)
The end of the Second World War and agreements signed between Sta-
lin and other allied leaders radically altered Polish territory. This in-
volved two major changes – loss of (formerly) eastern Polish lands in-
habited by Polish citizens and the acquisition of eastern German lands
populated largely by German citizens (the ‘Regained Territories’). The
loss of the eastern Polish territories brought with it the problem of re-
patriating Polish citizens from the new Soviet territory. This act was
based on several Polish-Soviet mutual repatriation agreements signed
in the 1940s and in 1957. On the basis of these agreements, people of
Polish and Jewish ethnicity, who had been Polish citizens as of 17 Sep-
tember 1939, were entitled to move and resettle within Poland’s new
borders (Łodzin´ski 1998). All repatriates were treated as Polish citi-
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zens, and automatically lost their foreign nationality upon repatriation
in Poland. The repatriation agreements signed with the Soviet Union
also concerned the resettlement of Polish citizens of non-Polish (Ukrai-
nian, Belarusian, Russian, etc.) ethnicity to the USSR. Thus, in both re-
patriation actions ethnicity constituted a decisive criterion.
Nevertheless, the biggest national group expatriated from Poland in
the post-war period, on the basis of the Potsdam agreements, were Ger-
mans. They were officially excluded by the Act on the Exclusion of Per-
sons of German Ethnicity from Polish Society (1946).7 This applied to
Germans not verified as Polish nationals or those manifesting their
German origins.8 Ethnic Poles, even those who had been German citi-
zens before the Second World War, were entitled to stay in Poland. Spe-
cial public bodies were established and appropriate legal rules intro-
duced to verify the Polish ethnicity of those who wished to stay in Po-
land.9 Two pivotal legal acts announced at that time were the Act on
Polish Nationality of Persons of Polish Ethnicity Inhabiting the Re-
gained Territories (1946)10 and a similar decree for inhabitants of the
former Free City of Gdan´sk (Danzig) (1947).11 These acts directly
linked a person’s nationality to his or her ethnicity.
Verification of ethnicity and objective ethnicity criteria were also in-
cluded in the 1951 Act on Polish Nationality. The Act obliged the inha-
bitants of the Regained Territories and the former Free City of Gdan´sk
to obtain adequate documents certifying their Polish ethnicity. It also
gave the right to Polish nationality to all Polish repatriates. Again, Pol-
ish citizenship was based primarily on ethnic criteria. This link was
also reflected in two subsequent legal acts concerning the permission
for the renunciation of Polish nationality for people of German
(1956)12 and Jewish (1958)13 ethnicities who left for their ethnic home-
lands (Albiniak & Czajkowska 1996: 324-325). Such acts were designed
to simplify the renunciation of Polish nationality. Behind these acts,
however, lay the idea of expelling those with non-Polish ethnicity from
the country. The fact that this pressure was directed towards selected
ethnic groups is symptomatic of this trend.
4.1.3 Stabilisation (1962-1989)
Another Act on Polish Nationality was passed in 1962. This Act re-
mained in effect, without any major amendments, until the end of the
communist era in Poland. It did not challenge the rules of acquisition
and loss of Polish nationality included in the 1951 Act. The 1962 Act
did not directly address the issue of Polish ethnicity, although it still ac-
corded special rights to repatriates returning to Poland.14
The link between the ethnicity of a person and his or her right to
Polish nationality was made an issue in the late 1960s. Polish authori-
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ties officially challenged the loyalty of Polish citizens of Jewish origin.
These people, who were perceived as having ‘dual loyalties’ and had of-
ten been active in some way in political life, were forced to leave Po-
land after signing a document expressing their intention to renounce
their Polish nationality upon acquisition of Israeli nationality (Stola
2000). The legal basis for this ‘action of mass renunciation of Polish
nationality’ was the aforementioned Decree of 1958. It is not within
the scope of this analysis to present the comprehensive political back-
ground behind this move asking Jews to repudiate their Polish nation-
ality.15 This episode demonstrates, however, how the concept of Polish
ethnicity and its tight connection with the right to Polish nationality
was exploited in Poland under the communist regime.
Furthermore, the communist authorities often required Polish emi-
grants to relinquish their Polish nationality whenever they came to visit
Poland. If they refused to do so, they risked being imprisoned in Po-
land for illegally overstaying abroad. Here ‘a need to renounce’ Polish
nationality was justified not in terms of the ethnicity criterion, but in
terms of a lack of loyalty towards the Polish People’s Republic and its
ideology.
In general, the analysis of legal acts on Polish nationality, alone, does
not allow for a thorough understanding of the issues of nationality in
communist Poland. This is due to the authorities’ high level of discre-
tionary powers regarding Polish nationality at that time, which was par-
ticularly evident in how ethnicity was used in administrative decisions.
Although absent from the 1962 Act on Polish Nationality, ethnicity
was a factor in decisions regarding Polish nationality and played a par-
ticular role in relation to German and Jewish minorities. Special de-
crees designed for these two groups in 1956 and 1958 were in force un-
til 1984 (Albiniak & Czajkowska 1996: 326).
4.1.4 Political and economic transition (the post-1989 era)
The end of the Polish People’s Republic and the establishment of the
Third Republic of Poland necessitated deep economic and political re-
forms in the country. Likewise, policymakers claimed as early as 1989
that there was need for a new nationality law. However, the 1962 Act
on Polish Nationality, with some amendments in the late 1990s and at
the beginning of the 2000s, is still in force.16 Nevertheless, some pol-
icy changes regarding Polish nationality have been introduced. These
changes in policy take advantage of the way provisions of the 1962 Act
on Polish Nationality were formulated. Therefore, an approach based
on a high level of discretion of public officials in conferring Polish na-
tionality has been continued in the Third Republic of Poland.
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The most significant amendments to the 1962 Act were introduced
in 1997-1998. Rules regarding the loss of Polish nationality were chan-
ged since one of the clauses of the Act – namely that ‘acquisition of a
foreign nationality results in the loss of Polish nationality’ – violated
the 1997 Polish Constitution17 (Jagielski 2000). An amendment was
passed to make it impossible to deprive anybody of Polish nationality
unless he or she expressed the desire to renounce it. A definition of
the type of stay (permanent residence permit) was added to the five-
year residence requirement for naturalisation. Although the exact peri-
od of total legal residence in Poland varies for different groups of for-
eigners, in practice, this change amounts to at least ten years of resi-
dency before a foreigner can apply for naturalisation, because it takes
at least five years to obtain a permanent residence permit. Changes
were also introduced to the procedure of acquiring nationality by mar-
riage. Whereas this path to Polish nationality was previously open only
to foreign women married to Poles, foreign men can now also acquire
Polish nationality by marrying a Polish woman. In 2001, provisions
concerning repatriation were removed from the Act on Polish National-
ity. A separate legal act known as the Repatriation Act that dealt with
this issue was implemented in 2000.
The Ordinance of the President of the Republic of Poland put into
force in 200018 was a step towards reducing discretion in decisions re-
garding the acquisition and loss of Polish nationality, although it did
not change the procedures significantly. However, while these proce-
dures previously had no legally binding basis, the 2000 Ordinance lists
all of the documents and forms required by the Presidential Chancel-
lery to process appropriate applications. The President initiated another
significant change to Polish nationality policy. In 1999, he expressed
his will (in the form of a legal act) to terminate all of the remaining
conventions with other former communist countries concerning pre-
vention of dual nationality.19 These conventions had affected foreign-
ers’ naturalisation processes by creating inequality among applicants
for Polish nationality. Most former Soviet Bloc citizens were not al-
lowed to retain their previous nationalities upon naturalisation in Po-
land, whereas other foreigners were subject to the discretionary deci-
sion by the Polish President. Since 2002, as a consequence of the Pre-
sident’s initiative, Poland has ceased to be a party to those
conventions.20
NATIONALITY REGULATIONS AND THEIR IMPLEMENTATION IN POLAND 127
4.2 Basic principles of current regulations on Polish nationality
4.2.1 Principles concerning Polish nationality
The legal regulations concerning Polish nationality can be found in the
amended 1962 Act on Polish Nationality as well as in the Repatriation
Act of 2000. The 1997 Polish Constitution formulated two principles
concerning nationality (art. 34). One states that the basic mode of ac-
quisition of Polish nationality is by birth to parents who are Polish citi-
zens (the ius sanguinis principle).21 The other principle stipulates an
absolute guarantee that no one can be deprived arbitrarily of his or her
Polish nationality.
Other principles are stated in the Act on Polish Nationality itself.
The principle of the continuity of Polish nationality (art. 1) translates
the idea of the persistence of Polish nationality in time (from the mo-
ment of its acquisition until the moment of its loss) into law. Under
this principle, the nationality status acquired under a given statute sur-
vives all subsequent changes in the statute, i.e. it is always considered
under the law in force at the moment of acquisition. The principle of
exclusivity of Polish nationality (art. 2) means that a person with dual
or multiple nationality is treated (domestically but also abroad) as a
Polish national by the Polish public authorities; it cannot be interpreted
as forbidding dual nationality. The principle of equal citizenship rights
for both husband and wife (art. 3) means that a conclusion of marriage
by a Polish national with a person who is not a Polish national does
not produce an automatic change in nationality for either husband or
wife and a change of nationality of one spouse does not induce the
change of nationality of the other.22
4.2.2 Acquisition of Polish nationality
Polish law provides for several modes of acquiring Polish nationality,
which can be divided into three basic groups according to their legal
form. The first group comprises modes of acquiring nationality ex lege
(acquisition at birth and acquisition through the repatriation proce-
dure). The second group comprises modes of acquisition through ap-
plication (acquisition by conferment and acknowledgement). The third
group unites modes of acquisition through declaration (by marriage,
option and reacquisition).
Acquisition of nationality at birth is mainly based on the ius sangui-
nis principle. A child acquires Polish nationality irrespective of the
place of birth when at least one parent is a Polish national (art. 4.2 and
art. 6). If the child has only one parent who is a Polish national and ac-
quires another nationality at birth, the parents can renounce the child’s
Polish nationality within three months after birth. Children born in Po-
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land to foreign parents do not acquire Polish nationality unless they
would otherwise be stateless. This means that ius soli is treated as an
auxiliary principle to determine the nationality of a child found or born
in the Polish territory if the child’s parents are unknown, stateless or
their nationality cannot be established (art. 5). All changes in the deter-
mination of a parent of a child or with regard to the nationality of one
or both parents will be considered in determining the nationality of a
child only if they occur within one year from the birth of the child (art.
7.1) Hence, acquisition of nationality by legitimisation, for instance, is
possible until the child’s first birthday. Afterwards, legitimisation
would have no effect on the child’s nationality.
Automatic acquisition of nationality is also possible through repatria-
tion. This is the only mode of acquiring Polish nationality not defined
in the Act on Polish Nationality but in a separate statute, namely the
Repatriation Act of 2000. According to this act, those holding a repa-
triation visa automatically acquire Polish nationality on the day they
cross the Polish border (art. 4). Repatriation visas are granted to those
of Polish descent, which is further defined to include those who once
had Polish nationality or who have at least one parent or grandparent
or two great-grandparents who were ethnic Poles or held Polish nation-
ality. Other conditions include a declaration by the person concerned
that he or she is of Polish ethnicity and proof of attachment to Polish
culture by nurturing Polish language, traditions and customs (art. 5).
Thus, this law uses both an ethnic criterion (Polish descent) and a cul-
tural criterion to determine a person’s belonging to the Polish nation.23
A foreigner may be granted Polish nationality by conferment (regu-
lar naturalisation) if he or she has resided in Poland for at least five
years on the basis of one of three types of permanent residence permit
(art. 8).24 Since such a permit may only be acquired after at least five
years of legal residence,25 it follows that the period after which a per-
son is eligible for naturalisation is at least ten years. Applications are
submitted via voivods (provincial governors) or consuls (for those living
abroad) and these public authorities as well as the Minister of Internal
Affairs (prior to 2007 the Head of the Foreigners’ Office) normally give
their opinion on the application. Apart from information on the re-
quired period of residence, applications have to include information on
the parents’ nationality, sources of income, past employment, knowl-
edge of the Polish language and services rendered to Poland (or Polish
diaspora organisations, etc.).26 The power to grant nationality is a con-
stitutional prerogative of the President of the Republic of Poland. The
decision of the President is entirely discretionary since the criteria are
unclear, especially with regard to the assessment of the additional in-
formation.27 The President also does not have to grant nationality even
if all of the conditions have been fulfilled. The President’s decision
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may even be called arbitrary in the sense that the decisions do not have
to be justified and there is no judicial review available,28 which may be
considered contrary to the provisions of art. 11 and art. 12 of the Eur-
opean Convention on Nationality (ECN) of 1997.29 In ‘particularly jus-
tified cases’ the President can disregard the residence requirement (art.
8.2), but this only applies to achievement-based acquisition of national-
ity. The conferment may be conditional upon providing proof of loss of
the former nationality through withdrawal or renunciation (art. 8.3).
From all of these provisions it is evident that the conferment procedure
cannot be regarded as a legal entitlement and is instead based on the
exercise of sovereign power by the head of state.
A stateless person or a person whose nationality cannot be estab-
lished can be acknowledged as a Polish citizen if he or she has resided
in Poland for at least five years on the basis of one of three types of
permanent residence permit (art. 9; also see note 24). As with the nat-
uralisation of foreign nationals, this is a discretionary procedure. How-
ever, in contrast to the regular naturalisation procedure, in this case
the decisions are not made by the President but by voivods and consti-
tute administrative case decisions that have to be justified. In these
cases, administrative and judicial reviews are available.
Under Polish law (art. 8.4-8.7) Polish nationality acquired by parents
through conferment can be extended to their minor children. When
both parents acquire Polish nationality by conferment, it is automati-
cally extended to children under sixteen years of age, whereas the
child’s consent is necessary if the child is sixteen or older. If only one
parent acquires nationality, it may be extended to a child if other condi-
tions are fulfilled – either the child is under this parent’s exclusive par-
ental authority or the other parent is a Polish citizen or the other par-
ent gives his or her consent for the child’s acquisition of nationality in
front of a relevant public authority. The same rules apply to the filial
extension of acquisition of Polish nationality through the acknowledge-
ment procedure, provided that these children reside in Poland (art.
9.4).
Finally, there are three modes of acquiring nationality by declaration.
The first is spousal acquisition of nationality (art. 10). The spouse of a
Polish national acquires Polish nationality upon making a declaration
(which has to be accepted by the relevant public authority, i.e. voivods
or consuls) when he or she has lived in Poland on the basis of a per-
manent residence permit and has been married to the Polish national
for at least three years. Compared to regular naturalisation, the mini-
mum period of stay required is thus shortened by half (five instead of
ten years). The voivod or consul can exercise full discretion whether to
make the acceptance of the declaration conditional upon the proof of
loss of the former nationality.
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Another mode of acquiring nationality by declaration is acquisition
of nationality by option (art. 6.3). This mode addresses those who (hav-
ing one parent who is a Polish national) lost their Polish nationality in
childhood by parental declaration (loss of nationality by option). They
can reacquire this nationality in the period between the time they turn
sixteen and six months after coming of age upon making a declaration
in front of the relevant public authorities, i.e. voivods or consuls.
The third and last mode of acquiring nationality by declaration is re-
acquisition of nationality (art. 11), also called reintegration. A Polish ci-
tizen who lost Polish nationality by marrying a foreign citizen can re-
gain his or her nationality if the aforementioned marriage ceases to ex-
ist. In these cases a declaration made in front of the relevant public
authorities, i.e. voivods or consuls, must also be accepted. As in the
case of acquisition of nationality by marriage, the public authorities
can make the acceptance of the declaration dependent upon the proof
of loss of the former nationality.
4.2.3 Loss of Polish nationality
As we have already mentioned, Polish nationality cannot be withdrawn
against the will of the person concerned. A Polish citizen can lose his
or her nationality if he or she renounces it; the loss is conditional upon
the consent of the President of Poland (art. 13). The decision concern-
ing the issuing of this consent is the President’s constitutional preroga-
tive and is thus not subject to administrative or judicial review. A per-
mit to renounce one’s Polish nationality issued by the President ex-
tends to children who are under parental authority if both parents
stand to lose their nationality. It is automatic unless the children are
sixteen years of age or older (in which case their agreement is neces-
sary). A permit given to only one parent extends to children under par-
ental authority if the second parent has no parental authority, if he or
she is not a Polish citizen or if he or she is a Polish citizen but con-
sents to the child losing the Polish nationality in front of relevant pub-
lic authorities.
Polish nationality may also be lost shortly after birth due to parental
decision (loss by option). For a child who has acquired Polish national-
ity at birth, parents may choose the nationality of a foreign country of
which one of the parents is a national. This must be done within three
months of the child’s birth (art. 6.1), regardless of whether the child is
born in Poland or abroad. However, as already explained, a child can
reacquire his or her Polish nationality lost in this way (acquiring Polish
nationality by option, art. 6.3). The optional renunciation of Polish na-
tionality acquired by ius sanguinis, however, does not apply if, for ex-
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ample, both parents are Polish nationals abroad and the child has ac-
quired the nationality of his or her country of birth through ius soli.
During the communist period, the rules governing the loss of Polish
nationality were quite different. Many emigrants lost their nationality
contrary to their wills and would now like to have their Polish national-
ity restored. Unfortunately, there is no procedure to this end. Some
emigrants use the procedure in front of the voivod, who is authorised
to establish whether a given individual has acquired and currently
holds Polish citizenship, has forfeited it or has never held it. Through
an administrative decision, this authority can certify that someone
holds Polish nationality following proceedings that take into account
the principle of continuity of Polish nationality.
4.2.4 Dual nationality
Dual and multiple nationality is allowed under Polish law. There are,
however, certain nuances concerning the possibility of acquiring this
status. Dual nationals by birth are never required to choose one nation-
ality over the other (neither upon reaching the age of majority nor at
any other time). Naturalisation procedures, by contrast, distinguish be-
tween, on the one hand, individuals seeking to become naturalised Pol-
ish citizens and, on the other hand, Polish citizens seeking to natura-
lise in another state. The law in force favours the latter and Polish citi-
zens can freely obtain other nationalities while retaining their Polish
citizenship. Foreigners seeking to access Polish citizenship, however,
may be required – at the discretion of relevant public authorities – to
relinquish other nationality ties. One is thus tempted to use Sanford
Levinson’s formulation to say that Polish law ‘tolerates political bigamy
so long as the second political marriage follows, rather than precedes,
acquiring [Polish] citizenship’ (cited in Schuck 2002: 72).
Although nowadays multiple nationality as a legal status is tolerated
in Poland, this has not always been the case in the past. A ban on dual
nationality was a guiding principle of the 1920 and 1951 Acts on Polish
Nationality. This historical fact, as well as the wording of art. 2 of the
1962 Act on Polish Nationality, seems responsible for some confusion.
The article states that ‘according to the law, a Polish national cannot be
recognised as a national of another country’. The Highest Administra-
tive Court interpreted this provision as a prohibition of dual or multi-
ple nationality in one of its judgments.30 Such an interpretation seems,
however, inconsistent with the wording of the very article as it uses the
term ‘recognised’ (uznawany). This is obviously not the same as stating
a prohibition of having multiple nationalities, and the 1962 Act re-
frains from restating an explicit prohibition of multiple citizenship in
earlier regulations. Therefore, the view that Polish law generally prohi-
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bits dual nationality does not prevail and is – correctly – not shared by
most legal scholars (Jagielski 1998; Ramus 1968; Mincer-Jas´kowska
1998). Art. 2 should be interpreted as a rule resolving a very particular
problem, which arises in domestic law when a Polish national holds
several nationalities. Accordingly, a dual or multiple national will al-
ways be treated as a Polish national by Polish public authorities inside
the Polish territory as well as abroad. A multiple citizenship holder
cannot claim rights that stem from an additional nationality status or
avoid obligations stemming from Polish nationality or ask to be treated
as a foreigner (Ramus 1968). In other words, foreign citizenship ties
are considered irrelevant in front of Polish public authorities and he or
she is treated as if he or she was Polish only. This reading of art. 2 also
coincides with the specific rules governing acquisition of Polish nation-
ality as thus far described.
4.2.5 Act on the Polish Ethnicity Card
As with other countries in the Central and Eastern European region,
Poland has recently passed a law giving certain benefits to members of
its kin minorities living abroad. The Act on the Polish Ethnicity Card31
was passed in September 2007. The first bill of this law was discussed
in parliament almost ten years earlier. The scope of the card is re-
stricted to ethnic Poles who are not Polish nationals, but are nationals
of one of the fifteen successor states of Soviet Union republics (art.
2.2). The Polish Ethnicity Card confirms a person’s belonging to the
Polish nation and the right to benefits provided for by the Act (art. 3).
It may be issued to a person who declares himself or herself to be a
member of the Polish nation and who fulfils the conditions specified
in the statute. These conditions are of mixed ethnic and cultural char-
acter and it should be noted that the ethnic criterion (descent) is not
obligatory. Instead of proving Polish descent a certificate issued by one
of the non-governmental organisations operating in these countries
(specified in the Prime Minister’s decree, obwieszczenie) may be pre-
sented, confirming active engagement in activities concerning Polish
language and culture or other involvement in Polish national minority
communities for at least three years prior to the application. In any
event, it is necessary to prove attachment to ‘Polishness’ through hav-
ing at least basic knowledge of the Polish language, which must be
considered by the applicant to be his or her native language, as well as
knowledge and practice of Polish traditions and customs (art. 2.1).
The law provides for different benefits, which include easier access
to the labour market (holders of the card do not need a work permit
and they can undertake economic activity in Poland on the same basis
as Polish nationals), and some educational, cultural and health bene-
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fits. In order to enter Polish territory, the holder of a Polish ethnicity
card still has to apply for a visa, but may be exempted from the fee for
a national visa (or this fee may be refunded) (arts. 5-8). The actual
meaning of these benefits is different depending on whether a holder
of the card is a citizen of a European Union country (in this case Lat-
via, Lithuania, Estonia) or not. Third country nationals holding the Pol-
ish ethnicity card enjoy free access to the labour market, free immedi-
ate medical assistance and access to education at tertiary level, free en-
try to state-run museums and 37 per cent travel reduction for train
transport. For EU citizens, only the last two benefits are of any signifi-
cance (Jagielski & Pudzianowska 2008).
The Act on the Polish Ethnicity Card was not easy to draft. It took
over ten years of discussions as there was a range of controversies re-
garding the shape of the successive bills (see Jagielski & Pudzianowska
2008). Many commentators claimed that it was discriminatory, and
that it was dangerous to create a privileged group of people having spe-
cial rights in Poland who are residents of foreign countries. This argu-
ment was not specific to Poland and was present in all countries that
adopted a kin minority legislation (see Kova´cs & To´th, Kusa´, Medved
and Smilov & Jileva in this volume). Moreover, a number of practical
arguments against the card were discussed during the parliamentary
debates (see Go´rny, Grzymała-Kazłowska, Korys´ & Weinar 2003). These
concerned high costs, the danger of abuse of the card by economic mi-
grants, etc. Even though domestic controversies were extensive, it can
be argued that the Polish Ethnicity Card did not produce many reac-
tions on the international arena (unlike, for example, the Hungarian
Status Law of 2001). The Belarusian government’s negative reaction is
the exception to the rule that can be easily explained. On the one hand,
apart from Ukrainians, Belarusian citizens are expected to be the main
recipients of the Polish ethnicity cards. On the other hand, the negative
reaction of Belarus is in line with the more general Belarusian policy
towards the Polish minority in Belarus, marked as it is by a variety of
more or less openly demonstrated conflicts and repressions from the
Belarusian authorities. Interestingly enough, preparations for a Belaru-
sian Ethnicity Card have recently been announced.
4.3 The unresolved debate (1999-2001)
Changes in the Polish nationality law have been planned since 1989,
but only selected goals have been achieved to date. The most important
act – the Act on Polish Nationality – remains unchanged, although sev-
eral bills on Polish nationality have already been proposed and dis-
cussed in the Polish Parliament. Work on nationality legislation was
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particularly intensive during the third parliamentary term (1997-2001),
when post-Solidarity parties held a majority in the Polish Parliament.
In the fourth parliamentary term (2001-2005), when post-communist
parties held the majority, work on nationality legislation was postponed
(see Go´rny, Grzymała-Kazłowska, Korys´ & Weinar 2003) only to reap-
pear on the agenda during the fifth and sixth legislative terms under a
majority of post-Solidarity parties (2005-2007 and 2007-present).
Nevertheless, works on the Act on Polish Nationality did not enter the
phase of parliamentary readings and discussions.
Apart from the ideological rationale for introducing new legislation
on nationality with democratic transition in all CEE countries, new so-
cial currents require new solutions for the law on Polish nationality.
For example, it is necessary to establish clear rules concerning rein-
statement of Polish nationality for people who were deprived of it in
various ‘historical contexts’. Moreover, issues relating to the repatria-
tion of people of Polish descent from the territory of the ex-USSR again
became prominent in the 1990s. Last but not least, increasing immi-
gration to Poland requires that rules on naturalisation be reevaluated
and made less discretionary.
The repatriation problem was solved legislatively with the introduc-
tion of the Repatriation Act in 2000. Seven years later, the Act on the
Polish Ethnicity Card introduced some privileges for members of Pol-
ish kin minorities. The enactment of this latter statute can also be re-
garded as a partial solution to the problem of the reinstatement of Pol-
ish nationality, as part of the diaspora considers it as a symbolic confir-
mation of their belonging to the Polish nation. However, a new Act on
Polish nationality is still missing. Its preparation started in the late
1990s and three bills on Polish nationality have been proposed. The
most recent one, which was submitted by a working group comprising
representatives of various parties in 2000, combined the two earlier
proposals. Certain issues included in the latest bill demonstrate the po-
litical background and aims behind the formulation of a new Act on
Polish Nationality and are worth noting.
In the bill – as in all acts on Polish nationality – the basic principle
for being recognised as a Polish citizen was the ius sanguinis principle.
This newest bill foresaw special procedures for people who intended to
reacquire their Polish nationality. In fact, as stated in the introduction
to the bill, the problem of ‘reinstating Polish nationality to all those
who have the right to it’ was considered very important by the bill’s
authors. The proposed reinstatement procedure would have applied to
those who had lost Polish nationality on the basis of previous Acts on
Polish Nationality (1920, 1951, 1962) and whose relinquishing of Pol-
ish nationality had not been ‘fully voluntary’.32 Applicants’ entitlement
to this procedure would not have been conditional on living perma-
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nently in Poland. The bill also proposed a procedure for granting na-
tionality to a particular group of people of Polish origin: Polish veter-
ans of the Second World War. As far as the naturalisation procedure is
concerned, the Bill on Polish Nationality added to the requirement re-
garding length of stay contained in the 1962 Act, criteria referring to
the applicants’ level of social, economic and cultural integration into
Polish society. They included adequate knowledge of the Polish lan-
guage, evidence of the applicants’ ability to sustain themselves in Po-
land and absence of a criminal record and of behaviour that does not
violate loyalty towards the Polish state. These criteria were intended to
set more precise and thereby less discretionary criteria for naturalisa-
tion in Poland.
The focus of discussions and political and legislative action regard-
ing Polish nationality and related matters has been undoubtedly on the
Polish diaspora and Polish emigrants, with immigration and naturali-
sation being of secondary importance. The parliamentary debates in
1999-2001 on such proposals were fairly uncontroversial (Go´rny, Grzy-
mała-Kazłowska, Korys´ & Weinar 2003) and can thus be considered in-
dicative of a consensual approach to nationality matters observed in the
contemporary Polish political scene. The reasons for the lack of con-
sensus on the bill, which led to its withdrawal from the parliamentary
agenda, are not clear. It seems, however, that the issue dividing the Pol-
ish Parliament was the problem of explicit acceptance of dual national-
ity (Go´rny, Grzymała-Kazłowska, Korys´ & Weinar 2007), which was
more a problem of a symbolic nature, rather than a legal one.
4.4 Acquisitions of Polish nationality in figures
4.4.1 Comment on data
Data on acquisitions of Polish nationality have just recently been inte-
grated into the main statistical system and database on foreigners. For
the years 1992-2001 we will therefore focus on acquisitions through
only one procedure, namely the conferment of Polish nationality, for
which nationwide data are available for the 1990s. To make our de-
scription for that period more precise and informative, we have en-
riched it with fragmented data regarding other procedures. These data
include information on foreigners who were naturalised through ac-
knowledgement and marriage procedures in 199733 and results of re-
search carried out in the Warsaw voivodeship in 1999, when data on
applicants for Polish nationality in 1989-1998 based on the three most
important procedures – acquisition through conferment, acknowledge-
ment and marriage – were collected.34 When describing later years
(2002-2006) we refer to acquisitions of Polish nationality through all
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three procedures: conferment, acknowledgement and spousal acquisi-
tion. Finally, we also provide data on repatriation to Poland for the peri-
od 1997-2006.
4.4.2 Naturalisations: Conferment and two other procedures
In 1992-2001, two consecutive Polish presidents granted Polish nation-
ality to 8,979 people under the conferment procedure. In this period,
the biggest national group of newly admitted Polish citizens were Ger-
mans (16 per cent). Other important groups were Israelis (8 per cent),
Canadians (8 per cent), Bulgarians (5 per cent) and Americans (4 per
cent) (see Table 4.1). However, as much as 20 percent of the applicants
originated from the former Soviet Union.
Table 4.1 Foreigners granted Polish nationality by conferment in 1992-2001 and by
conferment, acknowledgement and spousal acquisition in 2002-2006, by (former)
nationality
Nationality Acquisitions by conferment
procedure in 1992-2001
All b acquisitions in 2002-2006
Number of persons % Number of persons %
German 1,416 16 328 4
Israeli 726 8 469 5
Canadian 676 8 184 2
Bulgarian 490 5 165 2
American 381 4 149 2
The former Soviet Union,
including the Baltic statesa
1,778 20 4,392 51
Other 3,512 39 2,925 34
Total 8,979 100 8,612 100
a We include the general category ex-USSR, since for as many as 804 persons the statistics
do not indicate from which former Soviet Union republic they originate.
b Does not include acquisitions by repatriation, which are demonstrated in Table 4.2.
Sources: Ke˛pin´ska 2007; data provided by the Polish President’s Chancellery
In the 1990s, most applicants for Polish nationality originated from
countries constituting traditional areas of destination for Polish emi-
grants: Germany, the US, Canada and various countries in Western
Europe (e.g. France). The intensive Polish-Bulgarian student exchanges
during the communist era resulted in many Polish-Bulgarian mar-
riages and complicated nationality matters for their families. It is evi-
dent that the conferment procedure has been used by successive Presi-
dents to restore Polish nationality to Polish emigrants who had lost it.
This also explains the high number of Israelis ‘naturalising’ in Poland.
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The number of ex-USSR citizens naturalising via the conferment
procedure in Poland in the 1990s and 2000s is also quite high. It does
not fully reflect, however, the predominance of ex-Soviet citizens in
contemporary migration to Poland, since they were particularly likely
to use the acknowledgement procedure in the 1990s. This was due to
the requirement to relinquish their original nationality in accordance
with bilateral conventions on the prevention of dual nationality, which
were still in effect between Poland and countries of the former Soviet
Bloc in the 1990s. As these persons were generally stateless, they qua-
lified for the acknowledgement procedure. In 1989-1998, in the War-
saw voivodeship, 76 per cent of ex-USSR citizens (stateless persons at
the moment of applying) used the acknowledgement procedure and ci-
tizens of this region constituted 94 per cent of all those applying for
naturalisation under this procedure.
The importance of applicants for Polish nationality originating from
the ex-USSR is more visible in the data on acquisitions for 2002-2006,
where all three procedures are included. Newly naturalised Polish citi-
zens from this area constitute as much as 51 per cent of the total, with
the Ukrainians being the leading group (27 per cent of the total num-
ber of acquisitions and 54 per cent of the acquisitions by nationals of
the former Soviet Union). Immigrants from the former Soviet Union
have constituted the main segment of the ‘new wave’ of immigration
to Poland, which began in the late 1980s, and these migrants began
qualifying for naturalisation in the second half of the 1990s. The sub-
sequent termination of bilateral conventions on the prevention of dual
nationality with some Soviet Bloc countries allowed more and more ex-
USSR citizens to use the conferment procedure.
The chart showing the number of acquisitions of nationality by con-
ferment in the whole period analysed here shows a roughly u-shaped
curve (see Figure 4.1), so long as we exclude the latest figures for
2006. The highest annual numbers registered were 1,522 (in 1992),
1,791 (2004) and 2,625 (2005), whereas two among the three smallest
annual figures (679 and 555) occurred in the mid-1990s (in 1996 and
1997), and the third (662) in 2006. The ‘boom’ of naturalisations re-
gistered at the beginning of the 1990s was caused mainly by ‘early re-
conferments’ of Polish nationality. For example, in the 1992-1995 peri-
od, over one quarter of the people granted Polish nationality were Ger-
man citizens, probably many or most of whom had lost their Polish na-
tionality in the past.
The dramatic increase (56 per cent) in the number of acquisitions in
1998 can be partly explained by factors described above. Among them,
the increase in the number of applications by Israelis (and other Polish
emigrants) seems to be important. The number of ‘naturalising’ Israe-
lis rose in 1998 after President Kwas´niewski’s aforementioned promise
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of a ‘broad and uncomplicated restoration’. In 1997, the President
granted Polish nationality to only nineteen Israelis, whereas in 1998,
the respective number was six times higher (114 persons). Then, as
mentioned above, a gradual increase in the numbers of ex-USSR citi-
zens using the conferment procedure also contributed to the increase
in acquisitions.
The sharp decrease in the number of acquisitions of Polish national-
ity by conferment in 2006 deserves some explanation. Its main cause
is the change of the Head of State: Lech Kaczyn´ski, who is close to the
right-wing parties, replaced Aleksander Kwas´niewski, who came from
the main post-communist party. In 2005 – the last year of the Kwas´-
niewski presidency – many cases were processed faster than usual in
order to be completed before his term came to an end. Thereafter, Pre-
sident Kaczyn´ski appeared to be reluctant to grant Polish nationality, at
least at the beginning of his term.
Data on the conferment procedure certainly only describe part of the
phenomenon of naturalisations in Poland though, in our opinion, they
provide an accurate snapshot of national groups interested in Polish
nationality, especially in the 2000s. In the 1990s, the number of appli-
cants for the acknowledgement procedure was slightly higher than for
the conferment procedure. In the 2000s, the first of these procedures
almost totally lost its importance due to the abrogation of conventions
on the prevention of dual nationality. In fact, between 2002 and 2004,
Figure 4.1 Acquisitions of Polish nationality by conferment (1992-2006)
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fewer than 200 people were naturalised through any procedure other
than conferment.
The remaining procedure, i.e. spousal acquisition, played a second-
ary role in the 1990s and is still of only marginal importance. In 1997,
for example, only 52 foreign women used this mode of acquisition. In
the Warsaw voivodeship during the period 1992-1998, the number was
73 women. At the same time, the annual numbers of mixed marriages
in Poland were much higher – between 3,000 and 3,500 were con-
cluded in the 1990s and 2000s, respectively. Spousal acquisition
gained more importance after 1999 when it started applying not only
to women, but also to men, and when conditions regarding applica-
tions became more ‘reasonable’. It is likely to increase in importance,
since ex-USSR citizens no longer have to relinquish their foreign na-
tionality upon naturalisation in Poland. In 2002, for example, from
among 3,552 mixed marriages concluded in Poland, over 40 per cent
involved citizens of post-Soviet countries.
4.4.3 Repatriation
The repatriation procedure was introduced amidst much discussion.
On the one hand, speculation about thousands of people of Polish des-
cent (not always genuine) who would take advantage of the repatriation
procedure was aired in the media and in parliament. On the other
hand, virtually nobody dared to question Poland’s obligation to take
care of its exiles in faraway Asiatic republics of the former Soviet Un-
ion. The controversies surrounding repatriation influenced the final
shape of the Repatriation Act of 2000 by limiting repatriation to a very
small group of people. As a rule the repatriation procedure only applies
to persons who have lived permanently in certain Asiatic republics
prior to 2000. Thus, it is designed for those who did not manage to re-
patriate themselves in the 1940s and 1950s. The requirement that a
would-be repatriate has to be invited by an official institution or a pri-
vate person further limits the accessibility of this procedure.
In all, during the 1997-2006 period, only 4,015 repatriation visas
were issued and 5,293 repatriates arrived via the repatriation program
(Ke˛pin´ska 2004, 2007). The actual number of people who acquired
Polish nationality through the repatriation procedure is somewhere be-
tween these two figures, since new arrivals include non-Polish mem-
bers of repatriate families. From 2001 to 2006, 2,935 people acquired
Polish nationality as repatriates. As demonstrated in Table 4.2, people
from Kazakhstan represent the majority among repatriates (based on a
count of visas issued). Residents of other former republics of the Soviet
Union are in the minority and this relationship will persist due to the
structure of the Repatriation Act.
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Table 4.2 Repatriation visas to Poland in 1997-2006, by repatriates’ previous country of
residence
Country of previous
residence
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Total 316 281 278 662 804 613 301 269 252 239
Azerbaijan - - - - - - - - - 1
Belarus - 10 15 45 140 127 43 39 30 25
Czech Republic - - - - 2 4 1 1 1 1
Georgia - - - - - 1 3 - 3 3
Kazakhstan 316 245 172 361 216 194 156 122 155 125
Lithuania - - 11 16 20 3 - 1 1 1
Latvia - 1 1 10 - - - - - -
Moldova - 1 2 10 9 5 2 - 2 1
Russian Federation - 7 8 10 36 31 11 35 32 40
Ukraine - 15 69 210 381 245 77 56 23 27
Uzbekistan - 2 - - - 2 8 15 5 14
Source: Central Statistical Office, from Ke˛pin´ska (2007: 95)
According to the available fragmented data on acquisitions of Polish
nationality, naturalisation remains a limited phenomenon in Poland.
In the 1990s and 2000s, the annual numbers of persons granted Pol-
ish nationality did not exceed 3,000, although the beginning of the
1990s produced a visible increase in naturalisations. For example, in
the Warsaw voivodeship, 26 and 80 applicants had been granted Polish
nationality in 199035 and 1991, respectively, whereas in 1992, the num-
ber rose to 203, with no decrease evident in subsequent years.
4.5 Conclusions
There have been surprisingly few changes in Polish legislation on na-
tionality since 1962. The post-communist Third Republic of Poland
did not pass a new law on nationality despite expectations. All this does
not mean, however, that nothing changed at the level of practice re-
garding Polish nationality. Political attitudes also changed, a fact that is
exemplified by President Kwas´niewski’s declaration in 1998 to return
Polish nationality to those who had lost it during the communist era.
In general, the characteristic feature of legislation on Polish national-
ity is discretionary power given to public officials in making decisions.
Consequently, changing policy in nationality matters does not necessa-
rily require changes in the written law. At the same time, uncovering
the mechanisms of this policy in practice requires looking beyond the
written law. Even though the 1962 Act on Polish Nationality makes ac-
quisition of Polish nationality conditional only on the duration and
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type of an applicant’s stay in Poland, civil servants also take into ac-
count other factors referring to a foreigner’s social and cultural integra-
tion as well as his or her family and financial situation.
Poles living abroad and/or returning to Poland and their right to Pol-
ish nationality were the focus of the debate on reforms to Polish na-
tionality law in the 2000s. It is important to remember that only some
of the applicants for Polish nationality are immigrants. A visible pro-
portion of new citizens – around half in the 1990s – are people who
had lost Polish nationality under communism and repatriates. This is
undoubtedly a temporary phenomenon. The proportion has already
started to decline and will continue to do so as the pool of individuals
interested in reacquiring their Polish nationality wanes and as the
number of ‘typical immigrants’ who qualify for acquisition of Polish
nationality, which is already relatively high today, gradually grows.
Polish accession to the European Union boosted discussions on im-
migration to Poland in the context of the shift of the EU border to Po-
land’s eastern border. However, it did not affect the discourse on Polish
nationality, which was absent from the political and public agenda in
pre- and post-accession periods. This absence was probably due to the
post-communist majority in the Polish Parliament between 2001 and
late 2005, which was not eager to tackle nationality (and other) issues
pertaining to how to ‘deal with the communist past’. Works on legisla-
tion relating to nationality issues were resumed in the fifth (2005-
2007) and sixth (2007-2011) legislative periods when the post-Solidar-
ity parties had a majority in Parliament. It is, however, too early to ana-
lyse the proceedings relating to the most recent Bill on Polish National-
ity since it has not been yet discussed in Parliament.
It can be also argued that another consequence of Polish accession
to the EU is the visible increase in the interest in Polish nationality
among diaspora members. The number of applications for certifica-
tion/recognition of Polish nationality submitted to Polish consulates
abroad, especially outside Europe, grew in the 2000s. In 2000, only
765 such applications were registered, whereas in 2004 their number
reached 3,807. In 2000-2002, the largest number of applications came
from Germany. In 2003, Argentina was first with 505 applications
(Centre of Migration Research 2005).36 We are certainly not talking
about acquisitions of Polish nationality, but about situations whereby
people, usually descendants of Polish emigrants, who are entitled to ci-
tizenship but are not registered citizens (not having a national registry
number and passport, possibly due to a lack of interest on their part),
take advantage of this right.37
All in all, it seems that interest in Polish nationality, which was
rather weak in the 1990s and at the beginning of the 2000s, has been
growing recently. Moreover, it is likely to further increase in light of on-
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going immigration to Poland and the fact that Polish nationality has
entailed European Union citizenship since 2004.
Chronological list of citizenship-related legislation in Poland
Date Legislative act Content Source
1920 Act on Nationality of
Poland
Regulates modes of
acquisition and loss of
Polish nationality
www.dziennik-ustaw.pl
(in Polish)
1938 Act on Deprivation of
Polish Nationality
Regulates modes of loss
of Polish nationality
www.dziennik-ustaw.pl
(in Polish)
1946 Decree Concerning
Exclusion of Persons of
German Ethnicity from
Polish Society
Defines the framework
for the exclusion and
eventual deportation of
persons of German
ethnicity living on the
Polish territory after the
Second World War
www.dziennik-ustaw.pl
(in Polish)
1946 Act on Polish Nationality
of Persons of Polish
Ethnicity Inhabiting the
Regained Territories
Defines the conditions
for entitlement to Polish
nationality for persons
living in North-Western
Poland (territories
belonging to Germany
before the Second World
War)
www.dziennik-ustaw.pl
(in Polish)
1947 Act on Polish Nationality
of Persons of Polish
Ethnicity Inhabiting the
Former City of Gdan´sk
Defines the conditions
for entitlement to Polish
nationality for persons
living in the former city
of Gdan´sk (Danzig)
www.dziennik-ustaw.pl
(in Polish)
1951 Act on Polish Nationality Regulates modes of
acquisition and loss of
Polish nationality
www.dziennik-ustaw.pl
(in Polish)
1956 Decree of the Council of
the State No. 37/56
Concerning the
Permission for German
Repatriates to Renounce
Polish Nationality
(unpublished)
Provides a fast track for
the renunciation of
Polish nationality for
people leaving for
Germany
1958 Decree of the Council of
the State No. 5/58
Concerning the
Permission for People
Leaving for Israel to
Renounce Polish
Nationality
(unpublished)
Provides a fast track for
the renunciation of
Polish nationality for
people leaving for Israel
1962 Act on Polish Nationality Regulates modes of
acquisition and loss of
www.coe.int;
www.uric.gov.pl
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Date Legislative act Content Source
Polish nationality (in Polish);
www.dziennik-ustaw.pl
(in Polish);
www.abc.com.pl
(in Polish)
1997 Amendment of the Act
on Polish Nationality
Extends required time of
residence in Poland (by
five years) by introducing
the clause that only stay
on the basis of
permanent residence
permit be counted
1997 Constitution of the
Republic of Poland
(excerpts)
Protects citizenship
status: ‘A Polish citizen
shall not lose Polish
citizenship except by
renouncing it’ (art. 34.2)
www.legislationline.org
1998 Amendment of the Act
on Polish Nationality
Introduces equality in
treatment of husbands
and wives of Polish
citizens with regard to
acquisition of Polish
nationality; removes all
possibilities of losing
Polish nationality against
person’s will; makes
resignation from Polish
citizenship fully
dependent on the will of
its holder
1999 Act on Terminating the
Convention, Being
Effective in Polish-
Belarusian Relations,
between the Polish
People’s Republic
Government and the
USSR Government
Concerning the
Prevention of Cases of
Dual Nationality, signed
in Warsaw on 31 March
1965
Expresses Poland’s will
to terminate the
Convention on
Prevention of Dual
Citizenship in force
between Poland and
Belarus
www.dziennik-ustaw.pl
(in Polish);
www.abc.com.pl
(in Polish)
1999 Act on Terminating the
Convention, Being
Effective in Polish-Czech
Relations between the
Polish People’s Republic
and the Czechoslovak
Socialistic Republic
Concerning Regulations
Expresses Poland’s will
to terminate the
Convention on
Prevention of Dual
Citizenship in force
between Poland and the
Czech Republic
www.dziennik-ustaw.pl
(in Polish);
www.abc.com.pl
(in Polish)
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Date Legislative act Content Source
on Dual Nationality,
signed in Warsaw on 17
May 1965
1999 Act on Terminating the
Convention between the
Polish People’s Republic
and the Mongolian
People’s Republic
Concerning Regulations
on Dual Nationality,
signed in Ulan Bator on
23 May 1975
Expresses Poland’s will
to terminate the
Convention on
Prevention of Dual
Citizenship in force
between Poland and
Mongolia
www.dziennik-ustaw.pl
(in Polish);
www.abc.com.pl
(in Polish)
1999 Act on Terminating the
Convention, Being
Effective in Polish-Slovak
Relations between the
Polish People’s Republic
and the Czechoslovak
Socialistic Republic
Concerning Regulations
on Dual Nationality,
signed in Warsaw on 17
May 1965
Expresses Poland’s will
to terminate the
Convention on
Prevention of Dual
Citizenship in force
between Poland and
Slovakia
www.dziennik-ustaw.pl
(in Polish);
www.abc.com.pl
(in Polish)
1999 Act on Terminating the
Convention, Being
Effective in Polish-
Ukrainian Relations,
between the Polish
People’s Republic
Government and the
USSR Government
Concerning Prevention of
Cases of Dual
Nationality, signed in
Warsaw on 31 March
1965
Expresses Poland’s will
to terminate the
Convention on
Prevention of Dual
Citizenship in force
between Poland and
Ukraine
www.dziennik-ustaw.pl
(in Polish);
www.abc.com.pl
(in Polish)
2000 Repatriation Act Defines the framework
for the repatriation of
people of Polish descent
from the Asiatic
republics of the ex-USSR
www.legislation.org;
www.uric.gov.pl
(in Polish);
www.dziennik-ustaw.pl
(in Polish);
www.abc.com.pl
(in Polish)
2000 Ordinance of the
President of the Republic
of Poland concerning the
procedure in cases of
conferment or giving
permission to renounce
one’s Polish nationality,
as well as specimen
Defines the documents
to be submitted and the
exact procedures for the
acquisition of nationality
by conferment
www.dziennik-ustaw.pl
(in Polish);
www.abc.com.pl
(in Polish)
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Date Legislative act Content Source
certificates and
applications
2001 Amendment of the Act
on Polish Nationality
Introduces changes
relating to registration of
acquisitions and losses
of Polish nationality;
removes rules applying
to repatriation procedure
2003 Amendment of the Act
on Polish Nationality
Introduces procedural
changes
2005-2007 Amendments of the Act
on Polish Nationality
Introduce minor changes
resulting partly from the
accession of Poland to
the EU
2007 Act on Polish Ethnicity
Card
Defines the conditions
for entitlement to the
Polish Ethnicity Card;
introduces certain
benefits to members of
Polish kin-minorities in
fifteen post-Soviet states
including easier access
to the labour market and
some educational,
cultural and health
benefits
www.poland.gov.pl
(in Polish, Russian
and other languages)
Notes
1 It is beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss the complex relation between
ethnicity and nationality/citizenship. Though following, for example, Thomas
Hylland Eriksen (1999: 35), it is worth mentioning that the distinguishing mark of
nationalism (when talking about nationality he refers to nationalism) is by definition
its relation to the state. A nationalist holds that political boundaries should be
coterminous with cultural boundaries, whereas many ethnic groups do not demand
command over the state.
2 Repatriation Act, Journal of Law 160, 2000, 1118.
3 Act on the Polish Ethnicity Card, Journal of Law 180, 2007, 1280. In the official Eng-
lish translation, the Polish Ethnicity Card is sometimes called the ‘Polish Charter’
and there can be nothing more misleading. It is important to note that the Polish
Ethnicity Card in the title of the act refers to the document that is issued under the
act to certain subjects who are not Polish citizens, but are citizens of certain states
entitled to certain privileges within Polish territory. The card thus does not ascertain
the identity of the subject and can be compared to a student card inasmuch as it
serves as proof of certain entitlements under the act. In its symbolic function, the
card is deemed to ascertain that its holder ‘belongs to the Polish Nation’ defined in
ethnic terms in this statute (art. 3).
4 Act on Nationality of Poland, Journal of Law 44, 1920, 44.
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5 Act on Polish Nationality, Journal of Law 5, 1951, 25.
6 Act on Polish Nationality, Journal of Law 10, 1962, 49.
7 Act on the Exclusion of Persons of German Ethnicity from the Polish Society, Journal
of Law 66, 1946, 404.
8 The exclusion involved forced resettlement from the Polish territory and the loss of
property in Poland.
9 To be positively verified as Polish, a person had to prove his or her coming from a
Polish family and express his or her desire to belong to the Polish nation.
10 Act on Polish Nationality of Persons of Polish Ethnicity Inhabiting the Regained
Territories, Journal of Law 15, 1946, 106.
11 Act on Polish Nationality of Persons of Polish Ethnicity Inhabiting the Former Free
City of Gdan´sk, Journal of Law 65, 1947, 378.
12 Decree of the Council of the State No. 37/56 of 1956 Concerning the Permission for
German Repatriates to Renounce Polish Nationality, (unpublished).
13 Decree of the Council of the State No. 5/58 of 1958 Concerning the Permission for
People Leaving for Israel to Renounce Polish Nationality, (unpublished).
14 In fact, few people took advantage of this procedure, as there were no appropriate
guidelines for its implementation.
15 It would be an oversimplification to look for origins of that action only in the anti-
Semitic attitudes of the Polish elites and society. Not all Jews were forced to leave
Poland. Moreover, some of them remained not only in Poland but also in various
Polish political structures.
16 Act on Polish Nationality, Journal of Law 28, 2000, 353 (version including amend-
ments).
17 Constitution of the Republic of Poland, Journal of Law 78, 1997, 483.
18 Ordinance of the President of the Republic of Poland concerning the procedure in
cases of conferment or giving permission to renounce one’s Polish nationality, as
well as specimen certificates and applications, Journal of Law 18, 2000, 231.
19 They include conventions signed with the Soviet Union (1965), Czechoslovakia
(1965), Bulgaria (1972), Mongolia (1975) and the German Democratic Republic
(1975) (Albiniak & Czajkowska 1996).
20 At the time of writing, only the Ukrainian government has not ratified the
termination of the convention.
21 This is a guiding principle for the legislature, meaning that the preference in the
nationality regime should be given to the ius sanguinis principle and that other
principles should only play an auxiliary role.
22 This refers only to automatic change of nationality as a consequence of marriage.
Polish nationality law does provide for facilitated naturalisation of foreign spouses of
Polish nationals.
23 It should be noted that these conditions are defined differently in the recently
adopted Act on the Polish Ethnicity Card.
24 These are: 1) a permit to settle (zezwolenie na osiedlenie sie˛); 2) a long-term resident’s
EC residence permit (zezwolenie na pobyt rezydenta długoterminowego Wspo´lnot Eur-
opejskich) as defined in the Act on Aliens (arts. 64, 65); and 3) right of permanent re-
sidence (prawo stałego pobytu) as defined in the Act on the Entry into, Residence in
and Exit from the Republic of Poland of Nationals of the European Union Member
States and their Family Members (Journal of Law 144, 2006, 1043).
25 In some cases, the period after which a permanent residence permit may be
acquired is longer. For example, for people who have been granted subsidiary
protection it is seven years, which means that to be eligible for naturalisation such a
person has to wait at least twelve years (art. 64 of the Act on Aliens, Journal of Law
128, 2003, 1175).
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26 Attachment to the Ordinance of the President of the Republic of Poland concerning
the procedure in cases of conferment or giving the permit to resign from Polish
nationality and specimen certificates and applications, Journal of Law 18, 2000, 231.
27 The study on positive and negative decisions on applications for Polish nationality in
the Warsaw voivodship in 1989-1998 shows that Polish origins may influence a
positive decision on nationality (Go´rny 2001).
28 Cf. the resolution of the Highest Administrative Court of 9 November 1998, OPD 4/
98, ONSA 1999, book 1, item 6.
29 Art. 11 ECN requires that decisions relating to the acquisition, retention, loss,
recovery or certification of nationality contain reasons in writing; while art. 12
demands that these decisions be left open to an administrative or judicial review.
Poland has signed, but not yet ratified the ECN.
30 Judgment of 28 December 1994, V SA 1507/94; see Mincer-Jas´kowska 1996.
31 Act on the Polish Ethnicity Card, Journal of Law 180, 2007, 1280.
32 They had not expressed their will to decline Polish nationality (deprivation on the
basis of the Act of 1920) or they were ‘forced’ to relinquish Polish nationality
(deprivation on the basis of the Acts of 1951 and 1962).
33 Data from regional departments for 1997 were collected in one ad hoc action. For
2002-2006, we do not have exact data on the acknowledgement and marriage
procedures but only on the total for all three procedures. Moreover, we have separate
data only for the conferment procedure, but not for the years 2005-2006.
34 The database of 1,483 applicants, among whom 1,314 were granted Polish nationality,
was compiled on the basis of personal data files.
35 The number for 1990 may be slightly underestimated, as files were checked
according to the year of application. We started from 1989 and it is likely that
somebody applying prior to 1989 and who received Polish nationality in 1990 was
not registered in our database.
36 By 18 November 2004, 259 applications had been submitted in Argentina.
37 Data collected by Agnieszka Weinar in the research project entitled ‘New Poles, new
Europeans – dual nationality among descendants of Polish emigrants in Argentina’.
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5 Kin-state responsibility and ethnic citizenship:
The Hungarian case
Ma´ria M. Kova´cs and Judit To´th
The preference for the naturalisation of ethnic Hungarians has been
considered a counterbalance to the troubled history of a nation artifi-
cially split among various states and as a tool for preserving cultural
identity in the twentieth century. The principle of ethnicity has been
observed directly in nationality legislation and migration law through
regulations for visa, residence and employment permits, and asylum
status (To´th 1995). Due to the ideology of a ‘threatened Hungarian eth-
nic identity’ the relationship between the social and economic integra-
tion of migrants, migration law, naturalisation and citizenship has
never been publicly discussed (Fullerton, Sik & To´th 1997). Hungarian
authorities need not give reasons for refusing an application for natura-
lisation and there is no legal remedy against a negative decision. This
is justified by referring to the sovereign power of the state and, in cases
of rejection, by a presumption of the applicants’ missing ethnic and
cultural ties to Hungary. An extension of preference in naturalisation
to European Union citizens was smoothly passed in 2003, partly be-
cause of the supposed ethnic proximity of applicants in adjacent
states.1 Provisions supportive of family unity in nationality law are
widely accepted and so are the discretionary powers in naturalisation
proceedings that determine who is to be allowed to join this rather
homogeneous society (To´th 2005).
On the other hand, there are some contentious components of the
nationality regulations in contemporary Hungary.
– Naturalisation and its precondition, the authorisation of permanent
residence, are criticised as being too time-consuming and expen-
sive, and the requirements for documentation as too bureaucratic.
In other words, ethnic Hungarians, being the largest group of appli-
cants, do not see themselves as preferential beneficiaries when it
comes to the attitude of the authorities or to procedural provisions.
– Moreover, certain privileges of Hungarian citizenship were extended
to EU nationals and migrants under the scope of Community law
in the accession process (To´th 2004a).
– The role of naturalisation in the process of migrant integration has
been unclear. While the applicant is required to be highly integrated
in a cultural, economic and social sense, integration programmes
do not exist at all, which means that integration can only be
achieved by individual effort. The applicant must also not endanger
public order and is investigated in this regard in various ways.
– Nationality as a basket of various rights and obligations is basically
considered by the general public as a historical, cultural, ethnic and
emotional issue without awareness of its existing legal and norma-
tive status and its neutral significance in a democratic rule-of-law
system. For this reason, public opinion is strongly divided into ‘nor-
mativists’ and ‘nation builders’, representing different standpoints
concerning voting rights, principles for the acquisition of national-
ity, dual citizenship and never-ending citizenship for emigrants in
the diaspora.
– As for ethnic Hungarians, the right to have the family and given
name and the name of the applicants’ prior place of residence and
birthplace in their original ethnic language was finally introduced
in amendments related to the naturalisation and registry process.2
This causes certain confusion in the registration of foreigners and
nationals since registration is, in theory, based on the authenticity
and unaltered nature of existing identity documents. Moreover, this
right is exclusively reserved for ethnic Hungarians; it does not apply
to the non-Hungarian version of names of, for instance, naturalised
refugees or stateless migrants belonging to a linguistic minority,
which would be registered in the dominant language in their coun-
tries of origin.
5.1 History of Hungarian policies on nationality since 1945
Although the first Act on Hungarian Nationality (1879) became in-
creasingly restrictive through amendments adopted during wars, its ius
sanguinis principle has remained dominant up to the present day. This
Act was in force until 1948. The history of Hungarian policies on na-
tionality since 1945 can be divided into the following periods:
1945-1948: The Armistice Agreement concluded in Moscow (1945)3
annulled all the modifications of nationality that had come about as a
result of the territorial changes of the Hungarian state between 1939
and 1945. Millions of former Hungarian citizens who ended up under
the jurisdiction of neighbouring states lost their Hungarian nationality.
The Peace Agreement fixed the borders of the Hungarian state along
the frontiers as they had existed on the last day before the war began.4
Between 1945 and 1948 temporary regulations on nationality consid-
ered all those residing in Hungary in 1945 as nationals except for those
holding the nationality of another state. Bilateral agreements on popu-
lation exchange initiated by Czechoslovakia and the expulsion of Ger-
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mans resulted in the deprivation of nationality for those falling under
these measures.5 Individuals who had not returned to Hungary follow-
ing the conclusion of the war were deprived of their citizenship and,
between 1946 and 1948, their property was confiscated.6 Finally, the ci-
tizenship status of communists who had fled Hungary during the in-
terwar years was settled.7
1948-1956: In 1946 a reform of the legal status and civil rights of
children born out of wedlock established their full equality,8 but only
the new Act on Hungarian Nationality of 19489 provided a coherent le-
gal framework for the acquisition of nationality through changes in fa-
mily and personal status. The Act provided for the equal treatment of
children born out of wedlock and stipulated that all nationals residing
abroad should be registered, without, however, creating techniques for
registration in the absence of consular relations. The Act recognised
the pending Hungarian nationality of undocumented persons who had
been residing in Hungary for a given number of years.
1956-1989: This period witnessed the emancipation of spouses on
the basis of the New York Convention of 1957 on married women,10
the principles of which were inserted into the third Act on Nationality
adopted in 1957.11 The executive rules of the Act were not published
and were implemented by confidential order, such as the one requiring
emigrants to renounce their nationality and social insurance rights.
Following the 1956 revolution and the mass emigration it triggered, a
broad amnesty was proclaimed for returnees and a registry of nationals
permanently abroad was established.12
1989-1993: After 1989, Hungary started reforms to establish the rule
of law and constitutionalism. In 1989 the prohibition of deprivation of
nationality was regulated in the modified Constitution.13 At the same
time the nationality of expatriate nationals who had been deprived of
their nationality arbitrarily was restored upon request.14 The Geneva
Convention of 195115 inspired the preferential naturalisation of refugees
that was inserted into the nationality law. The fourth Act on Nationality
passed in 1993 made preconditions for naturalisation more restrictive
but preferences based on ethnic and family ties were intended to com-
pensate for this.16 Between 1989 and 1993 Hungary terminated bilat-
eral agreements with former socialist states that excluded dual citizen-
ship.
1994-2005: This period is marked by Hungary’s accession efforts to
the EU and by political debates on the status of ethnic Hungarians liv-
ing outside Hungary’s borders. During this time the Act on Nationality
was amended three times,17 due to the ratification of the European
Convention on Nationality (1997) and the UN Convention on Stateless
Persons (1954).18 Eligibility for preferential naturalisation was extended
to EU citizens and a super-preference was adopted in favour of ethnic
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Hungarians in the shadow of the upcoming Schengen restrictions
(To´th 2003).
In the period under discussion there were three major breaks in ba-
sic principles. Although from 1879 onwards Hungary tolerated multi-
ple nationality, between 1946 and 1989 the main rule was the exclu-
sion of dual citizenship through bilateral agreements with socialist
states. Mixed couples had to choose one of their nationalities for their
child. After 1989, the modified Constitution abolished the arbitrary de-
privation of nationality. International principles of human rights rele-
vant to nationality were inserted into the law, while a growing circle of
preferences was defined as a core element of domestic legislation.
5.2 Current nationality legislation
5.2.1 Current principles in nationality legislation
The Constitution contains a guarantee relating to citizenship, i.e. the
prohibition of its arbitrary deprivation (art. 69). Other rules are to be
settled in legislation to be adopted by a two-thirds voting majority. The
two-thirds rule, however, does not apply to the ratification of interna-
tional agreements on citizenship.
The Nationality Act ensures the equality of rights of citizens. It guaran-
tees that all citizens have identical legal standing irrespective of the le-
gal title of acquisition of citizenship. The 1997 European Convention
on Nationality obliges participating states to refrain from discrimina-
tion between their citizens, whether they are nationals by birth or have
acquired nationality subsequently.
Discrimination is forbidden among Hungarian nationals, irrespective
of the legal title under which their citizenship was granted. The Act
contains only one exception with regard to withdrawal of citizenship
which only applies to citizens by naturalisation.
The right to change citizenship is also included in the Nationality Act.
Withdrawal of citizenship is an exception. The more common proce-
dure is renunciation by a person who lives abroad and thus would pre-
sumably not become stateless. Measures aimed at the prevention of sta-
telessness restrict the right of the individual to self-determination and
the sovereignty of the state in accordance with the conventions of the
UN and the European Convention. The only legitimate reason for the
withdrawal of citizenship is if it was acquired in a manifestly fraudu-
lent manner. Moreover, in the case of renunciation the person must
prove that he or she has obtained another citizenship.
Domestic law ensures the granting of citizenship at birth by descent
(ius sanguinis) while ius soli is applied as an auxiliary principle for
abandoned or stateless children. The Act on Nationality supports family
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unity (with respect to legal status) by various preferences for the natur-
alisation of spouses and (adopted) minors. Refugees and stateless per-
sons are also given priority for admission to citizenship. Hungarian
regulations are special in granting preferential treatment to persons
who are former Hungarian nationals and to ethnic Hungarians in the
process of acquiring citizenship.
Hungary tolerates multiple citizenship, and the state strives to create
rules and enter into agreements to avoid conflicts between different le-
gal systems. A person acquiring Hungarian nationality by naturalisa-
tion need not renounce his or her prior citizenship. The circle of bilat-
eral agreements and the European Convention regulate several legal
relationships with respect to persons of multiple citizenship (e.g. with
regard to military service or taxation). Furthermore, those having an-
other citizenship are entitled to the same rights and obligations in the
territory of Hungary as other nationals, with the exception of employ-
ment in the police or security services (To´th 2004b). On the other
hand, the principle of genuine link19 requires a factual, effective and
close relationship between Hungary and the applicant for naturalisa-
tion or other modes of acquiring citizenship, regardless of his or her
existing other citizenship. However, for those in possession of Hungar-
ian nationality and living abroad the genuine and effective link to Hun-
gary is irrelevant. Since 1929, millions of (lawful) emigrants and their
descendants have preserved their Hungarian nationality despite acquir-
ing a second or third nationality, and despite the absence of close rela-
tions, or cultural and ethnic affiliation to Hungary.
Hungarian citizenship shall be certified with a valid document (iden-
tity card, passport, citizen’s certificate). In case of doubt it will need to
be either attested by the authorities or a certificate issued. Upon re-
quest, the responsible minister issues a certificate on the existence of
citizenship or its cessation, or verifies that the person concerned has
never been a Hungarian national. The certificate is valid for one year
from the date of issuance. The certificate’s contents may be contested
before the Municipal Court by the person concerned, his or her lawful
representative, the public prosecutor as well as the person’s guardian.20
The regulatory principles and essence of the citizenship system in
Hungary are in harmony with international legal norms. Hungary is a
signatory to all important conventions that define the framework of the
development of the law. However, some shortfalls in procedural guaran-
tees are still apparent.
5.2.2 Current modes of acquisition and loss of nationality
There are seven legal titles of acquisition of Hungarian nationality with
different requirements:
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1. The child of a Hungarian national obtains Hungarian citizenship
by birth (ius sanguinis) regardless of the place of birth.
2. The child of a stateless immigrant in possession of a permanent re-
sidence permit or an abandoned child of unknown parents shall be
considered as a Hungarian national unless or until this presump-
tion is rebutted (e.g. when he or she obtains a foreign citizenship
due to the clarification of his or her parent’s identity and national-
ity). There is no time limit for rebuttal; presumption of Hungarian
nationality on the basis of ius soli is therefore conditional.
3. Hungarian nationality of exiled nationals who were deprived of
their nationality between 1945 and 1990 shall be restored upon re-
quest. A declaration addressed to the President of the State rein-
states the nationality of the exiled national immediately when it is
made. Acquisition of nationality is also possible by declaration in
case the applicant was born in Hungary and has not acquired an-
other nationality through his or her parent by birth, provided that
at the time of the person’s birth he or she resided in Hungary, he or
she has lived without interruption in Hungary for a period of at
least five years by the time of submission of the declaration and he
or she is not older than nineteen years. Another ground for acquisi-
tion applies if the applicant was born from a Hungarian national
mother and a foreign father before 1 October 1957 and did not be-
come a Hungarian national by birth.
4. Presumptive paternity ensures nationality by law for a child born
out of wedlock if a parent who declares paternity or a judgement re-
cognises paternity/maternity, or if the parents marry subsequently
(family law facts).
5. Upon request the restitution of citizenship is ensured if the appli-
cant could not obtain a new citizenship within one year of his or
her renunciation of Hungarian citizenship.
6. Naturalisation implies a long procedure and is conditional on var-
ious preconditions. Basic, non-preferential cases of naturalisation
shall meet all of the following requirements:
L permanent residence in Hungary for eight years in possession of
a permanent residence permit or EEA citizens’ residence permit,
L clean criminal record and no current criminal proceedings,
L proven means of stable livelihood and residence in Hungary,
L naturalisation must not violate national interest of the state, and
L successful examination taken on basic constitutional issues in
the Hungarian language. If the applicant attended a Hungarian
language primary or secondary school or university either in
Hungary or in another state, he or she is exempt from the exam.
The requirements for preferential naturalisation differ from basic
ones as follows:
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L The permanent residence requirement is reduced to five years if
the applicant was born on Hungarian territory or has established
residence in Hungary before reaching legal age or is stateless.
L The permanent residence requirement is reduced to three years,
if the applicant has been married to a citizen for three years, or
he or she has a minor child who is a Hungarian citizen, or if the
applicant has been adopted by a Hungarian citizen or is an offi-
cially recognised refugee.
L There is a permanent residence requirement if any of the appli-
cant’s ascendants was a Hungarian national and he or she de-
clares himself or herself to be an ethnic Hungarian.
The permanent residence requirement can also be waived
L in the case of the extension of naturalisation to a minor child,
i.e. if the applicant is a minor and his or her application was sub-
mitted along with that of a parent who qualifies for naturalisa-
tion,
L if the applicant is a minor and has been adopted by a Hungarian
citizen,
L if the President of the State or the Minister of Foreign Affairs de-
termines that the applicant’s naturalisation is of ‘overriding inter-
est’ to the Republic of Hungary (for instance, if he or she is a
top-level artist, athlete, or scientist). The proven means of stable
livelihood and residence of the applicant can also be waived by
the President of the State.
7. Requirements for re-naturalisation include a permanent residence
permit of the applicant whose nationality has ceased, a clean crim-
inal record and no current criminal proceedings, proven means of
stable livelihood and residence in Hungary, and the assurance that
his or her naturalisation does not violate Hungarian national inter-
ests.
Loss of nationality shall be based on
1. Renunciation: A national residing abroad may renounce his or her
nationality if he or she possesses another nationality or relies on
the probability of its acquisition.
2. Withdrawal: Hungarian nationality may be withdrawn only if a per-
son who has acquired nationality by naturalisation has violated the
law on nationality, in particular by misleading the authorities by
submitting false data or omitting data or facts. In practice, however,
there have not been actual cases in which this provision would have
been applied to persons that would have become stateless as a re-
sult. Ten years after naturalisation, Hungarian nationality may no
longer be withdrawn.
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5.3 Current political debates on (dual) citizenship
5.3.1 The Hungarian Status Law and the referendum on dual citizenship
Minority protection for ethnic Hungarians and nation building has in-
spired debate in contemporary Hungary. There are numerous ramifica-
tions of the political discussions on legal development but we will
describe only two aspects briefly here and give a concrete example in
order to highlight the interrelations between nationality law, migration
law, external relations, European integration and nation building.
Although the list of states and criteria for visa obligations became part
of Community control, bilateral agreements on visa-free travelling were
maintained up to Hungary’s accession to the EU. Issuing visas, includ-
ing a national visa (in the terminology of the Schengen regime), has
just been reformed in favour of Hungarian minorities living in adja-
cent third countries. In 2006 a visa allowing its holder to stay in Hun-
gary and a multi-entry visa for ethnic Hungarian visitors has been in-
troduced. This visa may be issued for five years to a foreign applicant
who is capable of sustaining himself or herself, and wishes to use his
or her stay in Hungary for practising the Hungarian language and cul-
tural activities. Under this visa, employment or study in Hungary is
not allowed. The text of the visa agreements is neutral but there are
plans to reform them to reflect certain ethno-national priorities towards
Romania, Ukraine and Serbia-Montenegro.21 In brief, the visa policy
intends to secure the possibility for individuals belonging to the Hun-
garian external kin-minorities to freely visit and enter Hungary in order
to compensate for Community law and security requirements (To´th
2004b).
The Act on Benefits for Ethnic Hungarians living in Neighbouring
States of Hungary (usually called the Status Law) was adopted in 2001
after stormy political debates. It introduced a specific certificate for eth-
nic Hungarians living in Slovakia, Romania, Ukraine, Slovenia, Serbia-
Montenegro and Croatia. Because of constitutional inconsistency and
international protests (Ka´ntor 2004), the law was modified in 2003
ending some of the individual benefits (employment, social insurance
and public health) that were available in Hungary to holders of the
Ethnic Hungarian Certificate (identity card).22 In December 2004, an-
other support system (Homeland Fund) for community building was
adopted.23 Naturally, this set of direct ethnically-based assistance by dia-
spora law (To´th 2000) can legalise and inspire migratory movements
toward Hungary.
On 5 December 2004, Hungary held a referendum on whether it
should offer Hungarian citizenship to Hungarians living outside the
borders of the Hungarian state.24 The novel aspect of the proposal was
not the introduction of dual citizenship itself, since the option of ob-
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taining a Hungarian second citizenship had long been available for per-
manent residents within the country. The innovation would have been
to remove all residency requirements from the pre-conditions for ob-
taining a Hungarian second citizenship. Ethnic Hungarians in neigh-
bouring states, and possibly living elsewhere, were to be granted the
opportunity of obtaining Hungarian citizenship merely by declaring
themselves as of Hungarian linguistic affiliation, at a Hungarian con-
sular office, or if they hold a Hungarian Certificate, confirming their
Hungarian nationality. The proposal was thus directed at external co-
ethnic minorities living in neighbouring states and at members of the
Hungarian diaspora elsewhere in the world.
The text of the referendum question was as follows: ‘Do you think
that Parliament should pass a law allowing Hungarian citizenship with
preferential naturalization to be granted to those, at their request, who
claim to have Hungarian nationality, do not live in Hungary and are
not Hungarian citizens, and who prove their Hungarian nationality by
means of a ‘‘Hungarian Identity Card’’ issued pursuant to Article 19 of
Act LXII of 2001 or in another way to be determined by the law which
is to be passed?’25
Although the referendum question left the criteria of eligibility open
for future lawmaking, an approximation of potentially eligible clai-
mants can be made on the basis of the size of the Hungarian popula-
tion in the neighbouring states numbering around three million.26 As-
suming that the majority of those made eligible by the reform would
actually claim citizenship, the proportions of the resulting change
would exceed the growth of Germany’s citizenry after unification, but
of course, without the corresponding territorial enlargement. This then
points to the second specificity of the Hungarian situation, namely that
the dimensions of Hungary’s kin-minority problem are unusually large
even for Europe. Nearly a quarter of all ethnic Hungarians live outside
Hungary’s borders in neighbouring states.
Political debates on the referendum within Hungary were tremen-
dously polarised. Indeed, in 2003, the initiative to call a referendum
had not come from within the Hungarian political establishment, but
from a radical and somewhat marginal organisation not well integrated
into Hungarian politics, the World Federation of Hungarians (Debrec-
zeni 2004).27 The Federation had contested the policies of the Hungar-
ian Government on citizenship matters for years and had also set itself
on a collision course with the more moderate Hungarian minority par-
ties across the borders, especially when it mounted opposition against
the Orba´n Government’s (1998-2002) efforts, supported by external
Hungarian minorities, to provide an alternative solution to dual citizen-
ship through the creation of the Status Law of 2001.28 The law estab-
lished the certificate for ethnic Hungarians living in neighbouring
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states,29 entitling its beneficiaries to a set of cultural and economic
rights, including seasonal working permits in Hungary. However, the
Federation insisted that the benefits provided by the law were no sub-
stitute for what the Hungarians really needed, which was full Hungar-
ian citizenship.30
The Status Law provoked angry response in neighbouring states (see
Kusa´ and Iordachi in this volume). Hungary was accused of irredentist
nationalism, of creating a ‘veiled form of dual citizenship’, the ultimate
effect of which was to call the sovereignty of the neighbouring states
into question. Hungary was also criticised by the European Union for
the unilateral adoption of the law, for not having consulted the states
in question, and for the extraterritorial aspects of the law. But despite
this negative response, the World Federation of Hungarians insisted
that Hungary must proceed with the unilateral creation of non-resident
trans-border citizenship for ethnic Hungarians.31 Responding to argu-
ments that such a step would not be compatible with the terms of
Hungary’s accession to the Union, in the spring of 2003, the federa-
tion called on Hungarian voters to say ‘no’ to Hungary’s accession.
Hungary should only join the EU if it could take trans-border Hungar-
ians into the Union even if the state in which they live remains outside
of it (Csergo˝ & Goldzeiger 2004). So, in October 2003, the Federation
began collecting signatures for a referendum on establishing non-resi-
dent citizenship for trans-border Hungarians.
This points then to the third specificity of the Hungarian story,
namely that the initiative for citizenship reform came from outside the
Hungarian political establishment. Only this feature can explain the
puzzle of why any political actor would take the risk of launching an
initiative that has only limited support within Hungary itself and there-
fore carries the prospect of its own defeat.
Initially, mainstream Hungarian parties on all sides reacted very cau-
tiously to the initiative, along with the more moderate groups of trans-
border minorities. Only after a few months did the mainstream right-
wing parties (FIDESZ and MDF) along with the President of the
Republic declare their support for the referendum, while the socialists
and liberals turned against it.32 What followed was an agitated, occa-
sionally hysterical, campaign leading up to the referendum that ful-
filled the prophecy of its own failure ending up invalid on account of
the low number of participants. Eventually, 63.33 per cent of the eligi-
ble voters stayed away from the referendum. Among those who cast
their ballots, 51.57 per cent voted in favour of the reform, 48.43 per
cent against.33
No research is available on the question of what precisely motivated
Hungarian voters in their choices. Welfare protectionism could well
have played a role, given the fact that, apart from Slovakia, the living
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standards of trans-border Hungarians are way below those of Hungar-
ians, and that the arguments of the Socialist Party against dual citizen-
ship relied primarily on the costs of the reform. An equally important
motive may have been the fear of instability at the borders resulting
from conflicts with Hungary’s neighbours. Voters may also have been
influenced by the perception that dual citizenship would eventually
lead to voting rights. What is sufficiently clear, however, is that, at least
for now, trans-border dual citizenship could only be created in Hun-
gary without the popular mandate of the Hungarian electorate, the
mandate that the supporters of the initiative had hoped to obtain in the
referendum. To quote one liberal opponent of the initiative (Kis 2004a:
4): ‘The offer was made to a nation of ten million to enlarge its home-
land beyond the state-borders to the entire Carpathian basin. The na-
tion refused to take the risk and accept the costs.’
But given the enormous disappointment of trans-border Hungarians
with the result, the issues raised during the campaign will remain on
the agenda of Hungarian politics for quite some time to come.
5.3.2 Implications of trans-border dual citizenship
The arguments for the Hungarian trans-border dual citizenship initia-
tive are fundamentally different from those advanced in favour of dual
citizenship in the major immigration states of Western Europe. In the
immigration states dual citizenship is an instrument used to integrate
labour migrants into their country of immigration. Dual citizenship in
this case works towards the decoupling of citizenship from ethnicity. In
contrast, the Hungarian initiative is part of a counter-trend present in a
number of European countries of re-linking citizenship with ethnicity.
The Hungarian suggestion associates eligibility for extraterritorial
dual citizenship with membership in an ethnically defined community.
Dual citizenship would thus purposefully reaffirm the connection be-
tween ethno-cultural nationality and citizenship, which is precisely the
connection that most immigration states have been trying to weaken
when tolerating dual citizenship (Fowler 2002).
Advocates of the reform wish to overcome this difficulty by present-
ing their plan as based on a traditional ius sanguinis concept rather
than on ethnicity. In this view, trans-border citizenship is not some-
thing that would be newly granted to ethnic Hungarians. Trans-border
Hungarians would only ‘regain’ the citizenship of their ancestors who
had been citizens of the Hungarian part of the Dual Monarchy before
the First World War.34 However, there are several difficulties with this
approach (Nagy 2004).35
The first difficulty is political. After the First World War, those Hun-
garians who ended up as minorities in neighbouring states were ob-
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liged by the Peace Treaties to opt for the citizenship of their new home
state, or, if they declined to do so, to move to Hungary. Therefore, in
the eyes of Hungary’s neighbours, any unilateral change in the citizen-
ship status of minority Hungarians would amount to a unilateral
breach of treaty obligations, to a revision of the terms of the peace
treaty that still serves as the basis of international legitimacy for the
current borders of these states. It was for a similar reason that the Ita-
lian law of 2000 that offered Italian citizenship to the Italian diaspora
did not extend this offer to the descendants of Italians in Dalmatia, Is-
tria and Fiume, i.e. those regions that were ceded by Italy to Yugoslavia
in the post-war treaties.
Second, trans-border populations whose ancestors bore the citizen-
ship of a larger Hungarian state in the Dual Austro-Hungarian Monar-
chy before the First World War include millions of non-Hungarians.
So, even if the ius sanguinis view was applied, the only way to narrow
down eligibility for Hungarian dual citizenship to those with a Hungar-
ian ethno-cultural affiliation would be to apply an ethnic definition.
A third feature of dual citizenship that emerged from the referen-
dum initiative was the potentially weak distinction between active and
inactive citizenship for dual citizens. In most immigration states, trans-
national dual citizenship implies that only the citizenship of the cur-
rent country of residence is active, so that the rights associated with
the external citizenship are dormant (Faist 2005). However, in the case
of Hungarian trans-border citizenship such clear-cut distinctions be-
tween periods of active and inactive citizenship would be hard to make
(Vizi 2003).36 Therefore, with regard to the potential content of non-re-
sident trans-border citizenship, the general perception that has
emerged in Hungary is that even if dual citizenship would initially be
created without voting rights, it would only be a matter of time before
large numbers of trans-border voters would begin casting their ballots.
In view of these implications, it is hardly surprising that the proposal
created passionate debates both within Hungary and among the Hun-
garian minorities in the neighbouring states. For many participants the
question at stake was whether Hungary should experiment with ideas
that are pulling it away from, rather than bringing it closer to ‘main-
stream’ Europe. As Ja´nos Kis summarised it, the victory of the ‘yes’
votes would mean nothing less than putting Hungarian parliamentar-
ianism in danger and transforming the nature of Hungarian democ-
racy. Since elections in Hungary are usually won by a narrow margin,
the appearance of trans-border voters would most likely mean that ‘the
outcome of Hungarian elections would regularly be decided by voters
who do not pay taxes in Hungary and who are, in general, not subject
to its laws’. A further element of ‘organised irresponsibility’ inherent in
such a solution would be that those casting the swing votes may be
162 MA´RIA M. KOVA´CS AND JUDIT TO´TH
people who had never even lived in Hungary so that their political
choices would be made on a highly selective image of issues and candi-
dates. For all these reasons, he concluded, ‘the victory of ‘‘yes votes’’
would pull us back to the murky nationalism of past ages, it would lock
up Hungarian politics in the prison of revisionist nostalgia, it would
poison public life within Hungary as well as our relationship with
neighbouring states and with trans-border Hungarians, and it would
damage the level of our acceptance within the European Union’.37
In stark contrast to the liberals, advocates of the initiative argued that
their proposal is modelled on concepts and processes that are part and
parcel of an integrated Europe of the future, a de-territorialised world
in which individuals with multiple identities are entitled to a legal ex-
pression of the free choice of their nationality. Advocates argued that
all European states accept ethnicity as part of the basis of citizenship,
most even making provisions for the acquisition of benefits, including
citizenship, for co-ethnics who are citizens of another state. The pro-
blem with European norms and practices, they argued, is not that there
is no connection between ethnicity and citizenship but that Europe is
in a process of denial about this connection, treating ethnicity as
though it was a disreputable relative on whom we rely secretly, but
whom we hide from others (Scho¨pflin 2004). They pointed to plans or
existing legislation on non-resident citizenship for co-ethnic kin within
the European Union in Italy, Greece, Slovakia and the Czech Republic.
A particularly relevant example is Silesian Germans who, from the
early 1990s, were able to obtain German passports in addition to their
Polish ones and, by implication, European citizenship, without having
to take up residence in Germany. These precedents, they argued, point
to the legitimacy, even within the core nations of the European Union,
of using dual citizenship for the inclusion of trans-border co-ethnics in
the citizenry of the homeland.
Liberal opponents challenged this interpretation of larger European
processes and insisted that the EU would regard the ethnicist turn in
Hungarian legislation as a breach of common principles laid down in
European agreements (To´th 2004c).38 Secondly, they criticised the con-
frontational attitude towards Hungary’s neighbours promoted by this
policy. The problem with unilateral action is not so much that it vio-
lates international law, but that it is self-defeating. To quote the above
mentioned newspaper article by Ja´nos Kis again: The unilateral crea-
tion of Hungarian citizens in the territory of other states is nothing but
a ‘mirage’ that provokes ‘phony wars over phony questions and phony
answers’.
Thirdly, opponents argued, that the creation of dual citizenship can-
not be justified by reference to the approval by trans-border minorities
either, because these groups are themselves divided over the issue and
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do not speak with a single voice.39 In the end, any unilateral move by
Hungary to create dual citizenship would remain ‘a game of illusions
played between Hungarian nationalists and a minority within the Hun-
garian minority’ in a useless, but ‘ritual display of imagined political
togetherness’ (Kis 2004b).
Fourthly, critics objected that dual citizenship is incompatible with
claims of autonomy raised by trans-border minorities.40 Concurring
with Rainer Baubo¨ck they maintained that parallel ‘claims of multiple
citizenship and territorial autonomy should be seen as mutually in-
compatible. They would create fears in the host society about irreden-
tist threats to its territorial integrity that cannot be easily dismissed as
unreasonable’ (Baubo¨ck 2006: 159-160).
Therefore, according to the socialists and the liberals, Hungary must
take a new look at its homeland policies regarding kin-minorities. The
discourse advocated by the two mainstream right-wing parties aims at
recreating a ‘unitary Hungarian nation’ over and above existing state-
borders by means of creating legal bonds between parts of the Hungar-
ian nation living in several countries (Stewart 2004). Hungary should
step back from this confrontational approach because it relies on out-
right ignorance about the sensitivities of other states. Instead, it should
clearly articulate its policies in the conceptual framework of minority
protection. Hungary must accept that trans-border Hungarians are the
citizens of other states and should promote the protection of Hungar-
ian minorities in their efforts to secure equal individual and collective
rights in their home states.
Finally, there are obvious ambiguities in the arguments of both sides
in the debate. The idea of dual citizenship emerged in Hungary with
reference to a larger international trend of increasing toleration of dual
citizenship, partly within the European Union and partly within the
East-Central European region. However, while in the immigration
states of Europe the idea of dual citizenship is not associated with na-
tionalist policies, in Hungary, as in many other states of the region, the
demand for dual citizenship has mostly migrated to the nationalist
right. In the Hungarian referendum debate, the battle over dual citi-
zenship has been cast as a debate between the nationalist right as sup-
porters, on the one hand, and the Europe-oriented liberals, as oppo-
nents, on the other. However, this representation of the debate is, to
some extent, self-made and arbitrary. In fact, in their support of dual ci-
tizenship the nationalists have mainly been drawing on the arguments
of European liberals. At the same time, liberals relied on counter-argu-
ments they claimed to have extrapolated from relevant European
norms and practices, but these practices are much too diverse to form
the basis of a coherent interpretation. Unsurprisingly, by the end, both
sides failed to present a fully convincing, coherent interpretation of
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those international norms and practices that would support their re-
spective positions. In the final analysis it is quite possible that the con-
flicting stances of the two sides in the debate may stem from concerns
that are only remotely connected to the problems of trans-border Hun-
garians, namely from conflicting opinions, and concerns about the
long-term stability of Hungary’s transitional democracy. After all, par-
liamentary practices have not been firmly established in Hungary for
much more than a decade. Yet, in the Hungarian context, the creation
of trans-border non-resident dual citizenship would most likely amount
to a mass enfranchisement of a new electorate that, similar to all epi-
sodes of mass enfranchisement in the past, would introduce new un-
certainties into the system and could lead to an internal destabilisation
of Hungarian democracy itself. In this respect, both sides share the
same intuition, namely that if instituted, trans-border citizenship
would most likely have the effect of freezing the regular rotation of par-
liamentary forces for some time to come in favour of the nationalist
right: a prospect that is as welcome on one side as it is feared on the
other.
5.4 Trends in statistics
Data on trends of acquisition and termination of citizenship is infor-
mation of public interest.41 Nevertheless relevant data is only partially
available and in more detail only since 2001. Available data contain
numbers on naturalisation, re-naturalisation and on the termination of
nationality. Between 1958 and 1984 there were more cases of emigra-
tion than immigration (To´th 1997), and the total number of naturalised
and re-naturalised persons was 16,156 while at least 24,082 left the
country. The yearly average of naturalisations and re-naturalisations
was 622 while the average terminations of nationality was 926. During
this time there was no change in citizenship law, so it is only by exam-
ining legal and political practices that we can find an explanation for
the growth in the rate of nationality loss after 1967. A substantial pro-
portion of removal-upon-request came from female Hungarian spouses
marrying husbands from European states that prohibited dual citizen-
ship.
Between 1985 and 1989, the number of terminations was even high-
er than the number of naturalisations and re-naturalisations, but the
difference between them decreased. The major groups of applicants for
naturalisation were from the adjacent and socialist states (Romania,
Czechoslovakia, Soviet Union and East Germany) while the direction
of emigration/marriage migration was towards Austria and Yugoslavia.
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Table 5.1 Number of naturalisations and re-naturalisations as well as terminations of
nationality in Hungary, 1985-1994
Year Naturalisation/Re-naturalisation Removal/Renunciation
1990 3,170 1,184
Czech/Slovak 63 Czech/Slovak 2
Yugoslav 21 Yugoslav 18
Austrian 11 Austrian 169
Romanian 2,661 Romanian 1
Soviet 156 Soviet 1
East German 35 East German 70
Non-European 96 Non-European 1
1991 5,893 441
Czech/Slovak 25 Czech/Slovak 2
Yugoslav 22 Yugoslav 3
Austrian 18 Austrian 80
Romanian 5,114 Romanian –
Soviet 306 Soviet –
Stateless 13
Non-European 186 Non-European 1
1992 21,880 1,149
Czech/Slovak 249 Czech/Slovak 7
Yugoslav 1 Yugoslav 3
Austrian 7 Austrian 211
Romanian 20,624 Romanian –
Ex-Soviet 569 Ex-Soviet –
Stateless 7
Non-European 60 Non-European 3
1993 11,521 2,084
Czech/Slovak 55 Czech/Slovak 5
Yugoslav 309 Yugoslav –
Austrian 20 Austrian 314
Romanian 9,956 Romanian –
Ex-Soviet 843 Ex-Soviet –
Stateless 7
Non-European 75 Non-European 3
1994 9,238 1,688
Czech/Slovak 40 Czech/Slovak 7
Yugoslav 888 Yugoslav –
Austrian 1 Austrian 346
Romanian 6,254 Romanian –
Ex-Soviet 1,730 Ex-Soviet –
Stateless 1
Non-European 120 Non-European 2
Total 1985-1994 55,409 11,492
Yearly average 1985-1994 5,541 1,149
Source: www.bmbah.hu
Since 1990, the number of naturalisations has increased. This is not
only due to the larger number of ethnic Hungarian applicants but also
to the changing interpretation of the legal rules in force. The constitu-
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tional reform, aimed at establishing rule of law, influenced the practice
of the Ministry of the Interior. If an applicant met the legal require-
ments the discretionary power of naturalisation had to be interpreted
such that a positive decision on naturalisation was to be granted by the
President. However, this practice of ‘self-limitation’ could not compen-
sate for the more restrictive preconditions of naturalisation adopted by
the Act on Hungarian Nationality in 1993. The number of non-Eur-
opean applicants is growing, but has still remained marginal since the
1990s.
Table 5.2 Distribution of nationality law cases in Hungary, 1998-2008
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Applications for
naturalisation/
re-naturalisation
3,593 3,160 3,963 4,282 4,282 4,453 4,916 5,761 9,127 5,437 4,143
Applicants with citizenship (%):
Romania 61 60 63 69.8 69.8 73.2 60
Yugoslavia/Serbia 17 15 13 9.5 5.8 8.9 12
Ukraine 11 15 13 8.5 8.8 9.2 15
Other European 6 14 14 9.2 11.8 5 3
Non-European 5 5 3 2.5 3.3 3.2 7
Stateless 1 1 1 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Naturalised and
re-naturalised persons
6,203 6,203 7,538 5,934 3,890 5,579 5,667 9,981 6,564 9,398 8,132
Applications for
re-obtaining nationality
upon declaration of
expatriation, prior
nationals (persons)
232 200 208 194 212 151 144 136 104 85 68
Applications for
certificate of existing
nationality (persons)
3,934 4,264 3,935 3,924 4,401 4,803 5,984 5,482 4,121 4,276 4,958
Reinstatement of
nationality (persons)
- - - 1 1 2 1 0 0 0 0
Applications for
renunciation of
nationality (cases)
893 728 748 684 609 463 189 135 126 82 69
Accepted renunciations of
nationality (persons)
1,070 995 955 791 857 n/a 236 164 137 98 107
Note: n/a= not available
Source: www.bmbah.hu
Over the past number of years Hungary has become an immigration
country for large numbers of ethnic Hungarians and, increasingly for
others coming from more distant regions. There are three major chan-
nels for immigrants to become nationals: (1) naturalisation, (2) prior
nationals, mainly expatriates re-obtaining Hungarian nationality by de-
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claration or re-naturalisation, (3) expatriates or their descendants living
abroad who can prove Hungarian citizenship through a verification pro-
cedure of existing citizenship (Certificate of Nationality). This restora-
tion of legal ties with Hungary was made possible by political changes
and new rules on rehabilitation and compensation for damages or
harm committed against nationals by the socialist regime. Between
1998 and 2008, the number of naturalised and re-naturalised persons
was below the number of applicants for a citizenship card, which serves
to certify the holder’s Hungarian nationality. The ratio of naturalisation
according to legal titles for the years 2002, 2007 and 2008 proves that
preferential cases vastly outweigh non-preferential ones, which repre-
sented between 3 and 6 per cent of all cases (Table 5.3).
Table 5.3 Ratio of naturalisation decisions in Hungary in 2002, 2007 and 2008
Type of legal titles Art. 2002 2007 2008
Total % Total % Total %
No preference (basic
decision)
4 § (1) 244 6.27 186 2.71 206 3.39
Weak preference (applicant
was born in Hungary)
4 § (4) a. 3 0.0 90 1.31 70 1.15
Weak preference (applicant
immigrated as minor to
Hungary)
4 § (4) b. 2 0.0 136 1.98 136 2.24
Medium preference
(applicant’s spouse is
Hungarian national)
4 § (2) a. 325 8.35 402 5.87 380 6.26
Medium preference
(applicant’s minor child is
Hungarian national)
4 § (2) b. 49 1.25 123 1.79 118 1.94
Medium preference
(applicant is a recognised
refugee)
4 § (2) d. 17 0.4 43 0.62 22 0.36
Strong preference (applicant
is a minor)
4 § (5) 9 0.2 27 0.39 11 0.18
Strong preference (applicant
is a minor adopted by a
national)
4 § (6) 30 0.7 4 0.05 7 0.11
Strong preference (applicant
is an ethnic Hungarian)
4 § (3) 2,447 62.9 5,158 75.33 4,713 77.66
Re-naturalisation 5 § 764 19.6 676 9.87 403 6.64
Total 3,890 100.0 6,845 100.0 6,066 100.0
Source: www.bmbah.hu
Table 5.3 indicates that, beyond the ethnic immigration from the Car-
pathian basin, family reunification and repatriation of prior nationals
have added the largest numbers of new nationals.
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5.5 Conclusions
In Hungary, the term ‘nation’ is interpreted and used in law as a con-
cept referring to membership in the cultural, ethnic and linguistic
community. But the substance of the term remains indefinable by law.
This reveals contradictions between existing laws and the Constitution.
On the one hand, art. 6 of the Constitution refers to the kin-state’s re-
sponsibility for kin-minorities living across the borders. However, the
definition of membership in the minority or ethnic community is va-
gue, and various preferential provisions legally discriminate against
certain categories of people despite the fact that the state is party to
dozens of international treaties aimed at avoiding such discrimination.
Furthermore, minorities living in Hungary are distinct participants in
the state, in possession of subjective and collective constitutional
rights, although, in their case as well, membership of a specific ethnic
or national entity cannot be defined. Due to this problem neither statis-
tics on membership of minorities living in Hungary, nor hard data on
immigrants entering Hungary and enjoying legal preferences in the
country are available. According to Rainer Baubo¨ck, ‘[h]istoric tradi-
tions and the distinction between ethnic and civic nationhood are in-
creasingly irrelevant for explaining legislative changes’.42 Despite a
standard level of immigration, in the case of Hungary Baubo¨ck’s sug-
gestion is less evident than among the old EU Member States (To´th &
Sik 2003). The recently failed referendum of 5 December 2004 on ex
lege citizenship being granted to ethnic Hungarian minorities living in
adjacent states is a case in point as it would have used ethnic prefer-
ences for granting non-resident citizenship to trans-border Hungar-
ians. The role of nationality law in the integration process of migrants
has not been discussed publicly and the need to harmonise Hungarian
citizenship with that of other Member States of the European Union
has not been put on the agenda.
Chronological list of citizenship-related legislation in Hungary
Date Document Content Source
1946 Act XV on Czech-Slovak-
Hungarian Agreement
Deprives those who fall
under the bilateral
agreements on population
exchange of Hungarian
nationality
1947 Government Decree
12.200
Deprives expelled
Germans of Hungarian
nationality
1947 Act X Deprives those who have
not returned to Hungary
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Date Document Content Source
following the conclusion of
the war of Hungarian
nationality
1948 Act LX on Hungarian
Nationality
Like the previous Act of
1879, is based on ius
sanguinis; provides for the
equal treatment of children
born out of wedlock;
stipulates that all nationals
residing abroad should be
registered; recognises the
pending Hungarian
nationality of
undocumented persons
1949 Constitution (excerpts) www.legislationline.org
1957 Act V on Hungarian
Nationality
Introduces the
emancipation of spouses;
includes executive rules,
such as the one requiring
emigrants to renounce
their nationality and social
insurance rights
1989 Act XXXI amending the
Constitution of 1949
(excerpts)
Prohibits arbitrary
deprivation of nationality
1993 Citizenship Act (Act LV of
1993 on Hungarian
Nationality)
Provides that the
nationality of expatriate
nationals who have been
arbitrarily deprived of their
nationality is restored
upon request; includes
preferential naturalisation
of refugees and stricter
conditions for
naturalisation, but also
preferences based on
ethnic and family ties
www.coe.int;
www.huembwas.org;
www.bmbah.hu/
jogszabalyok.php
(in Hungarian)
1993 Government Decree 125/
1993 on the Execution of
Act No. LV of 1993 on
Hungarian Nationality
Defines formats and
procedural rules
www.coe.int;
www.bmbah.hu/
jogszabalyok.php
(in Hungarian)
2001 Legislation on Kin-
minorities (Act LXII of
2001 on Ethnic
Hungarians Living in
Neighbouring Countries)
Introduces an identity card
for ethnic Hungarians; lists
allowances and benefits
granted to holders of such
cards (mainly in Hungary)
2001 Act XXXII amending Act LV
of 1993 on Hungarian
Nationality
Allows ethnic Hungarians
to have the family and
given name in their
original ethnic language;
introduces facilitated
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Date Document Content Source
acquisition of nationality
for exiled nationals by
declaration to the
President of State
2001 Government Decree 103/
2001 amending
Government Decree 125/
1993 on the Execution of
Act LV of 1993 on
Hungarian Nationality
Provides fast-track
naturalisation process for
ethnic Hungarians and
minors
2003 Act LVI amending Act LV of
1993 on Hungarian
Nationality
Extends preference in
naturalisation to European
Union citizens
2003 Act LVII amending Act LXII
of 2001 on Ethnic
Hungarians Living in
Neighbouring Countries
Cuts and restructures
benefits and allowances for
ethnic Hungarians
2003 Government Decree 128/
2003 amending
Government Decree 125/
1993 on the Execution of
Act LV of 1993 on
Hungarian Nationality
Introduces new formats in
nationality procedures
2005 Act XLVI amending Act LV
of 1993 on Hungarian
Nationality
Reduces the waiting period
in naturalisation
procedures for ethnic
Hungarians; specifies
exceptions from taking the
examination on basic
constitutional issues;
allows the use of the ethnic
version of a person’s place
of birth in official
documents (in
combination with the
Hungarian version)
2005 Act LXXXIII amending Act
LXII of 2001 on Ethnic
Hungarians Living in
Neighbouring Countries
Harmonises proceedings
for the identity card for
ethnic Hungarians with the
new Code on Public
Administration Processes
2005 Government Decree 119/
2005 amending
Government Decree 125/
1993 on the Execution of
Act LV of 1993 on
Hungarian Nationality
Determines the C 20 fee
for the examination on
basic constitutional issues
in the naturalisation
procedure; clarifies family
unification rules in related
immigration rules
2006 Act XXI amending Act LV
of 1993 on Hungarian
Nationality
Introduces official notice
on ceased Hungarian
nationality of individuals to
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Date Document Content Source
the population registry of
the Central Statistical
Office and to the military
service registry of the
Ministry of Defence
2006 Act CIX amending the Act
LV of 1993 on Hungarian
Nationality
Entitles the President of
State to exempt applicants
from some naturalisation
requirements (e.g.
subsistence, examination
on constitutional basics);
introduces several
procedural changes
regarding issuing of
documents, the length of
procedures, etc.
2007 Act I on entry and staying
of persons in possession
of rights on free movement
and residence
Defines period of
residence in Hungary as
starting with the address
registration for permanent
residence holders,
recognised refugees and
registered persons with
right to free movement (i.
e. EU citizens and their
family members)
2008 Act LXXXII amending the
Act LV of 1993 on
Hungarian Nationality
Defines the body
responsible for the exam
on the constitution
Notes
1 Act LVI of 2003 amending Act LV of 1993 on Hungarian Nationality. It entered into
force with the accession of Hungary to the European Union on 1 May 2004.
2 Act XXXII of 2001 amending Act LV of 1993 on Hungarian Nationality, Government
Decree No. 125 of 22 September 1993, Decree of the Minister of the Interior No. 6 of
7 March 2003.
3 Concluded in Moscow on 20 January 1945 and published in Act V of 1945.
4 The Peace Agreement was concluded in Paris and published in Act XVIII of 1947. It
entered into force by Government Decree 11.800 of 1947.
5 See details in Czech-Slovak-Hungarian Agreement published in Act XV of 1946 and
Government Decree 12.200 of 1947.
6 In particular, Act X of 1947 and Act XXVI of 1948.
7 For instance, Prime Minister Decree 9.590 of 1945.
8 Act XXIX of 1946.
9 Act LX of 1948.
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10 Published in Law-Decree No. 2 of 1960.
11 Act V of 1957.
12 Law-Decree No. 11 of 1955, No. 7 of 1956, No. 11 of 1956; Ministerial Decree of the
Interior 2 of 11 January 1956.
13 Act XXXI of 1989 introduced a substantially new Constitution but formally it was
only an amendment.
14 Provisions of Act XXVII of 1990 and Act XXXII of 1990 were inserted into the third
Act on Nationality in 1993.
15 Published in Law-Decree No. 15 of 1989.
16 Act VL of 1993.
17 Acts XXXII of 2001, LVI of 2003 and XLVI of 2005.
18 Published in Acts II and III of 2003.
19 This principle is a legal expression of the fact that the individual who obtains this
citizenship – directly through the law or as a result of the action of the authorities –
is in actual fact more closely related to the state whose citizen he or she is than to
any other state (Lichtenstein v. Guatemala, 1995 WL 1 (International Court of Justice)
generally known as the Nottebohm case).
20 Act on Hungarian Nationality, arts. 10-12.
21 Before accession, Hungary had agreements on visa-free travel with six neighbours,
and a voucher system was defined with the Ukraine. For the sake of legal
harmonisation these agreements were modified. Visa requirements were introduced
for Ukrainian and Serbian citizens, while the agreement with Romania introduced a
maximum length of stay.
22 Act LXII of 2001 on Ethnic Hungarians Living in Neighbouring Countries. It was
amended by Act LVII of 2003. Its administrative rules on financial, technical and
procedural issues are laid down in ten government and ministerial Decrees.
23 Act II of 2005 on the Homeland Fund covers various community-building projects
for kin-minorities living in adjacent states.
24 In Hungary, a referendum is valid if at least 25 per cent of the electorate returns
identical votes, or if participation is higher than 50 per cent of the total number of
eligible voters. In this case neither criterion was fulfilled.
25 Official translation provided by the Government’s Election Office (Orsza´gos Va´laszta´si
Bizottsa´g), www.election.hu, last accessed 5 May 2005.
26 According to the statistics published in 2004 by the Hungarian Government Office
for Trans-Border Hungarians (Hata´ron Tu´li Magyarok Hivatala), the number of Hun-
garians living in Romania, Ukraine, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia, Croatia and
Slovenia as provided by the official censuses in these countries between 2000 and
2002 amounted to 2,429,000, among these in Romania 1,435,000; Ukraine
156,000; Serbia and Montenegro 293,000; Slovakia 516,000; Croatia 16,000 and
Slovenia 8,500 (see www.htmh.hu, last accessed 5 May 2005). The estimate for the
number of trans-border Hungarians potentially eligible for Hungarian citizenship
based on ethnic identification is higher than these numbers, which is explained by
the assumption that more people would be able to fulfil the criteria of Hungarian af-
filiation than those who actually declare themselves Hungarian in government cen-
suses. The number of potential claimants on such grounds globally was estimated at
around five million by the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Andra´s Ba´rsony (‘Ha-
ta´rok ne´lku¨l’, Kossuth Ra´dio´, 16 January 2003. www.hhrf.org, last accessed 5 May
2005). Also see note 34.
27 J. Debreczeni, ‘Haza´rdja´te´k’ [Gambling], Ne´pszabadsa´g [daily newspaper], 27 Novem-
ber 2004.
28 The Hungarian name of the federation is Magyarok Vila´gszo¨vetse´ge.
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29 Since its adoption, approximately a quarter of all trans-border Hungarians applied for
the Hungarian ID. There are about 850,000 card-holders today.
30 As a result of the conflict surrounding the Status Law, the Orba´n Government
withdrew public funding from the Federation.
31 Soon after the announcement of the plan for the referendum it became clear that
any legislation on dual citizenship would have to happen unilaterally, as the
Romanian president promptly announced his country’s opposition.
32 On 12 November 2004, President Ferenc Ma´dl, in a speech addressed to the
Hungarian Permanent Assembly (MA´E´RT), spoke of the perception of the referen-
dum initiative by external minorities as an act of ‘historical justice’ and added: ‘I call
upon Hungarians to use their votes to assume a sense of community with Hungar-
ians outside of our borders’ (www.martonaron.hu, last accessed 17 February 2005).
33 ‘A ketto˝s a´llampolga´rsa´gro´l, Adatok, a´lla´sfoglala´sok, elemze´sek’ [On dual citizenship,
data, opinions and analyses]. www.martonaron.hu, last accessed 17 February 2005.
34 Hungarian citizens who had emigrated from Hungary retained their Hungarian
citizenship. This, however, did not apply to former citizens of Hungary in the
neighbouring states who had lost their Hungarian citizenship as a result of the peace
treaties that redrew the borders of the Hungarian state. The possibility of inheriting
Hungarian citizenship applies only to people whose right to Hungarian citizenship is
derived from their connection to the territory of the state of Hungary as delineated in
the Paris Peace Treaty of 1947.
35 The dimension of the population potentially affected by the ius sanguinis
transmission of citizenship is difficult to assess. Given the fact that in 1920,
Hungary’s population had been reduced to half of what it had been before the war
(with a corresponding reduction of two-thirds of its territory), the idea that ius
sanguinis transmission could automatically create dual citizens after any number of
generations would amount to the obligation to re-activate the ‘dormant’ citizenship of
people whose numbers may surpass half of Hungary’s current population. The peace
treaty of 1920 reduced Hungary’s population from 18.2 million to 7.9 million and its
territory from 282,000 km2 to 93,000 km2. Trans-border Hungarians are estimated
to number about 3.5 million, while people (with their offspring) who retain a ius san-
guinis right to Hungarian citizenship (e.g. those who emigrated after 1939) are esti-
mated to be about 1.5 million.
36 Hungarian trans-border citizenship, if ever instituted, is more likely to be in line
with that of Croatia where trans-border dual citizens retain some of their rights
associated with Croatian citizenship, including voting rights in Croatian elections,
even at times when their alternate citizenship is active (see Ragazzi & Sˇtiks in this
volume). But while trans-border Croats vote for a quota of expatriate seats, trans-
border Hungarians would find it easy to vote for regular seats without putting their
alternate citizenship to rest. This is because Hungarian regulations on the
declaration of residence are extremely lax, requiring only three months of residence
for a citizen to activate his or her right to vote. Moreover, in order to avoid the
disenfranchisement of the homeless, voters can be admitted to the voters’ registry
without actually possessing an address or residence permit by simply making a
declaration of residence at a given locality at the municipal office. According to
recent changes in Italian law, Italian non-resident citizens may also vote in referenda
and national elections for a fixed number of seats. However, the numerical
dimensions of the Italian case are radically different from that of Hungary. There are
altogether 2.7 million non-resident Italian citizens, which is equivalent to about 3 per
cent of the resident citizenry of Italy, as opposed to the size of the trans-border
Hungarian population that represents 30-35 per cent of Hungary’s current citizenry.
174 MA´RIA M. KOVA´CS AND JUDIT TO´TH
37 J. Kis, ‘Mie´rt megyek el szavazni?’ [Why am I taking part in the voting?], Ne´pszabad-
sa´g, 20 November 2004.
38 Especially in the European Convention on Nationality (1997) ratified by Hungary in
2002 which stipulates in art. 2/a that ‘‘‘nationality’’ means the legal bond between a
person and a State and does not indicate the person’s ethnic origin’, and restricts the
‘recovery of former nationality’ of a given state to those residing on its territory.
39 For example, the biggest Hungarian party of the large Hungarian minority of
Romania, which has substantial representation in the Romanian parliament and
government, has traditionally been, at best, lukewarm about dual citizenship.
However, the most vocal advocates of trans-border Hungarian citizenship also come
from Romania and they also rely on a substantial constituency. Minorities them-
selves do not speak with a single voice because the attitudes of the different groups
of which they are composed are derivative of the long-term view each of these groups
takes on the possibilities of negotiating a better status for themselves in their host
states. Even if the idea of dual citizenship enjoyed the support of the majority of
trans-border Hungarians, this support would be based on a demagogic-populist
misrepresentation of what is actually possible.
40 T. Bauer, ‘Ketto˝s Kapitula´cio´’ [Dual Capitulation], Ne´pszabadsa´g, 8 January 2004.
41 Art. 61 of the Constitution provides a fundamental right to free expression and
obtaining as well as freely disseminating information of interest to the general
public. A separate law regulates its implementation (Act LXIII of 1992).
42 See ‘Western European Countries Tend to Follow a Liberalizing Trend towards
Citizenship Policies. Interview with Rainer Baubo¨ck’. www.migrationonline.cz.
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6 Politics of citizenship in post-communist
Romania: Legal traditions, restitution of nationality
and multiple memberships
Constantin Iordachi
A member of the European Union since January 2007, Romania has
brought a rich historical experience into the union that goes all the
way back to long-lasting Byzantine and Ottoman imperial legacies and
to the more recent successive waves of Western- and Soviet-style mod-
ernisation. Given Romania’s multiple historical legacies, which com-
bine pan-European trends with Central and Southeast European regio-
nal features, the history of Romanian citizenship legislation challenges
the clear-cut and neatly defined analytical dichotomies, such as ‘old’
versus ‘new’ states and ‘civic’ versus ‘ethnic’ or ‘inclusive’ vs. ‘exclusive’
citizenship doctrines, which are erroneously regarded as corresponding
to ‘Western’ vs. ‘Eastern’ historical experiences (for a critique of such
views, see Iordachi 2006).
This chapter focuses on the interplay of historical legacies in the evo-
lution of Romanian citizenship, underlining continuities and ruptures
in the transition from communist to post-communist policies of na-
tional membership. Methodologically, I distinguish between two insti-
tutional dimensions of citizenship: the legal category of nationality that
defines membership in a state understood as a territorial and national
organisation; and citizenship as rights and duties stemming from
membership and participation in a political community. The first di-
mension encompasses the construction of legal and political borders
between state citizens and aliens. The second dimension refers to the
civil, political and social entitlements of citizenship (Marshall 1950).1
Like the other contributions in this book, this chapter focuses on the
first legal dimension of nationality, which is regulated mainly by con-
stitutions and citizenship laws. Particular attention is devoted to the
most contested component of post-communist Romania’s nationality
policy: the right to reacquisition of nationality by former citizens and
their descendants living outside the state’s (post-1945) borders. This
policy resulted in the massive (re-)naturalisation of Moldovan and Uk-
rainian citizens stripped of their Romanian nationality following the
1940-1941/1944 Soviet occupation of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovi-
na. I argue that Romania’s policy regarding the restoration of national-
ity should be placed in the political and analytical context of post-com-
munist restitution. Restitution in its various forms has been an impor-
tant component of legal systems since ancient times, referring to the
return of a person to his or her original status and of restoration of his
or her rights or property, prior to a loss, injury or abuse. In post-com-
munist Central and Eastern Europe, the concept took on a peculiar le-
gal meaning because it denoted the process of undoing communist le-
gal and political abuses and dispossessions. Restitution was central to
post-communist legal and political transformation, which was aimed at
the restoration of the status-quo ante (before the communist takeover).
From this perspective, the legal ‘revolutions’ initiated in 1989, which
led to the dismantling of the communist regimes, should be under-
stood more in the original meaning of the term ‘revolution’, that is, as
a movement of rotation, which returns to an original position.
In post-communist East Central Europe, practices of restitution have
been applied to a wide range of societal domains. Yet, to date, research
has focused almost exclusively on the reconstruction of individual and
communal property rights. An important but largely understudied as-
pect is the restitution of nationality to former de-naturalised citizens.
In the context of post-communist nationalist upsurge, this practice was
not simply a necessary legal reparation for past injustices; it was also
seen as a means of recreating the pre-communist citizenry and na-
tional community and as a means for the restoration of national iden-
tity, allegedly lost under communist rule, which was defined as a re-
gime of Soviet occupation. The gap between political visions of recreat-
ing the inter-war national ‘imagined community’ and the far-reaching
practical complications this project generated led to a multitude of poli-
tical, legal-procedural and diplomatic crises, with wide domestic and in-
ternational implications. These complications and the debates sur-
rounding them account for the numerous shifts and turns of Roma-
nia’s policy regarding the restitution of nationality, which culminated
in the temporary suspensions of the process of restitution during the
period from 2001 to 2007.
6.1 History of Romanian nationality
6.1.1 The making of Romanian nationality: Pre-communist legacies
Modern Romania was established in 1859 through the state union of
the principalities of Moldova and Wallachia. After their establishment
in the fourteenth century, the two principalities were part of the Byzan-
tine political tradition and Eastern Orthodox religious commonwealth.
They fell under Ottoman domination in the fifteenth century and were
subject to Ottoman suzerainty until 1878; and thereafter experienced
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major stages of nation- and state-building during the ‘long nineteenth
century’, with such landmarks as the Congress of Paris (1856), the
Congress of Berlin (1879), and the Versailles Peace Treaties (1919-
1920), all part of successive geo-political reorganisations of Southeast
Europe by the great European powers. One can identify several histori-
cal periods in the development of Romanian citizenship, corresponding
to major stages in the process of nation-building and state-building:
1859-1918, 1918-1937, 1937-1944, 1944-1989 and 1989 to the present.
The legal bases of the modern Romanian nationality were set by the
1865 Civil Code, which emulated the French legal system put forward
in the 1804 Code Civil, based on the ius sanguinis principle in ascrib-
ing nationality at birth, and a selective policy of naturalisation of aliens,
favouring those born and raised in the country. The French model was
nevertheless amended in several respects: the Romanian Civil Code,
soon supplemented but also partially (and restrictively) modified by a
modern Constitution adopted in 1866, introduced Christian religion
and Romanian ethnicity as criteria for naturalisation, both absent in
the Code Civil. Firstly, until 1879, Jews were excluded from Romanian
nationality, on the basis of their religion, even if born and raised in the
country for generations; on this basis, they were deprived of substantial
civil, social and political rights. In 1879, under pressure from the inter-
national community, Jews were granted access to naturalisation; how-
ever, instead of a fast and collective citizenship emancipation, Jews
were only allowed to apply for individual naturalisation that could be
granted by parliament by means of a special law adopted for each indi-
vidual case. This lengthy and highly bureaucratic practice explains the
small number of naturalisations before the First World War, the great
majority of Jews remaining non-citizen permanent residents. Secondly,
the Romanian state pursued an active national policy: ethnic Roma-
nians from neighbouring countries immigrating to the ‘mother coun-
try’ were granted privileged access to nationality, without a naturalisa-
tion stage, i.e. without the necessity of having lived in the country for a
period of ten years. (They could prove their ethnic origin by means of
witness accounts or certificates of ethnicity issued by Romanian com-
munities abroad and further corroborated by their knowledge of the
Romanian language.) This practice, euphemistically called ‘recognition’
of citizenship, was justified by the incomplete ethnic boundaries of the
Romanian nation-state and legitimised an irredentist policy of incor-
porating Romanians from Austria-Hungary, Russia and the Balkans.
This legal model functioned until the First World War, with only minor
modifications necessitated by the annexation of Northern and Southern
Dobrogea/Dobrudja from the Ottoman Empire and from Bulgaria in
1878 and in 1913, respectively (Iordachi 2002).
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The socio-political upheaval of the Great War brought significant
changes to the Romanian citizenry. Firstly, interwar ‘Greater Romania’
almost doubled in size and population compared to the pre-war ‘Old
Kingdom’ by incorporating the province of Bessarabia (situated be-
tween the rivers Prut and Dniestr and annexed by Russia in 1812) and
territories that had been previously part of Austria-Hungary – namely
Bukovina, Transylvania, the Banat, Maramures¸ and the Partium. For
the first time in their modern history, ethnic Romanians thus lived in
a single ‘national and unitary state’, as Greater Romania was defined
by the 1923 Constitution. Although dominated by Romanians, the new
state also included a high ratio of ethnic and religious minorities: 28.1
per cent of the total population in 1930, including Hungarians (7.9 per
cent), Germans (4.1 per cent), Jews (4.0 per cent), Ruthenians (3.2 per
cent), Russians (2.3 per cent), Bulgarians (2.0 per cent), Gypsies (1.5
per cent), Turks (0.9 per cent) and Tartars (0.1 per cent) (Institutul
Central de Statistica˘ 1940: 44-45). Secondly, the events of the war gen-
erated an unprecedented liberalisation of access to citizenship. Under
international pressure, Romania took final steps towards the full civil
and political emancipation of Jews. Adopted in February 1924, the new
law on nationality granted citizenship to all legal inhabitants of the Old
Kingdom and the annexed territories. It also preserved the main fea-
tures of Romanian citizenship doctrine by stipulating three main ways
of acquiring nationality: (1) by descent, according to the principle of ius
sanguinis; (2) by marrying a Romanian man; and (3) by naturalisation,
after having fulfilled a residence requirement of ten years following the
declaration of intent to naturalise. Foreigners born and raised in Roma-
nia were exempt from the mandatory residential stage, provided they
requested naturalisation upon reaching maturity. Thirdly, the liberalisa-
tion of access to citizenship was accompanied by major socio-political
reorganisations of the country. Comprehensive reforms such as univer-
sal male suffrage (1918), massive land redistribution (1921) and the
new liberal Constitution (1923) remodelled the country into a multi-
party parliamentary monarchy.
While the new liberal regime remained largely unconsolidated and
marred by major regional and socio-political cleavages, it is important
to note that political pluralism was preserved almost throughout the
entire interwar period, free parliamentary elections being held as late
as 1937, at a time when the European continent was mostly dominated
by authoritarian political regimes. Ironically, the 1937 parliamentary
elections turned out to be Romania’s last free elections before 1990.
The Romanian citizenship doctrine suffered significant changes just
prior to and during the Second World War, with long-term legal conse-
quences. Firstly, under the joint pressure of right-wing organisations
from below and the authoritarian tendencies of King Carol II (1930-
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1940) from above, in 1938, the multiparty parliamentary regime col-
lapsed, being replaced by a (short-lived) regime of royal dictatorship
(1938-1940). The new political changes were also reflected in a new
law on citizenship, adopted in 1939 at King Carol’s initiative. The law
did not alter the main principles of ascribing citizenship, but intro-
duced numerous changes in the procedure of naturalisation, placed
under the control of the Ministry of Justice. The most important
change was that naturalised citizens were granted full political rights
only six years after the act of naturalisation. The law served as a basis
of Romania’s nationality policy until 1947/1952, when it was amended
and then fully abolished by the new communist regime; however, in
the post-communist period, many of its provisions have been rein-
stated. Secondly, the political accession of the extreme right led to the
massive de-naturalisation of Romanian Jews, their deprivation of sub-
stantive political and civil rights during the royal dictatorship of King
Carol II and their partial deportation and extermination during the dic-
tatorial regime of Ion Antonescu (1940-1944). Thirdly, during the Sec-
ond World War, Greater Romania suffered major territorial losses. In
1940 – under the new political conditions created by Nazi Germany’s
military domination in Europe – Romania was forced to cede North-
Western Transylvania to Hungary and Southern Dobrogea to Bulgaria.
Following the 1939 ‘Ribbentrop-Molotov’ Non-Aggression Pact, which
divided the spheres of influence between Nazi Germany and the
USSR, on 28 June 1940 the Soviet army occupied the provinces of Bes-
sarabia and Northern Bukovina. Romania ceded these provinces with-
out resistance, but in June 1941, it joined Nazi Germany’s anti-Soviet
war and managed to temporarily liberate the occupied territories (1941-
1944).
In 1944, a coalition of communists and democratic parties ousted
Antonescu from power, reinstated the 1923 Constitution, abolished all
anti-Semitic discriminatory laws and restored citizenship to all denatur-
alised inhabitants. The new democratic Romania also joined the anti-
fascist military coalition and restored its control over Northwestern
Transylvania. The return to the legal and territorial order of interwar
Greater Romania was nevertheless hampered by several factors: firstly,
in 1944, the Soviets reoccupied Bessarabia, which became the Molda-
vian Soviet Socialist Republic (MSSR) and included also the Transnis-
tria region (a long conundrum situated across the river Dniestr) and
Northern Bukovina, which was granted to the Ukraine (together with
the southern part of Bessarabia, detached from the MSSR). Secondly,
the Soviets intervened in the political process by installing the tiny
Communist Party in power and initiating the forceful Sovietisation of
Romania. The understanding of the communist legacy is essential to
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our effort to grasp the main features of citizenship policies in the post-
communist period.
6.1.2 A new legal beginning: Nationality under the communist regime
The communist regime implemented radical changes to Romania’s le-
gal and political system (1945-1989). Through three consecutive consti-
tutions (1948, 1952, 1965), major changes to the civil code and an all-
encompassing set of laws regulating every sphere of activity, the new
political regime broke with the past and redefined the nature of the
state by emulating the Soviet model of development. As a legal bound-
ary defining membership in the national and social-political commu-
nity, citizenship legislation was an essential dimension of the commu-
nist political transformation and was therefore subject to many revi-
sions in 1947, 1948, 1952, 1954, 1956 and 1971, reflecting the shifts
and turns of the political regime.
The communist regime redefined the conditions of acquisition and
loss of nationality. With the stroke of a pen, Decree No. 33/1952 abol-
ished all existing laws on citizenship (art. 10); instead, in two pages
and ten articles, it set new rules for the acquisition of Romanian na-
tionality, defining the legal boundaries of the socialist nation. Roma-
nian nationality was ascribed at birth iure sanguinis to children of at
least one Romanian parent. In a major departure from the legal tradi-
tion of the country, the decree thus allowed the transmission of nation-
ality on the paternal as well as on the maternal line in mixed families,
provided that at least one parent lived in Romania. This transmission
could not result in dual citizenship: upon adulthood, children born into
mixed marriages had to choose between the nationality of the mother
or the father, by parental accord. Combined with Decree No. 130/1949
(which allowed official investigations of the paternity of children, thus
eliminating ‘illegitimacy’ as an accepted legal category), these stipula-
tions contributed to the formal legal equality of women, since they
were legally enabled to transmit their own nationality to their children.
The decree discontinued the traditional ius soli policy of naturalisa-
tion of aliens born in the country and the privileged naturalisation of
ethnic Romanians living abroad. Decisions on the naturalisations of
aliens, as well as on the renunciations or withdrawals of nationality
were taken by the Presidium of the Grand National Assembly, estab-
lished in 1947 after the abolition of the monarchy and the proclama-
tion of the republic.
After 1958, political divergences with Moscow and the move of the
Romanian leaders towards political autonomy and a ‘national’ path to
building socialism led to significant changes in the official socialist
ideology. With the retreat of the Red Army (1958), Romanian leaders
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renounced external sources of legitimisation and recuperated tradi-
tional themes of nationalist ideology in an attempt to gain broader do-
mestic support (Shafir 1985). Initiated under the last years of Gheorghe
Gheorghiu-Dej’s rule, the nationalist turn of the regime, which was in-
tensified during the rule of Nicolae Ceaus¸escu (1965-1989), resulted in
a syncretism between nationalism and a ‘decayed Marxism,’ best de-
scribed by the concept of ‘national-communism’ (Verdery 1991).
The new nationalist orientation of the regime was also reflected in
the definition given to the legal principle governing the ascription of
nationality at birth. Adopted in 1971, the new Law on Romanian citi-
zenship reconfirmed the principle of ius sanguinis as the very founda-
tion of a homogeneous national community and imbued it with nation-
alist connotations. Art. 5 of the law read:
As an expression of the relationship between parents and chil-
dren, of the uninterrupted continuity of the fatherland of previous
generations that fought for social and national freedom, children
born of Romanian parents on the territory of the Socialist Repub-
lic of Romania are Romanian citizens. (emphasis added)2
This definition linked the application of the ius sanguinis principle to
birth on the territory and uninterrupted continuity of the nation in its
‘fatherland’. It made reference not only to parents and children in the
transmission of nationality, but also to generations. Other articles of
the law made evident that this link operated only at symbolic-ideologi-
cal level, the principle of ius sanguinis being in fact also applied to
children of citizens born outside the country. The argument was never-
theless meant to emphasise the ‘autochthonous’ roots of the Romanian
people and the historical ‘symbiosis’ between the nation, its territory
and the new socialist citizenry, thus alluding to the idea of organic na-
tionalism elaborated by Romantic nationalist thinkers in the first half
of the nineteenth century and brought to political prominence by right-
wing organisations in the interwar period.
In addition to ascription through ius sanguinis at birth, Romanian
nationality could also be acquired by naturalisation, by adoption and by
repatriation. Naturalisation was granted at adulthood by the Council of
State (a leading organ of the republic created in 1961) to persons who:
a) were born in Romania and lived there at the time of their request; b)
were born abroad but had lived uninterruptedly in Romania for at least
five years; c) were married to a Romanian citizen and had lived in the
country for at least three years. In addition to the residence condition,
aliens were required to:
1. prove, through their behaviour and attitude, attachment to the Ro-
manian state and the Romanian people;
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2. be eighteen years of age or above;
3. undertake socially useful work or prove sufficient material means
of subsistence;
4. renounce their foreign nationality or any commitment of loyalty to
a foreign power and swear allegiance to Socialist Romania.
The Romanian state reserved its right to unilaterally withdraw the na-
tionality of those individuals who ‘broke with the fatherland by cross-
ing the border clandestinely or, after relocating their domicile abroad,
assumed a foreign nationality, worked against the interests of the coun-
try or enrolled in a foreign army’ (art. 19). Access to nationality was
firmly controlled by the executive power; Ceaus¸escu alone, as the presi-
dent of the Council of State (from December 1967 to December 1989),
could grant or withdraw Romanian nationality.
6.2 Democratic transformation: Current regulations on
ascription, acquisition and loss of nationality
The 1989 collapse of the communist regime and the gradual democra-
tisation of the political system had a powerful impact on Romanian ci-
tizenship legislation, resulting in the redefinition of the legal criteria of
membership in the national community. Without significant dissident
or reformist movements during the communist period on which to
build the process of democratisation, post-communist Romania mod-
elled its legal and political systems on the interwar political regime: the
restitution of urban and land property, the recreation of political parties
and parliament’s structure and organisation were all shaped by its pre-
communist tradition. Yet, in many ways, the communist legacy deeply
affected the society and could not be written off as a simple ‘parenth-
esis’ in the country’s development.
Citizenship legislation is a relevant example in this respect. Adopted
in March 1991, the new Law on Romanian Citizenship was modelled
on the 1939 Law, abrogated by the communist regime in 1952; yet it
also preserved many provisions of the 1971 Law, resulting in a novel
synthesis. The 1991 Law specified four main ways of acquiring nation-
ality by different categories of inhabitants:
1. ascription at birth, through transmission iure sanguinis to descen-
dants of citizens, provided at least one of the child’s parents holds
Romanian nationality at the time of the child’s birth;
2. adoption of an alien child by a Romanian citizen;
3. by the act of repatriation of former citizens; and
4. upon request, by naturalisation of aliens born in Romania or who
have lived there for a certain period of time.
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6.2.1 Acquisition at birth
The ascription of Romanian nationality at birth is governed solely by
the principle of ius sanguinis, being granted to children who are: 1)
born within the territory of the country to two Romanian citizen par-
ents; 2) born within the territory of the country in mixed marriages
with only one Romanian citizen; and 3) born abroad to at least one Ro-
manian parent. That the principle of ius soli is of no relevance in the
ascription of nationality at birth is made evident by the provisions con-
cerning the nationality of newly-born children of unknown parents;
they are granted citizenship not on the basis of their birth on Roma-
nia’s territory, but under the assumption that their parents held Roma-
nian nationality (art. 5). Evidence to the contrary results in loss of na-
tionality, followed by the obligation of naturalisation (art. 30). In order
to make it clear that this procedure does not constitute an ius soli as-
cription of nationality, a 2003 amendment to the citizenship law re-
phrased art. 5 to read that the child found on Romanian territory ‘is
considered to be [instead of ‘is…’] a Romanian citizen’ (art. 5, 3/1; em-
phasis added).
6.2.2 Naturalisation
The 1991 Law granted naturalisation, upon request, to adult aliens and
their minor children, who were: a) born in Romania and lived there at
the time of their request; b) born abroad but had lived uninterruptedly
in Romania for at least five years; c) married to a Romanian citizen and
had lived in the country for at least three years. In addition to the resi-
dence requirement, applicants also had to:
1. prove, through their behaviour and attitude, their attachment to the
Romanian state and people;
2. be eighteen years of age or above;
3. prove they possess sufficient material means of existence;
4. have a clean criminal record; and
5. have ‘sufficient knowledge of the Romanian language’ in order to
be able to integrate into society.
Although the naturalisation requirements have been amended several
times since 1991 (see next section), the procedure of naturalisation,
which is patterned on the 1939 Law, has remained the same. Applica-
tions have to be filed personally or through authorised attorneys to a
Commission of Citizenship set up by the Ministry of Justice and made
up of five judges of the Bucharest Court, appointed for four years by
the president of the court. Upon their registration, requests for natura-
lisation are published in the Official Monitory of Romania, Part III, and
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are subsequently examined by the Commission. Decisions on naturali-
sation are taken by the Romanian government upon the recommenda-
tion of the commission and are published in the Official Monitory of
Romania, Part I. Naturalisation becomes effective upon the would-be
citizens taking the oath of loyalty in front of the Ministry of Justice, a
sub-secretary of state, or the chief of diplomatic missions abroad.
Romanian citizenship legislation underwent substantial amend-
ments, additions and modifications in 1999, 2002, 2003 and 2008
which were necessitated by the process of European integration and
the intensification of immigration and emigration. As a reaction to
growing migration tides, coupled with EU pressure to strictly control
external acquisitions of Romanian citizenship, requirements for natur-
alisation have been tightened. The mandatory residence period for the
naturalisation of foreigners was increased from five to seven years in
1999, and to eight years in 2003 (albeit reduced to five years for for-
eigners married to Romanian citizens). In order to eliminate cases of
fraud, a 1999 amendment demands a ‘continuous, stable and legal’ re-
sidence, while a 2003 amendment requires foreigners applying for nat-
uralisation to effectively relocate to Romania, spend at least six months
per year in the country and pay taxes there.3 In 1999, the residency re-
quirement was reduced to half for persons of international reputation,
a privilege granted since 2003 also to those who have invested more
than 500,000 euros in Romania. In 2008, this sum was increased to 5
million euros and the shorter residency requirement was extended also
to refugees and to citizens of EU Member States.
Moreover, besides the longer residency requirement, a 1999 amend-
ment to art. 9 of the law introduced additional conditions for naturali-
sation, such as sufficient knowledge of the Romanian language, of ‘ele-
mentary notions of Romanian culture and civilisation,’ of the Constitu-
tion and, since 2003, of the national anthem. Applicants for
naturalisation also need to sign a declaration of loyalty to the Roma-
nian state. Persons suspected of terrorism and those who present po-
tential threats to national security are ineligible for naturalisation.
6.2.3 Loss of nationality
According to the 1991 Law, Romanian nationality can be forfeited: 1) as
a result of the unilateral withdrawal by the state; 2) through voluntary
individual renunciation by citizens; 3) or in other special cases, such as
the adoption of children by foreign citizens (art. 24). Firstly, the Roma-
nian state could terminate the nationality of those individuals who had
obtained their naturalisation by fraud, who worked abroad against the
interests of the country or who enrolled in an enemy army (art. 25).
Secondly, the Law allowed Romanian citizens to renounce their nation-
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ality ‘for solid reasons’ according to a special procedure and pending of-
ficial approval, provided they are not under trial and have no debts to
private or public parties (art. 27).
Since 2001, in particular, Romania has become a major source coun-
try of labour migration, especially to Italy and Spain; taking advantage
of the freedom of movement, an estimated two to two and a half mil-
lion Romanian citizens currently live and work abroad either tempora-
rily or permanently. The most recent stipulations on the loss of Roma-
nian nationality express the Romanian state’s concern to preserve legal
ties with its citizens living abroad and to reduce the number of external
renunciations of nationality. To this end, in 2003, the Romanian state
waived its right to unilaterally terminate the nationality of ‘natural citi-
zens’ who had obtained it at birth (art. 24.d). In addition, in 2007, the
procedure for the individual renunciation of citizenship became even
more complex, costly and bureaucratic. These stipulations, combined
with the fact that the principle of ius sanguinis operates externally
without generational limits (so that Romanian nationality can be
passed on indefinitely to subsequent generations born abroad even in
cases of acquisition of a new nationality as long as parents do not re-
nounce their nationality of origin), account for the fact that the number
of individual renunciations or losses of Romanian nationality has been
rather small – varying from 12,594 persons in 1999 to 10,938 persons
in 2005 (National Institute of Statistics 2006: 81-83) – especially when
compared to the massive number of Romanian citizens living abroad
on a temporary or even permanent basis.
6.2.4 Restitution of nationality and multiple memberships
The most debated provision of the post-communist citizenship legisla-
tion was the right to restitution of nationality to former citizens. A tra-
ditional feature of the Romanian modern legal system, the right to re-
naturalisation survived in various forms under the communist regime
as well. Although the Socialist Republic conceived of itself as a new
state and granted citizenship to all inhabitants living in the country, it
also (partially) employed the principle of restitution in order to recon-
struct Romania’s interwar citizenry on new political bases. Thus, a law
passed in 1947 restored Romanian nationality to all those denaturalised
during the Second World War under discriminatory legislation or for-
eign occupation. The 1952 decree granted Romanian nationality to all
inhabitants who had settled in the country by 1920 (the ratification of
the Peace Treaty with Austria) but who had failed to qualify for citizen-
ship under previous laws. Another decree passed in 1954 reconfirmed
Romanian nationality for all those who had held this legal status as of
28 June 1940 and had resided in Romania ever since. Under Soviet
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pressure, the deadline for restitution was chosen specifically to exclude
from this right the inhabitants of Soviet-occupied Bessarabia and
Northern Bukovina, a clear indication of the limits of the communists’
policy on nationality restitution.
The communist regime also permitted the re-naturalisation of for-
mer citizens, but granted this right according to strict political criteria.
Art. 1.c of the 1952 Decree and art. 7 of the 1971 Law allowed former ci-
tizens to reacquire their nationality upon request on the basis of a spe-
cial authorisation issued by the Presidium of the National Assembly or,
after 1969, by the Council of State. Re-naturalisation was conditional
on the renunciation of the claimant’s foreign nationality, repatriation
and ‘integration into the socialist society’ (i.e. integration into the work-
force) as well as an attachment to the communist political regime, to
be affirmed by an oath of loyalty. In exceptional cases, the Council of
State authorised former citizens applying for re-naturalisation to main-
tain their domicile abroad, but they were expressly required to re-
nounce ‘in an authentic form’ their foreign nationality or – in case they
did not hold a foreign nationality – ‘any commitment, obligation of fi-
delity or oath of loyalty to a foreign state’ (1971 Law, art. 10 and art. 11).
Due to massive violations of human rights and the deterioration of the
standard of living, few former citizens applied for repatriation; on the
contrary, in the late 1980s, numerous Romanian citizens fled abroad
in order to escape political persecution and material hardship.
Upon the collapse of the communist regime, the repatriation of pre-
viously persecuted persons and the restitution of nationality to former
citizens were the major concerns of the new revolutionary power,
which was eager to resume ties with the Romanian Diaspora and kin-
minorities abroad. On 31 December 1989, the National Salvation Front
guaranteed the right of repatriation to all Romanian citizens residing
abroad (Decree No. 7). In addition to the repatriation of Romanian citi-
zens in exile, the decree also facilitated the reacquisition of nationality
by former Romanian citizens living abroad (art. 2), by request, through
the act of repatriation. Unlike the 1971 Law, the new decree did not re-
quire former citizens re-naturalised in Romania to renounce their for-
eign nationality, thus implicitly opening a gate to dual nationality.
In May 1990, a new decree passed by the provisional government
enlarged the rights to reacquisition of nationality by former citizens.
While the 1989 Decree made re-naturalisation conditional on repatria-
tion, the 1990 Decree granted former citizens the right to retrieve their
Romanian nationality, upon request, ‘even if they hold another nation-
ality and they do not establish their domicile in Romania.’4 In doing
so, the decree explicitly allowed certain categories of citizens to hold
dual nationality for the first time in Romania’s legal history.
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The provisions on repatriation and reacquisition of nationality were
reconfirmed and enlarged by the 1991 Law on Citizenship. The law sti-
pulated three modalities for the reacquisition of Romanian nationality:
(1) by repatriation (art. 8); (2) re-naturalisation by request without repa-
triation (art. 11); and (3) ‘restoration’ of nationality to former Romanian
citizens (art. 35) living in the lost territories of the interwar Greater Ro-
mania. Firstly, the law guaranteed former citizens the right to re-natur-
alisation through repatriation: ‘The person who has lost Romanian citi-
zenship can re-acquire it through repatriation, if he or she expresses a
manifest desire to do so’ (art. 8). Secondly, in line with the 1990 De-
cree, the 1991 Law allowed reacquisition of nationality by former Ro-
manian citizens even without repatriation: ‘[ f ]ormer Romanian citizens
who, before 22 December 1989, have lost their Romanian citizenship
for different reasons,’ can reacquire Romanian citizenship by request
even if they retain their foreign citizenship and their domicile abroad
(art. 37; emphasis added). Thirdly, and most importantly, the 1991 Law
introduced a new form of access to Romanian nationality that can be
generically called ‘restoration’ or ‘restitution.’ An additional paragraph
to art. 37 stipulated that the right to reacquisition of nationality is also
granted to all those who ‘were stripped of Romanian citizenship against
their will or for reasons beyond their control, and their descendants’ (em-
phasis added).
Due to the imprecise and ambiguous wording of the law, at first
glance, the difference between the second and third forms of re-natura-
lisation is not evident: the second referred to those who had lost Roma-
nian citizenship ‘for various reasons’, while the third referred to those
who had lost citizenship ‘against their will or for reasons beyond their
control’. The official interpretation of the law, however, made it evident
that the first paragraph referred to those who had lost nationality as a
result of individual actions that unilaterally breached their citizenship
contract with the Romanian state, while the second concerned those ci-
tizens denaturalised en masse as a result of territorial changes. In so
doing, the additional paragraph to art. 37 introduced several major in-
novations into Romanian citizenship legislation:
Firstly, the right to reacquisition of nationality was not restricted only
to those persons who had emigrated due to political persecution or
were stripped of citizenship by the communist regime; it was also
granted to ‘all former citizens and their descendants’ regardless of when
or under what conditions they had lost Romanian nationality. Although
not specifically mentioned in the text of the law, the main beneficiaries
of the policy of restoration of nationality have been the inhabitants of
the former Soviet Socialist Republic of Moldova, and those of the pro-
vinces of Northern Bukovina and Southern Bessarabia in the Ukraine.
Following the Soviet wartime occupation, the inhabitants of these pro-
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vinces were forcefully stripped of their Romanian nationality; the 1991
Law has enabled them to retrieve that legal status. (Equally eligible
were the inhabitants of Southern Dobrudja ceded by Romania to Bul-
garia in 1940, yet no claims to Romanian citizenship were reported
from this province).
Secondly, in a departure from the established legal tradition of the
country that had prohibited dual nationality, the law allowed re-natura-
lised former Romanian citizens to retain their foreign nationality as
well as their domicile abroad. In doing so, the law generated a novel ca-
tegory of non-resident dual citizens living in neighbouring countries.
Thirdly, compared to regular naturalisations, the restitution of na-
tionality was subject to a simpler procedure: re-naturalisation requests
could be sent by post or by third-party intermediaries to the Romanian
embassies or consulates abroad. Applicants were exempt from consular
taxes and the major conditions of naturalisation required of ‘regular’
aliens. Moreover, the process of re-naturalisation did not necessitate an
official interview and the personal presence of the claimant in Buchar-
est, as the oath of loyalty could be taken at Romania’s diplomatic repre-
sentations abroad. It was thus technically possible for a descendant of
a former citizen living abroad to ‘reacquire’ Romanian citizenship with-
out ever travelling to the country.
Overall, the legislation on the reacquisition of Romanian nationality
was highly expansive, albeit legally ambiguous. It combined the right
to re-naturalisation of expatriates and their repatriation with the princi-
ple of restoration of nationality to former citizens and their descen-
dants living in former historical provinces of interwar Greater Roma-
nia, including their right to hold dual nationality. How can one account
for these multiple forms of nationality restitution? According to the
legislators, the motivations behind these provisions were democratic,
as they were meant to redress communist injustice by allowing anti-
communist political dissidents or expatriates to reacquire, upon re-
quest, their lost rights. Adopted in anticipation of the imminent dis-
memberment of the USSR, the March 1991 Law was also animated by
implicit nationalist motivations, which aimed to symbolically undo the
effects of the Soviet occupation of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina
and to reconstruct the interwar national community. Seen in a histori-
cal retrospective, the law thus completed the process of restoration of
the citizenship body of interwar Greater Romania. Initiated in the post-
1944 period (see above the laws adopted in 1947, 1952 and 1954), this
process had, under Soviet pressure, left out the inhabitants of Bessara-
bia and Northern Bukovina.
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6.3 Current political debates
The new policy on the restitution of nationality has triggered numer-
ous domestic and international political debates. Far from concentrat-
ing on legal technicalities, these debates were linked to major political
issues such as the communist legacy, the ethnic-cultural boundaries of
the nation, issues of state sovereignty and territoriality, diplomatic rela-
tions with neighbouring countries and the compatibility of this policy
with the European standard on nationality laws and minority protec-
tion.
6.3.1 Dual nationality
A first set of political debates concerned the right to dual nationality.
Was dual nationality permitted only for former citizens reacquiring Ro-
manian nationality or was it open to all Romanian citizens? Although
the 1991 Law on Romanian Citizenship allowed re-naturalised Roma-
nian citizens to hold dual nationality, this provision did not imply a
generalised acceptance of dual nationality, but only a tolerance of dual
membership of re-naturalised citizens. For other modes of naturalisation,
the 1991 Law explicitly eliminated the tolerance of dual nationality. For
example, children adopted by aliens lost their Romanian nationality
upon acquiring the nationality of their adoptive parents (art. 29). Yet,
as noted above, the law did not contain provisions referring to the legal
status of Romanian citizens residing abroad who acquired another na-
tionality, and did not expressly oblige them to renounce their Roma-
nian nationality if the receiving state tolerated dual nationality in natu-
ralisations, thus de facto allowing for dual membership.
The most debated issue was the right of Romania’s ethnic Hungarians
to hold dual nationality, mostly in connection with campaigns by politi-
cal forces in Hungary for their access to Hungarian nationality (for de-
tails on these campaigns, see Kova´cs & To´th in this volume). The Ro-
manian-Hungarian post-communist debate over dual nationality was
linked to a wider ideological controversy between the two countries
over contrasting but also overlapping definitions of the nation (Iordachi
2004: 257-260). These debates originated in the separation of the citi-
zenries of the two countries following the collapse of Austro-Hungary
after the First World War, and led to numerous diplomatic and territor-
ial conflicts. During the communist period, Hungary abandoned the
idea of recovering lost territories but focused instead on the issue of
kin-minority protection, legitimised by an ethno-cultural definition of
the nation. To Hungary’s policy of treating its kin minorities abroad as
an integral part of the Hungarian nation and its pretence of monitor-
ing their treatment in neighbouring countries, Romania answered with
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a statist definition of the nation according to which all inhabitants of
the country – irrespective of their ethnicity – were Romanian citizens
and full members of the socialist nation, ethnic Hungarians included.
The Romanian-Hungarian political-diplomatic conflict over the status
of ethnic Hungarians in Romania reached a peak in the late 1980s, as
became manifest, for example, during the meetings of the Conference
for Security and Cooperation in Europe that took place in Vienna
(1986-1989); it also continued in the post-communist period, even if at
a lower intensity. Leading Romanian politicians criticised the stipula-
tions of the 2001 Hungarian Status Law pertaining to Romanian citi-
zens of Hungarian origin, agreeing to its implementation only after
Hungary granted access to its labour market to all Romanian citizens,
irrespective of their ethnicity; they also declared their opposition to the
granting of dual nationality to Romania’s ethnic Hungarians. With the
liberalisation of the status of dual citizens in Romania in 2003 (see
next paragraph), on the one hand, and the failure of the 2004 national
referendum in Hungary over granting dual nationality to ethnic Hun-
garians living abroad, on the other hand, the debates over the issue
faded away from the public agenda, with dual citizenship ceasing to be
a matter of political contestation. In retrospect, it is important to note
that, while rejecting the right to dual nationality for Romania’s ethnic
Hungarians, Romanian policymakers defended this right in the case of
Moldovan citizens opting for Romanian nationality. This contradiction
can be explained by the fact that Romania acted simultaneously in a
double role: as a ‘nationalising state’ in regard to the Hungarian minor-
ity in Transylvania and as an ‘external homeland’ in relation to ethnic
Romanians in Bessarabia and Bukovina (Iordachi 2004: 32; for a con-
ceptualisation of these roles, see Brubaker 1996).
A second set of debates concerned the legal status of dual citizens.
The 1991 Constitution restricted the political rights of dual citizens,
granting access to ‘public office or dignity, civil or military,’ only to per-
sons ‘whose citizenship is only and exclusively Romanian, and whose
domicile is in Romania’ (art. 16.3; emphasis added). Gradually, the
great increase in the number of dual citizens led to a ‘normalisation’ of
their status. In 2003, as part of numerous amendments to the Consti-
tution, the restrictions on the political participation of dual citizens
were lifted. Currently, the only condition of eligibility to public office,
including the parliament and the presidency, is ‘Romanian citizenship
and domicile in the country.’
The restoration of Romanian nationality to Moldovan and Ukrainian
citizens has generated a new category of non-resident dual citizens. What
is the legal status of these absentee citizens? According to the Roma-
nian legislation, non-resident dual citizens acquired automatic access
to full social and political rights, except for the rights and obligations
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that are temporarily discontinued for citizens residing abroad, such as
the obligation to pay taxes and perform one’s military service (also dis-
continued for resident citizens since 2006), and – until 2003 – eligibil-
ity for public offices and awards (restricted for dual citizens; see above
paragraph). It is intriguing to note, however, that the public debates
over the restoration of Romanian nationality and the right to dual na-
tionality focused on the national and geo-political effects of this policy,
mostly in connection to Romania’s relation to the Republic of Moldova
and, to a lesser extent, the Ukraine. The debates did not address the
question of the new citizens’ potential socio-political integration into
Romanian society or the devaluation of citizenship implied by the pol-
icy of granting nationality to persons who have not proven their knowl-
edge of the country’s legislation and might not have even visited Roma-
nia.
The massive numbers of restitutions of Romanian citizenship to
Moldovan and Ukrainian citizens also generated international debates
regarding issues of overlapping citizenries and the loyalty of dual citi-
zens. Firstly, Romania’s policy on the restitution of nationality contra-
dicted the internal legislation of two neighbouring states, since neither
Moldova (until 2000) nor the Ukraine allowed their citizens to hold
dual nationality. Secondly, Moldovan and Ukrainian policymakers ac-
cused Romania of using dual nationality as a strategy of increasing its
political influence in the region, with the final aim of reacquiring its
lost territories. Romania’s citizenship policy was thus perceived as add-
ing to regional instability rather than to retroactive justice and integra-
tion.
Diplomatic debates concentrated mainly on Romania’s relationship
to the Republic of Moldova. With the establishment of the new state in
1991, Romania was trapped in ‘the dilemma of the Romanian-Roma-
nian relations’ (Cojocaru 2001). In the early 1990s, the diplomatic rela-
tions between the two countries seemed to proceed in tune with the
strategy of the ‘two Romanian states’, put forward by the Moldovan
Popular Front and shared by numerous politicians in Romania, accord-
ing to which Moldova’s independence represented the first step toward
a gradual and negotiated process of political unification between the
two countries. To this end, Romania inaugurated a policy of special
partnership with Moldova, introduced visa-free and passport-free travel
between the two countries, set up special educational programmes for
Moldovan students and built a comprehensive network of inter-minis-
terial consultations. However, at the political-diplomatic level, the two
countries soon drifted further apart. That was mostly because the Re-
public of Moldavia was tormented by internal inter-ethnic conflicts and
secessionist movements, tacitly or openly supported by Moscow, which
degenerated into a civil war in 1992 in the multiethnic province of
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Transnistria (also known as the Trans-Dniestr region). Fearing that
ethnic strife would lead to disintegration, Moldovan leaders decided to
consolidate the statehood of the new republic by relying on the Soviet
version of local identity, i.e. on Moldovenism rather than on the pan-Ro-
manian national identity. This change in Moldova’s internal policy af-
fected its relations to Romania. At the official level, the formula of the
‘two Romanian states’ was gradually abandoned, with Romania and
Moldova defining themselves as ‘two brotherly states’ and then more
neutrally as ‘two neighbouring states’. After the electoral victory of the
Communist Party in 2001, the diplomatic relations between Romania
and the Republic of Moldova worsened considerably. The new Moldo-
van President Vladimir Voronin launched aggressive cultural polices
meant to strengthen the Moldovan identity, to marginalise Greater Ro-
manian unionist forces and to forcefully reduce Romania’s political in-
fluence in the republic. Moreover, blaming Romania’s irredenta poli-
cies, Voronin put forward his own plans for a Greater Moldova, raising
territorial claims to Romania’s province of Moldova.5 This obstruction-
ist policy led to an almost complete deadlock in the diplomatic rela-
tions between the two countries.
6.3.2 The restoration of nationality in practice: Domestic and international
constraints
From 1991 to 2001, the policy of restoration of Romanian nationality
was applied without major convulsions, resulting in massive (re-)natur-
alisations of Moldovan citizens. Since 2001, however, Romania has
considerably slowed down the process of restitution for two main rea-
sons. Firstly, the number of applications from Moldova has increased
dramatically since January 2001, when Romanian citizens were
granted visa-free travel in the Schengen space, effectively clogging the
bureaucratic process of restoration of nationality. Secondly, although
the European Commission repeatedly stated that the policy of restitu-
tion of citizenship is an internal matter for Romania, several EU agen-
cies voiced concerns that, upon Romania’s accession in January 2007,
the country’s policy on restitution of nationality could become an un-
controllable gate of access to the Schengen space of non-EU citizens,
bypassing restrictive immigration policies. These combined challenges
generated a series of crises in the process of restitution, leading to its
intermittent suspension from December 2001 to September 2007.
According to official figures, between August and December 2001
alone the Commission for Citizenship received approximately 300 de-
mands for nationality per day, or an aggregate of 19,000 in six
months.6 Confronted with this massive influx of requests, the govern-
ment temporarily suspended the provisions on the restoration of na-
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tionality by emergency ordinances valid for two periods of six months
each, from December 2001 to June 2002, and then again from Novem-
ber 2002 to May 2003, subsequently approved by parliament. In justi-
fying the approval of the second ordinance, a parliamentary report in
April 2003 pointed out that the ‘explosive increase in the number of
demands’ blocked the work of the commission, which was composed
of only five magistrates. It also blamed the fact that, according to offi-
cial statistics, most of the re-naturalisation demands were opportunis-
tic, being made ‘in the new context created by the elimination of visa
requirements for Romanian citizens who travel in the Schengen space,
as well as in view of Romania’s prospective integration into the North
Atlantic structures.’ Pointing out that ‘the reparatory character taken
into account at the time of elaboration of the Law on Citizenship is
present in fewer and fewer cases,’ the parliament asked the govern-
ment to identify a legal solution ‘to eliminate re-acquisitions of nation-
ality for a purpose alien to the original intention of the law.’7
At the end of each period of suspension of the restoration of nation-
ality, the government implemented major alterations of the citizenship
law by two emergency ordinances passed in June 2002 and April
2003. The first ordinance unified the provisions on the reacquisition of
nationality with those on the restoration of nationality in a single arti-
cle (art. 10) placed in the section dealing with naturalisation, thus im-
plying that the restoration of nationality to former citizens was a privi-
leged naturalisation granted by the Romanian state and not an auto-
matic entitlement to nationality. The restoration of nationality
continued to be exempted from consular taxes (art. 36, para. 2); in ad-
dition, claimants were given the right to contest the decision of the
Commission of Citizenship during an interval of fifteen days.
These new provisions did not offer an efficient solution to the flood
of naturalisation demands, so that in November 2002 – just four
months after its reinstatement – the government yet again suspended
the restoration of nationality process for six months. In May 2003,
upon the expiry of the new deadline, the law on citizenship was altered
once more by a governmental ordinance approved by parliament with
minor modifications in October 2003. The new ordinance reinstated
the suspended provisions on the restoration of nationality as two addi-
tions to art.10 dealing with the reacquisition of nationality (classified as
art. 101 and 102), but introduced ample amendments to their imple-
mentation: Firstly, applicants to the restoration of nationality became
subject to almost all of the conditions for naturalisation demanded of
aliens; the only condition waived for former citizens was the obligation
to relocate to Romania and reside there for a mandatory period. Sec-
ondly, the requests for nationality had to be handed in personally to the
Commission of Citizenship in Bucharest and only ‘in thoroughly justi-
POLITICS OF CITIZENSHIP IN POST-COMMUNIST ROMANIA 195
fied cases’ by attorneys or third parties. Until 2003, the requests for re-
acquisition of Romanian nationality could be filed not only personally
but also ‘by third parties’, either at the Ministry of Justice in Bucharest
or at Romania’s consulates abroad. According to media reports, this
procedure led to the creation of clientelist networks in Moldova for the
collection of dossiers and their transport in huge packages to Buchar-
est. In order to eliminate these practices, the new ordinance obliged ap-
plicants to travel personally to Bucharest, sometimes for undetermined
periods of time necessitated by the new bureaucratic procedures, thus
increasing the costs of naturalisation. Thirdly, the ordinance introduced
a new form of re-naturalisation of former citizens and their descen-
dants: a new article 102 allowed persons eligible for the restoration of
nationality to apply for naturalisation directly at the Ministry of Justice
after four years of continuous residence in Romania. This provision
was another indication that Romanian authorities intended to trans-
form the restoration of nationality into a privileged form of naturalisa-
tion of former citizens relocating to Romania. Fourthly, in order to
eliminate opportunistic reacquisitions of nationality, the new amend-
ments stripped new citizens of some of the most immediate advan-
tages of Romanian nationality: art. 37 stated that former citizens who
reacquire nationality and effectively live in Romania ‘cannot exercise
their right to free movement of persons’, i.e. they are forbidden to tra-
vel abroad with a Romanian passport during the first four years after
their naturalisation. Exceptions to this rule were allowed only in emer-
gency situations, such as periods of study abroad, family unification,
medical treatment abroad, etc. This overt form of discrimination
against a certain category of Romanian citizens because of the manner
of their naturalisation was abolished in September 2007.
These substantial amendments to the citizenship law revealed the
government’s intention to discontinue the restitution of nationality to
former citizens living in Moldova and the Ukraine, transforming it in-
stead into a selective and privileged naturalisation of alien ethnic Roma-
nians relocating to Romania, after a residence of four years. Thus,
while former citizens living abroad were required to fulfil additional
conditions that made their naturalisation very lengthy and difficult, for-
mer citizens working, studying or living in Romania were granted ac-
cess to direct naturalisation after a residence period of four years, by
means of a special procedure. In addition, by requiring applicants to
possess ‘knowledge of the Romanian language and elementary notions
of Romanian culture and civilisation’,8 the government made it more
difficult for non-ethnic Romanian applicants to recover their lost na-
tionality, fuelling suspicion that the new conditions were specifically
meant as an obstacle to their re-naturalisation.
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6.3.3 The restoration of nationality reloaded
Predictably, the May 2003 amendments to the citizenship law led to an
almost complete deadlock in the process of re-naturalisation, at a time
when the number of applications was soaring. The restrictive policy of
the government triggered incendiary reactions from the pro-Moldovan
interest groups in Romania, who conducted media campaigns against
the governmental policy and – with the help of naturalised Moldovans
elected in the Romanian parliament – initiated bills for amending the ci-
tizenship law. The most contested provision was the applicants’ obliga-
tion to travel to Bucharest and file their dossiers in person. Following
street protests in Bucharest of Moldovan citizens applying for naturalisa-
tion, this condition was finally abrogated by parliament in June 2003.
In March and April 2006, two open letters signed by 25 non-govern-
mental organisations from Romania and Moldova urged the govern-
ment to unblock the process of nationality restitution. The petitioners
argued that the bureaucratic blockage was ‘premeditated,’ with the
Ministry of Justice deliberately creating obstacles to the restoration of
nationality. In their view, the restoration of nationality was a ‘legitimate
right’ of the Moldovans and its denial by the Romanian government
violated basic human rights and established principles of international
law. The petitioners also denounced the restrictions on free movement
imposed on new citizens, arguing that this provision discriminated
among Romanian citizens according to their place of residence and the
manner of their naturalisation, in direct violation of the Constitution
which stated that all citizens are equal before the law.
In two consecutive responses, the Ministry of Justice pointed out that
the restoration of nationality is not an automatic entitlement of former
citizens but a right granted by the Romanian state under certain condi-
tions. Acknowledging that the Commission for Citizenship was over-
whelmed by the large number of applications, the Ministry pledged to
consider potential solutions to the problem.9
In 2006, two parliamentary bills attempted to provide a legal solu-
tion to the issue. In order to speed up the restoration of nationality pro-
cess, they proposed simplifying the procedure, shortening the proces-
sing time, allocating more magistrates to the task and making the
Commission of Citizenship responsible for the resolution of demands
within ‘reasonable administrative deadlines.’10 The senate nevertheless
rejected both bills on the grounds that they contradicted Romania’s ob-
ligations under the EU treaty of accession, and that they would lead to
potential conflicts with the Commission of the European Union.11
More recently, however, mounting public and political pressure has
convinced the government to again modify its citizenship laws. In Sep-
tember 2007, a new governmental ordinance facilitated the restoration
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of nationality by means of major procedural amendments. Firstly, the
Commission of Citizenship now consists of five specially appointed jur-
idical councillors on a full-time basis, who replace the regular part time
judges. Applications for nationality can be sent by post as well; incom-
plete files are not automatically rejected, with later additions also being
permitted. Secondly, in order to speed up the process of naturalisation,
the decisions are now also taken by the Minister of Justice and not so-
lely by the entire Council of Ministers. Rejections can be appealed by
applicants in local courts, not only in Bucharest; new requests for na-
tionality can also be filed one year after a rejection. The ordinance also
obliges naturalised citizens to take the oath of allegiance no later than
three months after the decision to naturalise instead of within one year
as previously requested. It is expected that these amendments will
speed up the process of naturalisation and will increase the number of
Moldovan citizens acquiring Romanian nationality.
6.4 Statistics on the restitution of nationality
Since there are no general official statistics available, the number of
former citizens and their descendants re-naturalised to Romanian na-
tionality is highly contested. Official sources acknowledge a number of
102,000 Moldovan and Ukrainian citizens naturalised until 2001; no
general figures have been released for the period since then. According
to alternative unofficial estimates, the Romanian government granted
nationality to at least 300,000 Moldovan citizens belonging to various
ethnic groups between 1991 and 2000 alone.12 The number of ‘restitu-
tions’ of nationality to Moldovan and Ukrainian citizens dropped to in-
significant levels in the period 2000 to 2003. Although the process of
Table 6.1 Naturalisations in Romania, 16 June 2000-29 October 2008
Year Total number
naturalisations
Moldovan citizens Ukrainian citizens
2008 4,961 3,605 165
2007 1,150 615 51
2006 740 487 3
2005 1,789 1,592 13
2004 751 258 6
2003 281 8 0
2002 318 1 3
2001 348 1 1
2000 357 1 0
Total 2000-2008 10,695 6,568 242
Source: Monitorul Oficial al României, Part I; calculated from official sources made available
by Constantin Dolghier, available at http://cetatenie.info.tm
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restitution of nationality was resumed in 2004, the annual number of
(re-)naturalisations remains relatively low.
Since there was neither a drop in the number of demands nor an in-
crease in the number of rejections during this period, the low number
of restitutions of nationality was clearly due to the considerable slow-
down in the bureaucratic processing of applications. According to var-
ious unofficial estimates, the number of accumulated applications for
restoration of nationality filed by Moldovan citizens is currently be-
tween 500,000 and 900,000.13 Among these, in the period 2001 to
2007, Romanian authorities officially registered only 31,764 requests
(by publishing them in the Official Monitory), among which 29,276 ori-
ginated in the Republic of Moldova and 838 in Ukraine. Overall, be-
tween 16 June 2000 and 28 October 2008, the Romanian government
awarded 10,695 naturalisations, of which 6,568 were awarded to Mol-
dovan citizens and 242 to Ukrainian citizens.14
Although Moldovan citizens continue to dominate the number of
persons acquiring Romanian nationality, their proportion within the to-
tal number of naturalisations is much lower than the share of Moldo-
vans among all applicants.
As shown in Figure 6.1, this gap is due to the fact that since 2000
the procedure of restitution of Romanian nationality to Moldovan and
Ukrainian applicants has been slower than that of the naturalisation of
aliens.
Figure 6.1 Duration in months of the process of naturalisation in Romania, by original
nationality of applicants accepted in 2005, 2006 and 2007
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On average, applicants from the Republic of Moldova and the Ukraine
naturalised in 2005 (included in the graph under the label ‘Moldovan/
Ukrainian’) had to wait 39 months between the official registration of
their requests and the decision regarding naturalisation; those natura-
lised in 2006 had to wait 44 months between the two stages. At the
same time, other categories of aliens only waited, on average, between
fourteen and eighteen months. Since the procedure for the naturalisa-
tion of aliens, according to the law, is in fact more complicated than
that of the restitution of nationality, it becomes apparent that the
length of the re-naturalisation process was not simply due to the record
number of demands but also to a conscious political decision to halt
the process by administrative means.
The amendments to the nationality law enacted in September 2007
made possible a massive increase in the number of naturalisations. As
a consequence, the duration of the naturalisation process for all cate-
gories of applicants began to converge: while aliens had to wait longer
(40 months at maximum), the waiting period for nationality restitution
slightly decreased from 44 to 40 months (see Figure 6.1). Overall, be-
tween 16 June 2000 and 14 September 2007, the Romanian govern-
ment awarded 5,062 naturalisations, of which 2,664 were restitutions
of nationality to Moldovan citizens and 58 to Ukrainian citizens.15
Since the adoption of the new amendments to the nationality law on
14 September 2007, the Romanian government awarded a record num-
ber of 5,633 naturalisations (higher than the sum of 5,062 naturalisa-
tions granted in the previous seven years); of this number, 672 were
granted in the last quarter of 2007 and 4,961 in 2008 (until October
2008). Out of this total number of new citizens, there were 1,826 nat-
uralisations of aliens and 3,807 ‘restitutions’ of nationality. Among the
latter, 318 restitutions were registered between 14 September and 31
December 2007, 299 to Moldovan citizens and nineteen to Ukrainian
citizens. A record number of 3,770 restitutions of nationality occurred
during the period 1 January to 28 October 2008, among which were
3,605 to Moldovan citizens and 165 to Ukrainian citizens. These fig-
ures prove that, after the de facto suspension during the period 2000-
2007, the process of restitution of Romanian citizenship to former citi-
zens from Moldova and the Ukraine has been resumed under the new
2007 provisions of the nationality law.
6.5 (Re)constructing nationality in post-communist Romania:
Comparative perspectives
The collapse of the communist regimes led to the reorganisation of na-
tionality policies in Central and Eastern Europe. One can distinguish
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two main clusters of nationality policies, in direct relation to patterns
of nation-building and state-building in these regions: nationality poli-
cies in successor states in former multi-ethnic federal states such as
Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and the USSR; and in post-communist na-
tion-states such as Albania, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary.
The dismantling of the former federal systems generated numerous
legal, political and territorial conflicts, most notably in Yugoslavia and
the USSR (the ‘velvet divorce’ between Slovakia and the Czech Repub-
lic was smoother, although it was not free of legal conflicts, see Liebich,
Warner and Dragovic 1995). In his analysis of ‘citizenship struggle’ in
the successor states of the former USSR, Rogers Brubaker differen-
tiated between a ‘new state’ model of legislation on nationality and a
‘restored-state’ model (1992: 275-276). The former was enacted in So-
viet republics that lacked a statehood tradition. Without a history of dis-
tinctive citizenry, these republics, such as the Republic of Moldova, had
to create their citizenship body by conferring rights on all of their resi-
dents, on an inclusive basis. The latter, ‘restored-state’ type, was applied
in republics that relied on a pre-Soviet statehood tradition, such as the
Baltic states. Motivated by the fear that their nation would ‘die out’,
these states revived their pre-Second World War nationality laws in or-
der to restore the citizenry that had existed prior to the Soviet conquest
and to initially exclude from citizenship all residents who immigrated
to these countries in the post-1945 period. To these, I would add a
third, hybrid category, represented by ‘new states’ that have also as-
sumed a ‘restored’ state-dimension, such as the Ukraine. The Ukrai-
nian legislation granted citizenship to all inhabitants residing within
the republic’s territory, on a very inclusive basis. At the same time, it
also granted access to Ukrainian citizenship to former citizens and their
descendants born or permanently residing within any territories which
formed a part of the historical states of the Ukrainian People’s Repub-
lic, the Western Ukrainian People’s Republic, the Ukrainian State, the
Ukrainian Socialistic Soviet Republic, Trans-Carpathian Ukraine and
Ukrainian Soviet Socialistic Republic (URSR), on the express condition
that they renounce their foreign citizenship.16
A different category of nationality policies can be found in post-com-
munist nation-states. Although these states did not suffer territorial
changes or a massive influx of population after 1989, they have all re-
vised their nationality laws in order to reflect the new political transfor-
mations.17 New nationality laws in these states encompassed an impor-
tant national dimension, repressed under the regime of Soviet domina-
tion; after decades of political isolation from their kin-populations
abroad, most of these states have resumed policies of ‘positive discrimi-
nation’ towards their co-ethnics.
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Romania’s post-communist nationality policy belongs to the second
cluster mentioned above; yet, due to the country’s geo-political position
and its territorial disputes with the Soviet Union during the Second
World War, the Romanian policy combines elements characteristic of
policies in East-Central European and former Soviet countries. The
most important concept that dominated Romania’s post-communist ci-
tizenship policy was that of the restoration of nationality in order to
undo the effects of the territorial changes that took place during and
after the Second World War, an issue declared taboo during the period
of Soviet domination. Romania granted the right to re-naturalisation to
all former citizens and their descendants, irrespective of their ethnic ori-
gin, their form of de-naturalisation and the period of their attachment
to the Romanian state. In doing so, Romanian legislation went beyond
regular laws on repatriation, of the kind post-communist Poland
passed in relation to former citizens of Polish ethnic origin deported to
the Soviet Union at the end of the Second World War. It also went be-
yond forms of privileged naturalisation of kin population abroad, as is
the case with Hungary’s policy towards former citizens of Hungarian eth-
nic origin relocating to the kin-state. To a certain extent, Romanian legis-
lation resembles the policy of the restoration of citizenship to former
citizens and their descendants implemented by the Ukraine, with the
notable difference that, unlike the Ukraine, Romania allowed new citi-
zens to hold dual citizenship and retain their domicile abroad. Most clo-
sely, Romanian citizenship legislation resembles the ‘restored-state’ po-
licies of the Baltic states. This similarity is not surprising: Greater Ro-
mania’s provinces of Bessarabia and Bukovina as well as the Baltic
states were occupied by the Soviet Union in June 1940 as a direct con-
sequence of the 1939 Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact. In the post-Soviet peri-
od, Romania and the Baltic states officially denounced the ‘infamous
pact’ and tried to undo its legal consequences by applying the principle
of restitution of pre-Soviet nationality. The major difference in the ap-
plication of this principle was that in Romania its provisions were not
meant to discriminate against ‘internal foreigners’ as in the Baltic
states, but to include former citizens living abroad.
Due to the legacy of territorial conflicts and competing projects of
nation-building and state-building in post-communist East-Central Eur-
ope, Romania’s policy on the restoration of nationality generated inter-
state tensions, most evident in its relation to the Republic of Moldova.
Given the complex and multifarious nature of this relationship, Roma-
nian policymakers have been unable to put forward a coherent policy
toward Moldova, oscillating between ‘sentimentalism’ and ‘pragma-
tism’. On the one hand, Romanian politicians regard Moldova as Ro-
mania’s former province, occupied as a result of the 1939 Ribbentrop-
Molotov Pact, and reserve the country’s right to unilaterally restore Ro-
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manian nationality to Moldovan citizens. On the other hand, Romania
was the first country to recognise the independence of the new Repub-
lic of Moldova upon its proclamation in August 1991. Unlike the Feder-
al Republic of Germany, in relation to the former GDR, or Greece, in
relation to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Romania con-
tested neither the statehood nor the name of the new republic. It has
treated Moldova as an independent and sovereign state, thus implicitly
recognising its legitimate right to establish its own version of national
identity and citizenship legislation. The failure of the policy of special
partnership inaugurated between the two countries in the early 1990s
and the forceful suspension of the process of restitution of nationality
following pressure from the EU (2001-2007), widened the gap between
these two policy lines.
What are the prospects of Romanian-Moldovan relations? Currently,
both countries try to adapt their bilateral relations to the new realities
created by Romania’s EU membership. On the one hand, Romania has
reiterated its historical rights to Bessarabia. In June 1991, the Roma-
nian parliament officially condemned the 1939 Ribbentrop-Molotov
Pact as illegal, ab initio null and void of consequences for Romania; in
September 2007, President Traian Ba˘sescu announced his intention to
officially condemn (yet again) the pact in order ‘to give political force’
to this declaration.18 Moreover, in September 2007 Romania re-
launched its policy of restitution of nationality. Facing criticism from
various EU agencies,19 Romanian authorities presented this policy as
part of the EU’s program of integration with neighbouring countries,
arguing that it would enable the EU to boost its influence in the for-
mer Soviet space, as well as to import a qualified Moldovan workforce
in order to reduce its labour shortages. On the other hand, Moldova’s
communist leadership, backed by Russia, took advantage of the securi-
tisation of the EU border between Romania and Moldova and the im-
position of travel visas to Moldovan citizens travelling to Romania in
2007 in order to discontinue socio-economic and cultural relations be-
tween the two countries. Moreover, a new Law on the Status of the
Public Functionary, adopted in 2007, excludes all Moldovan citizens,
who hold dual citizenship or have their domicile abroad, from public
office; this effectively stripped a large part of the population of impor-
tant political rights. Officially justified by the need to reduce the num-
ber of naturalisations abroad, to eliminate conflicts of interest with
other states and to consolidate Moldova’s statehood, this controversial
Law primarily targets Romanian-Moldovan dual citizens with a view to-
ward weakening political opposition to the ruling Communist party
and to countering Romania’s political influence in the republic. At a
diplomatic level, Moldova has also tried to bypass Romania as a media-
tor in its relations with the EU (see the decision to prevent the opening
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of new Romanian consulates in Moldova and to instead use Hungary’s
embassy for granting of EU Schengen visas to Moldovan citizens).
Although the effects of Romania’s policy on the restitution of national-
ity and the response to it by the neighbouring states (mostly Moldova)
should not be unduly exaggerated, it is likely that the interaction of citi-
zenship policies in East Central Europe will continue to challenge in-
ter-state relations in the region.
Chronological list of citizenship related laws in Romania
Date Document Content Source
1947 Law No. 162 for the
Modification of arts. 9, 18,
25, 26, 28, 29, 30, 31, and
34 of the Law Concerning
the Acquisition and Loss of
Romanian Nationality of 19
January 1939
Restores citizenship to all
those who were domiciled
in Romania on 26
September 1920 (the
ratification of the Treaty
with Austria), Jews de-
naturalised in the period
1937-1944 and inhabitants
of Bessarabia who
immigrated to Romania
proper after the Soviet
occupation (28 June 1940)
www.cdep.ro
(in Romanian)
1950 Decree No. 145 Concerning
the Abrogation of Law No.
162 of 30 May 1947 for the
Settlement of the
Citizenship of Certain
Categories of Inhabitants
Abrogates Law No. 162;
punishes false declarations
under that law with long-
term imprisonment
www.cdep.ro
(in Romanian)
1952 Decree No. 33 Concerning
Citizenship in the Popular
Republic of Romania
Abolishes previous laws on
state citizenship; redefines
conditions of access and
loss of Romanian
citizenship based
exclusively on the ius
sanguinis principle; serves
as a legal basis for
communist citizenship
doctrine
www.cdep.ro
(in Romanian)
1954 Decree No. 80 for the
Reacquisition of
Citizenship by Certain
Categories of Persons
Restores citizenship to all
those denaturalised under
previous special laws
www.cdep.ro
(in Romanian)
1954 Decree No. 296 for the
Modification of art. 1 of the
Decree No. 33 of 24
January 1952, Concerning
Citizenship in the Popular
Republic of Romania
Modifies art. 1 of the 1952
Law; reconfirms Romanian
citizenship to all those who
held this status on 28 June
1940 and have resided in
Romania since that date;
excludes from Romanian
www.cdep.ro
(in Romanian)
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Date Document Content Source
citizenship the inhabitants
of Soviet-occupied
Bessarabia
1956 Decree No. 63 on the
Citizenship of Certain
Categories of Persons
Regulates the legal status
of certain categories of
persons
www.cdep.ro
(in Romanian)
1971 Law No. 24 Concerning
Romanian Citizenship
Redefines conditions of
naturalisation, ascription
and reacquisition of
Romanian citizenship
www.cdep.ro
(in Romanian)
1989 Decree-Law No. 7
Concerning the
Repatriation of Romanian
Citizens and of Former
Romanian Citizens
Guarantees the right to
repatriation of Romanian
citizens living abroad;
allows them duty-free
transfer of goods and
priority acquisition of
state-owned real estate
www.cdep.ro
(in Romanian)
1990 Decree-Law No. 137 of 11
May 1990 Concerning
certain Provisions
Pertaining to Romanian
Citizenship
Allows reacquisition of
Romanian citizenship by
former citizens without
renunciation of foreign
citizenship and relocation
to Romania
www.cdep.ro
(in Romanian)
1991 Law on Romanian
Citizenship
Redefines conditions of
naturalisation, ascription
and reacquisition of
Romanian citizenship;
introduces the right of
restoration of citizenship
to former citizens of
interwar Greater Romania
according to a simple
procedure without
renunciation of foreign
citizenship and relocation
to Romania
www.cdep.ro
(in Romanian);
www.legislationline.org
(in French)
1998 Law No. 146 for the
Abrogation of Decree-Law
No. 7/1989
Abrogates facilities granted
upon the repatriation of
citizens living abroad
www.cdep.ro
(in Romanian)
1999 Law No. 192 for the
Modification and
Additions to the Law on
Romanian Citizenship No.
21/1991
Denies the state the right
to withdraw state
citizenship from those who
acquired it at birth;
abolishes repatriation as a
mode of reacquisition of
citizenship; transforms the
reacquisition of citizenship
into a simplified procedure
of naturalisation; increases
requirements for
naturalisation (continuous
www.cdep.ro
(in Romanian)
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Date Document Content Source
residential stage of seven
years, knowledge of the
country’s language and
legislation)
2001 GEO* No. 167 Concerning
the Suspension of Certain
Provisions Concerning the
Implementation of the
Law on Romanian Citizen-
ship No. 21/1991
Suspends art. 35 on the
restoration of citizenship
for a period of six months
www.cdep.ro
(in Romanian)
2002 Law No. 225 Concerning
the Approval of the GEO
no 167/2001
Approves the suspension
of the right to restoration
of citizenship for six
months
www.cdep.ro
(in Romanian)
2002 GEO No. 68 for the
Modification and
Additions to the Law on
Romanian Citizenship No.
21/1991
Unifies the provisions on
the reacquisition of
citizenship with those on
the restoration of
citizenship
www.cdep.ro
(in Romanian)
2002 Law No. 542 Concerning
the Approval of the GEO
No. 68 of 13 June 2002
Approves the modification
with minor amendments
www.cdep.ro
(in Romanian)
2002 GEO No. 160 Concerning
the Suspension of Certain
Provisions Concerning the
Implementation of the Law
on Romanian Citizenship
No. 21/1991
Suspends art. 35 on the
restoration of citizenship
for a period of six months
www.cdep.ro
(in Romanian)
2003 Law No. 165 Concerning
the Approval of the GEO
No. 160
Approves the suspension
of the right to restoration
of citizenship for six
months
www.cdep.ro
(in Romanian)
2003 GEO No. 43 for the
Modification and
Additions to the Law on
Romanian Citizenship No.
21/1991
Introduces new conditions
for naturalisation of former
citizens; demands that
applicants submit their
requests personally in
Bucharest; introduces a
new form of re-
naturalisation of former
citizens living in Romania
after four years of
continuous residence;
denies former citizens re-
naturalised in Romania the
right to travel abroad for
four years
www.cdep.ro
(in Romanian)
2003 Law No. 405 Concerning
the Approval of the GEO
No. 43/2003
Approves the
modifications with minor
amendments
www.cdep.ro
(in Romanian)
2007 GEO No. 87 for the Streamlines the procedure www.cdep.ro
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Date Document Content Source
Modification of the Law on
Romanian Citizenship No.
21/1991
of naturalisation now
granted by the Ministry of
Justice and not the Council
of Ministers; reorganises
the Commission of
Citizenship under the
leadership of the Ministry
of Justice; enlarges the
Commission to four
members, but allows it to
work with a quorum of at
least three members
(in Romanian)
* GEO: Governmental Emergency Ordinance
Notes
1 This distinction also necessitates a terminological clarification: in Romania, the
modern legal vocabulary of citizenship emulated the French legal terminology,
employing nat¸ionalitate (nationality) in the sense of state citizenship. The semantic
distinction between the terms ‘citizenship’ (meaning state membership) and ‘nation-
ality’ (meaning ‘ethnic origin’) was only introduced in the official legal vocabulary
after the Second World War, as part of the Soviet-style institutionalisation of ethnicity.
On the one hand, due to its discriminatory use in the Second World War, the expres-
sion ‘ethnic origin’ (originea etnica˘) was purged from the communist political vocabu-
lary. On the other hand, in order to continue to acknowledge the legal existence and
legitimate collective rights of various ethnic groups living in the country side by side
with the dominant ethnic group, the communist legislation employed the term ‘na-
tionality’ to denote the ethnic origin of a person and not his or her state citizenship, as
had previously been the case. To differentiate the new denotation of the term from
its previous legal meaning (state citizenship), ‘nationality’ was employed in the com-
munist political language mostly in plural, as ‘co-inhabiting nationalities.’ In the
post-communist period, Romanian legislation employs the term nat¸ionalitate along-
side the expression ‘origine etnica˘’ (ethnic origin), and refers to ethnic groups mostly
as minorita˘t¸i nat¸ionale (national minorities). The term ‘citizenship’ (ceta˘t¸enie) is em-
ployed to refer to both the legal and participatory dimensions of this institution. This
chapter uses the term ‘nationality’ to refer to state membership in line with the legal
vocabulary employed in the current volume, irrespective of the previous or current
understandings of the term ‘nat¸ionalitate’ in Romanian.
2 All translations of legal texts are the author’s, if not otherwise indicated.
3 See the parliamentary debates at www.cdep.ro.
4 Monitorul Oficial 75, 21 May 1990.
5 ‘Voronin: ‘Iˆn Romaˆnia sunt 10 milioane de moldoveni’, 24 February 2007,
www.bbc.co.uk.
6 ‘Expunere de motive pentru aprobarea Ordonant¸ei de urgent¸a˘ a Guvernului nr. 160/
2002’, 1, www.cdep.ro.
7 ‘Expunere de motive la Legea pentru aprobarea Ordonant¸ei de urgent¸a˘ a Guvernului
nr. 160/2002,’ www.cdep.ro.
8 Monitorul Oficial, Partea I, 399, 9 June 2003.
9 The petitions and the official answers are available on the site www.curaj.net.
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10 Ilie Ilas¸cu, Session of the Senate, 19 March 2007, www.parlament.ro. A former
Moldovan citizen imprisoned in Transnistria for his opposition to the secessionist
leadership of the region during the civil war, Ilas¸cu was later elected in the Moldovan
and Romanian parliaments in absentia. Following international pressure, Ilas¸cu was
released from prison in 2001 and migrated to Romania, where he agitates for dual ci-
tizenship for all Moldovans, in his capacity as a member of the Romanian parlia-
ment. On the case of Ilas¸cu, see Iordachi (2004: 249-252)
11 Petre Stra˘chinariu, Session of the Chamber of Deputies, 28 June 2007,
www.parlament.ro.
12 Estimation by former Moldovan Prime Minister Mircea Druc, Evenimentul Zilei, 20
May 2000. See Iordachi (2004: 248).
13 For this estimation, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Traian_Basescu.
14 Data calculated after the Official Monitory of Romania, processed and made available
online by Constantin Dolghier at www.cetatenie.info.tm.
15 Data calculated after the Official Monitory of Romania, processed and made available
online by Constantin Dolghier at www.cetatenie.info.tm.
16 See art. 8 of the 2001 Law on Citizenship of Ukraine, available at www.mfa.gov.ua.
17 This claim is valid for Poland, as well. Although the 1962 Polish Nationality Act has
not been replaced by a new post-communist law, it was nevertheless amended in
important points, while numerous procedural changes have also been implemented.
See Go´rny & Pudzianowska in this volume.
18 ‘Traian Ba˘sescu va denunt¸a Pactul Ribbentrop-Molotov’, 21 December 2007,
www.bbc.co.uk.
19 On 25 September 2007, President Ba˘sescu asked the government ‘to simplify to the
maximum’ the naturalisation conditions for Moldovan citizens. His statement was
criticised by Marianne Mikko, the President of the European Parliament Committee
for the Cooperation between the EU and the Republic of Moldova, as lacking
‘political wisdom’. See ‘EP official: Basescu’s statements about citizenship for
Moldovans “not wise”’, Nine O’Clock 4029, 28 September 2007, www.nineoclock.ro.
In July 2007, Kalman Mizsei, the director of the EU representative office to Moldova,
called on Romania to cancel its policy of nationality restitution for Moldovans as it
contradicts the EU charter. See: ‘Romania asked to cancel easy citizenship for Moldo-
vans’, New Europe: The European Weekly, 14 July 2007, www.neurope.eu.
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7 The politics of Bulgarian citizenship:
National identity, democracy and other uses
Daniel Smilov and Elena Jileva1
It is a well-known paradox that a polity cannot define its membership
in a democratic way; there must be an already defined membership in
order for a democratic procedure to take place. Therefore, even in genu-
inely democratic polities, the original membership rules are a complex
mixture of normative egalitarian principles and historical contingency,
which privileges certain groups. With the passage of time, the contin-
gent privileges tend to acquire a self-perpetuating, normative status.
Modern Bulgarian citizenship laws are no exception to this general
pattern. Various groups controlling the government and the parliamen-
tary majority in the country have at one point or another attempted to
entrench their privileged status in Bulgarian legislation. Such groups
were most successful in times when democracy gave way to authoritar-
ian regimes with fascist leanings and communist rule. What is surpris-
ing in the Bulgarian case, however, is the resilience of social pluralism,
which has ultimately prevailed over such attempts. The overall result
has been a certain normative incoherence of citizenship regulation in
the country, which makes it capable of accommodating different histor-
ical narratives and normative visions. This inclusive incoherence, we ar-
gue, was and still is of crucial importance for the Bulgarian polity.
Bulgarian mediaeval states existed between the late seventh century
and the Ottoman invasion in the fourteenth century – an event that left
a substantial historical mark. Modern Bulgaria was established in 1878-
1879 as a fairly independent principality in the former territories of the
Ottoman Empire. Its subsequent turbulent history, which fits within
its mere 130 years of existence with some difficulty, has not been con-
ducive to the formation of a natural and self-explanatory sense of be-
longing to, and membership of, the Bulgarian polity. Ethnic Bulgarians
(comprising today more than 80 per cent of the population), Turks,
Roma, Greeks, Macedonians, Christians, Muslims and Jews – the main
constituents of modern Bulgarian society – may differ in their interpre-
tations of the past and their visions for the future of the country. Never-
theless, despite this lack of homogeneity, the Bulgarian polity has pro-
ven remarkably stable and, particularly over the last two decades, has
made important strides towards the establishment of genuine liberal
democracy.
The main goal of this chapter is to trace the citizenship policies,
which have played an important role in these developments. The first
section outlines the history of Bulgarian citizenship laws in the period
between the liberation from Ottoman rule and the end of communist
rule. The second section discusses the developments after the fall of
the Iron Curtain by focusing specifically on the 1991 Constitution and
the new citizenship laws. The third section provides an overview of the
current political debates on citizenship in Bulgaria. The fourth section
offers some statistical information about the current trends in the ac-
quisition of Bulgarian citizenship. The chapter ends with some obser-
vations about the overall adequacy of the current citizenship regulation.
As this introduction shows, Bulgarian regulation in this field is rather
backward-looking, as it mainly addresses problems characteristic of the
twentieth century. The danger is that by preserving this focus, it re-
mains oblivious to the ever more pressing demands of a globalising
world.
7.1 History
The history of the modern Bulgarian state begins with the liberation of
the country in the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1878. In the spring of
1879, the provisional Russian authorities in the mediaeval capital of
Veliko Turnovo convoked a Constituent Assembly. It was given a man-
date to adopt a constitution for the new Principality, which was practi-
cally independent but formally remained in a vassal (tributary) relation-
ship with the Turkish Sultan.2 The decisions of this Constituent As-
sembly are very important from the point of view of citizenship policy
in Bulgaria, and are thus worth examining in some detail (for the fol-
lowing, see Vladikin 1994 and Balamezov 1993).
Firstly, the delegates encountered the paradox outlined in the open-
ing paragraph of this chapter: they faced the question of who had the
right to participate in the Constituent Assembly – and whose interest it
should represent. Of course, the Russian authorities had invited some
of the Bulgarian nobility (notables), and had carried out impromptu
elections in parts of the Bulgarian lands under their jurisdiction. How-
ever, in addition to these rather haphazardly gathered (though formally
legitimate) representatives, there were numerous delegations from
other lands inhabited by Bulgarians. These lands were to remain out-
side the territory of the Bulgarian Principality, according to the treaty
concluded at the Berlin Congress of the Great Powers (1879).3
Before the formal opening of the Constituent Assembly, all of the de-
legates – both legitimate ones and others – met to discuss the question
of the ‘unity of the nation’. All of them agreed that the great powers
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had unjustly excluded certain Bulgarian territories from the Principal-
ity.4 The disagreement was about the proper course of action; some ar-
gued that the Constituent Assembly should be boycotted in protest
against the Berlin Congress treaty. The adoption of a constitution, their
argument went, would legitimise the partition of the Bulgarian lands.
Others, strongly encouraged by the Russian authorities, insisted that a
constitution should be adopted anyway in order to stabilise the new po-
lity. Finally, common sense prevailed and, after numerous passionate
patriotic speeches, the formally legitimised delegates began their work
on the text of the Constitution. The discussions of the ‘national ques-
tion’, however, left an indelible mark on the ensuing proceedings; there
was a common understanding that the Constitution should defend the
interests of all Bulgarians as much as possible – both those living in
the Principality and those left outside of it.
Secondly, another main issue, which became the focus of vigorous
debate in the Constituent Assembly, was the scope of the (political)
rights that were to be granted to citizens of the Principality. There were
conservative voices in the Assembly who argued in favour of limited
suffrage (based on education, wealth and property), or for special
powers of the monarch to appoint members of parliament. These con-
servative voices were drowned out by a sea of egalitarian sentiments.
The end result was full male suffrage in the elections for parliament,
no powers for the monarch to appoint MPs, and a single-chamber leg-
islature (without a senate of the type of the House of Lords, for in-
stance). These institutional arrangements – which were decidedly unty-
pical of the period – determined the egalitarian, Rousseauian bias of
the Turnovo Constitution. Male citizens5 were entitled to an impressive
set of political rights of participation.
Thus, the concrete citizenship arrangements, which the 1879 Consti-
tution embodied, should be read through the double lens of nationalist
and egalitarian-Rousseauian concerns and ideas. On the face of it, ega-
litarianism prevailed. Art. 54 stated that:
All persons born in Bulgaria who have not obtained any other ci-
tizenship as well as those born elsewhere of Bulgarian subjects
are subjects of the Bulgarian Principality.
This emphasis on the principle of ius soli revealed the reluctance of
the delegates to draw distinctions among the people living in Bulgaria:
all were entitled to citizenship status, regardless of their ethnic origin
and religion. Moreover, the Constitution prohibited drawing further
distinctions among citizens: all males received the same scope of politi-
cal rights (art. 60), there were express prohibitions of different estates
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(casts) of citizens (art. 57) and of any titles of nobility, orders or other
signs of distinction (art. 58).6
The constitutional defence of national ideals was by no means ne-
glected, however. The main concern of the drafters was to ensure that
Bulgaria preserved legitimate claims over lands inhabited by Bulgar-
ians. This was done, somewhat ingeniously, in the provisions on reli-
gion (arts. 37-42). It was here regulated that the dominant religion in
the Principality would be Eastern Orthodox Christianity, and (more im-
portantly) that the Principality ‘constitute[d] an inseparable part of the
Bulgarian Church District’ and was ‘subject [in religious matters] to
the power of the Bulgarian Church, regardless of its seat’. The purpose
of these articles was to constitutionalise the Bulgarian Exarchate – the
autonomous Bulgarian Church recognised by the Ottoman Empire in
1870 – whose seat was in Istanbul and whose jurisdiction extended
well beyond the territory of the Principality; it covered both Eastern Ru-
melia and Macedonia, as well as some lands ceded to Serbia in 1878.
In this way, the articles regarding religion drew the informal bound-
aries of the Bulgarian political community, and in a highly symbolic
way articulated the territorial claims of the new Bulgarian state.
It is important to stress this ‘territorial’ meaning of the regulations
on religion; the entrenchment of Orthodox Christianity in this specific
way was not designed to create religious discrimination against other
faiths. The new Bulgarian state was by no means militantly religious.
Art. 40 of the Constitution explicitly stated that all persons (citizens or
not) residing (permanently or temporarily) in Bulgaria were entitled to
religious freedom (as long as they did not violate the law). The real pur-
pose of establishing Orthodox Christian faith was that it provided an
opportunity for the Constituent Assembly to settle the ‘national ques-
tion’ in a way acceptable to all delegates. On the one hand, citizens of
the new Principality were granted a broad spectrum of civil and politi-
cal rights in a rather egalitarian fashion (for its time). On the other
hand, ethnic Bulgarians living abroad were given the consolation that
their lands were symbolically ‘constitutionalised’ through references to
the Bulgarian Exarchate. These Bulgarians were granted the equivalent
of a symbolic citizenship and a promise that the new Principality
would take care of their interests as well. This promise actually deter-
mined the course of Bulgarian politics for the better part of the follow-
ing century. Its influence is still evident in current citizenship law.
Along with the symbolic gains for ethnic Bulgarians, there were
some more tangible privileges for them as well. The Constituent As-
sembly did not accept a strong ius sanguinis principle; no one really
wanted all ethnic Bulgarians (or Bulgarians by blood) to automatically
acquire citizenship rights in the Principality. This would create incen-
tives for a mass exodus of Bulgarians from Eastern Rumelia, Macedo-
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nia, Eastern Thrace and other regions. Instead, the founding fathers of
modern Bulgaria would maintain the compact Bulgarian population in
adjacent lands as a way of legitimising future territorial expansion. Yet,
these Bulgarians were granted some privileges – mostly in the form of
less strict requirements for acquiring Bulgarian citizenship through
naturalisation.
Based on the explanations given thus far, we will now provide a gen-
eralised description of Bulgarian citizenship regulations, since all sub-
sequent laws adopted in the country took into account the principles
elaborated in the Turnovo Constitution of 1879. The first such law
was adopted as early as 1880 (First Law on Bulgarian Nationality
(podanstvo)).7 The second law was adopted by the State Council in
1883. The Third Law on Bulgarian Nationality came into force in 1904.
They were all heavily reliant on the principle of ius soli: all persons
born in the territory of the Principality became Bulgarian citizens by
right. Such was the case with the existing minorities of Turks, Greeks
and others: ‘Bulgarian subjects are all those individuals who at the time
of the establishment of the Bulgarian Principality had residence in or were
born on its territory’ (1880 Law).8
By comparison, the principle of ius sanguinis had more limited ap-
plications. Persons born in foreign countries of parents who were Bul-
garian subjects were granted citizenship by origin. Ethnic Bulgarians
born or living abroad, however, did not automatically acquire citizen-
ship, and this covered probably more than half of all Bulgarians living
in the Ottoman Empire before the liberation of 1878.
The principle of ius domicilii was also applied in two ways: firstly, as
already mentioned, all former Ottoman subjects residing in the terri-
tory of the Principality at the time of its creation were granted citizen-
ship; secondly, residence became a ground for acquiring citizenship
through naturalisation. The regular residence requirement was three
years based on a permit for permanent domicile. Those who did not
have a permit for permanent domicile had to prove ten years of contin-
uous residence to become eligible for naturalisation. The regulations
foresaw the facilitated naturalisation of foreigners of Bulgarian extrac-
tion. They became entitled to citizenship one year after they obtained a
grant for permanent domicile in the Principality. The same applied to
men married to Bulgarian women and those who had performed a
meritorious service to the country. (Needless to say, every alien woman
who married a Bulgarian became ipso facto a Bulgarian.) Naturalisation
was granted by the King’s decree (ukaz) upon a proposal from the Min-
ister of Justice.
Naturalised citizens enjoyed the civil and political rights of Bulgarian
subjects with a few important exceptions: they were not eligible to
membership in the National Assembly or any other elective public of-
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fice for fifteen years after naturalisation. This text of the law was actu-
ally in conflict with the Turnovo Constitution, which did not introduce
such restrictions,9 but since there was no mechanism for constitutional
review, such conflicts were resolved in favour of the law.
This was the model that lasted until 1940 without any important
changes of principle. In 1885, the Bulgarian Principality was united
with Eastern Rumelia, which almost doubled its territory and popula-
tion. In 1908, the Principality gained full formal independence and be-
came a kingdom – the monarch received the original mediaeval Bulgar-
ian title of ‘tsar’. The defeats in the Balkan wars and the First World
War paradoxically led to a certain enlargement of the territory of the
kingdom; parts of Macedonia and Eastern Thrace were among the
most important gains. The net result – territorially – was positive,
although some lands of the Principality in Dobrudja were lost to Roma-
nia. But the real problem was the cost of the territorial gains. The
numbers of dead and wounded were staggering, and the economy was
in ruins and burdened by war reparations for decades to come. Most
importantly, from our perspective, the problem of refugees arose. Sig-
nificant numbers of people from Macedonia, Eastern and Western
Thrace and other neighbouring territories moved to the motherland as
a result of the war and of post-war policies of ‘population exchange’,
which was really just an internationally regulated version of ethnic
cleansing.
Immediately after the war, leading politicians attempted to abandon
the territorial expansion paradigm (‘unification of all Bulgarian lands’,
in the parlance of the time), which was at the root of so many political
and social disasters. This proved virtually impossible, however. The po-
pulist-agrarian Prime Minister Alexander Stambolijski, who tried to
mend fences with neighbouring countries and Serbia in particular, was
considered a national traitor by many. Eventually he was brutally killed
by Bulgarian-Macedonian nationalists, who insisted that the inclusion
of Macedonian lands in Bulgaria should always be a top political prior-
ity.10
Although the desire for territorial expansion remained a key factor of
Bulgarian politics after the Balkan wars and the First World War, the
symbolic geography of the Bulgarian political community dramatically
changed. Firstly, the religious jurisdiction of the Bulgarian Exarchate
over Macedonia and other lands was lost. Serbia (or rather the King-
dom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes), Greece and other countries did
not recognise this jurisdiction, and extended the jurisdiction of their
own national churches over these lands. Secondly, the mass exodus of
Bulgarians from Macedonia and Eastern Thrace led to important de-
mographic changes in these regions. The end result was that the
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boundaries of the ‘Bulgarian lands’ were no longer so neatly defined as
in the pre-war period.
The changes in the symbolic geography of Bulgarian lands led to the
increased importance of the concept of ‘Bulgarian origin’ or ‘Bulgarian
extraction’. After the First World War, Bulgarian governments could no
longer rely on the Exarchate and the Bulgarian schools to help preserve
the Bulgarian national identity of those living in neighbouring coun-
tries. In fact, the Greek and Serbian governments both pursued a
course of aggressive – and often physically repressive – replacement of
the markers of Bulgarian identity. The Bulgarian government could not
do much in this situation; in fact, all it could do was increase the privi-
leges for ethnic Bulgarians within its domestic jurisdiction.
The Fourth Law on Bulgarian Nationality adopted in 1940 was the
primary example of this tendency. Formally, the law repeated some of
the main provisions of previous legislation.11 However, there were
many provisions in which the concept of ethnically defined ‘Bulgarian
origin’ played a crucial role. Firstly, the law introduced a strongly ethnic
definition of ‘Bulgarian origin’: ‘all persons born of Bulgarian parents’
(art. 4). Secondly, persons of Bulgarian origin were granted significant
privileges vis-a`-vis other groups. For instance, previous legislation al-
lowed foreigners of non-Bulgarian extraction to be naturalised three
years after obtaining a residence permit,12 while the 1940 law raised
the requirement to ten years (art. 9). At the same time, people of Bul-
garian origin were entitled to naturalisation within a year (as in pre-
vious laws). Furthermore, and very tellingly, art. 15 of the law provided
that Bulgarian subjects of non-Bulgarian origin who left the country
would thereby lose their citizenship. Moreover, these individuals had to
sell their property within three months of departure. These discrimina-
tory provisions bear the mark of the time, and this mark was increas-
ingly fascistic and paranoid. In his commentary on the law (prefaced
by the then Minister of Justice Vasil Mitakov), Malinkov (1941: 42) ar-
gues that these measures were necessary in view of the agreements
with Turkey, Greece and Romania on population exchange.13 Another
‘reason’, cited by the author, was ‘the strong Zionist propaganda, which
resulted in a great number of Jews, who were Bulgarian subjects, reset-
tling in Palestine.’
Thus, the 1940 law shifted the emphasis of citizenship regulation
from ius soli to ius sanguinis. Ethnic Bulgarians were given some sig-
nificant privileges. Furthermore, the state became increasingly para-
noid about its citizens of non-Bulgarian extraction. During the Second
World War, Bulgaria was governed by a pro-German authoritarian re-
gime headed by Tsar Boris III. Although this regime never openly en-
dorsed the Nazi totalitarian ideology as a whole, in some of its policies
it clearly came close to it. For instance, under German pressure, laws
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restricting the rights of Jews were implemented; the infamous Law on
the Protection of the Nation (1940) was the primary piece of legislation
modelled on the Nuremberg laws. Much of the Bulgarian legislation re-
mained loosely enforced, however, and the population at large sym-
pathised with the Jews. These public sentiments, along with the deci-
sive action of the politician Dimiter Peshev and a few other members
of the establishment and the Orthodox Church, ultimately led to the
saving of 50,000 Bulgarian Jews from deportation to the death camps
(see Todorov 2001). This triumph of citizen decency in repressive times
was marred, however, by the deportation of 11,000 Jews from the terri-
tories occupied by the Bulgarian army in Greece, Macedonia and south-
east Serbia to Treblinka and possibly other camps.14
Thus, the regime did succumb to the fascist political fashion of its
time, and the 1940 Law was a good example of this. Art. 21, for in-
stance, envisaged various grounds for a loss of Bulgarian citizenship,
including ‘acting against the security of the Bulgarian state’. It is im-
portant to note, that only Bulgarian subjects living abroad and Bulgar-
ian subjects of non-Bulgarian origin could lose their citizenship in this
way. The language in the provision for subjects of non-Bulgarian origin
was particularly telling: they were to lose their citizenship ‘if they ha[d]
proven unworthy of it or were considered dangerous for state security
and public order.’ Needless to say, the vagueness of the provision was a
guarantee for administrative abuses.
In September 1944, the monarchical regime came to a crushing end
through a communist takeover, which began the establishment of
Soviet-sponsored communist rule in Bulgaria. This led to significant
changes in Bulgarian nationality laws. The 1947 Constitution of the
People’s Republic of Bulgaria did not have provisions pertaining to the
acquisition, loss or restoration of nationality, but for the first time
changed the legal status of Bulgarians by turning them from subjects to
citizens – this was in line with the antimonarchical sentiments of the
time. In 1948, the Grand National Assembly adopted the Law on Bul-
garian Citizenship, which replaced the 1940 Law on Bulgarian Nation-
ality. The reasons set out in the bill sent to the Assembly pointed out
that there was a need to overcome an inadmissible differentiation of
Bulgarian citizens into those of Bulgarian origin and those of non-Bul-
garian origin who were treated less favourably. Therefore, the law re-
verted back to the pre-1940 main principles in this area. Art. 1.1 stated
that a ‘Bulgarian citizen by origin is any person whose parents are Bul-
garian citizens’. The reference to ‘Bulgarian parents’ was eliminated,
which turned the definition from an ethnic into a rather more civic
one. Art. 2 introduced the principle of ius soli by stipulating that a:
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Bulgarian citizen by place of birth is every individual born or
found inside the territory of the country, whose parents are un-
known, or are of unknown citizenship or are without citizen-
ship.
However, this was a more limited application of ius soli compared to
the Law of 1880, according to which practically every individual born
in Bulgaria was considered a Bulgarian subject.15 The restriction of the
scope of the place-of-birth principle can be explained by contextual con-
siderations: in 1948, Bulgaria was a country with a growing population
that had absorbed significant waves of refugees over the previous two
decades. There were practically no reasons for encouraging aliens to
settle in Bulgaria. Paradoxically, however, this principle of limited ius
soli became a permanent feature of subsequent legislation, even after
the demographic context had completely changed.
Moreover, although the communist rulers attempted to abandon the
fascist-inspired conceptions of ‘Bulgarians by origin’, they still pre-
served some of the most discriminatory practices embedded in the
1940 Law. Thus, immediately after the communist takeover on 9 Sep-
tember 1944, many Bulgarians were deprived of Bulgarian citizenship
for political reasons and their properties were confiscated (Aleksandrov
1995: 44-45).
In 1968, a second Law on Bulgarian Citizenship was adopted. Under
the 1968 Law all Bulgarians who refused to return behind the Iron
Curtain were deprived of their citizenship. Similarly, anyone who in
any way dared to express a negative opinion of the communist regime
was also deprived of his or her citizenship.16 The 1968 Law, like the
1940 Law, did not tolerate dual citizenship: a number of special bilat-
eral international agreements were signed with a view toward eliminat-
ing or preventing dual citizenship (Valkanov 1978: 33-48; Tzankov
2004: 48-51).17 The 1968 Law did not explicitly require the renuncia-
tion of a previous citizenship by aliens who sought naturalisation, but
it did deprive Bulgarians naturalised elsewhere of their Bulgarian citi-
zenship.
This last clause was introduced at the time of the expulsion of the
Bulgarian Turks (Liebich 2000: 105) – a shameful episode, which coin-
cided with the end of communist rule in the country. Although crude
analogies between fascist and communist rule are always misleading,
it seems that in 1984 the Communist party leadership got infected
with an ethnic paranoia that was very similar to that of their fascist pre-
decessors. They decided to change the names of all ethnic Turks and
Muslims into Bulgarian names (for more details, see Kalyonski &
Gruev 2008). The massive administrative operation was accompanied
by intense propaganda, which promoted the idea that these minorities
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were actually ethnic Bulgarians forcefully assimilated by the Ottomans.
Few ethnic Turks were convinced, which led to a protracted period of
tension and repression, culminating in 1989 in the successful attempt
of the Communist regime to expel more than 300,000 Turks to neigh-
bouring Turkey. The regime argued that the process was a ‘voluntary’
resettlement; the public called it, with some irony, ‘the Great Excur-
sion’. Thus, the regime which started with a fierce rejection of the fas-
cist laws and policies, ended up endorsing similar ones, albeit consider-
ably less sinister (without death camps and ‘a final solution’, for in-
stance). In the same year, communist rule finally collapsed, as a result
of which between one-third and one-half of the ‘excursion-goers’ even-
tually returned home safely.18 On 20 December 1990, the Grand Na-
tional Assembly passed a law to have citizenship restored to the victims
of the repressions against the Turks and Muslims, after which they
could also reclaim any property confiscated during their absence (for
more details, see the discussion in section 7.4).19
7.2 Current citizenship rules and practices
The current Bulgarian legal regulations regarding citizenship are based
on the provisions of the 1991 Constitution. As we made clear in the
previous section, the most repressive parts of the communist legisla-
tion were amended even before the adoption of the new basic law.
However, the Constitution was meant to embody a complete vision of
all questions relating to membership in the Bulgarian polity. Not sur-
prisingly, much of this new philosophy resembles the approach of the
Constituent Assembly in Veliko Turnovo in 1879. Firstly, the Constitu-
tion grants citizenship to all persons born in the territory of Bulgaria,
unless they acquire another citizenship by origin, or born to at least
one parent who is a Bulgarian citizen (art. 25 (1)). Compared to the
1880 Law, for instance, this is a more limited application of ius soli si-
milar to the communist laws. Concessions to ethnic Bulgarians are
also constitutionalised: ‘A person of Bulgarian origin shall acquire Bul-
garian citizenship through a facilitated procedure’ (art. 25 (2)). In order
to avoid some of the most repressive practices of previous regimes, the
Constitution expressly prohibits depriving Bulgarian citizens by birth
of their citizenship (art. 25 (3)) and the extradition or expatriation of ci-
tizens (art. 25 (4)).20
Furthermore, the Constitution practically guarantees the full scope
of rights to all Bulgarian citizens without differentiating between citi-
zens by birth or by naturalisation. There are only some minor, but
symbolically important, exceptions, like the requirement of art. 93 (2),
which states that candidates for the office of President of the Republic
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should be Bulgarian ‘citizens by birth’,21 which, as a non-ethnic cate-
gory, does not exclude representatives of minorities from running for
this office. The inclusion of this provision was not a reflection of some
grand ideology of Bulgarian nationhood, but was the result of a contex-
tual, tactical political game among the major players in the Grand Na-
tional Assembly, who wanted to block the candidacy for president of
the then popular ex-communist leader Andrei Lukanov, who was born
in the Soviet Union and originally had a Soviet passport.
As often happens with such contingent political calculations, this
one also had serious unintended consequences for its drafters from the
ex-communist Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP). In 1996, Georgi Pirins-
ki, the official BSP candidate for president was practically disqualified
from the race by the Constitutional Court, which ruled that for the pur-
poses of the presidential election citizenship by birth was to be estab-
lished according to the law in force at the time of birth of the candi-
date.22 Thus, Pirinski was denied ‘citizenship by birth’ due to the vag-
aries of the communist citizenship laws in force at the time of his
birth (Pirinski was born in New York, and according to the then valid
law was not a citizen by birth). The dubious constitutional reasoning of
the justices – which gave priority to the communist legislation over the
Constitution – can be explained by the politicisation of the Court dur-
ing that period; most of the judges just happened to be opponents of
the BSP. This example vividly shows that citizenship policy is never so-
lely a reflection of coherent ideologies and grand principles because
key decisions can often be explained by contextual factors of temporary
importance. Another example was the amendment to the Constitution
that stipulated five years of residence in the country for presidential
candidates. In the mind of the drafters, this requirement was designed
to prevent Tsar Simeon II from running for the presidency in 1991. In
fact, it did prevent him from doing so, but only ten years later (in
2001), when many of the drafters of this amendment would have been
perhaps more supportive of his candidacy.
Leaving these unintended consequences aside, the Constitution had
to solve one very serious problem indeed: the ongoing tension between
the Bulgarian majority and the Turkish minority after the events of
1989. As mentioned above, the citizenship rights and property of Bul-
garian Turks were restored, but many of them had already acquired
Turkish citizenship and some had actually decided to resettle in Turkey
permanently.23 The question about the status of these persons with
double citizenship would require a major revision of citizenship poli-
cies, as both the 1940 and the communist regulations had expressly
prohibited dual citizenship. The 1991 Constitution altered this practice,
mostly by remaining silent on the possibility of double citizenship.24
Thus, in order to remedy the former injustices against the Bulgarian
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Turks, Bulgaria became one of the few countries in Eastern Europe to
recognise dual citizenship (Liebich 2000: 105).
Despite these concessions to the Turkish minority, the 1991 Consti-
tution remains fundamentally sceptical about minority rights. It
espouses an attitude that closely resembles the German constitutional
doctrine of ‘militant democracy’, especially in its application to minori-
ties in contemporary Turkish constitutionalism.25 The Constitution is
specifically concerned with ethnic and religious politics and in a num-
ber of provisions it expressly prohibits the establishing political parties
on an ‘ethnic, racial or religious basis’, (11(4)) or parties whose activities
are directed against the integrity of the country, the unity of the nation,
or the igniting of racial, national, ethnic, and religious hatred (44(2)).
These provisions threatened to bring the Bulgarian polity to a crisis
immediately after the first parliamentary elections under the new Con-
stitution in 1991. The reason was the controversy over the Movement
for Rights and Freedoms (MRF), a political party organised mostly by
members of the Turkish ethnic minority, which successfully ran in the
in parliamentary election and formed a coalition government with the
Union of Democratic Forces (UDF), the anti-communist opposition.
BSP deputies attacked the constitutionality of the party before the Con-
stitutional Court.26 In a well-reasoned decision, the Court effectively re-
laxed the prohibition of ethnic parties in art. 11 of the Constitution by
arguing that only parties that are ethnically exclusive and threaten the
constitutional order are to be banned. This decision legitimised the
MRF, which gradually emerged as one of the major political parties in
Bulgarian politics. The MRF is currently probably one of the few ethnic
parties in Europe that officially belong to the European family of liberal
parties. The MRF has been part of the ruling coalitions in Bulgaria
since 2001.
The rationale of the 1991 Constitution was reflected in Bulgaria’s ci-
tizenship legislation. The 1968 Law went through a series of amend-
ments. The most recent Law on Citizenship was enacted in 1998. It
took into consideration the new social developments of the transition
period, as well as the prospect of EU membership. All of the remain-
ing discriminatory positions included in the earlier Bulgarian citizen-
ship laws, which affected those citizens who had left the country, were
ultimately revoked by the 1998 Law.27 The 1998 Law restored the citi-
zenship of Bulgarians whose citizenship had been withdrawn by de-
crees during the period 1944 to 1947.28
7.2.1 Acquisition of Bulgarian citizenship
The present law, as already stated, accommodates multiple citizenship.
Dual citizens are treated as Bulgarian citizens only when they enter
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Bulgarian territory and acquire the rights and duties of Bulgarian citi-
zens. According to art. 3 in the current law:
Any Bulgarian citizen who is also a citizen of another state shall
only be considered a Bulgarian citizen in the application of the
Bulgarian legislation unless otherwise provided for by law.
There are very few disadvantages for people with dual citizenship, ac-
cording to the Constitution: among the conditions for the election of
deputies to the national parliament is the requirement that the ‘person
must be a Bulgarian citizen who does not have another citizenship’;
the same is true for presidential candidates.
As Todorov points out, the 1991 Constitution defines two notions: ‘a
person of Bulgarian origin’ (a Bulgarian) and ‘a Bulgarian citizen’. A
Bulgarian is a person who by his or her origin is of Bulgarian ‘blood’.
Para. 2 (1) of the 1998 Law specifies that ‘a person of Bulgarian origin
is one whose ascendants (or at least one of these) are Bulgarian’. A Bul-
garian is not necessarily a Bulgarian citizen. He or she could, for in-
stance, be a Moldavian, a Macedonian or a Hungarian citizen. The no-
tion ‘Bulgarian’ refers to an ethnic identity, not a legal status. The only
privilege that the Constitution provides for ethnic Bulgarians is the
ability to obtain Bulgarian citizenship through a facilitated naturalisa-
tion procedure. By contrast, the notion of the ‘Bulgarian citizen’ is legal
and civic in its content. Bulgarian citizens, including those by birth,
can be ethnic Bulgarians but also individuals from other ethnic groups
such as Turks, Armenians, Chinese, etc. (Todorov 1996: 7).
Therefore, the ethnic definition of ‘Bulgarian’ plays a role only in the
rules for naturalisation. There are two methods for the acquisition of
Bulgarian citizenship by naturalisation: a general regime and a prefer-
ential regime for certain categories of persons, including ethnic Bulgar-
ians. The great majority of those who have acquired Bulgarian citizen-
ship through naturalisation over the past few years have done so using
the preferential regime (Tzankov 2005).
Art. 12 of the 1998 Law establishes the general regime for naturalisa-
tion. The requirements are that the applicant:
1. is of lawful age;
2. was granted permission for permanent residence29 in the Republic
of Bulgaria not less than five years before application;
3. has not been sentenced by a Bulgarian court for an intentional
crime of a general nature and has not been the subject of criminal
proceedings for such a crime unless the person concerned has been
rehabilitated;
4. has an income and occupation enabling him or her to support him-
self or herself in the Republic of Bulgaria;
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5. has a command of the Bulgarian language subject to verification in
accordance with a procedure established by an order of the Minister
of Education and Culture; and
6. was released from his or her previous citizenship or will be released
from his or her citizenship at the moment of acquiring Bulgarian
citizenship.30
It is clear from these provisions that the general regime for obtaining
citizenship by naturalisation is quite restrictive. Applicants (if they do
not fall into some special category) are normally required to have legally
resided in the country for ten years (five years to obtain a permit, and
another five to be eligible for citizenship). The waiting period for the
permanent residence permit can be waived for those who have invested
more than US$ 500,000. Furthermore, the 1998 Law introduces for
the first time the requirement of a clean criminal record, and, more im-
portantly, knowledge of the Bulgarian language,31 employment and in-
come or income guarantees for an applicant of foreign origin. It is not
surprising, then, that between 2000 and 2006, there were only a total
of 2,395 applications for Bulgarian citizenship through general natura-
lisation, of which only 865 were granted – all in all, statistically insig-
nificant numbers (see Table 1 and Table 2 in section 7.4).
In contrast to the general regime, the 1998 Law is much less restric-
tive with regard to privileged groups. These can be divided into three ca-
tegories. The first one is entitled to privileged naturalisation, which re-
quires a minimum of three years residency after the acquisition of a
permit for permanent residence in the territory of the Republic of Bul-
garia. It includes persons married to Bulgarian citizens, persons having
acquired permanent residence before the age of majority (art. 13) and re-
fugees (art. 13a). Similar access is granted to stateless persons (art. 14).
The second category of persons who can benefit from the regime of
privileged naturalisation includes those who have made special contri-
butions and performed meritorious service to the Republic of Bulgaria.
They are granted achievement-based nationality. Most often, this criter-
ion is used to facilitate the acquisition of Bulgarian citizenship for ath-
letes.32
While refugees and foreign athletes must still satisfy a three-year re-
sidence requirement for facilitated naturalisation, this condition is
dropped for the third category. It is, in fact, the most important group
in terms of numbers and consists of persons of Bulgarian origin. Ac-
cording to art. 15 of the law, as amended in 2001, applicants of Bulgar-
ian origin are exempted from all but two requirements: the minimum
age and a clean criminal record. It is important to note that the exemp-
tion from language tests and residence requirements was adopted in
2001, which led to a significant increase in naturalisation proceedings,
224 DANIEL SMILOV AND ELENA JILEVA
as discussed in section 7.4. The privileges for ethnic Bulgarian appli-
cants also have financial implications; for instance, they pay a fee of
only 5 BGN, whereas other foreigners pay 1,000 BGN.33
Any person who is not a Bulgarian citizen may acquire Bulgarian ci-
tizenship through naturalisation provided that he or she is of Bulgarian
origin.34 Establishment of Bulgarian origin is ethnic; the applicant has
to show that at least one of his or her ancestors (ascendants – parents
and grandparents) was an ethnic Bulgarian. The birth certificates of
the parents and grandparents, their mother tongue, membership in
Bulgarian institutions such as the Bulgarian Church, schools, former
Bulgarian citizenship of the parents, etc., are relevant criteria for the
establishment of the ethnic origin of the applicant through the ethni-
city of his or her parents. It is important to note, however, that the law
remains virtually silent about these more specific criteria of Bulgarian
ethnicity, which leaves a significant degree of discretion to the adminis-
trative authorities in the resolution of individual cases.35
An attempt to clarify the concrete conditions of proving ‘Bulgarian
origin’ is made in the 2000 Law on Bulgarians Living outside the Re-
public of Bulgaria, which states that Bulgarian origin can be proven by
documents issued by a Bulgarian or foreign state institution, an organi-
sation of Bulgarians living outside the Republic of Bulgaria approved
by the authorised state institution or by the Bulgarian Orthodox
Church (art. 3). However, even with these clarifications, the problem of
definitional indeterminacy and administrative discretion remains.36
7.2.2 Loss of citizenship
Following the Constitution’s rationale to avoid the excesses of the com-
munist regime, the 1998 Law declares that Bulgarian citizens by birth
can lose their citizenship only if they express an explicit wish for this
and acquire another citizenship. Generally, there are three ways to lose
one’s Bulgarian citizenship: release from Bulgarian citizenship, revoca-
tion of naturalisation, and deprivation of citizenship. According to art.
20:
any Bulgarian citizen who is permanently residing abroad may
request to be released from Bulgarian citizenship, if he or she
has acquired foreign citizenship or if there is information show-
ing that a procedure for acquisition of foreign citizenship has
been initiated.
Naturalisation can be withheld in a limited number of cases, for in-
stance if the person has obtained it through the provision of false infor-
mation or through the withholding of relevant information from the
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authorities (art. 22). Deprivation of citizenship of a naturalised person
can take place if the person has committed grave crimes against Bul-
garia (art. 24).
Revoked Bulgarian citizenship can be restored under certain condi-
tions. These are dealt with both in the provisions in the 1998 Law and
the amendments of 2001. The most important of these conditions is a
residence requirement: three years of lawful permanent residence after
the submission of the application for the restoration of one’s citizen-
ship (art. 26 (3)).37
7.3 Current political debates
The discussion thus far has demonstrated that, at the level of the Con-
stitution, Bulgarian legislation provides for a fairly egalitarian frame-
work, which could be interpreted as an acceptable basis for a civic com-
munity. However, this framework remains incomplete, and it allows
for alternative interpretations through legislation; the main culprit in
this regard is the provision for privileged naturalisation of Bulgarians
by origin. The same is true of the provisions for multiple citizenship,
which could also be interpreted as bestowing specific privileges on par-
ticular groups of citizens. Thus, ultimately, the Constitution leaves it to
the political process to determine the precise make up of the Bulgarian
political community, and the exact scope of the privileges for specific
groups. In this section we therefore examine the dynamics of the politi-
cal processes, which have a bearing on the questions discussed.
The most important recent development in this regard is the rise of
populist politics in the country. Bulgarian populism is marked by a cri-
sis in the representative system, and the ‘mainstream parties’ in parti-
cular, and the constant emergence of new players – such as the ex-Tsar
Simeon’s NDSV movement (National Movement Simeon the Second)38
in 2001, Boyko Borissov’s GERB (Citizens for European Development
of Bulgaria) in 2006, and even something like a radical nationalist
party – Ataka – in 2005. These populist players are largely indifferent
to traditional left-wing or right-wing political ideologies. They use other
means for the mobilisation of their people, which often include anti-
corruption campaigns and various milder or stronger versions of na-
tionalism. The rise of populism in Bulgaria coincided with the transfor-
mation of the MRF – the Turkish minority party – into a mainstream
player consistently taking part in the government of the country.39
Thus, the anti-elite, anti-establishment rhetoric of the newcomers also
acquired some ethnic overtones; they started to ethnicise corruption
and to portray the MRF as the most problematic element in the party
system. However, evidence shows that the MRF, although prone to pa-
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tronage and clientelistic practices, is no more corrupt than the other
parties.
In the face of populist attacks from these newcomers, the representa-
tives of the ‘mainstream parties’, such as the BSP, had to revise their
campaign strategies and react to the challenge. President of the Repub-
lic Georgi Parvanov – who was the former chairman of the BSP and a
historian by training – played a primary role in the design of the new
political course, which could be described as the ‘mainstreaming’ of
some mild forms of nationalism in order to reduce the appeal of the
populists. As the head of state, Parvanov started taking public positions
on issues of ‘historical importance’, such as the significance of the
struggles for the liberation of Macedonia in Bulgarian history, the ‘mis-
interpretations’ by domestic and foreign experts of specific events, such
as the Batak massacre in 1876, and so on.40 Formal official rituals also
underwent significant redevelopment in order to stress the historical
continuity of the Bulgarian nation and the grandeur of the sacrifice
made by its ancestors.
Of course, President Parvanov played an important role in the for-
mation of citizenship policy as well, though in this area, the ‘main-
streaming’ of nationalism began even before the start of his mandate.
Gradually, however, citizenship policy was included in the symbolic
manifestations of mild nationalism, especially with regard to interna-
tional relations with Macedonia.
Below we demonstrate how the rise of populism and the reactive
‘mainstreaming’ of mild nationalism affected three specific policy
areas: the voting rights of Bulgarian Turks residing in Turkey, the nat-
uralisation policies and policies that address demographic problems
and the need for foreign labour.
7.3.1 The voting rights of Bulgarian Turks living in Turkey
As already discussed, in the 1980s, the then communist regime of Bul-
garia adopted a policy towards the Turkish minority in Bulgaria, ac-
cording to which Bulgarians with Turkish origin were forced to adopt
Slavic names. This led to a great wave of emigration back to Turkey in
1989. After the one-party system collapsed in 1989, many reclaimed
their Bulgarian citizenship, but only some of them resettled in Bulgar-
ia, while others who regained Bulgarian passports preferred to remain
in Turkey (see also Kadirbeyoglu in this volume). Among this group,
there are many children and retirees who nowadays spend their sum-
mers in Bulgaria. Some come back to pursue higher education or per-
form military service in Bulgaria, given the general fear among Turks
of having to do one’s military service in the Kurdish regions of Turkey.
The two states have an agreement concerning the mutual recognition
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of one another’s military service (which became a moot point after the
professionalisation of the Bulgarian army). In general, the relation-
ships between Bulgaria and Turkey have begun to flourish and have
reached an unprecedented level of civility, especially when, in 1997, the
then newly elected Bulgarian President Peter Stoyanov delivered a
speech to the Turkish National Assembly, asking for forgiveness for
what had been done to the Turkish minority in his country (Petkova
2002: 52-54).
According to official migration statistics, Turkish migrants with dual
Bulgarian and Turkish citizenship form a community of around
380,000 people. Under the 1998 citizenship law, these migrants have
the right to regain their Bulgarian citizenship while keeping their Turk-
ish citizenship. As dual citizens, they develop and share dual loyalty,
rights and obligations (O¨zgu¨r-Baklacioglu 2006: 322).
The rise of populism in Bulgaria meant that the voting rights of Bul-
garian citizens of Turkish origin who are resident in Turkey came in-
creasingly under attack. These rights are the same as those of other ci-
tizens; that is, they can participate in parliamentary, presidential, local
and EP elections in Bulgaria. Debates about these voting rights arose
first in the 1990s. Thus, on the eve of parliamentary elections in De-
cember 1994, the possibility of significant support for the MRF by Bul-
garian Turkish voters in Turkey was strongly debated in the Bulgarian
media. MRF supporters were estimated at 150,000 eligible voters. The
main question was whether citizens with dual citizenship who were
not resident in Bulgaria had the right to influence Bulgarian internal
politics. However, this debate was not revived in the 1997 parliamen-
tary elections when Bulgarians had much more serious crises to deal
with, such as trying to survive after the economic crisis of 1996 (Iva-
nov 1997).
During all general elections held in the past fifteen years, the inter-
ested parties (specifically the MRF) have organised large numbers of
Bulgarian Turks with voting rights who reside permanently in Turkey
to vote either in polling stations in Turkey (in over 70 locations in
2005) or to be transported by bus to Bulgaria to cast their votes there.41
Bus transportation has been widely available during municipal elec-
tions in Bulgaria. In the June 2001 parliamentary election, the MRF re-
ceived 38,840 of the 50,000 votes cast in Turkey. In this way, the votes
of the dual citizens living in Turkey helped elect three MRF members
to the Bulgarian Parliament (it needs to be noted, however, that dual ci-
tizens have neither a special representation quota nor specially desig-
nated MPs as their representatives). The local elections in 2003 showed
similar results, when dual citizens contributed to MRF electoral vic-
tories in twelve municipalities as well as the election of 695 local mu-
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nicipality council members and advisors (O¨zgu¨r-Baklacioglu 2006:
328).
Protests against the voting rights for dual citizens have been ex-
pressed by political parties, public opinion as well as some scholars
(e.g. Boyadjiev 1996).42 In 2007, however, these protests escalated into
a campaign by all of the opposition parties, in which individual mem-
bers of the ruling majority also took part (including the BSP chairman
of parliament who in a crucial vote on some of the debated residence
requirements, sided with the opposition).
The conflict over the voting rights for dual citizens emerged in rela-
tion to the first European Parliament elections in May 2007. The ques-
tion was whether the National Assembly should introduce specific resi-
dence requirements for voters in European Parliamentary elections,
which would disqualify the Bulgarian Turks living in Turkey. The oppo-
sition parties proposed these requirements, which soon gained wide-
spread public support. According to a study by the Alpha Research
Agency, public opinion in Bulgaria was clear with some 78.7 per cent
of all Bulgarians supporting residency requirements in these elections.
Such a high rate of popular approval is comparatively rare in Bulgarian
politics. The sole opponents of the new regulation were supporters of
the MRF.43
In the ensuing heated parliamentary debates some members of the
opposition even argued that MEPs elected with the help of Bulgarian
voters in Turkey would in fact represent Turkey rather than Bulgaria.
After four hours of debate over the controversial text, 80 opposition
MPs walked out of the plenary hall. Ultimately, the ruling coalition al-
lowed all citizens to be enfranchised regardless of where they resided.
In the subsequent election, the MRF did exceptionally well and came
in third with 20.26 per cent, just behind GERB (a centre-right populist
party) with 21.68 per cent and the BSP with 21.41 per cent. The MRF
received a total of 392,650 votes.
In the following local elections of 2007, attempts to introduce the re-
sidency requirements succeeded initially, but were then dramatically
watered down through various legal technicalities, which made it possi-
ble to claim residency only on the basis of a permanent address regis-
tered on one’s identity card, which virtually all people have, even if they
live abroad. Thus, the practice of ‘electoral tourism’ continued una-
bated.
It is important to note, however, that the MRF is gradually losing the
public debate on residency requirements, and if they were to join the
opposition, a reversal of policy is very probable. What is striking in the
emerging dominant public opinion is the lack of a principled vision of
citizenship. Some who support the denial of voting rights argue that
this measure will eliminate possibilities for vote-buying and electoral
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fraud; others see it as a punishment for the ‘corrupt’ MRF; while still
others try to argue that only taxpayers should have political rights; and
last, but not least, are the Ataka supporters, who believe that ethnic
Bulgarians should be privileged in terms of political rights. This ca-
cophony of angry voices is the mark of populist mobilisation.
7.3.2 Dual citizenship for persons with Bulgarian origin
At first sight, the contemporary naturalisation policy of Bulgaria has
been a success – numbers of applicants and naturalised citizens con-
tinue to rise. In a situation of negative demographic trends,44 this is
undoubtedly good news. However, the problem is that this policy is not
designed to help solve the demographic problem, or provide the neces-
sary workforce, but mostly to win some symbolic battles over the past
with neighbouring countries, as well as to mobilise domestic voters.
The backward-looking nature of this policy means that its successes
will hardly be sustainable.
The majority of applications for the acquisition of Bulgarian citizen-
ship are based on Bulgarian origin. Between 2001 and 2005 this
amounted to 90 per cent of the total number of applications (Tzankov
2005). For the period 2000 to 2006, the largest number of applica-
tions for citizenship were those based on origin and were filed by Bul-
garians abroad, mainly from Macedonia, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine and
Serbia. In total, there were 87,722 applications for citizenship based on
origin. Of these, 32,702 came from Macedonia and 38,641 were filed
by Moldovan citizens. During the same period, the number of citizens
from Macedonia who were granted Bulgarian citizenship on the
grounds of their Bulgarian origin by Vice-Presidential Decree was
10,850. The number for Moldova was 9,187 (see Table 1 and Table 2 in
section 7.4).
According to Stefan Nikolov from the State Agency for Bulgarians
Abroad (SABA), ‘since 2001, Bulgaria has been attractive because of its
Euro-Atlantic prospects, its stability and the travel opportunities that
Bulgarian passports offer’. Nikolov also noted that the number of appli-
cations has increased exponentially. In 2001, only 940 people acquired
Bulgarian citizenship, but the number rose to 3,000 in 2002; 4,000 in
2003; 5,559 in 2004; 5,722 in 2005; and 6,511 in 2006 (see Table 2).
One of the most prominent cases of Macedonians being granted Bul-
garian citizenship was that of the former Prime Minister of Macedonia,
Ljubcho Georgievski.
More than 20,000 people have received Bulgarian passports since
2001, when the number of applicants for Bulgarian citizenship was al-
most 5,500. That number rose to nearly 29,500 in 2004. In 2005
alone, when 23,200 applications were submitted, more than 2,400 Ma-
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cedonians and a slightly greater number of Moldovans were granted
Bulgarian citizenship. The total combined number of Russians, Israe-
lis, Ukrainians and Serbs who received Bulgarian passports in 2005
was less than 700.45 Less than five months before Bulgaria joined the
EU, the number of applicants awaiting approval exceeded 50,000. In
2007, that number rose to 60,000 persons waiting for Bulgarian citi-
zenship.46
All this is due to the privileged and facilitated naturalisation proce-
dure for members of Bulgarian minorities applying for Bulgarian citi-
zenship in neighbouring countries. Once it is granted to them, they en-
joy all the rights to which Bulgarians are entitled, without being ob-
liged to give up their other nationality or live in Bulgaria.
But here lies the problem: it remains unclear what the actual contri-
bution of these people to contemporary Bulgarian society is going to
be. They are applying with the explicit expectation of the travel oppor-
tunities that a Bulgarian passport affords, without having to live in the
country. The fear is that the ultimate result of this policy might be the
further extension of the ‘symbolic Bulgarian citizenship’ without ad-
dressing the actual pressing social problems. There is also a European
dimension to this issue: this type of external Union citizenship gener-
ates immigration rights and rights to political participation at the EU
level, which may conflict with the developing EU immigration regime.
This problem, however, has not even been registered in Bulgarian pub-
lic debates.
As to the symbolic ‘gains’ that the policy offers, they come mostly in
the form of settling historical scores with neighbouring countries. Ma-
cedonia is the primary target here,47 and thus it is no surprise that cur-
rent Bulgarian naturalisation policy is most negatively received there,
especially among the nostalgic pro-Yugoslav local political establish-
ment. The concept of ‘Bulgarian by origin’ contradicts the ‘official’ in-
terpretation of Macedonian identity because the concept assumes that
there are ethnic Bulgarians living within Macedonian borders. The offi-
cial reaction of the Macedonian government to the Bulgarian policy
has been ambivalent, however, if we leave aside the ongoing anti-Bul-
garian bias in the local media. Unlike the Ukraine, Macedonia has not
chosen to penalise its citizens who hold dual citizenship.
Nevertheless, Macedonia has intensified its claims that Bulgaria is
violating the rights of Macedonians in Bulgaria and, in particular, their
rights to association and assembly. Symbolic politics here has indeed
led Bulgaria to violate the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR). In 2000, the Bulgarian Constitutional Court (BCC) banned
the tiny nationalist Macedonian party OMO-Ilinden because it was
seen as a threat to the integrity of the state and the unity of the nation.
The BCC’s decision48 strayed from its previous reasoned judgements
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concerning the MRF (see the discussion in section 7.2), and essentially
ruled that certain speeches, letters and maps produced by the party
were a substantial threat to the Bulgarian state. This paranoid reason-
ing was judged to be in violation of ECHR art. 11 (in conjunction with
art. 10) by the European Court of Human Rights in 2006.49 Since
then, Bulgarian authorities have denied registration to OMO on various
formal and procedural grounds. These decisions have recently been cri-
ticised by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe.50
It is difficult to say who has the upper hand in these friendly
skirmishes in the symbolic warfare between Bulgaria and Macedonia.
Naturalisation numbers and some famous ‘casualties’, such as the nat-
uralised former PM of Macedonia, tilt the scales towards Bulgaria. But
the OMO-Ilinden story and the general sympathy for the underdog
seem to level the score. It is quite clear, however, that the target audi-
ence of the symbolic warfare is domestic; it is used for mobilisation
purposes by particular actors, and at least in the Bulgarian case, it cor-
relates to the rise of populism and the reactions to it. Not surprisingly,
the major actors in this symbolic warfare in Sofia are, on the one hand,
the leaders of the nationalistic-populist parties (Ataka, Internal Macedo-
nian Revolutionary Organisation (VMRO), among others); on the other
hand, it is the President of the Republic himself, who apart from being
a key figure in the administration of naturalisation policies, regularly
expresses the official Bulgarian position on the symbolic front.
In terms of more tangible international relations, Macedonia and
Bulgaria, surprisingly, do not have any serious unresolved questions.
Despite the apparent mutual animosities, Bulgaria has always
staunchly supported Macedonia both in difficult times, such as during
the bombardment of Kosovo by NATO, and now when Macedonia is
on its way to becoming a NATO member. Patronising as this behaviour
may appear to politicians in Skopje, it is still markedly different from
the behaviour of Macedonia’s other EU neighbour, Greece, which still
refuses to recognise the official name of the country, and vetoed Mace-
donian NATO membership in April 2008.
7.3.3 National dreams and the imperatives of a globalised world
In this section, we further pursue the theme of an obsession with the
past in the development of Bulgarian naturalisation policy, and raise
the issue of its adequacy vis-a`-vis more contemporary challenges. Many
of the Bulgarian government’s organisational efforts in this area can be
understood as an attempt to symbolically restore the Bulgarian Exarch-
ate through some modern surrogate, which would institutionalise links
with the ethnic Bulgarians abroad.
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A primary recent example of these efforts is the aforementioned Law
on Bulgarians Living outside the Republic of Bulgaria (2000). This law
is based on a specific ethnic definition of Bulgarians abroad, which is
less inclusive than the definition of ‘Bulgarian by origin’ (O¨zgu¨r-Bakla-
cioglu 2006: 335). ‘Bulgarians by origin’, to remind the reader, are
those persons who have a Bulgarian parent (mother or father). ‘A Bul-
garian living outside the Republic of Bulgaria’ is a person permanently
residing abroad who has at least one parent of Bulgarian origin and
has Bulgarian national consciousness. The law in question is designed to:
encourage the creation of favourable conditions for the free de-
velopment of Bulgarians living outside […] Bulgaria, according
to the principles of international law and the legislation of the
respective state with the aim of protecting their rights and lawful
interests.
The Bulgarian state commits itself to support the organisation of Bul-
garians outside Bulgaria whose activities are directed at the conserva-
tion and development of the Bulgarian language, as well as cultural
and religious traditions. Furthermore, the law provides certain entitle-
ments for Bulgarians living abroad; for instance, free elementary and
secondary education in the state and municipal schools in the Republic
of Bulgaria, according to current conditions and regulations for Bulgar-
ian citizens. Significantly, with regard to the pursuit of higher educa-
tion, the law grants Bulgarians living abroad the right to apply for pub-
lic financial assistance (art. 10).
Apart from dealing with students, the law also regulates the state
support for ‘the preservation and demonstration of the Eastern Ortho-
dox faith as the traditional religious affiliation of Bulgarians and as a
factor in preserving the Bulgarian national identity’. Moreover, it makes
special provisions for Bulgarians living abroad who wish to settle in
Bulgaria. It creates favourable conditions for their return by offering
them state-owned lands or municipal agricultural lands for use during
the early years after settlement.
Although the law envisages the creation of a National Council for
the Bulgarians Living Abroad, the state body responsible for relations
with Bulgarians abroad is the State Agency for Bulgarians Abroad
(SABA). This agency primarily establishes and maintains contact with
and supports the activities of societies, associations, church communes,
media and schools of the Bulgarian communities in dozens of coun-
tries. In addition, SABA is an important element in the processes of ac-
quiring Bulgarian citizenship, in obtaining permission for long-term
residence in Bulgaria and for certifying the Bulgarian origin of persons
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who have applied for Bulgarian citizenship. The SABA, in essence,
serves as a functional substitute for the now defunct Exarchate.
The problem here is that because of the excessive focus on historical
Bulgarian minorities in adjacent lands,51 the state has virtually ne-
glected the close to a million people who have left the country since
1989, emigrating for economic reasons to Western Europe, North
America and elsewhere. There is hardly any coherent policy concerning
these people, who remain Bulgarian citizens in most cases. Many open
questions concerning their situation – such as their health insurance
contributions, for instance – are resolved ad hoc, if at all. The Council
of Ministers discussed a special report on The Bulgarians Abroad and
the State Policy towards Them on 20 December 2007 in an effort to re-
spond to some of these problems.52
However, as the report shows, the state is making efforts mainly to
attract Bulgarians from historical minorities, while relatively few mea-
sures have been designed to motivate the Bulgarian emigrants living in
Western Europe and North America to return. The report estimates
that at present more than three million Bulgarians live abroad, of
which one million are Bulgarian citizens. About 800,000 of these have
emigrated to Western European or North American countries. Unfortu-
nately, the report does not provide more detailed figures for the various
regions. Nevertheless, it contains several interesting findings, such as
the lack of a new migration of people to EU countries since accession.
The policy measures envisaged by the report mainly involve preserving
Bulgarian national identity abroad, and introducing educational and vo-
cational advantages in the country for ethnic Bulgarians residing
abroad with a view to curbing the worrying demographic trends; ac-
cording to projections, the Bulgarian population will decrease from 7.7
million in 2004 to only 5.5 million by 2050, if current trends continue.
While the interests of the historical Bulgarian communities are more
or less addressed by the report and its recommendations, the problems
of economic emigrants are largely neglected. Academic degrees and
professional qualifications gained abroad still need to go through a
complex procedure of domestic legalisation. EU accession partially re-
solved this problem for degrees and qualifications acquired in other
EU countries, although, at the practical level, numerous problems per-
sist.53 For North American emigrants, EU accession has not changed
anything substantially. Moreover, Bulgarian employment and hiring
practices in many areas (and especially in the public sector) remain
highly clientelistic. The practice of widespread patronage in appoint-
ments is definitely a serious hurdle for any person motivated to return
from a period of economic emigration. Significantly, the above-men-
tioned report fails to address any of these problems.
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At the end of his mandate, Prime Minister Ivan Kostov of the UDF
proved to be an exception to the general trend of neglecting economic
emigration by inviting ‘prominent Bulgarians’ living abroad (mainly in
the EU and North America) to a grand seminar in Sofia. This initiative
– episodic as it was – encouraged a number of young, well-educated
Bulgarians to return to Bulgaria (ironically, most of them joined the
Tsar’s movement in 2001 and became political opponents of Kostov).
However, what is currently needed in this regard are not these kinds of
episodic gatherings, but some major revisions in policies and institu-
tional structures, which remain highly conservative and do not allow
for ‘external’ competition. Restructuring institutions, ranging from the
higher education system (which is highly inflexible to courses in for-
eign languages, guest professorships, etc.) to the administration and
the business communities, would not only motivate Bulgarian emi-
grants who have left the country for economic reasons to return, but
would also attract new highly skilled immigrants. Arguably, the latter
are as important as the historical diaspora, since they could introduce
newer skills and training, novel practices, etc.
Finally, an important flaw in the current state policy in terms of the
imminent problems of labour shortages (recognised both by the afore-
mentioned report and increasing insistent calls from the Bulgarian
business community), is its implicit assumption that labour shortages
can be addressed primarily by attracting ethnic Bulgarians, be they his-
torical or contemporary emigrants. However, it is questionable whether
the three million ethnic Bulgarians are willing to return to the mother-
land under the conditions Bulgaria can currently offer. Bulgaria may
therefore have to look for alternative solutions to labour shortages such
as non-ethnic immigration, which, in turn, would require dramatic im-
migration and citizenship policy revisions. This is a debate that has yet
to take place, however.
7.4 Current statistical trends
As we have already mentioned, we can observe a marked increase both
in the number of applications for Bulgarian citizenship and the num-
ber of those granted citizenship since 2001. Between 2001 and 2005,
the number of applications for citizenship increased by a factor of four,
from 5,495 applicants in 2001 to 29,493 in 2004. There was a slight
decrease in 2005 and 2006, but the sizeable difference between appli-
cations filed and citizenships granted does not necessarily mean that
those applications were denied. There are at present approximately
58,600 files still awaiting a decision, which might simply mean that
there is an administrative backlog (Tchorbadjiyska 2007: 100-101).
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Table 7.1 and Table 7.2 provide detailed data on the numbers of ap-
plications and the numbers of those granted citizenship status in Bul-
garia between 2000 and 2006. They differentiate between normal nat-
uralisation procedures and the preferential treatment of ethnic Bulgar-
ians.
According to Tchorbadjiyska (2007), one of the factors influencing
the increase was a change in 2001 in the laws regarding Bulgarian citi-
zenship. Until 2001, applicants of Bulgarian ethnic origin needed to
demonstrate proficiency in the Bulgarian language and, most impor-
tantly, had to either renounce their present nationality or commit
themselves to doing so. As discussed, these two conditions were
dropped after 2001. Thus, those Bulgarian minorities living abroad
who might not have applied earlier because they did not want to lose
their present nationality now have a possibility to acquire Bulgarian na-
tionality while retaining their former citizenship. Apart from the
change in legal conditions, the increase in citizenship applications is
explained by changes in the visa regime. As most of the Bulgarian
minorities abroad are citizens of countries that were either on the Bul-
garian visa blacklist or were included in it upon entry to the EU, their
travel options were seriously hampered. In this situation, the acquisi-
tion of Bulgarian citizenship, especially under simplified procedures,
became an obvious solution.
7.5 Conclusions
The normative frame of Bulgarian citizenship discussed in this chapter
is characterised by a degree of substantial incoherence. At the most ba-
sic level, the Bulgarian polity combines two different competing and
sometimes conflicting principles. On the one hand, it commenced as,
and remains, a predominantly Bulgarian project. On the other hand,
there has been a genuine attempt to create an egalitarian political com-
munity, which does not differentiate between its members, be they of
Bulgarian origin or not. This constitutive incoherence has resulted in a
complex web of general equality norms, privileges and exceptions. In-
deed, there were low points in the development of the Bulgarian polity,
when the desire to entrench privileges led to discriminatory and repres-
sive practices – especially in the authoritarian-totalitarian period of
1940-1989. However, in times when democracy had a real chance, the
incoherent normative framework proved sufficiently inclusive and thus
stimulated a rich plurality of voices in Bulgarian public life. This inclu-
sive incoherence characterises the contemporary regulation of citizenship
as well.
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Normative incoherence has one significant drawback: it does not
lend itself easily to constitutionalisation and judicial interpretation.
Even Dworkin’s super judge Hercules (Dworkin 1986) would find it
difficult to construct a theory that eliminates the tension between egali-
tarian and identity-based considerations in the Bulgarian case. In the
absence of a judicially administrable citizenship rulebook, much has
been left to the political process. It is an encouraging fact that at pre-
sent this political process has provided for a robust representation of
the main minorities in the country. However, as John Hart Ely (1980)
predicted in another context, when you rely exclusively on the demo-
cratic process, there may be some tiny and insular minorities whose
rights will be neglected. In Bulgaria, the associational rights of Macedo-
nians have proven Ely right, and it is good that the country is already
in an internationally regulated environment; under pressure from the
Council of Europe and other organisations this problem is currently
being resolved.
More worrying, however, are certain aspects of the internal dynamic
of the political process related to the rise of populism. This phenomen-
on focuses domestic politics on issues such as anti-corruption, personal
charisma and, most importantly, national identity and historical symbo-
lism. This seems a common Central European development. It does
not affect only the marginal radical nationalist parties. In the emerging
political trend, Bulgarian actors stand together with the Kaczynski
brothers in Poland, Victor Orban in Hungary, Fico and Mecˇiar in Slova-
kia, and so on. Populism threatens to turn the inclusive incoherence of
the Bulgarian normative model into a cacophony of angry voices, in
which some nasty overtones from authoritarian and totalitarian times
are clearly discernible.
Overall, although the record of the Bulgarian polity in its modern
history has been, at certain points, mixed, it still provides reasons for
confidence. In the absence of thoroughly principled solutions to ten-
sions and conflicts, the achievement of modus vivendi compromises has
been the norm in this history. For students of coherent normative the-
ories, this political modus vivendi response perhaps seems unsatisfac-
tory. This is not such a great problem, however, because the very idea
that civilised relationships among members of a pluralistic polity de-
pend on the existence of a coherent theory embodied in a citizenship
rulebook strikes us as utterly bizarre.
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Chronological list of citizenship-related legislation in Bulgaria
Date Document Content Source
1879 Turnovo Constitution Defines Bulgarian subjects
as those being born in
Bulgaria who have no other
citizenship and those born
of Bulgarian subjects
elsewhere
1880 First Law on Bulgarian
Nationality
Is based on the ius soli
principle; envisages four
modes of acquisition (by
origin, adoption, marriage,
naturalisation) and five
modes of losing Bulgarian
nationality (by
renunciation, decision of
the authorities, absence,
adoption and marriage)
1883 Second Law on Bulgarian
Nationality
Adds the ius domicilii to
the ius soli principle (i.e.
Bulgarian subjects are all
Turkish subjects who were
born on, or resided in, the
territory of the Bulgarian
Kingdom at the time of the
liberation wars)
1903 Third Law on Bulgarian
Nationality
Maintains the main
principles of the first two
laws while the principle of
ius sanguinis becomes
more important
1940 Fourth Law on Bulgarian
Nationality
Stresses the ius sanguinis
principle in addition to the
ius soli principle
1947 Constitution of the
People’s Republic of
Bulgaria
Changes the legal status of
Bulgarians from subjects
into citizens
1948 First Law on Bulgarian
Citizenship
Based on the ius sanguinis
principle; declares that
‘enemies’ of the state and
those who defected to the
West can be deprived of
Bulgarian citizenship
1968 Second Law on Bulgarian
Citizenship
Deprives Bulgarian
citizenship of all those who
refuse to return to
Bulgaria; prohibits dual
citizenship
www.legislationline.org
(as amended in 1989)
1991 Constitution of the
Republic of Bulgaria
Defines as Bulgarian
citizens all those who have
a parent with Bulgarian
www.legislationonline.org
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Date Document Content Source
citizenship and those born
in the Bulgarian territory
who are not entitled to any
other citizenship; foresees
a facilitated procedure of
acquiring citizenship for
those of Bulgarian descent
1998 Law on Bulgarian
Citizenship
Based on both ius soli and
ius sanguinis; establishes
four principles for the
acquisition of Bulgarian
citizenship (by origin,
place of birth,
naturalisation and
restoration);
accommodates multiple
citizenship
www.bulgarianembassy.
org.uk
2001 Amendments Facilitate the procedures
for acquisition of Bulgarian
citizenship for ethnic
Bulgarians; require
persons of non-Bulgarian
origin acquiring Bulgarian
citizenship by
naturalisation to be
released of their previous
citizenship
Notes
1 The authors thank Rossitza Guentcheva and Ruzha Smilova for their very helpful
comments.
2 This had implications from the point of view of international law; formally, until
1908, Bulgarians were still considered subjects of the Turkish Sultan (Geshkoff
1927).
3 Such delegations mostly came from Eastern Rumelia – an artificially created, semi-
autonomous region in the Ottoman Empire – and Macedonia and Eastern Thrace (or
the Vilayet of Adrianople), two other Ottoman regions which were to remain within
the Empire without any special privileges for the compact localised masses of
Bulgarians living there. Similar delegations came from other lands, such as
Bessarabia in present-day Ukraine and Moldavia and Dobrudja in present-day
Romania (see Vladikin 1994: 97).
4 The delegates considered the Berlin treaty an illegitimate revision of the San Stefano
Peace Treaty (March 1878) between Russia and Turkey, which created Grand
Bulgaria, including territories in what is today Macedonia, Turkey, Serbia and Greece.
The date of this treaty – 3 March – is currently the Bulgarian national holiday. San
Stefano Bulgaria roughly coincided with the jurisdiction of the Bulgarian Exarchate,
the Bulgarian Orthodox Church authorities in the Ottoman Empire.
THE POLITICS OF BULGARIAN CITIZENSHIP 241
5 The Turnovo Constitution used subject (podanik) and citizen (grazhdanin) interchange-
ably. With the fall of the monarchy and the establishment of communist rule, the
term subject was eliminated from legal documents and acquired negative connota-
tions in official public discourse. However, it was not true that the subjects to the Bul-
garian monarch had fewer rights than the citizens of the communist republic.
6 It is not only political rights that reflect the egalitarian bias of the Constitution. Art.
78, for instance, granted the right to free public primary schooling to all subjects
(both male and female) of the principality.
7 It envisaged four methods of obtaining Bulgarian nationality (by origin, adoption,
marriage and naturalisation) and five methods for the loss of Bulgarian nationality
(by renunciation, decision of the authorities, absence, adoption and marriage). The
main principle embedded in the law again was the principle of ius soli. Art. 1 para. 1
stipulates: ‘All individuals born on the territory of the Bulgarian Kingdom who have
not obtained foreign nationality count as Bulgarian nationals.’
8 Art. 2 of the 1883 Law introduced a slightly more restrictive version – not all
individuals, but only former Turkish subjects could make use of the principle stating
that: ‘Bulgarian subjects are all those Turkish subjects who at the time of war for the
liberation of Bulgaria had residence or were born on the territory of the Bulgarian
Kingdom’. This restriction, which was contrary to the general language of the
Constitution (art. 54), was eventually eliminated from later versions.
9 Art. 65 just stated: ‘Only Bulgarian subjects may occupy positions in the state, public
and military service.’
10 This was the second assassination of a prime minister by Macedonian nationalists.
In 1895, Stefan Stambolov was slain in the centre of Sofia, partly for the same
reasons.
11 According to art. 7, a ‘Bulgarian national is every person 1) whose father or (if the
father does not have a nationality or is of unknown nationality) mother is a
Bulgarian subject, regardless of their places of birth; 2) legitimated by a Bulgarian
subject, 3) born out of wedlock whose Bulgarian subject’s origin is proved while he
or she is a minor.’ Ius soli was still present in art. 8: a ‘Bulgarian subject by place of
birth is every individual 1) born in the Kingdom of unknown parents or parents
without nationality and 2) born of foreigners, if he or she had permanent residence
in Bulgaria and has not declared foreign nationality one year after coming of lawful
age’ (Valkanov 1978).
12 In order to obtain a residence permit, applicants had first to prove that they had lived
in the kingdom for a year, and then to provide information about their origin
(parents), religion, material standing and other details (art. 27).
13 The treaty with Greece was ratified by Bulgaria on 4 October 1920. In September
1940, a similar treaty was signed with Romania.
14 It is still being debated in Bulgarian scholarly literature whether the Bulgarian
authorities were fully responsible for these deportations: some argue that the
occupied territories were virtually under German command. Be that as it may, the
Bulgarian authorities did nothing, or at least not enough, to prevent these
deportations. Most importantly, Jews from the occupied territories were apparently
not granted Bulgarian citizenship, while Greeks and Macedonians were.
15 Those born in Bulgaria to an alien were entitled to Bulgarian citizenship if at the
time of their majority they were domiciled in Bulgaria.
16 Toni Nikolov, ‘The Right of Bulgarian Citizenship and the European Norms’, Demok-
ratzija, 12 May 1998.
17 Such agreements were concluded between the People’s Republic of Bulgaria and the
USSR in 1958, the People’s Republic of Hungary in 1959, the Socialist Republic of
Romania in 1959, and again with the USSR in 1966, the German Democratic
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Republic in 1971, the People’s Republic of Poland in 1972 and the Czechoslovak
Socialist Republic in 1975 (Zakon za bulgarskoto grazhdanstvo 1968).
18 From 3 June through 21 August 1989 (when Turkey closed its borders), 311,862 ethnic
Turks managed to leave the country. After the fall of Todor Zhivkov and the
communist regime in November 1989, some 125,000 returned to Bulgaria. By the end
of 1989, the refugees’ back-and forth movements ceased and 245,000 refugees who
had fled Bulgaria were granted Turkish citizenship (O¨zgu¨r-Baklacioglu 2006: 321).
19 The reversal of policy against the Turkish minority started immediately after the fall
of the communist regime in November 1989: there were communist leadership
decisions calling for the repeal of the repressive legislation as early as December of
that same year.
20 The last provision was amended in 2005 in compliance with international treaties
concluded by Bulgaria regarding international criminal tribunals: ‘No Bulgarian
citizen may be surrendered to another State or to an international tribunal for the
purposes of criminal prosecution, unless the opposite is provided for by international
treaty that has been ratified, published and entered into force for the Republic of
Bulgaria.’
21 ‘Bulgarian by birth’, according to the 1991 Constitution, is not an ethnic category; it
refers to those born within the country’s borders or to Bulgarian citizen parents and
includes thus ethnic Turks and other non-ethnic Bulgarians.
22 See Decision No. 12, 23 July 1996.
23 There are no reliable data for the number of permanent settlers, but estimates show
that it was about 100,000.
24 The Constitution mentioned the possibility of dual citizenship in its prohibition on
dual citizens running for parliament and the presidency.
25 The term ‘militant democracy’, which was first coined by Karl Loewenstein in the
1930s, refers to a constitutional legal doctrine according to which the democratic
state should actively protect itself and its values against internal enemies and should
prevent them from coming to power by using the democratic process. The
doctrine requires instruments such as bans on extremist organisations and anti-
system parties, loyalty requirements for civil servants, etc. The doctrine was first
systematically implemented within the German Basic Law after the Second World
War. For further information, see Sajo 2004.
26 Decision 4, 21 April 1992.
27 This process was ultimately finalised in 1998 because it was only then that the
Union of Democratic Forces succeeded in the formation of a stable government.
Until then, the country was run mainly by the ex-communist BSP, whose
assessment of the communist period was rather ambivalent; in general, the party
was unwilling to radically revise the policies of the communist regime.
28 Among those, for instance, were 43 former ambassadors of the Bulgarian Kingdom
who had lost their Bulgarian citizenship by a decree issued by the erstwhile
President Vassil Kolarov in 1947. They had refused to acknowledge the ‘people’s
power’ of the communist regime (Rossitza Milanova, ‘The Citizenship of Those
Bulgarians Whose Citizenship Was Denounced between 1944 and 1947 Is Restored’,
Democrazija, 12 May 1998).
29 There are different procedures for obtaining this permission. In most cases, the
applicants have to show that they have legally resided in the country for the previous
five years or that they have invested more than US$ 500,000. Ethnic Bulgarians and
foreigners born in Bulgaria are exempt from these conditions. Those who have
performed meritorious service to the country are also exempted from the
requirements. For more details, see the information at the site of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs: www.mfa.bg.
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30 This requirement was added in 2000.
31 Order No. 5 of 1999 of the Minister of Education and Science defines the procedure
for the establishment of knowledge of Bulgarian language. The applicants either
have to show documents proving that they have studied in Bulgarian schools or have
valid certificates for the language proficiency, or they have to take a written exam
before a special commission. They need to demonstrate that they have sufficient
knowledge of the Bulgarian language to enable them to communicate at ‘an
elementary level’ (art. 6(2)).
32 Until 2006, the proposal allowing foreign athletes to obtain Bulgarian citizenship
was made by the Bulgarian vice prime minister responsible for sports. This provision
was amended in 2006 when the government decided that the proposal should be
made by the director of the State Agency for Youth and Sport (Telegraph, 8 June
2006).
33 Interview with Elitza Hristrova, State Agency for Bulgarians Abroad, 2 June 2007.
34 Alternatively, (2) he or she has been adopted by a Bulgarian citizen on terms of full
adoption; (3) one of his or her parents is a Bulgarian citizen or has passed away as a
Bulgarian citizen (art. 15).
35 While the 1998 Law envisions a preclusive deadline of three months for the
facilitated naturalisation of foreigners with Bulgarian origin, the procedure usually
takes two to three years due to the numerous inspections at various Bulgarian
institutions. Such inspections are carried out by the Directorate for Migration at the
Ministry of the Interior, the National Security Service, the State Agency for
Bulgarians Abroad (SABA) and others (Interview, State Agency for Bulgarians
Abroad, 2 June 2007). The problem of discretion in the administration of these
checks remains quite acute, however.
36 The State Agency for Bulgarians Abroad (SABA) is also involved in the process of
verifying Bulgarian origin: see the discussion in section 7.3.3 on this topic. Stefan
Nikolov (SABA) said that officials are conducting ‘thorough inspections’ to prevent
unlawful claims and abuses, since many of those waiting for their applications to be
processed might have submitted ‘documents with dubious validity’ (‘Thousands
Seeking Bulgarian Citizenship Ahead of EU Entry’, Southeast European Times, 14 Au-
gust 2006, www.setimes.com).
37 Some usual provisos apply, such as the absence of a criminal record and the
requirement of good, moral behaviour.
38 The NDSV could only be interpreted as a populist party in is first two years of its
existence; it gradually transformed into a ‘normal’ party, albeit at the cost of its
popularity.
39 The reasons for this development are numerous, but one is that MRF can rely on the
relatively stable ethnic support of Bulgarian Turks. In circumstances of declining
turnout, the stability of the electorate of the MRF increases its relative influence.
40 In a curious development, in 2007, the Bulgarian President involved himself in a
public debate with a junior art historian, who was supported in her research by a
young German scholar. The art historian had written a paper interpreting the ‘myth
of the Batak massacre’. Apparently, she had traced the reconstruction of specific
events in the public memory from the Bulgarian uprising against the Ottomans in
1876, exploring the role that works of art played in this construction. The President
interpreted the whole project as an attempt to deny that the massacre ever happened
(an indisputable fact), and to misinterpret Bulgarian history. He even hosted an
‘open history class’ in the town of Batak, the main purpose of which was to discredit
the art historian’s project. Leaving aside the historical substance of the debate, it is
highly unusual for a head of state to take on the role of a guardian of national
history, especially when his opponents are academics.
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41 Some Bulgarian elections have coincided with major Muslim holidays, in order to
make the ‘electoral tourism’ possible.
42 In 2006, the radical nationalist party Ataka proposed amendments to the 1998 Law
on Bulgarian Citizenship. These amendments were meant to eliminate dual
citizenship. The party proposed that a Bulgarian citizen cannot be a citizen of
another country, with the exception of citizens of Bulgarian ethnic origin and
Bulgarian culture. These privileges would be confined to persons living permanently
in neighbouring regions in Greece, Macedonia, Serbia and Romania, and also
including Bessarabian Bulgarians. The Bulgarian Parliament rejected the proposal
with nineteen votes ‘for’, 78 ‘against’ and 26 abstentions (Telegraph, 8 June 2007).
43 Rumjana Bachvarova, ‘The Reticence of Power’, Capital, 23 February 2007,
www.capital.bg.
44 The country is losing between 30,000-50,000 citizens per year, although the most
recent statistics show that the decrease in population is slowing down.
45 Although there is a relatively large community of some 235,000 Bulgarians in the
Ukraine, not many applications for Bulgarian citizenship are filed from this country,
as according to Ukrainian law, they have to renounce their Ukrainian citizenship in
the process. Serbians have been increasingly interested in obtaining Bulgarian
citizenship since Bulgaria joined the EU. Since the beginning of 2007, nearly 1,200
Serbs (actually ethnic Bulgarians from Dimitrovgrad and Bosilegrad) have taken
advantage of the right to obtain Bulgarian citizenship. According to the Bulgarian
Ministry of Justice, another 3,400 had submitted applications and were awaiting
decisions (‘Serbians Are Increasingly Interested in Obtaining Bulgarian Citizenship’,
Sofia Echo, 6 August 2007, www.sofiaecho.com).
46 In contrast to Hungary, the privileges for ‘external citizens’ neither created heated
public debates nor significant problems during EU accession negotiations. There are
several reasons for this. Firstly, the Bulgarian diaspora in neighbouring countries is
smaller than the Hungarian one, and much less organised. In most cases, the policy
provides for individual exit strategies of Bulgarians abroad. Secondly, Bulgaria has
complied with all of the formal requirements of the EU visa regulations, and has
imposed visa restrictions on neighbouring countries in which Bulgarians live.
Finally, the issue is not internally divisive, as is the case in Hungary; no major party,
including the MRF, opposes the current policies.
47 As O¨zgu¨r-Baklacioglu argues, the Law on Bulgarians Abroad established kin minority
protection and turned dual citizenship into an engine of intensive nation-building.
Dual citizenship status for the migrant community in Turkey remains a subject of
political debate, while it does not create problems in cases involving Macedonian
applications. In other words, the accommodation of Macedonians as Bulgarian
citizens has a special historical importance in building the Bulgarian nation. In
nationalist circles, it is perceived as the return of the Macedonians to their ‘first’
origin, i.e. the Bulgarian one. As understood from the application procedure,
Macedonian applications are handled under the provision for applicants with
Bulgarian origin. Macedonians do not need a permanent resident status and do not
have to show a certificate proving knowledge of the Bulgarian language. Among the
initial set of application documents is a declaration that verifies Bulgarian cultural
consciousness (O¨zgu¨r-Baklacioglu 2006: 336).
48 Decision 1, 29 February 2000.
49 Case of the United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden and others v. Bulgaria, 19
January 2006.
50 See Svetoslav Terziev, ‘Strassbourg Harasses Bulgaria about OMO’, Sega, 27 March
2008, www.segabg.com.
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51 One of the main target groups of the SABA is the community of Bessarabian
Bulgarians and Bulgarian minorities in Serbia, Moldova and Romania.
52 At the time of writing there is an ongoing debate organised by SABA on this
document; see www.saba.government.bg.
53 For instance, the so-called VAK (Supreme Commission of Attestation) still has the
right to examine, in substantive terms, degrees earned in the EU. It is true that the
Commission, as a rule, does not usually apply this right. But still, according to the
law it can deny the domestication of an EU degree on substantive grounds by a secret
vote!
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Part III
Post-partition states

8 Czech citizenship legislation between
past and future1
Andrea Barsˇova´
The main contours of the Czech (formerly Czechoslovak) citizenship
laws were shaped by momentous historic events. Administrators,
judges and lawyers smoothed over rough outlines made by political
forces, adding to them exceptions, interpretations and remedies. Con-
sequently, Czech citizenship legislation has always been complex.2 This
chapter follows the main trends of its development and gives a brief ac-
count of Czech citizenship legislation and the politics and policies
linked with it since 1918. It focuses on responses to unprecedented so-
cial changes and challenges in the last two decades, which may be sti-
mulating for the current debates on citizenship policies in the Eur-
opean and transnational context.
8.1 History of Czechoslovak citizenship policies
8.1.1 Citizenship policies from 1918 to 1993
Czechoslovak citizenship came into existence with the creation of Cze-
choslovakia on 28 October 1918. It was linked to the municipal right of
domicile that had been an important instrument regulating migration
within the Habsburg monarchy.3 Former Austro-Hungarian nationals,
who had a right of domicile in municipalities that became part of the
Czechoslovak territory after the break-up of the Austro-Hungarian Em-
pire, acquired Czechoslovak citizenship. The basic rule was modified
by peace treaties4 and constitutional laws5 which regulated the issue of
citizenship in order to protect ethno-national minorities and provided
options to choose the citizenship of an ethnic kin state. The creation of
Czechoslovakia led to the massive remigration of ethnic Czechs and
Slovaks, in particular from Austria (Vaculı´k 2002: 38-39; Kristen 1989:
83). Apart from specific provisions linked to the creation of the new
state, provisions of old Austrian laws on citizenship remained in force
in the Czech lands of Bohemia and Moravia.6 This was the case, for in-
stance, with the ius sanguinis principle laid down in the 1811 Austrian
Civil Code.
The end of the Second World War7 and the restoration of Czechoslo-
vakia led to the adoption of ad hoc laws that introduced the criterion of
ethnicity into citizenship legislation. The new legislation was linked to
post-war (both forced and voluntary) migration. Under the President’s
Constitutional Decree No. 33/1945 Coll. Concerning Czechoslovak Citi-
zenship of Persons of German and Hungarian Ethnicity (one of the so-
called ‘Benesˇ decrees’), Czechoslovak nationals of German and Hun-
garian ethnic origin were deprived of Czechoslovak citizenship.8 On
the other hand, Constitutional Act No. 74/1946 Coll. Concerning the
Naturalisation of Compatriots Returning to the Homeland and its im-
plementing regulations provided for facilitated naturalisation of ethnic
Czechs, Slovaks and members of other Slavonic nations who settled or
re-settled in Czechoslovakia. Naturalisation was often linked to changes
of names to Czech or Slovak ones (Vaculı´k 2002: 40-49). In the post-
war years, more than 200,000 Czechs, Slovaks and members of other
Slavonic nations immigrated to Czechoslovakia while more than
2,820,000 inhabitants of German ethnicity were expelled.
After the communists seized power in Czechoslovakia in February
1948, deprivation of citizenship was introduced as a supplementary
penalty for certain political offences. A complex new citizenship legis-
lation was adopted in 1949. Act No. 194/1949 Coll. on Czechoslovak
Citizenship modified by Act No. 72/1958 Coll., replaced the old legis-
lation, but preserved many of its features, such as the ius sanguinis
principle and the principle of a single citizenship. Both in the commu-
nist ideology and in legal theory, citizenship meant not only legal but
also factual bonds between a citizen and the society. A legal textbook
published in 1963 defines ‘socialist citizenship’ in the following way:
‘Socialist citizenship is not only a legal bond between a citizen and the
state, but it means also belonging to a community of working people,
who participate in the building of socialist (communist) society and in
the building and defence of the socialist state; it means belonging to
the community connected by shared dreams and ideals’ (Cˇerny´ & Cˇer-
venka 1963: 19).
The law also provided for depriving people of Czechoslovak citizen-
ship. It was applied as penalty to those citizens who lived abroad and
had engaged in activities ‘which might endanger state interests’, those
who had left the territory of Czechoslovakia ‘illegally’, those who had
not returned to Czechoslovakia when requested to do so by the Minis-
try of the Interior and those who lived abroad for more than five years
without a ‘valid passport permitting its holder to live abroad’. These le-
gal provisions existed until 1990.
The Prague Spring of 1968, a movement towards the liberalisation
of communist rule, was accompanied by the Slovak national move-
ment.9 This movement demanded the introduction of a federal system
within a multiethnic, but centralised, Czechoslovakia. As of 1 January
1969, the unitary Czechoslovak state was transformed into a federal
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state, composed of the Czech and the Slovak Republics.10 At the level
of citizenship legislation, this change was reflected by the adoption of
Federal Act No. 165/1968 Coll. on the Principles of Acquisition and
Loss of Citizenship, which was followed by the Act of the Czech Na-
tional Council No. 39/1969 Coll. on the Acquisition and Loss of Citi-
zenship of the Czech Socialist Republic, adopted in April 1969.11 The
new legislation introduced, in addition to the (federal) Czechoslovak ci-
tizenship, citizenship of the two (Czech and Slovak) Republics as the
constituent entities of the Federation.12 Under this legislation, Czecho-
slovak nationals automatically acquired the citizenship of either the
Czech or Slovak Republic, based on their place of birth and some sup-
plementary criteria.
The new legislation gave people a right to change the republic-level
citizenship at their discretion but this right was rarely exercised. The
reason was trivial: the republic-level citizenship had no practical conse-
quences whatever. In fact, most citizens were not even aware of their
republic-level citizenship.13 In addition, the freezing period of ‘normali-
sation’ in the 1970s and 1980s, which followed the suppression of the
Prague Spring, pushed most people into private and family life as the
only remaining space for meaningful activities, where the question of
citizenship had no significance.
The fall of the communist regime in November 1989 prompted new
developments in all spheres, including citizenship legislation. The first
task for the new democratic government was to remedy injustices
caused by deprivations of citizenship under the communist rule. In re-
sponse to communist abuses of power, a constitutional provision was
introduced, to stipulate that, ‘no one shall be deprived of his or her citi-
zenship against his or her will’.14 In 1990, Act No. 88/1990 Coll. was
adopted, which provided for the reacquisition of the Czechoslovak citi-
zenship by emigrants who had lost it in the period of communist rule.
The law, which was not free of certain restrictions and shortcomings,15
identified one strand of future development in the field of citizenship
legislation that I will call restitution legislation.
8.1.2 Break-up of Czechoslovakia and creation of the Czech citizenship
The demise of the communist regime opened a space for the resur-
gence of nationalist feelings and politics.16 In Czechoslovakia, the re-
birth of the Slovak nationalist movement led to a consensual break-up
of the federal state. In the fall of 1992, as the break-up of Czechoslova-
kia was increasingly becoming a realistic option (negotiated and carried
through by the ruling political elite),17 many Czechoslovaks started to
think about their future in terms of citizenship.18 The dormant provi-
sions of the existing citizenship legislation, which allowed for a simple
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switch between the Czech and the Slovak republic-level citizenships,
started to be widely invoked. Until the end of 1992, some 65,000 Slo-
vak republic-level citizens applied for the Czech republic-level citizen-
ship.
On 1 January 1993, the Czech and the Slovak Republics were estab-
lished as successor states to the former Czechoslovakia. In the Czech
Republic, citizenship issues were regulated by the hastily drafted and
adopted Act No. 40/1993 Coll. on the Acquisition and Loss of Citizen-
ship of the Czech Republic.19 The primary aim of the law was to identi-
fy nationals of the new state and to prevent dual (Czech and Slovak) ci-
tizenship.20
The provisions of the new legislation fell into two main categories.
The first was a set of transitory provisions regulating initial determina-
tion of nationals of the new state,21 complemented by provisions gov-
erning the option for Czech citizenship. The other category involved
rules of permanent nature, regulating e.g. acquisition of the Czech citi-
zenship by birth, naturalisation or loss of Czech citizenship.
Table 8.1 Conceptual scheme of Act No. 40/1993 Coll. on the Acquisition and Loss of
Citizenship of the Czech Republic
Norms regulating initial determination of citizenship Norms regulating
standard procedures for
acquisition and loss of
citizenship (e.g. by birth,
naturalisation)
overall initial determi-
nation of citizenship
supplementary and cor-
rective initial determi-
nation
time
aspect
automatic operation of
laws taking effect on 1
January 1993
temporary application
of norms
permanent application
personal
scope
core of nationals of the
new state, the category
was established by
operation of law – all
former Czech Republic-
level citizens
solves individual cases,
takes into account the
will of individuals
concerned
plurality of cases, not to
be defined in advance
As regards the initial overall determination of citizenship, Act No. 40/
1993 Coll. stipulated that, ‘natural persons, who were citizens of the
Czech Republic as of 31 December 1992, are citizens of the Czech Re-
public as of 1 January 1993.’ Leading Czech jurists explain the estab-
lishment of Czech citizenship in the following way. ‘As a consequence
of the disappearance of Czechoslovakia and the establishment of the
Czech Republic as an independent entity under public international
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law, the Czech republic-level citizenship acquired as of 1 January 1993
an international dimension and turned into full-fledged state citizen-
ship.’ (Cˇerny´ & Vala´sˇek 1996: 99). The same approach as regards over-
all (collective) initial determination was adopted by Slovak legislators.
This prevented de iure statelessness in the wake of the break-up of
Czechoslovakia.22
The primary rule was supplemented with a set of transitory provi-
sions regulating the right of option and facilitating naturalisation for
certain Slovak citizens. In the period from 1 January 1993 to 30 June
1994, 240,000 former Czechoslovak citizens acquired Czech citizen-
ship under the option clauses.
The criteria for exercising this right of option, however, included not
only two years of permanent residence in the territory of the Czech Re-
public, but also a clean criminal record.23 The application of the latter
condition had a disproportionate impact on members of the Roma
(Gypsy) minority.24 It was criticised by Czech human rights activists as
well as by the international community. The criticism led to piecemeal
adjustments and a softening of Act No. 40/1993 Coll. in relation to for-
mer Czechoslovak (now Slovak) nationals.25
In the decade following the establishment of the independent Czech
Republic, public and political discourse on citizenship matters was
dominated by one issue: the intentional and accidental consequences of
the break-up of Czechoslovakia. In the shadow of this central theme,
some problems related to the restitution of Czechoslovak (now Czech)
citizenship for emigrants were also discussed. In the autumn of 1998,
with the change of government (from liberal-conservative to social-de-
mocratic), a more profound reform of citizenship legislation was put on
the government agenda. This led to (a) significant alterations of the tran-
sitory provisions of the 1993 Citizenship Act, and (b) the adoption of Act
No. 193/1999 Coll. on the Citizenship of Some of the Former Czecho-
slovak Citizens, which was another piece of restitution legislation.
(a) The former legislation mitigated the harsh consequences of the
break-up of Czechoslovakia for some groups of former Czechoslovak
nationals. A ruling of the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic
of 5 May 199726 also fostered this development. The Court held that
one does not lose Czech citizenship by one’s declaration to opt for citi-
zenship in the Slovak Republic. (These individuals became dual na-
tionals.)27 Major amendments to the 1993 Citizenship Act were imple-
mented by Act No. 194/1999 Coll. which not only transformed this
ruling into a statutory provision, but also allowed all Czech citizens
who were former nationals of Czechoslovakia to acquire Slovak citizen-
ship without losing their Czech citizenship. (This is an exception to
one of the declared principles of the Czech citizenship legislation, i.e.
the prevention of dual citizenship.)
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The law also introduced a simplified procedure for acquisition of
Czech citizenship by declaration for former Czechoslovak nationals
who had been living continuously in the territory of the Czech Repub-
lic since the break-up of Czechoslovakia. This was a corrective provi-
sion. It provided for acquiring Czech citizenship by those who for var-
ious reasons (legal or personal) could not opt or apply for Czech citi-
zenship before. The necessity of the remedy is demonstrated by this
figure: 6,278 former Czechoslovak citizens acquired Czech citizenship
in 1999 alone, by invoking the new provision.28
A subsequent amendment to Act No. 40/1993 Coll. adopted in 2003
(Act No. 357/2003 Coll.) introduced further remedial provisions. It gave
former Czechoslovak nationals who were granted Slovak citizenship
(i.e. were naturalised in Slovakia) in the period from 1 January 1994 to
1 September 1999 the right to (re-)acquire the lost Czech citizenship
by declaration. The amendment also gave the right to acquire the
Czech citizenship by declaration to certain groups of Slovak nationals
who were minors at the time of the break-up of Czechoslovakia.29
(b) Act No. 193/1999 Coll. on the Citizenship of Some of the Former
Czechoslovak Citizens, reintroduced and broadened the right of reac-
quisition of Czech citizenship by declaration. It applied to emigrants
who had lost Czechoslovak citizenship under communist rule, but for
legal or practical reasons had not been able to make use of the first res-
titution act of 1990. Originally, the applicability of the law was limited
to five years after its entry into force.
8.2 Basic principles of acquisition and loss of Czech citizenship
As stated above, the citizenship legislation has gone through a series of
adjustments since 1993. While the greater part of the fine-tuning was
related to the situation of former Czechoslovak nationals, there have
been other changes, such as acquisition of citizenship by children or
naturalisation. Some changes reflected reforms of the administrative
structures. This section describes the main principles of Czech citizen-
ship legislation in force as of 1 January 2008. It does so only selectively
in so far as they reflect topical political discussions or indicate new
trends.
8.2.1 Acquisition of citizenship
There are four ways of acquiring Czech citizenship: a) acquisition of ci-
tizenship by former Czechoslovak citizens by option, declaration or fa-
cilitated naturalisation (as described above), b) acquisition of citizen-
ship by birth, adoption and establishment of paternity, c) acquisition of
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citizenship by being found in the territory of the Czech Republic and
d) acquisition of Czech citizenship by naturalisation.
Under the ius sanguinis principle, one acquires Czech citizenship at
birth if at least one parent is a Czech citizen. The place of birth is not
relevant. Ius soli applies if the parents are stateless and at least one of
them is a permanent resident (i.e. a green-card holder).30 A natural
person found in the territory of the Czech Republic is a Czech citizen
unless it is proved that he or she acquired the citizenship of another
state at birth.
The conditions for naturalisation are strict:31 permanent residence for
at least five years, clean criminal record,32 passing a Czech language
test, renunciation of the previous citizenship,33 no infringement of im-
migration law, and fulfilment of certain statutory duties, such as pay-
ing taxes, health, social and retirement insurance. The permanent resi-
dence status is an eligibility criterion that may not be waived. Under
the immigration legislation in force until April 2006 an immigrant
could apply for permanent resident status (i.e. a green card) only after
ten years of continuous legal residence in the Czech Republic and after
eight years in cases of family reunion. Exemptions were made only for
those related to Czech citizens or permanent residents and on humani-
tarian grounds. Thus, the waiting period for naturalisation for many
immigrants was in fact fifteen years or more.34
There are statutory exemptions for certain categories (such as recog-
nised refugees and stateless persons). For instance, refugees are eligi-
ble for naturalisation without having to renounce their original citizen-
ship. (They acquire permanent resident status by virtue of being
granted asylum.) Most of the requirements can be waived at the discre-
tion of the Ministry of the Interior if certain conditions are met. For in-
stance, the Ministry may waive the five-year duration of permanent re-
sidency (but not the permanent resident status as such) for applicants
born in the Czech Republic, former Czech (or Czechoslovak) nationals,
spouses of Czech nationals, children of Czech nationals, stateless per-
sons or refugees.
There is a long list of discretionary exemptions from the require-
ment to renounce one’s original citizenship. This list was extended by
Act No. 357/2003 Coll. partly because of an initiative by the Human
Rights Council (see below). Applicants may keep their previous citizen-
ship (and become dual or multiple nationals) if they are permanent re-
sidents, have stayed legally in the territory for at least five years, have a
genuine link to the Czech Republic and, in addition, satisfy one of the
prescribed conditions. These are, for example, situations when the ap-
plicant’s renunciation of the previous citizenship involves unreasonable
fees or other demands not acceptable in a democratic state, when nat-
uralisation is in the interest of the Czech Republic because of the ex-
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pected significant contribution to the Czech society in science, societal
life, culture or sports or when the applicant is a former Czech (or Cze-
choslovak) national.35 There is also an exemption for applicants who
have resided legally in the Czech Republic for at least twenty years and
have held permanent resident status for five years or more.
The relatively simple language test is waived for all Slovak nationals
and for any one else at the discretion of the authorities.
The Ministry also screens all applicants in order to assess the secur-
ity risk that they pose to the state. Some authors consider passing the
security test an additional condition for naturalisation (Vala´sˇek &
Kucˇera 2006: 85).
8.2.2 Loss of citizenship
Since the Czech Constitution prohibits deprivation of citizenship
against one’s own will, it may not be imposed as a penalty. In confor-
mity with the principle of ius sanguinis even later generations of
Czech descent born and living abroad cannot lose Czech citizenship by
mere operation of law.
A Czech national can lose citizenship in two ways: by a declaration of
renunciation and by acquisition of foreign citizenship at his or her re-
quest. A Czech citizen may lose his or her citizenship by a declaration
of renunciation if he or she stays abroad and at the same time pos-
sesses the citizenship of a foreign state (cases of dual and multiple citi-
zenship).36 A Czech citizen automatically loses Czech citizenship as a
consequence of acquiring a foreign citizenship if the latter citizenship
is acquired at his or her own request. (This does not apply if the acqui-
sition of a foreign citizenship is automatic, for example by descent.)
This mode of automatic loss of citizenship was introduced by the 1993
Citizenship Act and did not exist before 1 January 1993.37 This provi-
sion became controversial in practice.38 Its constitutionality was also
challenged with reference to the ban on deprivation of citizenship
against one’s will but was eventually confirmed by the Constitutional
Court.39
The 2003 amendment to the 1993 Citizenship Act (Act No. 357/
2003 Coll.) introduced an exemption from the loss of citizenship in re-
lation to marriage. If a Czech national acquires the citizenship of his
or her spouse during the marriage, he or she will not lose Czech citi-
zenship.40
8.2.3 Dual and multiple citizenship
The Czech legislation is becoming generally more tolerant about dual
(and multiple) citizenship. This trend is clearly visible in spite of the
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fact that the official citizenship policy followed the principle of preven-
tion of dual citizenship until recently. In reality, there are numerous
dual and multiple nationals who acquired the status legally. These are
e.g. former Czech and Czechoslovak citizens who reacquired Czech ci-
tizenship by declaration under the restitution laws, people who became
dual Czech and Slovak nationals due to the break-up of Czechoslova-
kia, applicants for naturalisation for whom the Ministry of the Interior
waived the requirement for them to renounce their former citizenship
(including cases of achievement-based naturalisation), naturalised refu-
gees, and Czech spouses of foreign citizens. There are those who ac-
quired dual citizenship by descent and emigrants who acquired foreign
citizenship but never lost their Czech (or Czechoslovak) citizenship.
Moreover, there are many cases in the grey zone. For instance, if the
Czech authorities are not informed of the acquisition of a foreign citi-
zenship by a Czech citizen or by the foreign state concerned, which is
often the case, they still treat the person as a Czech citizen (e.g. they
will grant him or her a passport).
8.2.4 International treaties
The Czech Republic is party to certain bilateral and multilateral treaties
concerning citizenship. The current trend is toward accession to multi-
lateral treaties41 as most bilateral treaties were terminated, primarily
because they were not compatible with the provisions of the 1997 Eur-
opean Convention on Nationality as regards the preservation of dual ci-
tizenship for children whose parents have different citizenship. These
terminated bilateral agreements were with the former Soviet Union
and some of its successor states as well as the German Democratic Re-
public, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, and Mongolia.
Politically, the most controversial of the bilateral agreements was the
1928 Naturalisation Treaty between the United States and Czechoslova-
kia, which precluded dual citizenship of emigrants.42 The Treaty was
valid until 20 August 1997. The application of the Treaty excluded
many former Czechoslovak citizens from restitution of their property
lost during the communist regime.
8.2.5 Procedure
The Ministry of the Interior is responsible for citizenship issues. The
Ministry decides on naturalisations. It maintains a central register of
persons who have acquired or lost Czech citizenship. A decision by the
Ministry may be appealed. In this case, the Minister of the Interior de-
cides. The Minister receives the opinion of a special consultative com-
mission, but is not bound by it.43 Decisions on citizenship are open to
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judicial review.44 Fees are relatively high – 10,000 Czech crowns (ap-
proximately 400 euros) for granted naturalisation. The acquisition of
citizenship by declaration is free of charge.
8.3 Current political debates
The gradual solution to the problem of the break-up of Czechoslovakia,
which dominated the citizenship agenda in the first decade after 1993
created some space for fresh approaches to the fundamental issues of
citizenship legislation. The shift of perspective was also due to a new
phenomenon: increasing migration to the Czech Republic and evolving
integration policies (Barsˇova´ 2005; Barsˇova´ & Barsˇa 2005: 231-238).
An impetus for an overall revision of the citizenship legislation came
from the government Council for Human Rights.45 Following an Ana-
lysis of Dual Citizenship Issues submitted to the government and the
adoption of major amendments to the 1993 Citizenship Act in 2003,
the government decided that the Ministry of the Interior should pre-
pare a comprehensive analysis of the citizenship legislation based on
broad public consultation and submit it to the government by 30 June
2005. The Ministry circulated a consultation paper in the autumn of
2004 and subsequently, in May 2005, a draft Analysis of the Legisla-
tion on the Acquisition and Loss of Citizenship.46
The Analysis discusses the fundamental principles of the new citi-
zenship law. It suggests the following crucial moves towards liberalisa-
tion: a) full toleration of dual (multiple) citizenship on both the entry
and exit sides and b) facilitated acquisition of citizenship by second-
and third-generation migrants.
a. As regards the grounds for this profound reform, the Ministry re-
fers to both the prevailing trends toward liberalisation abroad and
practical aspects. There are countries which do not allow, in legisla-
tion or in practice, renunciation of one’s citizenship. This is a
source of undue administrative burden, according to the Ministry.47
b. The Ministry suggests that foreign nationals born in the territory of
the Czech Republic should have the right to acquire Czech citizen-
ship by declaration within two years after the age of majority if they
are permanent residents and have a clean criminal record. The
same should apply to those who have lived continuously in the
Czech Republic since early childhood. Even if this proposal is not a
very favourable solution in comparison with other options (such as
the application of ius soli at birth), it is still a positive change in the
national context. At present the Czech citizenship legislation does
not have any provisions specifically addressing the issue of second
and third generation immigrants. The proposed rule would at least
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eliminate the need to apply for membership in the community
where the applicant was born and grew up.
On the other hand, the Ministry states that the strict conditions for nat-
uralisation should be maintained or even be tightened. It proposes ex-
cluding from naturalisation applicants who are likely to become a pub-
lic burden. The Analysis also contemplates some changes in language
testing: the testing should be more professional.48
In July 2005, the government approved the Analysis.49 A year later,
in June 2006, the Ministry of the Interior circulated the first frame-
work draft of the new legislation. In addition to the changes mentioned
above, the Ministry proposes to amend the Constitution so as to allow
the withdrawal of citizenship in cases of false acquisition of citizenship
(e.g. fraudulent use of documents). Another controversial proposal of
the draft concerns an amendment to the Constitution introducing the
clause that there is ‘no legal right to be granted citizenship’. This pro-
posal can be regarded as the Ministry’s response to the criticism that it
was making extensive use of discretion in naturalisation cases (see be-
low).
The parliamentary elections held in June 2006 and the subsequent
establishment of a right- wing centrist government slowed down the
legislative process, but they have so far not brought about a major reor-
ientation.50 On 17 March 2008, the government discussed the new
draft framework legislation submitted by the Minister of the Interior.51
The blueprint consisted of two pieces: the framework Constitutional
Act on Citizenship of the Czech Republic and the framework Law on
Citizenship of the Czech Republic.52
The primary aim of the proposed constitutional act is to implement
the two controversial changes discussed above. It also proposes to ex-
empt from judicial review a denial of naturalisation if it is justified on
the grounds of possible risks to the sovereignty, security or democratic
foundations of the state.
Guided by the opinion of its Legislative Council, the government
eventually rejected the proposed constitutional legislation. According to
the opinion of the Council, it is neither necessary nor advisable to
amend the constitution for the purposes of the intended reform.53
However, the government approved the framework citizenship law
and decided that the Minister of the Interior should submit a full ver-
sion of the bill for approval no later than 31 May 2009. The law should
enter into force as of 1 January 2010.
The approved blueprint builds upon the analysis and suggests mer-
ging all legislation on citizenship into a single code. The transformation
provisions of the existing citizenship law relating to the break-up of
Czechoslovakia would be deleted. Broadly formulated provisions en-
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abling former Czechoslovak and Czech citizens, as well as their descen-
dants, to acquire Czech citizenship by declaration, would replace the
existing specific restitution legislation. Excluded are, however, those
who lost Czechoslovak citizenship under the Benesˇ decrees and their
descendants. Acquisition of citizenship by declaration is also suggested
for second-generation migrants. The acquisition of citizenship by de-
claration is in both cases construed as a legal right with relatively sim-
ple qualifying conditions. This is in marked contrast with the proposed
naturalisation rules.
Conditions for naturalisation are detailed and strict. They allow for a
thorough screening of applicants and include, inter alia, a test of writ-
ten Czech proficiency as well as knowledge and orientation tests, stric-
ter requirements regarding one’s criminal record, and compliance with
an extensive range of public law obligations, obligations in relation to
the municipality where the applicant lives, and even some civil law ob-
ligations.
Because of the rigorous naturalisation requirements, activists from
various human rights organisations have criticised the proposal. Martin
Rozumek of OPU (Organisation for Aid to Refugees) argues: ‘The pro-
posal requires that foreigners fulfil a number of conditions which most
Czech citizens would find difficult to fulfil’.54
The blueprint includes an unrestricted acceptance of dual (multiple)
citizenship on both the entry and exit sides. However, there are indica-
tions that this liberal approach may change in the future, albeit only
with regard to foreigners applying for naturalisation. In fact, the gov-
ernment urged the Minister of the Interior to reconsider this particular
issue in further stages of legislative drafting.55 The liberalisation on the
exit side (that is in relation to Czech citizens who acquire foreign na-
tionality) remains unchallenged.
As one of the conditions for property restitution introduced in the
early 1990s was the Czechoslovak (Czech) citizenship of the applicant,
legislators and the general public have consistently viewed citizenship
legislation and its changes in this context. Notwithstanding the criti-
cism of various international bodies, including the UN Human Rights
Committee,56 this restriction has been retained both by the legislature
and by the Constitutional Court.57 The need to protect legal certainty,
ownership rights, and the stability of the legal order were raised to de-
fend the status quo. As a result, the link between restitution of citizen-
ship and restitution of property often hampered the adoption of more
inclusive citizenship legislation.
Lukewarm attitudes towards Czech emigrants among part of the lo-
cal population also influenced the discussion on the possible extension
of the legislation on reacquisition of Czech citizenship. Finally, the
2006 amendment to Act No. 193/1999 Coll. on the Citizenship of
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Some Former Czechoslovak Citizens merely abolished the deadline for
making a declaration on the reacquisition of Czech citizenship. The
senate, without support of the government, pushed the bill through
parliament.58
The link between the restitution or the retention of citizenship and
the restitution of property also plays a key role in relation to the Benesˇ
decrees, which deprived people of German and Hungarian ethnic ori-
gin of their Czechoslovak citizenship. The interpretation of these de-
crees still plays a role in some restitution cases and remains highly
controversial.59 The prevailing public opinion on the restitution of Ger-
man property is negative. Therefore, it is not surprising that the gov-
ernment does not contemplate any change in the citizenship legislation
in this regard. The decrees thus remain a sensitive political issue not
only in Slovakia and Hungary, but also in the Czech Republic.
Among the practical problems repeatedly brought to the attention of
the government by non-governmental organisations and other actors,
such as the Ombudsman, is the extensive discretion of the Ministry of
the Interior in decisions on naturalisation and the way it is exercised.
In practice, the Ministry’s negative decisions do not often constitute
grounds for rejection of an application, but refer vaguely to administra-
tive discretion as such and to the fact that there is ‘no legal right to be
granted citizenship’. Until recently the courts conducting the judicial
reviews have sustained the practice.60 It was only a few legal scholars
who expressed doubts about whether ‘granting citizenship is, indeed,
an act of mercy, exercised by the state at its own good will’ or is rather
in the interest of society (Chlad 2004: 350; Molek & Sˇimı´cˇek 2005:
142-144). A cautious shift in the jurisprudence regarding the use of dis-
cretion in naturalisation procedures was brought about by the Supreme
Administrative Court (established in 2003).61 Most recently, the idea
that discretionary naturalisation should be completed or replaced by
granting a right to naturalisation once the specified conditions are met,
is gaining some ground within the administration and the justice sys-
tem. However, the Ministry of the Interior, a key player in the formula-
tion of citizenship policies, still rejects the idea strongly.62
8.4 Statistics63
If we exclude Slovak nationals, the numbers of persons naturalised an-
nually in the Czech Republic have been surprisingly stable in the last
decade, with a maximum of 2,000 persons and a minimum of 837 per
annum, as shown in Table 8.2.
CZECH CITIZENSHIP LEGISLATION BETWEEN PAST AND FUTURE 261
Table 8.2 Naturalisations (excluding Slovak nationals) in the Czech Republic, 1993-2007
Year 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
1,469 1,412 2,000 1,380 837 1,128 1,031 1,059 1,121 1,150 1,267 1,495 1,177 1,355 1,027
Source: Ministry of the Interior
The number of Slovak nationals granted Czech citizenship based on
supplementary and corrective initial rules (see Table 8.1) is still signifi-
cant (Act No. 40/1993 Coll., Sections 18a, 18b and 18c).
Table 8.3 Number of Slovak and other nationals acquiring Czech citizenship from 2001-2007
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Total 6,321 4,532 3,410 5,020 2,626 2,346 1,877
Declaration based on Act No. 139/1999 Coll. 1,607 1,273 1,154 1,784 190 205 225
Act No. 40/1993 Coll. – total 4,714 3,259 2,256 3,236 2,436 2,141 1,652
Slovakia – Act No. 40/1993 Coll. – total 3,593 2,109 989 1741 1,259 786 625
Slovakia – declaration section 18a* 3,378 1,862 850 627 565 375 268
Slovakia – declaration section 18b** – – 55 364 123 63 49
Slovakia – declaration section 18c*** – – 5 573 325 167 177
Slovakia – naturalisation section 7 215 247 79 177 246 181 131
Other naturalisations (section 7) –
Act No. 40/1993 Coll.
1,121 1,150 1,267 1,495 1,177 1,355 1,027
Source: Czech Statistical Office
* Former Czechoslovak nationals who had lived continuously in the territory of the Czech
Republic since the break-up of Czechoslovakia
** Former Czechoslovak nationals who were naturalised in Slovakia in the period from 1
January 1994 to 1 September 1999
*** Former Czechoslovak nationals born in Slovakia who were minors during the break-up
of Czechoslovakia, but with at least one parent a Czech republic-level citizen
In 2007, the total number of persons naturalised was 1,158. This num-
ber included 424 Ukrainian nationals, 131 Slovak nationals, 102 Rus-
sian nationals, 50 Polish nationals, 40 Vietnamese nationals, 39 Belar-
usian nationals, 36 Romanian nationals, 33 Moldovan nationals, 31
Greek nationals and 28 Armenian nationals.64
Table 8.4 Slovak nationals who acquired Czech citizenship by declaration (Section 18a of Act
No. 40/1993 Coll.)
Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
6,278 5,377 3,378 1,862 850 627 565 375 268
Source: Ministry of the Interior
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Table 8.4 shows that at the end of 1990s there were still a number of
former Czechoslovak citizens living in the Czech Republic whose sta-
tus was not adequately regularised. The decreasing numbers indicate
that the problem is diminishing.
Table 8.5 Former Czechoslovak nationals who (re-)acquired Czech citizenship by declaration
under Act No. 193/1999 Coll.
Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004* 2005 2006 2007
798 1,899 1,607 1,273 1,154 1,784 190 205 225
Source: Ministry of the Interior
* The deadline for making the declaration expired on 2 September 2004. The Act No.
46/2006 Coll. deleted the deadline and thus made the law operational again. It was pub-
lished and entered into force on 27 February 2006.
Act No. 193/1999 Coll. concerns those who emigrated during the com-
munist regime. As they live all over the world, the process requires
time both for spreading the information on the right to reacquire the
Czech citizenship and for the actual exercising of that right. The num-
bers show that the deletion of the deadline for making the declaration
is warranted.
8.5 Conclusions
The consensual division of Czechoslovakia caused many problems re-
garding citizenship. The new legislation did not generate de iure state-
less persons, as was sometimes mistakenly contended by its critics.
Rather, the consequence of the restrictive and inadequate citizenship
legislation was that some former Czechoslovak citizens ended up with
the citizenship of a successor state in which they did not live and to
which they were only formally attached.65 This revealed the need to
clarify international rules concerning cases of state succession.66 It also
raised a more puzzling question: Does the right to a citizenship imply
a right to choose one’s own citizenship?
By the application of remedial provisions introduced in the period
1993-2003, most of the problems related to the break-up of Czechoslo-
vakia have been solved. Nonetheless, the original intention of the legis-
lators to avoid dual Czech and Slovak citizenship has not been fully
achieved. On the contrary, the precarious position of some groups of ci-
tizens shows that there are situations in which it is not justified to
deny a person the right to dual citizenship. Cases of dual Czech and
Slovak citizenship are numerous.
Conditions are unfavourable as regards naturalisation except for for-
eign nationals with strong family links to Czech citizens (spouses, chil-
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dren). They involve long waiting periods to fulfil the eligibility criteria
as regards the residence requirement. Longer periods of absence are
not tolerated and only formal continuous legal status counts. There is
also a Czech language test (although kept at a reasonably easy level).
As a rule, applicants have to relinquish their original citizenship and a
number of additional criteria are tested. There are no specific provi-
sions for automatic acquisition of the Czech citizenship by second- and
third-generation immigrants (not even at the age of majority) or facili-
tated naturalisation for this category. Decisions denying naturalisation
are open to judicial review but both in theory and practice administra-
tive discretion is applied very broadly in naturalisation cases. On the
other hand, the legal status of naturalised citizens is secure as a ban
on the deprivation of citizenship is guaranteed under the Constitution.
At present, Czech citizenship legislation is at a crossroads. Issues re-
lated to the break-up of Czechoslovakia, which have dominated the po-
litical debates, are losing their topicality. New challenges are linked to
increasing immigration. In particular, the restrictive nature of current
as well as proposed naturalisation provisions, which reflects the surviv-
ing parochial character of Czech society, is in conflict with the declared
need for effective integration policies. The proposed comprehensive ci-
tizenship reform should address the issue more adequately. It is also
important that the considered liberal approach to former Czechoslovak
and Czech citizens and their descendants is not in practice narrowed
down to an ethnic preference. At a more general level, the proposed re-
form can be seen as a key element in the transformation of the Czech
self-image from an ethnic to a civic nation.
Chronological list of citizenship-related legislation in Czechoslovakia/the Czech Republic
Date Document Content Source
1920 Act of 29 February 1920,
No. 121 Coll. of Acts of the
Czechoslovak Republic,
introducing the
Constitutional Charter of
the Czechoslovak Republic
Provides for a single
Czechoslovak citizenship
and prohibits dual
citizenship
1920 Constitutional Act of
9 April 1920, No. 236,
Supplementing and
Amending Existing
Provisions on the
Acquisition and Loss of
Citizenship and on
Domicile in the
Czechoslovak Republic
Implements provisions of
the peace treaties
concerning the state
succession in relation to
citizenship; determines
who are Czechoslovak
citizens; provides for the
continuation of Austro-
Hungarian citizenship
legislation
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Date Document Content Source
1945 President’s Constitutional
Decree No. 33/1945 Coll.
Concerning Czechoslovak
Citizenship of Persons of
German and Hungarian
Ethnicity
Deprives most ethnic
Germans and Hungarians
of the Czechoslovak
citizenship
http://sudetengermans.
freeyellow.com
1946 Constitutional Act No. 74/
1946 Coll. Concerning the
Naturalisation of
Compatriots Returning to
the Homeland
Facilitates naturalisation of
returnees who were ethnic
Czechs, Slovaks or
members of other Slavonic
nations
1949 Act No. 194/1949 Coll. on
the Acquisition and Loss of
Czechoslovak Citizenship,
amended by the Act No.
72/1958 Coll. Modifying the
Regulations on the
Acquisition and Loss of
Czechoslovak Citizenship
New citizenship code
adopted after the
communist coup d’e´tat in
February 1948
1968 Constitutional Act No. 143/
1968 Coll. on the
Czechoslovak Federation
Transforms centralised
Czechoslovakia into a
federation of two entities:
the Czech Republic and the
Slovak Republic
1968 Federal Act No. 165/1968
Coll. on the Principles of
Acquisition and Loss of
Citizenship
Provides a framework for
the introduction of
republic-level (Czech and
Slovak) citizenship
1969 Act No. 39/1969 Coll. of
Czech National Council on
Acquisition and Loss of
Citizenship of the Czech
Socialist Republic
Introduces republic-level
Czech citizenship
1990 Act No. 88/1990 Coll.
Amending and
Supplementing Legislation
on Acquisition and Loss of
Czechoslovak Citizenship
Provides for the
reacquisition of
Czechoslovak Citizenship
by emigrants who have lost
it during the period of the
communist rule; deletes
the provisions on
withdrawal of citizenship
1993 Constitution of the Czech
Republic
Contains the provision that
‘no one shall be deprived
of his or her citizenship
against his or her will’
www.psp.cz
(in Czech and English)
1993 Act No. 40/1993 Coll. on
Acquisition and Loss of
Citizenship of the Czech
Republic
New citizenship code
which enters into force in
the Czech Republic after
the dissolution of
Czechoslovakia
www.legislationline.org
1993 Act No. 272/1993 Coll., Introduces changes to the www.legislationline.org
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Date Document Content Source
Amendment of the Act No.
40/1993 Coll.
right to opt for Czech
citizenship with regard to
certain Czechs born in the
territory of Slovakia before
31 December 1939
1995 Act No. 140/1995 Coll.,
Amendment of the Act No.
40/1993 Coll.
Facilitates the
naturalisation of those who
immigrated to the Czech
Republic upon invitation
by the government;
concerns in particular the
members of the Czech
minority from the
Chernobyl area
www.legislationline.org
1996 Act No. 139/1996 Coll.,
Amendment of the Act No.
40/1993 Coll.
Introduces discretionary
waiver of the clean criminal
record requirement in
naturalisation procedures
with regard to Slovak
citizens who were former
Czechoslovak citizens and
have been living in the
Czech Republic since the
break-up of Czechoslovakia
www.legislationline.org
1999 Act No. 193/1999 Coll. on
the Citizenship of Some of
the Former Czechoslovak
Citizens
Provides for the
reacquisition of Czech
citizenship by emigrants
who have lost it in the
period of communist rule
and were not able to make
use of Act No. 88/1990
Coll.
www.legislationline.org
1999 Act No. 194/1999 Coll.,
Amendment of the Act No.
40/1993 Coll.
Introduces significant
remedial changes in
relation to the situation of
former Czechoslovak
citizens living in the Czech
Republic since the break-
up of Czechoslovakia
www.legislationline.org
2003 Act No. 357/2003 Coll.,
Amendment to the Act No.
40/1993 Coll.
Introduces further
remedial provisions with
regard to former
Czechoslovak nationals
and certain liberal
changes, in particular with
regard to dual nationality
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Date Document Content Source
2006 Act No. 46/2006 Coll.,
Amendment to Act No.
193/1999 Coll. on the
Citizenship of Some of the
Former Czechoslovak
Citizens
Removes the deadline for
making declarations on
reacquisition of Czech
citizenship by some of the
former Czechoslovak
citizens (emigrants)
Notes
1 The author and editors would like to thank Tibor Papp from the Institute of
Informatics and Statistics in Bratislava for providing the most recent information on
the draft bill in section 8.3 and the data for 2006 and 2007 in section 8.4.
2 See the leading handbooks on Czech citizenship law Cˇerny´ & Vala´sˇek 1996 and
Vala´sˇek & Kucˇera 2006.
3 Domicile (domovske´ pra´vo, Heimatrecht) refers to membership in a municipal commu-
nity. In the Czech lands (Bohemia and Moravia) as parts of the Austro-Hungarian
Empire, domicile was regulated by Act No. 105/1863 Coll. [Collection] of Acts of the
Empire, as amended by Act No. 222/1896 Coll.
4 E.g. Treaty of Versailles (1919), Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye (1919) and Treaty of
Trianon (1920).
5 Constitutional Act of 9 April 1920, No. 236, Supplementing and Amending Existing
Provisions on the Acquisition and Loss of Citizenship and on Domicile in the
Czechoslovak Republic and Act of 29 February 1920, No. 121 Coll. of Acts of the
Czechoslovak Republic, introducing the Constitutional Charter of the Czechoslovak
Republic. The basic principles of the Czechoslovak citizenship were thus regulated
by constitutional laws and treaty provisions. The system, however, failed to achieve
the declared aim of protecting minorities and preventing statelessness.
6 In Slovakia, provisions of former Hungarian laws remained in force. See also Kusa´
in this volume.
7 In October 1938, Czechoslovakia lost parts of its territory inhabited mainly by a
German population. In March 1939, after the secession of Slovakia, the rest of the
Czech lands were turned into the Protectorate Bohemia and Moravia. The complex
legal consequences in terms of citizenship are described by Verner (1947, Appendix
II: 227-270).
8 The Presidential Decree exempted from withdrawal of citizenship those citizens of
German and Hungarian ethnicity who had joined the fight for liberation or were
persecuted by the Nazis. The legislation also established a possibility to apply for the
restitution of Czechoslovak citizenship within six months after the entry of the
Decree into force. Most of the Czechoslovak citizens concerned had actually acquired
German or Hungarian citizenship in the period 1938-1945.
9 See also Kusa´ in this volume.
10 Constitutional Act No. 143/1968 Coll. on the Czechoslovak Federation.
11 The corresponding law regulating the same issue in the Slovak Republic was the Act
of the Slovak National Council No. 206/1968 Coll.
12 In this paper, the term republic-level citizenship is used to denote membership in the
constitutive entities of the federal state. The term (state) citizenship is used exclusively
to indicate membership of a sovereign state. In Czech language and legal terminol-
ogy, the term state citizenship (sta´tnı´ obcˇanstvı´) is used for both legal statuses.
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13 The republic-level citizenship was not recorded in any official documents, such as
birth certificates, ID cards or passports. On the other hand, the ID and other
documents recorded the ethnic origin (na´rodnost), (e.g. Czech, Slovak, Hungarian),
which was based, in principle, on one’s own declaration.
14 Constitutional Act No. 23/1991 Coll. introducing the Charter of Fundamental Rights
and Freedoms. The Act amended art. 5 of Constitutional Act No. 143/1968 Coll. on
the Czechoslovak Federation. The Act came into force on 8 February 1991. Later, it
was transformed into art. 12(2) of the Czech Constitution. The provision offers
stronger protection against deprivation of citizenship than art. 15(2) of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, which only bans arbitrary deprivation of citizenship.
15 Act No. 88/1990 Coll. provided for the reacquisition of Czechoslovak citizenship by
former Czechoslovak citizens who had lost Czechoslovak citizenship in the period
between 1 October 1949 and 31 December 1989. The reacquisition took effect in
certain cases through a simple declaration. However, two issues are important. First,
the law did not go back to before 1948 to cover former Czechoslovak citizens who
were deprived of Czechoslovak citizenship by the post-war Presidential Decrees
(Germans and Hungarians). Second, the law provided a relatively short period to
exercise the right to request the reacquisition of citizenship. It expired on 31
December 1993.
16 See Kusa´ in this volume.
17 The Constitutional Act No. 542/1992 Coll. on the Dissolution of Czechoslovakia on
31 December 1992 was adopted by the Federal Assembly on 25 November 1992.
18 Since the establishment of Czechoslovakia in 1918, there has been much intra-state
migration. For instance, in the period 1918-1938 many Czechs went to Slovakia as
part of a new Czechoslovak administration. After 1945, there was continuous
economic emigration from Slovakia to Bohemia and Moravia. One important
element of the post-war internal movements of inhabitants was (both spontaneous
and state-organised) resettlement of Slovak Roma in industrial towns and cities of
Moravia and Bohemia.
19 The drafting and the adoption of the law took place in exceptional circumstances.
The whole process was finished within two months.
20 The possibility of dual (Czech and Slovak) citizenship was the most divisive issue
between the ruling political elites – Slovak nationalists and Czech pragmatists. It was
favoured by the former and denied by the latter. Since an agreement on state
succession regarding citizenship had not been reached, two separate citizenship laws
regulated the citizenship of the successor states.
21 For the concept of the initial determination (Erstabgrenzung), see the work by Krom-
bach (1967).
22 The same criterion, i.e. republic-level citizenship, was used in some countries of
former Yugoslavia (Slovenia, Croatia), while the countries of the post-Soviet Eurasia
applied a permanent residency criterion instead.
23 The right to opt for Czech citizenship was restricted by the requirement that the
person had not been convicted in the last five years for an intentional criminal
offence.
24 Most Roma migrated to Czech lands from Slovakia after 1945. Consequently, many
Czech Roma became Slovak citizens by the application of the general rules of initial
determination.
25 The first significant change was introduced by Act No. 139/1996 Coll., which
allowed for exceptions in naturalisation procedures from the clean criminal record
requirement for former Czechoslovak citizens who had resided in the territory of the
Czech Republic since the break-up of Czechoslovakia. See Linde 2006 for a
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comprehensive explanation of the causes that have led to the state’s changes in
attitude.
26 File No. IV US 34/97.
27 The ruling was confirmed by a subsequent ruling on 14 November 2000 (File No. I.
US 337/99). The Court argued that exercising the right of option does not mean that
a person acquired foreign, i.e. Slovak citizenship at his or her own request, which
would lead to automatic loss of Czech citizenship. In practical terms, this ruling con-
cerned mostly ethnic Czechs living in Slovakia.
28 See also below Table 8.4.
29 See below Table 8.3, sections 18b, 18c.
30 The situation of children born to a stateless parent without permanent residence is
not regulated adequately.
31 I do not distinguish between eligibility and conditions for naturalisation. In Czech citi-
zenship legislation, the conditions for naturalisation fall into two categories: a) condi-
tions sine qua non, which cannot be waived, and b) conditions, which can be waived
at the discretion of the authorities.
32 The applicant has not been convicted for an intentional crime in the last five years.
33 The applicant has to submit a certificate of the loss of his or her previous citizenship
or a certificate that by the acquisition of Czech citizenship he or she will lose his or
her previous citizenship.
34 Act No. 326/1999 Coll., as amended (Aliens Act). The amendment of the Aliens Act,
Act No. 161/2006, which entered into force on 27 April 2006, cut the waiting period
for permanent resident status to five years (in order to implement EU Directive
2003/109/EC Concerning the Status of Third-country Nationals who are Long-term
Residents).
35 This does not apply to Slovak citizens.
36 In order to avoid statelessness, there is no provision allowing for the renunciation of
Czech citizenship if the person concerned is not a citizen of another state.
37 We assume that the intention of the drafters of the law was to reduce the cases of
Czech citizens living abroad transferring Czech citizenship over several generations.
38 It had particularly precarious consequences for Czech women who married citizens
of some Islamic countries. The status of non-citizens put them at a disadvantage
with regard to inheritance rights, for example whereas the potential loss of Czech
citizenship in the case of naturalisation would deprive them of diplomatic protection.
Another category adversely affected are citizens who applied for a foreign citizenship
before the law entered into force but were granted a foreign citizenship after 1
January 1993.
39 In the Court’s opinion, there is a distinction between deprivation of citizenship, pro-
hibited by the Constitution, and loss of citizenship. Those who apply for a foreign citi-
zenship should be aware of the legal consequences attached to the act, which are pro-
vided for by law. Thus, the loss of citizenship based on the acquisition of foreign citi-
zenship does not constitute deprivation of citizenship against one’s will. See Ruling
published under No. 6/1996 Coll. Concerning the Proposal to delete Section 17 of
Act No. 40/1993 Coll. on the Acquisition and Loss of Citizenship of the Czech Re-
public.
40 This provision existed previously, but the wording was not clear and, in practice, it
was incorrectly applied only to rare cases of automatic acquisition of citizenship
through marriage.
41 The Czech Republic is party to the following multilateral treaties: 1997 European
Convention on Nationality (No. 76/2004 Collection of International Treaties,
henceforth Coll. of I. T.), date of entry into force: 1 July 2004; 1961 UN Convention
on the Reduction of Statelessness (No. 43/2002 Coll. of I. T.), date of entry into
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force: 19 March 2002; 1954 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless
Persons (No. 108/2004 Coll. of I. T), date of entry into force: 17 October 2004.
42 Published as Act No. 169/1929 Coll. The treaty established a rule that in the case of
naturalisation, the citizenship of the state of origin is automatically lost.
43 In 2007, the Ministry issued 577 negative decisions regarding naturalisation. 319
unsuccessful applicants appealed. In 92 cases the Minister of the Interior overturned
the negative decision (Ministry of the Interior 2008: 155).
44 Act No. 150/2002 Coll. on Judicial Reviews of Administrative Acts. For judicial
review in naturalisation cases see section 8.3 of this chapter.
45 The Council for Human Rights is an advisory body to the government. See
Resolution of the Government of the Czech Republic No. 493/2002 Related to the
Communication by the Council for Human Rights on the Citizenship of the Czech
Republic. The communication concerned certain urgent issues, such as the
incompatibility of the remaining bilateral agreements with the requirements of the
European Convention on Nationality. It also brought to the attention of the
government certain problems of interpretation and practice in the field of citizenship
law.
46 Ministry of the Interior, Document No. VS – 473/50/2-2004.
47 The fundamental incentives for the switch towards toleration of multiple citizenship
thus seem to be those described by Hagedorn (2003). Obviously, citizens and
immigrants campaign for dual citizenship for different reasons. Dual citizenship
corresponds to the needs of both expatriates and immigrants and offers them a
greater scope for individual choice.
48 At present, the state authorities processing applications for naturalisation carry out
the testing. This does not guarantee uniform standards of testing.
49 Ministry of the Interior, Analy´za u´pravy naby´va´nı´ a pozby´va´nı´ sta´tnı´ho obcˇanstvı´. [Ana-
lysis of the regulation on acquisition and loss of state citizenship] Adopted on 13 July
2005 by Government Resolution No. 881.
50 The governing coalition consists of the liberal-conservative Civic Democratic Party,
Christian Democrats and the Greens. In its programme declaration, the new
government stated that it would ‘consider the possibility of simplifying the
acquisition of dual nationality’. See the Programme Declaration of the government,
available at www.vlada.cz.
51 Under the government’s legislative rules, a framework law (veˇcny´ za´meˇr za´kona) nor-
mally precedes the full legislative draft if a law regulates new and complex issues.
These blueprints represent a step in legislative drafting at government level. As such,
they are not subject to consultation with, or decision by, the parliament. Consulta-
tions on the draft legislation within the administration and with other stakeholders
took place from July to November 2007.
52 Ministry of the Interior, Na´vrh veˇcne´ho za´meˇru u´stavnı´ho za´kona o sta´tnı´m obcˇanstvı´
Cˇeske´ republiky a na´vrh veˇcne´ho za´meˇru za´kona o sta´tnı´m obcˇanstvı´ Cˇeske´ republiky, VS-
1283/50/2-2007 [The proposal of the framework for the Constitutional Act on Citi-
zenship of the Czech Republic and the framework for the Act on Citizenship of the
Czech Republic]. The government took its decision by Resolution of 17 March 2008,
No. 254.
53 See Stanovisko Legislativnı´ rady vla´dy ze dne 7. u´nora 2008 [Opinion of the
Legislative Council adopted on 7 February 2008].
54 See Martin Rozumek, ‘Prˇipomı´nky Organizace pro pomoc uprchlı´ku˚m k na´vrhu
veˇcne´ho za´meˇru nove´ho za´kona o naby´va´nı´ a pozby´va´nı´ sta´tnı´ho obcˇanstvı´ Cˇeske´
republiky [Comments of the Organisation for Aid to Refugees concerning the
framework proposal of the new Czech Citizenship Law]’, 15 August 2007,
www.migraceonline.cz.
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55 Government Resolution of 17 March 2008, No. 254, point II.
56 The Human Rights Committee expressed in its views in several cases, e.g. No. 516/
1992 (Simunek et al.), 586/1994 (Joseph Adam), 857/1999 (Blazek et al.) and 747/
1997 (Dr. Karel Des Fours Walderode), that ‘a requirement in the law for citizenship
as a necessary condition for restitution of property previously confiscated by the
authorities makes an arbitrary, and, consequently a discriminatory distinction
between individuals who are equally victims of prior state confiscations, and
constitutes a violation of article 26 of the Covenant [on Civil and Political Rights]’.
57 See Judgement of the Constitutional Court published under No. 185/1997 Coll. The
European Court of Human Rights declared cases that concerned the restitution of
property inadmissible. See European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber
decisions of 10 July 2002 as to the admissibility of application No. 38645/97,
Polacek v. the Czech Republic and application No. 39794/98, Gratzinger v. the
Czech Republic.
58 The Chamber of Deputies passed the bill on 23 November 2005. One hundred and
two deputies voted for the bill and 49 against. The Act No. 46/2006 Coll. was
published and entered into force on 27 February 2006.
59 Some of the judicial cases concern the citizenship of deceased persons, as the right
to restitution by heirs depends on this issue. In certain cases, the Ministry of the
Interior completed legal proceedings that had started in the late 1940s, using the
then valid citizenship legislation. (See e.g. Decision of the Supreme Administrative
Court of 27 November 2003, ref. no. 6 A 90/2002-82 (www.nssoud.cz) and
the Judgment of the Constitutional Court of 29 June 2005, 1U´S 98/04
(www.concourt.cz).
60 See Molek & Sˇimı´cˇek 2005.
61 Resolution by the Supreme Administrative Court of 23 March 2005, ref. no. 6A 25/
2002-42 and Decision by the Supreme Administrative Court of 4 May 2006, ref. no.
2As 31/2005-78. (www.nssoud.cz). In the former case the Court decided that negative
decisions on naturalisation can be reviewed by administrative courts. (The Ministry
of the Interior as well as some courts were of the opinion that naturalisation cases,
unlike other citizenship cases, can not be reviewed by courts because of the non
existence of the legal entitlement to citizenship.) In the latter case the Court
confirmed its opinion on the possibility of administrative review of naturalisation
cases and rejected the whole theory of unlimited administrative discretion in these
procedures.
62 In the discussion on the draft citizenship legislation in 2007-2008, the Ministry of
Justice, the Supreme Administrative Court and the Minister of Human Rights and
Minorities supported this idea.
63 As part of a new, more active approach to the issues of immigration and integration,
the Czech Statistical Office started to gather and analyse data on naturalisation in a
systematic manner. These statistics however only cover the period since 2001. They
can be found at www.czso.cz.
64 See Czech Statistical Office, www.czso.cz.
65 In many cases, Slovak citizens living in the Czech Republic had even difficulties to
acquire permanent resident status (Boucˇkova´ & Vala´sˇek 1999). In some of these
cases, the situation developed into de facto statelessness.
66 The variety of solutions adopted in the numerous cases of state succession made it
difficult to prove the presence of a concrete and detailed customary law on state
succession and citizenship. It was only the 1997 European Convention on Nation-
ality that introduced certain generally applicable rules on citizenship in cases of state
succession.
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9 The Slovak question and the Slovak answer:
Citizenship during the quest for national self-
determination and after1
Dagmar Kusa´
Citizenship is both a status and a praxis. As a status, it is defined by a
collection of laws and regulations. In Slovakia, these have been shaped
by both principles of ius soli and ius sanguinis, the latter gaining im-
portance especially after the First and the Second World War. The
praxis involves the civic and political participation by citizens as well as
the policies of governments concerning the implementation of the law
in relation to its citizens as well as to non-citizens. The latter depend
strongly on the political situation of the times. The first two turbulent
decades of the Czechoslovak Republic were marked by attempts to eth-
nically homogenise the ‘Czechoslovak’ nation, targeting primarily the
German and Hungarian minorities (but also Roma and others) as un-
wanted elements, culminating in three years of ‘homelessness’ after
the end of the Second World War. Only the communist government re-
stored their civil and political rights. Yet it was unable to do away with
the national sentiments of the Slovaks, striving to achieve national self-
determination within or without Czechoslovakia. The Federation of
1968 (and the Warsaw Pact tanks that preceded it) quieted the national-
ist voices until 1989, when they echoed through the public squares
with all the more vigour. The dissolution of Czechoslovakia, which fol-
lowed in 1993, made for a messy transition period in citizenship policy
with the need to address both issues related to the end of the commu-
nist regime and its victims, as well as to the status of Czech nationals
in Slovakia.
The last decade has also brought new challenges connected to the in-
tegration of Slovakia into the European Union and marked by general
globalisation processes. Slovakia is figuring out its relationship towards
an influx of newcomers from parts of the world with which it had no
cultural contact in the past. International institutions shape these poli-
cies to a large degree, although the careful observation of Hungary’s –
its closest neighbour and historic adversary – citizenship policies
seems to have just as much impact on shaping the public debate and
legal provisions taken in Slovakia. While we will be focusing in this
chapter primarily on citizenship as a status, the political praxis of gov-
ernments does need some attention to complete our understanding of
what shaped citizenship policies at different times.
9.1 History of Slovak citizenship
9.1.1 Citizenship policies since the first Czechoslovak Republic
Czechoslovak citizenship was created with the first Czechoslovak Re-
public on 28 October 1918. The collective identity to which it referred
was cumbersome, to say the least, and was a result of the historical
path of the Czech and Slovak nation-building processes as well as of
the peculiar nature of the new state that had resulted from the dissolu-
tion of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and from the peace treaties fol-
lowing the First World War. The Wilsonian principle of self-determina-
tion influenced the understanding of the concept of citizenship and
contributed to the growing role of ethnicity in its legal definition. Con-
cepts of citizenship and ethnic nationality are often difficult to set apart
neatly. They influence each other, and both depend heavily on political
interpretations. The Czechoslovak Republic consisted of a multitude
of ethnic groups and the leadership struggled with asserting the
dominant position of the Czech and Slovak nations in their newly
established Republic. National minorities, especially the three million
Germans and close to a million Hungarians, formed 44 per cent of the
total population. The Czechoslovak Government thus enforced an offi-
cial Czechoslovak nationality2 (instead of separate Czech and Slovak
nationalities).
The sovereign nation needed to be propped up by some ‘objective’
quantifiable measures of dominance. Population censuses helped to
provide these measures and also allowed citizens to be distinguished
from foreigners.3 The power of numbers as represented in the census
was becoming apparent to national leaders prior to the foundation of
Czechoslovakia. With the growing turbulence over what was then
called the ‘nationality question’ within the Habsburg Empire the cen-
sus was becoming more and more powerful as an expression of ‘real’
power, as a ticket to future control over territory and as one of the de-
terminants of state formation and boundaries. In 1900, for example,
the German newspaper in Bohemia appealed to its readers: ‘Dear fel-
low citizens! Please pay close attention to column 13 (Umgangssprache)
in the census form. The future of our nation depends on this minor
entry. 1. What is the language used on a daily basis? It is the language
most commonly used by an individual. Daily use means the communi-
cation in the family, among people that live together, in their employ-
ment, with an employer. Wherever this communication happens in the
German language, no other language should be entered into column
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13. Is the language used on a daily basis identical with the mother ton-
gue? Absolutely not. Czech employees […] use in their German employ-
ment the German language instead of their mother tongue. German is
their language of everyday use.’ (Zeman 1994: 37). In a similar manner
Czech, Slovak and Ruthenian leaders appealed to their respective con-
stituencies to enter their mother tongue. Data were collected by census
officials, often with the aid of the army and police and accompanied by
threats, blackmail or violence.
The census remained important, especially in border disputes after
1918. The northern part of the Czech Teschen-Silesia region as well as
the southern part of the Slovak borderlands with Hungary were heavily
disputed after the war and nationality was used as a tool for demarca-
tion policies. Polish representatives based their arguments on census
data from before 1918, which showed a clear majority of ethnic Poles
in those territories. As the populations here were ethnically mixed and
their mother tongue was often Polish or Hungarian, the question in
the 1921 census carried out by the Czechoslovak Government was
promptly changed to ask directly about nationality. A Silesian national-
ity was created (besides Polish and Czechoslovak). Respondents in this
category were then automatically counted among Czechoslovak na-
tionals. This resulted in a complete change of the population propor-
tions. While the percentage of Poles fell to 25 per cent (from 139,000
to 69,000), the percentage of Czechoslovaks grew from 40 per cent to
65 per cent (from 123,000 to 177,000) (Paul 1998: 163).
The fate of Teschen-Silesia was decided at the Paris Peace Confer-
ence. Polish representatives succeeded in their demand for a plebiscite.
If this had been carried out, Czechoslovakia might have lost some of
these economically strong territories. However, the international com-
mission overseeing the plebiscite could not agree on the conditions,
the Red Army was already invading Poland, and legal norms in Cze-
choslovakia were confusing due to the existing state of legal dualism
where Czech lands inherited the legal system from Austria, and Slova-
kia that of Hungary. A plebiscite was to be carried out not only in Sile-
sia, but also in the northern Slovak areas of Spisˇ and Orava, which
would result in implementing two plebiscites regulated by differing
sets of laws. The northern boundary was therefore finally decided upon
the recommendation of the Allied Powers. Poland was compensated
for much of Silesia with 25 settlements in Orava and Spisˇ (Klimko
1980; Peroutka 1991).
Legal dualism was caused by differing practices in granting citizen-
ship and domicile before 1918 following the Austro-Hungarian Com-
promise of 1867. While in Austria domicile, i.e. a legal title of resi-
dence in a municipality (Heimatrecht), was closely registered, it was not
in the Hungarian part of the empire that included Slovakia.4 Even
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though domicile was granted to all those born and residing in a muni-
cipality, the gentry had a right to deny some people domicile even if
they were born or had resided in the locality for a long time. Jurova´
(2002) maintains this was the fate of many Roma who moved from vil-
lage to village. This was due to arts. 8-15 of the municipal law (XXVII/
1886) that tied the acquiring of domicile of those who move and/or
marry to fulfilling certain duties towards the municipality, thus giving
the authorities opportunities for convenient interpretation. Further-
more, Act No. 222/1896 amended some provisions of the 1863 munici-
pal law that specified conditions under which a Roma could be granted
domicile.
The Roma and Hungarians were groups that succeeding Czechoslo-
vak governments sought to minimise statistically after 1918. The cen-
sus of 1921 shows a remarkable number of ‘foreigners’ without Cze-
choslovak citizenship that still have domicile on Slovak territory. The
extent to which these groups were affected by citizenship policies has
unfortunately not been extensively researched and quantitative data in
this area are missing (Jurova´ 2002).
Czechoslovakia’s citizenship regulations were further disturbed by
the events of the Second World War. Slovakia experienced its first (de-
batably) independent statehood as a Nazi puppet state, while the Czech
lands were occupied under the Third Reich’s Protectorate. The end of
the Second World War and the restoration of Czechoslovakia led to the
adoption of ad hoc laws that introduced the criterion of ethnicity into
citizenship legislation. The new legislation was linked to the post-war
massive emigration and population exchange. Under the President’s
Constitutional Decree No. 33/1945 Coll. (Collection), Czechoslovak citi-
zens of German and Hungarian ethnic origins were deprived of Cze-
choslovak citizenship.5 This also meant their exclusion from official in-
stitutions (Order 99/1945 of the Slovak National Council), as well as
from reimbursement for war damages, and implied other practical con-
sequences.6 Further decrees also disbanded German and Hungarian
associations and organisations.
The transfers of ethnic Germans were agreed to by the Allied Powers
at the Potsdam Conference in 1945. They did, however, not approve of
applying the same policy based on a principle of collective guilt to
Hungarians. The alternative solution found by the Benesˇ Government
was a ‘voluntary exchange of populations’ between Czechoslovakia and
Hungary. This plan resulted in the removal of 89,660 ethnic Hungar-
ians, who were moved into Hungary, in return for receiving 73,273 eth-
nic Slovaks (Vadkerty 2002: 32). Oral history projects document that
the nature of the exchange was in many cases coercive. Another wave
of transfers, labelled by the Czech historian Karel Kaplan as an ‘inter-
nal colonisation’ (Kaplan, 1993: 9), was based on the Presidential De-
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cree No. 88/1945 on universal labour service. Ethnic Hungarians were
recruited for ‘voluntary agricultural work’7 into the then vacant Sude-
tenland. Age limits imposed by the Decree were also frequently ig-
nored and property left behind was confiscated (in direct violation of
the Decree) (Kusa´ 2005). These policies were accompanied by a pro-
gramme of re-Slovakisation, passed by the Slovak National Council in
June 1946. This policy gave ethnic Hungarians an opportunity to ‘re-
claim’ Slovak citizenship (based on the premise of previous coercive
Magyarisation of Slovaks) within the time span of one year. Some
320,000 Hungarians were granted Slovak citizenship on this basis.
However, as the census of 1960 shows, many returned to claiming
Hungarian ethnicity in the census as soon as the political situation tol-
erated it.8
This era has been dubbed as the ‘homeless years’ by Hungarian
authors. Citizenship was eventually restored to the Germans and Hun-
garians remaining in Czechoslovakia in 1948 by the newly established
communist government; most Hungarians who had been transferred
to Sudetenland have returned. Many, however, never recovered lost
properties. The Benesˇ Decrees and their legal and practical conse-
quences remain a painful open wound in Czech and Slovak political
memory to this day and have been repeatedly debated, especially in
connection with possible compensation for those affected and their
descendants. Representatives of German and Hungarian communities
sometimes called for an annulment of the Benesˇ Decrees, but due to
the complexity of the political situation of interwar and post-Second
World War years and a lack of political will in the Czech and Slovak Re-
publics, it is unlikely that such a measure will be adopted. Some conci-
liatory steps were taken by the Czech and Slovak governments in the
past decade on the level of bilateral declarations (the Czech-German
Declaration of 1997) or public speeches (e.g. Hrusˇovsky´ 2003).
9.1.2 Regulation of Czechoslovak citizenship in 1949-1968 and the ‘Slovak
Question’
The rise of communist monopoly rule meant, ironically enough, the
end of ‘homelessness’ for the Hungarians and Germans in Czechoslo-
vakia. Citizenship laws were, however, misused for other political pur-
poses, as one of the tools to keep the lid on the population, as a sort of
preventive blackmail of those who might think of publicly voicing their
disapproval of the communist regime.
The legal process of acquisition and loss of Czechoslovak citizenship
in the period following the February putsch of 1948 was governed by
the Act on the Acquisition and Loss of Czechoslovak Citizenship No.
194/1949, as amended by the Act No. 72/1958 Modifying the Regula-
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tions on the Acquisition and Loss of Czechoslovak Citizenship.9 Cze-
choslovak citizenship could be acquired in four ways: 1) by birth: Cze-
choslovak citizenship was transferred to the child by his or her parent
citizens regardless of whether the child was born in the territory of the
Czechoslovak Republic or abroad. If the child was born in the territory
of the Czechoslovak Republic, it was sufficient if one of the parents
was a Czechoslovak citizen;10 2) by marriage: A foreigner could acquire
Czechoslovak citizenship on demand upon marrying a Czechoslovak
citizen. This acquisition needed to be investigated and approved by a
district National Committee within six months; 3) by grant: A foreigner
could be granted Czechoslovak citizenship upon request after meeting
two principal conditions: residing in the Czechoslovak territory for five
consecutive years and abandoning his or her previous citizenship.
There was no legal entitlement to be granted citizenship; 4) by reacqui-
sition: This applied to the acquisition of citizenship by the ‘homeless’
persons of German and Hungarian nationality ex lege after taking a citi-
zenship oath without the need to apply or to fulfil other conditions.11
The loss of Czechoslovak citizenship was possible by 1) renunciation
upon request,12 2) revocation by the state due to hostile acts against the
Republic, illegal emigration, or not returning to the homeland for the
period of five years or upon request of the Ministry of the Interior, 3)
marrying and acquiring citizenship in another country (with a possibi-
lity to request retention of Czechoslovak citizenship), 4) a court deci-
sion as a penalty for ‘high treason, espionage, desertion of the Repub-
lic, military subversive activities, war treason, assassination of a state
official’,13 5) naturalisation in the United States of America, and 6) as a
consequence of agreements on dual citizenship.14
During this period of time, and especially during the de´tente period
of the 1960s, when literature and arts were flourishing after the de-
nunciation of the Stalinist doctrine, Slovak leaders and intellectuals
voiced their desire for self-determination of the Slovak nation in a fed-
erative arrangement. They did not wish to be Czechoslovak citizens,
but Slovak citizens of Czechoslovakia. While the Czech elite focused on
market liberalisation and democratisation of the regime, Slovaks called
for ‘first federalisation, then democratisation’ – a slogan that reap-
peared repeatedly in public squares after 1989 in a much more malevo-
lent form. This issue divided Czech and Slovak intellectuals during the
entire duration of the communist regime, as the Czech cultural leaders
failed to see the urgency of this issue for the Slovaks. The Soviet leader-
ship, however, duly noted Slovak aspirations for federation. Thus when
the tanks rolled into Prague and Bratislava on the 21 August 1968 it
brought with it different realities for the two nations. While the oppres-
sion following the Warsaw Pact invasion was equally suffocating in
both parts of the country, it also brought the desired federation for the
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Slovaks. Dissent in Slovakia was therefore more muted compared to
the Czech region. The Soviets poured investment into the Slovak in-
dustry in the post-1968 era further contributing thereby to different
perceptions of the ‘normalisation’ period between the two nations.
What was an era of darkness for most Czechs, was seen by many
Slovaks as a repressed society, but with real industrialisation and fed-
eration at least on paper. While this reality itself may not have had an
immediate impact on citizenship laws and practice, it certainly reverb-
erated on the political scene after 1989, when the cultural divide be-
tween Czechs and Slovaks escalated into the ‘Velvet Divorce’.
9.1.3 Regulation of Czechoslovak citizenship in 1969-1992: Czechoslovak
Socialist Federative Republic
Until 1968, when the Czechoslovak Federation was established, Cze-
choslovakia was a unitary state with a single Czechoslovak citizenship.
The establishment of a federation also resulted in the creation of Czech
and Slovak citizenships. Constitutional Law No. 143/1968 Coll. on the
Czechoslovak Federation, which came into force on 1 January 1969, is
based on the principle of individual preference when determining the
citizenship of the two constituent republics.15
The original text contains a provision according to which every citi-
zen of one of the republics is also a citizen of Czechoslovakia (art. 5).
Citizenship was regulated by the Constitutional Act of the National
Council of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic No. 165/1968 Coll. on
the Principles of Acquisition and Loss of Czech and Slovak Citizenship,
followed by the Act No. 206/1968 Coll. of the Slovak National Council
on Acquisition and Loss of Citizenship of the Slovak Socialist Republic.
Normally citizenship at the level of the two republics was deter-
mined by the place of birth or by the citizenship of the parents, if that
could be identified. Czech or Slovak citizens could, however, choose a
different citizenship until 31 December 1969. The Act precluded dual
citizenship, one had to choose one or the other. The Slovak National
Council passed Act No. 206/1968 Coll. to apply these rules in domes-
tic legislation.
Between 1969 and 1992 it was possible to acquire Slovak and Czech
citizenship by birth,16 by choice (within one year after the establish-
ment of the federation), by marriage, or by grant (after five consecutive
years of residence for foreigners and two years for Czech citizens with
permanent residence in Slovakia).
Loss of citizenship in the ‘normalisation’ era was similar to previous
regulations. It could be renounced, lost due to acquiring Czech citizen-
ship, or one could still be deprived of it on the basis of art. 7 of Act No.
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194/1949 Coll., naturalisation in the US, or according to agreements
on dual citizenship.
After the fall of communism, both Czech and Slovak national elites
struggled to assert the position of their nations within Europe. National
identity had to be reconstructed and to a large extent even re-invented.
Both elites turned to their past to seek linkages and justification for
steps towards self-determination. Czechs and Slovaks, however, sought
friendship with very different animals from their past. Czechs built on
Masaryk’s democratic ideals from the first interwar republic, while Slo-
vaks viewed this era suspiciously with a memory of Czech ‘Pragocentr-
ism’17 and of the refusal of the Czechoslovak Government to grant Slo-
vakia the right to self-determination or autonomy in a federation. In-
stead, Slovaks referred to the legacy of the Slovak puppet state created
by the Nazis.18 The discrepancy in perceptions of the post-1968 era
added to the rift between the two nations. This ‘failure to find a decent
past’ together, as Igor Lukes (1995) coined it, contributed to the choice
of separate paths for the future by the political elites, whose sentiments
were, however, not reciprocated by the majorities of populations on
either side of the new border.
In the confused atmosphere of rampant nationalism that had anti-
Czech, anti-Hungarian, anti-Semitic, and even anti-Western traits in
the years prior to the Velvet Divorce, Slovak representatives raised
many issues that seemed to be frivolously escalating the conflict into
what became popularly known as the ‘hyphen war’, i.e. the war about
the spelling of ‘Czechoslovakia’. Slovak delegates claimed that the term
Czechoslovakia was discriminatory to the Slovaks, who are commonly
mistaken for Czechs abroad. Claims were backed by invoking the
myths of one thousand years of suffering by the Slovaks under the
Hungarian yoke, only to be replaced by the Czech yoke in 1918. The
Federative Assembly finally settled on ‘Czech and Slovak Federative Re-
public’ as the name for the post-communist state.
The Slovak Prime Minister Vladimı´r Mecˇiar conducted a policy of
blackmail, threatening the Czech leadership with the possibility of se-
cession over each major political issue. The Czech Prime Minister
Klaus eventually called his bluff and startled Mecˇiar by accepting the
proposal for separation. The divorce was decided at the top political le-
vel without being ratified by popular participation, but also without
strong protests by the Czech and Slovak public. Over half of the re-
spondents in public opinion surveys voiced their desire to remain in
the common state and/or to have an opportunity to decide its fate in a
referendum (Nemcova´ 1992). It was instead decided by political elites.
On 1 January 1993, the two nations started a new period in their his-
tory and had to determine their identities and related policies anew.
Even before the dissolution, the citizenship laws had been growing in
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significance, and many Czechs and Slovaks were using their right to
choose their republic-level citizenship.
In Slovakia, the nationalist craze played out directly in many legal
provisions that concerned anybody ‘other’ than ethnic Slovaks.19 Such
was the case with the ‘Sign Law’ (a law regulating public inscriptions
such as topographical names of towns, villages, streets and store signs),
the Act on the Official State Language, which was passed without any
provisions for the use of languages of the national minorities (which
were adopted only in 1997), the ‘Territorial Arrangement’ that redrew
district boundaries to lessen the percentage of ethnic Hungarians in
areas where they were concentrated, and other legislation. This policy
has also affected the practice of allowing access to those seeking asy-
lum, with possible hopes for eventually acquiring citizenship in the
Slovak Republic. While the legislation regulating the asylum proce-
dures was not markedly different from other countries, the political en-
vironment was palpably hostile. During the war in Bosnia and Herze-
govina, Slovakia, just as many other countries, received an influx of re-
fugees. The Migration Office of the Ministry of the Interior was at that
time particularly untoward in granting anyone the status of a refugee.
Many, if not most, displaced persons had to contend with a protective
status of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees office
in Slovakia, and most were turned back after a few months, not always
into safe conditions.
After the accession of the Slovak Republic to the European Union in
2004 and its becoming a part of the Schengen territory in 2007, a
number of EU regulations were transposed into Slovak Law. With the
amendment of the Asylum Law in 2007 the Slovak Republic imple-
mented the EU provision on minimal standards for the granting and
loss of the refugee status and also implemented the Dublin Treaty,
which sets criteria for determining which EU Member State is respon-
sible for processing a particular asylum application. The Slovak Repub-
lic, unlike its neighbours, still lacks a coherent immigration and inte-
gration strategy, although a plan for establishing Immigration and Nat-
uralisation Services is underway.
In 2007, the Slovak Government amended the Act on Citizenship,
gearing up towards accession to the Schengen Treaty. According to the
Minister of Interior, Robert Kalinˇa´k, the new act is a response to ‘the
growing danger of organised crime and international terrorism’.20 The
new version of the citizenship act significantly tightens the naturalisa-
tion requirements. According to this law, a foreigner may acquire Slo-
vak citizenship after eight years of permanent residence in the Slovak
Republic (as opposed to the previous five).
The law also stipulates that foreigners applying for Slovak citizen-
ship must pass a test where they must demonstrate a thorough knowl-
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edge of the Slovak language, the basic historical and geographical facts
regarding the Slovak Republic and Slovak culture. Applicants are inter-
viewed about their person and family, and must further demonstrate
‘basic general knowledge’, and pass a written test where they are asked
to summarise a random newspaper article. These new requirements,
which demand that applicants ‘prove cultural acclimatisation,’ are per-
haps more a reflection of the nature of the government that came to
power in 2006 (a coalition consisting of the populist SMER, or the
People’s Party – Movement for Democratic Slovakia, led by the notor-
ious former prime minister Vladimı´r Mecˇiar, and the nationalist Slovak
National Party) than of any purported requirements relating to acces-
sion to the Schengen Treaty.
9.2 Current regulations of acquisition and loss of Slovak
citizenship
In the first years of the Slovak Republic, Slovak citizenship was either
determined by law or could be individually chosen. Those who were ci-
tizens of the Slovak Republic before 31 December 1992 automatically
became citizens of independent Slovakia, as stipulated in Act No. 40/
1993 Coll. on Citizenship of the Slovak Republic. Czech citizens could
apply for Slovak citizenship until 31 December 1993 by way of a written
request to the District Office in the territory of the Slovak Republic or
to the Diplomatic Mission or Consular Office of the Slovak Republic
abroad. This option was open to all citizens of the former Czech and
Slovak Federative Republic. Those applying for Slovak citizenship had
to provide proof that they were Czechoslovak citizens as of 31 Decem-
ber 1992 and state their place of birth and permanent residence (art.
7).
9.2.1 Acquisition of citizenship
Slovak citizenship can currently be acquired by birth, by adoption, or
by grant. The laws regulating citizenship are comparatively generous
towards individuals with Czech or Slovak roots, allowing for a plural ci-
tizenship and extending considerable citizenship rights to the Slovak
expatriates living abroad.
Acquisition of citizenship by birth is firmly based on ius sanguinis
except in those cases where a child would otherwise become stateless.
In current legislation a child acquires Slovak citizenship only if at least
one of the parents is a citizen of the Slovak Republic or if the child
was born in the territory of the Slovak Republic to parents who are sta-
teless or whose citizenship is not transmitted to the child iure sangui-
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nis.21 If citizenship cannot be established, a child is considered to be a
citizen of the Slovak Republic if he or she was born or was found in
the territory of the Slovak Republic and his or her parents are not
known. If one of a child’s parents is a citizen of another country and
the other is a citizen of the Slovak Republic, then the child is a citizen
of the Slovak Republic even if it is later established that the child’s par-
ent who is a citizen of the Slovak Republic is not the child’s natural
parent. A child can also acquire citizenship when he or she is adopted
by a Slovak citizen. In the case of a disagreement between the parents,
Slovak citizenship can be determined by a court judgement on the ba-
sis of one parent’s or a legal guardian’s request.
Citizenship in the Slovak Republic can also be granted upon request
to a foreigner. This requires consecutive permanent residence and phy-
sical stay in the Slovak territory for at least eight years immediately
prior to submitting an application for citizenship. Slovak law also re-
quires sufficient basic proficiency in the Slovak language. Applicants
must also have a clean criminal record, which means that they must
not have been prosecuted for an intentional crime during those five
years before the application, must not be under an administrative ex-
pulsion order from the country of residence or subject to extradition
proceedings.22
Facilitating factors in the application procedure are if an applicant is
stateless or voluntarily renounces his or her previous citizenship.
Furthermore, citizenship can be granted upon request to those who
have entered into marriage with a Slovak citizen (after living in the Slo-
vak Republic for a period of five consecutive years), or those who have
made special contributions to the Slovak Republic through their
achievements in the field of economy, science, culture or technology.
There are also special provisions for the restoration of citizenship to
those who lost it according to previous legislation. A person whose for-
mer Czechoslovak citizenship has expired or who has lost the Czecho-
slovak citizenship due to a long absence or on the basis of citizenship
law during the communist regime, may be granted citizenship of the
Slovak Republic even if the abovementioned condition of five years
consecutive permanent residence has not been met. Former Slovak citi-
zens returning to live in Slovakia have to have permanent residence in
the Slovak Republic for three years prior to filing an application for citi-
zenship.23
9.2.2 Loss of citizenship
Slovak citizenship can be lost, only upon the holder’s own request, by
releasing the person from the state bond. Only those can be released
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who already possess another citizenship, or who will acquire another
citizenship as soon as they are released from Slovak citizenship.
A Slovak citizen cannot be released if he or she is being prosecuted,
is currently serving a sentence or is due to serve a sentence or has out-
standing taxes or other debts to pay to the state. The District Office,
Diplomatic Mission or a Consular Office of the Slovak Republic makes
the final decision on the loss of citizenship. Citizenship is lost on the
day of receipt of the document stating his or her release from the state
bond of the Slovak Republic.
9.2.3 Procedure
Slovak citizenship acquired by naturalisation is awarded by the Minis-
try of the Interior of the Slovak Republic based on a written applica-
tion. This application has to be filed in person at a District Office,
Diplomatic Mission or Consular Office of the Slovak Republic. It must
include personal data about the applicant and must be accompanied by
a dossier of documents including a brief curriculum vitae, an identifi-
cation card, a birth certificate, a personal status certificate, and a certifi-
cate of residence in the Slovak Republic. Former Czechoslovak citizens
that qualify for restoration of citizenship have to provide a document
stating the release from the state bond of the Czechoslovak Republic,
the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic or the Slovak Socialist Republic
(whichever applies). Former Slovak citizens applying for citizenship
after two years of residence in Slovakia can submit a Slovak Status ID
as a form of identification. The Ministry of the Interior can ask for
other documents if required to render a decision.
The application is accompanied by a questionnaire on the basis of
which the authorities evaluate the applicant’s Slovak language skills.
Verification has to be done in a way that takes the applicant’s circum-
stances into account. The District Office has the right to request a
statement from the police and will then forward the complete applica-
tion with all documents and statements to the Ministry of the Interior
for a final decision. When making its decision, the Ministry of the In-
terior has to take into account the public interest as well as statements
of state institutions and of the police. It has nine months from receipt
of an application to issue a decision. If statements of state institutions
and of the police are required, the processing period is prolonged to
one year.
Slovak citizenship is acquired by obtaining a Certificate of Acquisi-
tion of Slovak Citizenship at the District Office, Diplomatic Mission or
Consular Office of the Slovak Republic and after taking the obligatory
oath. The citizenship oath reads: ‘I promise on my honour and con-
science that I will be loyal to the Slovak Republic, I will respect the Slo-
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vak Constitution, laws and other legal rules and will duly fulfil all du-
ties of a Slovak citizen.’24
If the applicant doesn’t pick up the Certificate of Acquisition within
six months of receiving a written notification the Ministry will stop the
procedure. If the Ministry rejects the application then the applicant can
apply again after a minimum waiting period of one year.
9.2.4 International treaties
Slovakia is party to many international multilateral and bilateral
treaties that impact on domestic citizenship regulations. International
treaties take precedence over domestic law – if they differ from the pro-
visions in the Act No. 40/1993 Coll. on Citizenship of the Slovak Re-
public, the legal regulations of international law outweigh domestic
law (art. 17).
As in the case of the Czech Republic, the treaty with the United
States that precluded naturalised American citizens of Czech and Slo-
vak origin from holding dual citizenship (the 1928 Naturalisation
Treaty) expired in 1997. This allowed many former citizens and their
descendants to restore their Slovak citizenship and to file claims for
restitution of property with the Slovak state.
Among the other important bilateral treaties was the Agreement on
Slovak-Hungarian Neighbourly Relations from 1995, which had impli-
cations for the practical implementation of certain cultural and educa-
tional rights of ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia. Many international pro-
visions – including this one – were passed only because of extensive
pressure from European institutions dangling the carrot of EU acces-
sion in front of the Slovak leadership. The Slovak-Hungarian Treaty
was passed at the peak of the Mecˇiar Government era, to the bewilder-
ment of his followers and perhaps of himself, after Slovakia had re-
ceived demarches from the OSCE High Commissioner on National
Minorities and other international institutions regarding its practices
concerning national minorities and foreigners. The international com-
munity thus played a key role in shaping domestic policies in this tran-
sition period keeping the ugly dragon of nationalism and xenophobia
on a somewhat shorter leash.
9.2.5 Dual and multiple citizenship
Slovak legislation tolerates dual citizenship. Regulations of dual and
multiple citizenship on a European level are, however, developing
slowly and with obstacles. The regime changes and successive creation
of new states after 1989 created a need to come up with common regu-
lations regarding citizenship policies that resulted in the European
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Convention on Nationality (ETS No. 166), which entered into force on
1 March 2000. It was the first international document to establish core
principles and rules applying to all aspects of citizenship to which the
domestic law of the parties to the treaty should conform. The Conven-
tion was opened for signature to Member States of the Council of Eur-
ope as well as non-members on 6 November 1997. Slovakia signed
and ratified the Convention, as did the Czech Republic.
Among other issues the Convention covers questions of multiple ci-
tizenship. Art. 14 directly stipulates the right to dual citizenship in the
case of acquiring citizenship of another country by marriage. The force
of the Convention is, however, softened by arts. 15 and 16, which give
the parties the right to determine whether their nationals who acquire
or possess the nationality of another state retain or lose their citizen-
ship; and the right of state parties to make the acquisition or retention
of their citizenship conditional upon renunciation or loss of another ci-
tizenship (unless it is not possible or cannot reasonably be required).
These articles are often used in practice to preclude multiple citizen-
ship. There have been speculations as to whether Slovakia could use
them in this way if the Hungarian Parliament passes the law on dual
citizenship for ethnic Hungarians living abroad (see Kova´cs & To´th in
this volume). This would not be possible without amendments to the
current law, which stipulates that the loss of Slovak citizenship results
only from a person’s own request to be released from the state bond.
The state cannot on its own initiative deprive any person of their Slo-
vak citizenship. It is, however, possible that some ethnic Hungarians
residing in Slovakia could be released from the state bond upon their
own request after gaining Hungarian citizenship, thus becoming Hun-
garian foreign nationals living in Slovakia. This status would, however,
bring more inconveniences than benefits to the applicants. It is far
more likely that, if Hungary passed the dual citizenship law, most eth-
nic Hungarians in Slovakia would hold on to their Slovak citizenship.
As was already mentioned, Czech and Slovak nationals could choose
their citizenship for a period of one year after the dissolution of the
Czechoslovak Federative Republic. This situation was not without com-
plications. It rendered tens of thousands of Roma living in the Czech
Republic stateless due to improper documentation, permanent resi-
dence in Slovakia (many migrated from Slovakia to Czech lands before
1989), lack of information about the procedure (and the need to apply),
a criminal record or other reasons.25 Furthermore, from 1994 it be-
came harder for Czech or Slovak citizens to live and work in the other
part of the former common republic. In 1999, after years of continu-
ous pressure from European institutions and non-governmental orga-
nisations, and following a Czech Supreme Court decision of 1997,
which ruled that the Czech citizens who chose Slovak citizenship in
288 DAGMAR KUSA´
1993 did not lose their Czech citizenship, the Czech citizenship laws
were amended to allow for reacquisition of the Czech citizenship for
certain groups of people within a stipulated period. Further revisions
of the Czech law were passed in September 2005 to allow for dual citi-
zenship for Czechs living in Slovakia, who had lost their Czech citizen-
ship by acquiring the Slovak nationality between 1 January 1994 and
September 1999.26 Applications for dual citizenship can be submitted
to the Consular Office of the Czech Embassy in Bratislava. The applica-
tion process takes up to two months. Approximately five thousand peo-
ple requested dual citizenship in 2005.27
9.3 Current political debates and reform plans
9.3.1 The Hungarian Status Law and referendum on dual citizenship
Slovak-Hungarian relations have been an inflammable issue on the
Slovak political scene since the fall of communism. Much nationalist
rage was directed against the former dominant nation, the Hungarian
part of the dual monarchy. Policies of forceful Magyarisation in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth century and the turbulent dissolution of
the empire that left one third of the ethnic Hungarians outside the bor-
ders of the Hungarian state, provide historical memories that shaped
mutual relations in a controversial fashion. The myth of a thousand
years of suffering under the Hungarian yoke has long been nurtured
by Slovak nationalists and after 1989 it often served as a useful rallying
point.
The question of Hungary’s relationship with ethnic Hungarians liv-
ing abroad, especially in the areas immediately bordering on Hungar-
ian state territory, was therefore watched closely and suspiciously. The
issue exploded in the Slovak media in 2001 when Hungary passed the
Status Law (the law on Hungarians living abroad) and again in 2004
when a referendum was held on allowing ethnic Hungarians to acquire
dual citizenship. The content and impact of these Hungarian initiatives
are described in detail in Ma´ria M. Kova´cs’s and Judit To´th’s chapter on
Hungarian citizenship in this book, so I will focus here only on the re-
percussions in Slovakia.
The Hungarian Status Law
The question of ethnic Hungarians living abroad was not used for a na-
tionalist agenda in Slovakia alone. It also polarised the political scene
in Hungary and deepened the left-right divide. Viktor Orba´n’s FIDESZ
played on national sentiments of Hungarians about co-ethnic minori-
ties in neighbouring countries and produced a bill on benefits for eth-
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nic Hungarians living abroad, passed by the Hungarian Parliament in
2001.
The first version of the law, which entered into force on 1 January
2002, provided for financial stipends for students of Hungarian eth-
nic origin abroad. Members of Hungarian minorities could also ap-
ply for Hungarian identity cards (Status ID), with which they can ac-
cess further benefits such as discounts in Hungary for public trans-
portation and entrance fees for museums and cultural and
educational events. The Status ID was handed out on the basis of a
recommendation from local cultural organisations representing Hun-
garian minorities abroad by the newly established Office for Hungar-
ians living abroad with its seat in Budapest. After the refusal of the
Slovak and Romanian Governments to allow implementation of the
Status Law in their states’ territories and after criticism by the Ve-
nice Commission that was asked by the Council of Europe to exam-
ine the matter,28 the law was amended in summer 2003. Since then
the education stipend is no longer addressed to individuals, but to in-
stitutions that offer education in the Hungarian language or on Hun-
garian culture. The financial aid is thus accessible not only to ethnic
Hungarians but to anybody who wishes to study Hungarian culture
and history.
The amended version was approved by a majority of the Hungarian
Parliament, with the exception of the FIDESZ party, the originator of
the law, and the FKGP, the Smallholders’ Party, which had lost seats
due to a large corruption scandal involving its president. It was also
accepted by the Venice Commission and Romanian Government. Slo-
vak representatives, however, remained opposed to it, and the political
parties of the ruling coalition (apart from the Party of Hungarian Coa-
lition SMK) contemplated passing an ‘anti-law’, which would prevent
the implementation of the Status Law in the territory of the Slovak
Republic. The lengthy, emotionally charged squabble between Slovak
and Hungarian leaders was finally resolved in December 2003 by the
Slovak-Hungarian Agreement on Support for the National Minorities
in the Areas of Culture and Education. An article on the Slovak-Hun-
garian Agreement in the daily paper SME summarises its key
points.29 The treaty identifies two specific cultural foundations that are
permitted to distribute financial aid to cultural and educational institu-
tions only (some university students qualify as an exception). It estab-
lishes a principle of reciprocity, and the distribution of funds will be
subject to annual control by a Slovak-Hungarian commission of ex-
perts.
The crux of the tensions, however, was apparently not in the law it-
self. Old historical grievances were voiced in the circles of the law’s
critics, accusing the political representation of Hungary of ‘soft irre-
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dentism’, i.e. attempts to recreate the Hungary of the times of the Hun-
garian kingdom on a psychological level, and of lurking historic revi-
sionism among the Hungarian minorities themselves.
Frantisˇek Miklosˇko, one of the most prominent Christian Democrats
and the former Speaker of the National Council of the Slovak Republic,
expressed views that can be attributed to Slovak representatives in gen-
eral: ‘I voiced my opinion even on TV, and my Hungarian Colleagues
hold it against me. I would say that the Status Law psychologically cre-
ates the concept of a Great Hungary. The Slovak side made mistakes
too, when the Law was debated we were sleeping and suddenly we
were confronted with a done deed. There is one serious problem how-
ever: Hungary is passing a law that is implemented in the territory of
the Slovak Republic. We don’t mind if Hungarians have some advan-
tages, but it seemed to be a precedent that would not be good, and the
Venice Commission has also denounced it.’30
The representatives of the Party of the Hungarian Coalition in Slova-
kia, which had seats in the Slovak coalition government, found them-
selves between the grindstones as it were of the two national leader-
ships. Both sides looked to them for resolution and they drew fire from
Slovak nationalists for being ‘irredentist Hungarians’, as well as from
Hungarian leaders in Hungary for being too passive. La´szlo´ Nagy,
member of the SMK Presidium and chair of the Committee for Hu-
man Rights, Nationalities, and Status of Women of the NCSR, laments:
‘One problem of the Law is that it became a part of the internal politi-
cal game. We are not affected by it, but Dzurinda and others assume
that the voter expects rejection of the Status Law by the Slovak political
leaders, which may be an erroneous assumption. It has played a nega-
tive role in Slovak-Hungarian relations that got decidedly chilly in
2002.’31
The subject of the Hungarian Status Law is divisive among the Slo-
vak-Hungarian population of the Slovak south as well. Although ten-
sions between Slovaks and Hungarians in this ethnically mixed region
are usually less than in the rest of the country, they have been palpable
concerning topics related to the quasi-citizenship of the Status Law and
the question of dual citizenship, which emerged shortly afterwards.
The question of dual citizenship for ethnic Hungarians
The question of dual citizenship for ethnic Hungarians living abroad
emerged as a hot political issue in 2003. The first requests to the Hun-
garian leadership came from the Hungarian minority in Vojvodina, la-
ter accompanied by similar demands from Hungarians in Romania.
The World Federation of Hungarians prepared a petition for a referen-
dum about dual citizenship. Its goal was to achieve Hungarian citizen-
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ship for all applicants who were already holders of a Status ID under
the Hungarian Status Law.
This initiative was supported by the opposition political parties in
Hungary – the Young Democrats (FIDESZ) and the Hungarian Demo-
cratic Forum (MDF), which managed to rally enough support to get
the required number of signatures on the petition for a referendum
that would decide whether to grant Hungarian citizenship to ethnic
Hungarians from abroad. The referendum took place on 5 December
2004, but, since over 60 per cent of eligible voters decided to stay at
home, the referendum results (in favour of dual citizenship by a small
margin) were declared invalid.32
Dual citizenship for ethnic Hungarians was justified mainly on the
basis of empathy with ethnic kin. The press again debated attempts to
repair the ‘Trianon Injustice’ that truncated the Hungarian nation after
the First World War. On the other hand, the initiative was also designed
to give practical advantages resulting from Hungarian nationality. This
would be relevant especially for Hungarians living outside of the EU
borders. The ruling parties MSZP and SZDSZ stood firmly against the
referendum, appealing mostly against the costly consequences that im-
plementation of the law would have. The situation was further compli-
cated by the fact that Romanian and Ukrainian legislations preclude
dual citizenship, thus ethnic Hungarians acquiring Hungarian citizen-
ship would have to renounce their original citizenship, which could
lead to an untenable situation for the Hungarian Government.
The Slovak leadership watched the development leading to the refer-
endum with a heightened sense of insecurity and antagonism. Accord-
ing to diplomatic sources (report of Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Slova-
kia was prepared to protest in the EU if the referendum was successful,
based on its inconsistency with the Agreement on Slovak-Hungarian
Neighbourly Relations from 1995, as well as with the principles of the
EU of non-discrimination and democratic governance.
The SMK was once again caught in the middle. While the executive
vice-president of the SMK, Miklo´s Duray, supported the idea of the re-
ferendum, the official SMK position, as represented by its chairman
Be´la Buga´r, was to support policies that will help ethnic Hungarians to
stay in the country where they were born. He warned that the initiative
might antagonise Hungarians living in Hungary and members of
Hungarian minorities. ‘We find ourselves unwillingly amidst the Hun-
garian internal political struggle and are receiving one slap after an-
other. We have not received such slaps even in our native country. We
want to remain in our native country, pay taxes there, etc.’33
The heated debate ended up in a Slovakian Court. The Slovak Na-
tional Party (SNS) sued the Vice-Chairman of the SMK, Miklo´s Duray
(one of the more radical leaders of the Hungarian minority in Slova-
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kia), for treason because of his speech in favour of the dual citizenship
initiative in the Hungarian Parliament.34 The ethnically charged de-
bates about the Status Law and the referendum on dual citizenship
have probably also contributed to support for Slovak nationalist and po-
pulist platforms, which has grown over the past two years.
9.3.2 Comparison of the Slovak Act on Expatriate Slovaks with the
Hungarian Status Law
The Hungarian Status Law is not a unique invention without parallel
(as it sometimes appeared to be from the indignant reactions in the
Slovak press). In 1997, the Slovak Republic passed Act No. 70/1997
on Expatriate Slovaks. Prior protection of Slovak nationals living
abroad was guaranteed by a declaration of support in the Slovak Re-
public’s constitution. The House of Expatriate Slovaks, founded by the
Ministry of Culture of the Slovak Republic, has also been in existence
since 1995, focusing on cultural cooperation and support of expatriate
Slovak institutions. According to the Act No. 70/1997, it is sufficient
to apply for the status of an expatriate Slovak or to be a direct descen-
dant of a Slovak national. If the applicant cannot provide any documen-
tation certifying his or her ethnic origin, a letter from an institution re-
presenting Slovaks abroad or two witnesses that have the status of ex-
patriate Slovaks will do. Application is submitted to the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (MFA) of the Slovak Republic and the application pro-
cess takes two months. If it is successful the MFA issues an Expatriate
Slovak Certificate. Among the benefits that this status brings is the per-
mission to reside ‘for a long time’ in the territory of the Slovak Repub-
lic and the opportunity of applying for permanent residence in Slova-
kia. It is likewise possible to apply for studies at any Slovak university
or to apply for a job without having permanent residence in Slovakia
or the employment authorisation required by other foreign nationals.35
The Hungarian Status Law has inspired changes in the Slovak Status
Law. In 2005 the National Council of the Slovak Republic passed an
Amendment to the Act on Expatriate Slovaks36 (now properly labelled
‘Slovaks living abroad’) that established the Office for Slovaks Living
Abroad, which is funded from the state budget and is responsible for
carrying out the official state policy towards Slovakia’s external citizens.
The Office also issues Certificates of Ethnic Slovaks Living Abroad (Slo-
vak Status IDs) that make the process of claiming benefits related to
the status easier. Financial support is tied to the areas of culture, edu-
cation and research, information, and media. Individuals and institu-
tions can apply for funding in ‘activities that further the development
of Slovak identity, culture, language, or cultural heritage in these coun-
tries.’37
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Hopefully, the amended law will help to provide assistance to Slo-
vaks living abroad at the place of their residence. Some representatives
of the Slovak institutions abroad complain that the direct result of the
Slovak Status Law is a brain drain of young people who leave to study
and work in Slovakia rather than financial support for Slovak publica-
tions and cultural events in the areas where Slovaks living abroad are
concentrated.38 The most remarkable difference between the Slovak
and Hungarian Status Law in their current form is the territorial lim-
itation of the latter, which restricts the implementation of the law to
neighbouring countries with a large proportion of Hungarian minori-
ties. The Slovak counterpart has no such stipulation. This is easily ex-
plained by the fact that most of the Slovaks living abroad reside in the
United States (over 1,200,000 Slovaks).
9.4 Statistical trends (acquisition of Slovak citizenship since
1993)
After the fall of communism, Slovakia experienced tumultuous shifts
in population, largely in connection with the dissolution of the Czech
and Slovak Federative Republic, but undoubtedly also as a result of its
strategic position as a bridge between Western and Eastern Europe.
There have been shifting migration trends, too. In the early 1990s, the
Slovak Republic was losing its citizens to the Czech Republic. This
trend ceased after 1994 when Slovakia started gaining population from
abroad and increasingly so, from the East. Most migration is temporary
and circular with migrants returning after short stays in Slovakia. The
number of those who actually ask for Slovak citizenship changes with
domestic and international events, circumstances and legislation. The
following tables and graphs show the numbers of successful applicants
who acquired Slovak citizenship.
Table 9.1 Number of persons who acquired citizenship of the Slovak Republic, 1993-2008
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Czech
citizens
64,834 20,612 1,379 575 416 399 849 3,903 175 805 942 2,262 2,439 120 155 91
Other
citizens
1,550 1,393 910 768 1,519 535 417 623 1,362 3,539 3,100 1,508 539 930 1,235 555
Total 66,384 22,005 2,289 1,343 1,935 934 1,266 4,526 1,537 4,344 4,042 3,770 2,978 1,050 1,390 646
Source: Ministry of the Interior, Slovak Republic
As can be seen from Table 9.1, in 1993 and 1994, the vast majority of
those who acquired Slovak nationality were Czech nationals. Due to
the possibility of choosing citizenship in 1993, the proportion of Czech
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nationals among the successful applicants for citizenship was over-
whelming. This proportion has gradually declined thereafter and was
lowest in 1996 to 1998, which is probably due to the political situation
in Slovakia. The numbers of Czech applicants rose again especially
after the amendments to the citizenship law in 1999, and have also
been growing in the years up to 2005. Since then, the number of
Czech applicants has dropped rapidly. One explanation for this drop
might be that both the Czech Republic and Slovakia joined the Euro-
pean Union in 2004.
For others the trends in the acquisition of citizenship are quite differ-
ent. Notable again is the decline in numbers in the years 1995 and
1996, followed by an increase due to the influx of refugees fleeing from
the countries of former Yugoslavia. There is a marked increase in the
naturalisation of foreigners from outside former Czechoslovakia espe-
cially since the year 2000, when more applicants from Asia and the
Near East sought to settle in the Slovak Republic. The more detailed ap-
plication procedure for citizenship specified in the Act on Citizenship
No. 265/2005 Coll. and stricter conditions for naturalisation that were
introduced in the Act No. 344/2007 may have contributed to the drops
in the number of citizenship acquisitions in 2005 and 2008, although
these drops were not more dramatic than in some of the previous years.
Figure 9.1 illustrates the diverse trends in the two populations who
have acquired Slovak citizenship over the past decade. (The years 1993
and 1994 have been excluded here due to the high number of Czech
applications for citizenship resulting from the dissolution of Czecho-
slovakia.) We can clearly see the impact of the Czech amendments to
the citizenship law in 1999 in the resulting increase of Czech nationals
applying for and receiving Slovak citizenship. The rapid increase in ci-
tizenship granted to other foreign nationals cannot be readily explained
on the basis of legislative changes, but rather on the basis of new mi-
gration patterns. Compared to earlier times, many more foreigners
looking both for asylum and for citizenship have settled in Slovakia.
Among those who seek Slovak citizenship are people fleeing from per-
secution, violence, civil war or other conditions threatening their lives
and security in their home countries. More than 54,000 foreigners have
applied for asylum in Slovakia since 1992. However, as of the end of
2008, asylum status was granted to only 632 of them. This tendency
makes Slovakia a country with one of the lowest rates of refugee recogni-
tion in Europe. The year 2004 recorded the highest number of appli-
cants, increasingly coming from countries such as India, Russia (particu-
larly Chechnya), Pakistan and China. Since 2004, there has been a steady
decline in the number of applications for asylum, mirroring larger migra-
tion trends within Europe and changes in Slovak asylum policies as well
as the 2007 entry of the Slovak Republic into the Schengen area.39
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Table 9.2 Refugees and asylum seekers in the Slovak Republic, 1995-2008
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Asylum
applications
359 415 645 506 1,320 1,556 8,151 9,734 10,358 11,395 3,549 2,849 2,642 909
Persons granted
refugee status
80 72 69 53 26 11 18 20 11 15 25 8 14 22
Refugees granted
Slovak citizenship
0 4 14 22 2 0 11 59 42 20 2 5 18 4
Source: Ministry of the Interior, Slovak Republic
9.5 Conclusions
The evolution of policies relating to the definition, granting and with-
drawal of citizenship in Central Europe was closely tied to turbulent
events on the international and regional political scene. More than in
the West, the ideals and practices of citizenship were marked by strug-
gles for national self-determination, as well as power struggles between
the small neighbouring states squeezed in between the warring super-
powers during the Cold War period.
Figure 9.1 Czechs and other foreign nationals who acquired citizenship of the Slovak Republic,
1995-2008
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Slovak national development had not run its course in the period be-
fore 1948. The Slovaks had not achieved a truly independent statehood
and were not content to be submerged in a centralised Czechoslovak
state after the Second World War. The Slovak Question emerged as a
dominant issue at several turning points in history. It impacted on citi-
zenship policies within the common state of Czechs and Slovaks in
1968, when the Slovaks received the gift of federation from the invad-
ing Soviet troops, and then again after 1989, when it led to the Velvet
Divorce between the two nations.
Citizenship practices as well as the understanding of what citizen-
ship entails and should entail were murky due to frequent changes in
policies prior to 1989, due to their ad hoc nature and inconsistencies
in the first years of the post-communist regime, as well as because of
the tumultuous political scene in Slovakia and new challenges result-
ing from Slovak independence in 1993.
Slovak citizenship policies were strongly shaped by international in-
fluences, especially by pressures from the European Union and bind-
ing treaties with the Council of Europe. On the other hand, they also
reacted to the heated, historically and emotionally charged political de-
bates on the status of Hungarians living abroad and the possibility of
their acquiring dual citizenship in Hungary. Central European reality
shows us how closely citizenship and identity are intertwined and how
easily they are misused for political machinations that further the ego-
istic agendas of parties and leaders.
Citizenship policies are being gradually simplified and fitted to the
new migratory trends that result from membership in the EU. Central
European neighbours have not quite yet abandoned nationalist appeals
and contentious policies that seek easy enemies to rally supporters. At
the same time, they have to quickly figure out how to absorb inflows
from parts of the world very different from theirs. All these develop-
ments occur in the context of an enlarging European Union with the
common citizenship of the Union linking the nationality policies of its
Member States to each other.
Chronological list of citizenship-related legislation in Czechoslovakia/the Slovak Republic
Date Document Content Source
1945 President’s Constitutional
Decree No. 33/1945 Coll.
Concerning Czechoslovak
Citizenship of Persons of
German and Hungarian
Ethnicity
Deprives most ethnic
Germans and Hungarians
of Czechoslovak
citizenship
http://sudetengermans.
freeyellow.com
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Date Document Content Source
1948 Act No. 245/1948 on the
Citizenship of Persons of
Hungarian Ethnicity
Returns Czechoslovak
citizenship to ethnic
Hungarians who were
Czechoslovak citizens on 1
November 1938 and were
not subject to the ‘voluntary
exchange of population’
between Slovakia and
Hungary in 1946
www.centrum.usd.cas.cz
(in Slovak)
1949 Act No. 194/1949 on the
Acquisition and Loss of
Czechoslovak Citizenship,
amended by the Act No.
72/1958 Modifying the
Regulations on the
Acquisition and Loss of
Czechoslovak Citizenship
Is adopted as the new
citizenship code after the
communist coup d’e´tat in
February 1948
www.portal.gov.cz
(in Czech)
1952 Act No. 59/1952 on
Contracting Marriage with
a Foreigner
Stipulates a requirement to
obtain permission from
the Ministry of the Interior
to marry a person of non
Czechoslovak citizenship
www.lexdata.cz (in Czech)
1953 Act No. 34/1953 Coll. on
the Acquisition of
Czechoslovak Citizenship
by Particular Persons
Returns Czechoslovak
citizenship to ethnic
Germans who were
deprived of it by the
Presidential Constitutional
Decree No. 33/1945 and
are permanent residents of
the Czechoslovak Republic
www.centrum.usd.cas.cz
(in Czech)
1968 Constitutional Act No. 143/
1968 Coll. on the
Czechoslovak Federation
Transforms centralised
Czechoslovakia into a
federation of two entities:
the Czech Republic and the
Slovak Republic
1968 Act No. 165/1968 Coll. on
Acquisition and Loss of
Czech and Slovak
Citizenship
Provides a framework for
the introduction of
republic-level (Czech and
Slovak) citizenship
1968 Act No. 206/1968 Coll. of
Slovak National Council on
Acquisition and Loss of
Citizenship of the Slovak
Socialist Republic
Introduces republic-level
Slovak citizenship
1990 Act No. 88/1990 Coll.
Amending Regulations on
Acquisition and Loss of
Czechoslovak Citizenship
Sets regulations for re-
acquisition of Czech or
Slovak citizenship by
emigrants or others who
were deprived of Czech or
Slovak citizenship prior to
1989
www.zbierka.sk (in Slovak)
298 DAGMAR KUSA´
Date Document Content Source
1991 Constitution of the Slovak
Republic
Contains the provision that
‘no one shall be deprived
of his or her citizenship
against his or her will’ and
the Bill of Fundamental
Rights and Freedoms,
including the ‘right to
choose one’s nationality’
www.government.gov.sk
(in Slovak);
www.legislationline.org
(excerpts)
1993 Act No. 40/1993 Coll. on
Citizenship of the Slovak
Republic
Enters into force as the
new citizenship code in the
Slovak Republic after the
dissolution of
Czechoslovakia
www.coe.int; www.minv.sk
(in Slovak)
1997 Act No. 70/1997 Coll. On
Expatriate Slovaks and
Changing and
Complementing Some
Laws
Defines rights and benefits
of Slovaks living abroad
www.gszs.sk (in Slovak)
2002 Act No. 480/2002 Coll. on
Asylum, amended by Act
No. 1/2005 Coll.
Regulates asylum
acquisition procedure
www.unhcr.sk (in Slovak)
2005 Act No. 265/2005 on State
Citizenship of the Slovak
Republic
Regulates acquisition and
loss of Slovak citizenship;
details the requirements
and procedure for the
acquisition of Slovak
citizenship; nullifies Act
No. 194/1949 in its
amended forms and Act
No. 206/1968 in its
amended forms
2005 Act. No. 474/2005 Coll. on
Slovaks Living Abroad and
on Amendments and
Additions to Certain Laws
Establishes the Office for
Slovaks Living Abroad and
regulates the
competencies of the state
administration regarding
state support for Slovaks
living abroad
www.gszs.sk (in Slovak)
2007 Act No. 344/2007 Coll.
Amending and
Supplementing the Act No.
40/1993 on Citizenship of
the Slovak Republic
Introduces a longer waiting
period for the acquisition
of citizenship (eight
consecutive years of
permanent residence
before applying instead of
the previous five) and
stricter control of
applicants’ fulfilment of
the conditions stipulated
by the Law
www.zbierka.sk (in Slovak)
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Date Document Content Source
2007 Act No. 502/2007 Coll. on
Citizenship of the Slovak
Republic
Consolidates existing
legislation on citizenship
(Act. No. 40/1993, Act No.
70/1997 on Slovaks living
abroad, Act No. 36/2005
on family, Act No. 265/
2005 and Act No. 344/
2007)
www.zbierka.sk (in Slovak)
Notes
1 The author and the editors thank Lucia Mokra´ for her research contributions on legal
and statistical developments.
2 Nationality in this context is not a synonym for citizenship, but refers to
membership in an ethnic nation. The idea of a Czechoslovak nation did not take
root – it was neither popular with Czech and Slovak political representatives nor with
the general population and was eventually abandoned in favour of separate Czech
and Slovak nationalities.
3 For a detailed history of census taking and practices, see Kertzer & Arel 2002.
4 For a more detailed description of the development in the Czech part of
Czechoslovakia see Barsˇova´ in this volume.
5 The Presidential Decree exempted from loss of citizenship those citizens of German
and Hungarian ethnicity who had joined in the fight for liberation or were victims of
Nazi persecution. The legislation also established a possibility to apply for the re-
granting of Czechoslovak citizenship (a policy called ‘Re-Slovakisation in Slovakia’)
within six months after the Decree entered into force.
6 For decades, the topic of the transfers of ethnic Hungarians was taboo in Slovak
literature. The few texts that were written were from the pen of Hungarian authors
in Slovakia – Zolta´n Fa´bry’s The Accused Speaks Out (written in 1946) was published
in the 1960s, and in 1982 Ka´lma´n Janics’s Czechoslovak Policy and the Hungarian
Minority, 1945-1948 was published in the US in a small edition of a few hundred co-
pies. After 1989, the topic was begrudgingly picked up. The most comprehensive
analysis and documentation was published by Vadkerty (2002).
7 The voluntary part was secured by leaflets promising return of Czechoslovak
citizenship in return for being recruited as agricultural labourers. Leaflets also
reiterated that this was the very last chance for Hungarians to reacquire Czecho-
slovak citizenship.
8 The Czechoslovak census of 1947 records 390,000 Hungarians in Slovakia, the 1961
census records 518,782 (data from Kocsis & Kocsis-Hodosi 1998).
9 See also Barsˇova´ in this volume for the same pieces of legislation from a Czech
perspective.
10 Children born of mixed marriages, where one parent was a Czechoslovak citizen and
the other was the citizen of the Soviet Union, Poland or Hungary, represented an
exception. In those cases, citizenship was determined by an agreement of the parents
at the time of inscription in the book of births. In cases where an agreement wasn’t
reached, the child acquired the citizenship of the parent in the state of birth. If the
child was born in the territory of a third state, it acquired citizenship of the state on
whose territory the child’s parents had resided before they went abroad.
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11 Act No. 34/1953 Coll. Concerning the Acquisition of Czechoslovak Citizenship by
Particular Persons and Act No. 245/1948 on the Nationality of Hungarian Nationals.
12 Stipulated by art. 6 of the Act on Czechoslovak Citizenship.
13 This provision was defined by Act No. 86/1950 of the Penal Code. The penalty
included the loss of citizenship rights, expulsion from the army, and forfeiture of
property. Act No. 63/1965 abrogated this penalty and the next codification of the
Czechoslovak Penal Law did not include this kind of penalty.
14 Most socialist states had concluded bilateral agreements that excluded dual
citizenship among them.
15 See also Barsˇova´ in this volume.
16 A child whose parents were Slovak citizens acquired Slovak citizenship. If one of
them was Slovak and the other Czech, and the child was born in the Slovak territory,
then the child acquired Slovak citizenship. If the child was born abroad, it acquired
the mother’s citizenship. Parents could also agree on the child’s citizenship via a
statement until six months after birth.
17 ‘Pragocentrism’ was a term used by the Slovak leaders to denote the tendency of the
Czech representation to rule the country from a strong unitary centre, Prague.
Slovak elites have had qualms with Pragocentrism ever since the creation of the first
republic in 1918.
18 This claimed heritage is a controversial and complex one. Though perhaps only the
Slovak National Party would fully claim the legacy of the Slovak Republic of the war
period, together with the persona of its president, Jozef Tiso, responsible for
sweeping anti-Semitic measures, all parties and most leaders do recognise at least its
partial validity as the first form of official Slovak statehood.
19 For a description of the developments in the Czech Republic see Barsˇova´ in this
volume.
20 ‘Conditions for Gaining Slovak Citizenship Will Tighten’, The Slovak Information Press
Agency, 26 June 2007.
21 Art. 5 of Act No. 40/1993 Coll. on Citizenship of the Slovak Republic.
22 Art. 7 of Act No. 40/1993 Coll. on Citizenship of the Slovak Republic as amended by
Act No. 344/2007 Coll.
23 Art. 7 of Act No. 40/1993 Coll. on Citizenship of the Slovak Republic as amended by
Act No. 344/2007 Coll.
24 Art. 8a, sect. 9 of Act No. 40/1993.
25 See European Roma Rights Center report ‘Personal Documents and the Threat to the
Exercise of Fundamental Rights Among Roma in Former Yugoslavia’, www.errc.org,
retrieved in May 2006.
26 See also Barsˇova´ on Czech citizenship in the present volume.
27 Embassy of the Czech Republic in Slovakia, www.mzv.cz.
28 Among the main objections was the charge of ethnic discrimination concerning
access to the benefits of the law. The Status Law is also territorially limited in
implementation to certain neighbouring countries where the Hungarian minority is
numerous and where the standard of living is not higher than within Hungary itself.
Austria was therefore not included among the countries where the Status Law was to
be implemented.
29 I. Stupnˇan, ‘Schva´lili dohodu s Madˇarskom’ [Agreement with Hungary Approved],
SME, 12 December 2003.
30 The interview with Frantisˇek Miklosˇko was conducted by the author in Bratislava on
13 June 2003.
31 The interview with La´szlo´ Nagy was conducted by the author in Bratislava on 18 June
2003.
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32 Only 37.5 per cent of registered voters participated in the referendum. 51.5 per cent of
the voters were in favour of dual citizenship, 48.5 per cent against. 50 per cent of
eligible voters have to participate for a referendum to be valid in Hungary (or an
equivalent of over 25 per cent of all eligible voters must select the same answer on
the referendum). Source: ‘Neplatne´ madˇarske´ referendum o dvojitom obcˇianstve
[Invalid Hungarian Referendum on Double Citizenship], BBC Slovak.com, 6
December 2004. www.bbc.co.uk.
33 Peter Stahl, ’Madˇari hlasuju´ o dvojitom obcˇianstve’ [Hungarians Vote on Double
Citizenship], Hospoda´rske noviny [daily newspaper], 3 December 2004.
http://hnonline.sk.
34 The SNS sued Miklo´s Duray many more times afterwards for treason, libel,
damaging the name of the Republic, and more. Each charge was dismissed by the
courts. SNS leader Jan Slota called the representatives of the Hungarian minority
‘radioactive extremists’ (Slota: ‘Politici z SMK su´ ra´dioaktı´vni extre´misti’ [Politicians
from the Party of Hungarian Coalition are Radioactive Extremists], 6 June 2005,
www.sns.sk). Shortly before the parliamentary elections of June 2006 SNS popularity
climbed to almost 10 per cent in public opinion polls. In the June 2006 elections,
the populist left-leaning party SMER-SD came out on top with 29 per cent of the
votes. SNS came in third with almost 12 per cent of the votes. The former leader of
the government coalition SDKU´ received 18 per cent of the votes (Source: SITA
[Slovak Press Agency], 18 June 2006).
35 Arts. 5 and 6 of the Act No. 70/1997 Coll. on Expatriate Slovaks and Changing and
Complementing Some Laws.
36 Act No. 474/2005 Coll. on Slovaks Living Abroad and on Amendments and
Additions to Certain Laws.
37 Art. 5 of the Act No. 474/2005 Coll. on Slovaks Living Abroad and on Amendments
and Additions to Certain Laws.
38 Ondrej Sˇtefanko, ‘Slovenska´ republika a zahranicˇnı´ (dolnozemskı´) Slova´ci’ [Slovak
Republic and Foreign (Hungarian) Slovaks],Cˇesky´ a slovensky´ svet [Czech and Slovak
World], www.svet.czsk.net, accessed in May 2006.
39 ‘Pocˇet zˇiadatel’ov o azyl na Slovensku vy´razne klesol’ [Number of applicants for
asylum has gone significantly down in Slovakia], Sme, 1 March 2009. www.sme.sk.
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10 From civic to ethnic community? The evolution
of Slovenian citizenship
Felicita Medved
This chapter focuses on drzˇavljanstvo of the Republic of Slovenia, i.e.
on citizenship or nationality as a legal bond between a person and a so-
vereign state. After tracing the history of citizenship in the territory of
present day Slovenia, it gives a brief description of the evolution of the
Slovenian citizenship legislation, both in terms of the initial determina-
tion of its citizenry at the inception of the state in June 1991 and the
rules governing the acquisition and loss of citizenship. In fifteen years
of statehood the legal regime on citizenship has undergone several
changes. The Constitutional Law on citizenship was supplemented and
changed five times, with the first supplement already adopted in De-
cember 1991 and the latest amendments made in November 2006.
These developments have, on the one hand, implied an opening to-
wards certain groups, either in response to international standards or
for national interests. On the other hand, they have slowly supplanted
the civic conception of citizenship that governed the initial determina-
tion of Slovenian citizenry in 1991 with a concept of nation as a com-
munity of descent.
10.1 History of citizenship policies
10.1.1 History of citizenship up to 1991
Citizenship legislation in the territory of Slovenia first evolved within
the framework of the Habsburg Empire. The 1811 Austrian Civil Code,
which established a link between unified citizenship status and civil
rights and other regulations concerning citizenship, operated in the
Slovenian lands until the collapse of the monarchy, except in Pre-
kmurje, where Hungarian citizenship law was in force after 1879. In
close relation to citizenship, the right of domicile in municipalities (do-
movinska pravica, Heimatrecht), as a form of local citizenship, which
gives rights to unconditional residence and poverty relief, was regu-
lated on similar principles in both parts of the Austro-Hungarian mon-
archy in the second half of the nineteenth century (Radmelicˇ 1994:
207; Kacˇ & Krisch 1999: 607-613).
On 1 December 1918 most of the Slovene lands, the Croat lands and
Bosnia and Herzegovina joined Serbia and Montenegro to form the
Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (SHS), later to be named the
Kingdom of Yugoslavia. The Saint-Germain-en-Laye Peace Treaty,
which came into force in July 1920, and the Trianon Treaty, which
came into force one year later, established that a person who had a
right of domicile outside of Austria and Hungary from then on ac-
quired the citizenship of one of the successor states. The Saint-Ger-
main Treaty postulated, inter alia, that such persons could opt for the
citizenship of that successor state in which they once had domicile or
the successor state where the majority was of their ‘race’ or spoke their
language. However, not everyone who had domicile (pertinenza) in the
Slovenian Littoral and part of Carniola that thereafter belonged to Italy
automatically acquired Italian citizenship. Those who were not born
there or acquired domicile after 24 May 1915 or once had domicile in
this territory could opt for Italian nationality. On 25 November 1920
the provincial government of Slovenia issued the executive regulations
to the Treaty on the acquisition and loss of Yugoslav citizenship by op-
tion and request.1 The option was based on previous domicile or na-
tionality, i.e. ethnicity. According to the Rapallo Treaty between the
Kingdom of SHS and Italy of 12 November 1920, Yugoslavia provided
a one-year right of option for Italian citizenship for ethnic Italians in
the from then on Yugoslav territory (Kos 1994).
At the level of Yugoslav internal legislation, the 1928 Citizenship
Act2 introduced a unified citizenship, primarily based on ius sanguinis
a patre and the principle of a single citizenship. In the early 1930s, pro-
visions of Austrian and Hungarian regulations concerning the right to
domicile were replaced by membership of a municipality.
In the Slovenian Littoral, Italian citizenship legislation was in force
from 7 June 1923 until mid-September 1947. Italy did not apply any
special regulations concerning citizenship in the occupied territory dur-
ing the Second World War, whereas the German and Hungarian occu-
pying forces granted citizenship to certain groups of people by regula-
tion and law respectively, which were subsequently nullified (Radmelicˇ
1994: 222-223).
The post-war regulation of Yugoslav citizenship started on 28 August
1945 before the final organisation of the second Yugoslavia was clear.3
The following persons became Yugoslav citizens: 1) all those who, on
the date of the enforcement of the Act, were citizens under the then va-
lid 1928 Act; 2) persons who had domicile in one of the municipalities
in the territory, which according to international treaties became part
of Yugoslavia; and 3) persons who belonged to one of the Yugoslav na-
tions and resided in its territory without right to domicile, unless they
decided to emigrate or to opt for their previous citizenship. An excep-
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tion to this regulation was added in 1948, excluding from citizenry
with a retroactive effect those persons of German ethnicity who were
abroad and were Yugoslav citizens as of 6 April 1941, having domicile
in one of the municipal communities and were, according to art. 35a
disloyal ‘to the national and state interests of the nations of Yugoslavia
during and before the war.’4 Another Act adopted in 1945 (and nulli-
fied in 1962) concerned officers of the former Yugoslav army who did
not wish to return to Yugoslavia and members of various military for-
mations who served occupying forces and escaped abroad. They lost ci-
tizenship ex lege, followed by the sequestration of their property.5
According to the Paris Treaty with Italy which came into force in
September 1947 persons who had permanent residence on 10 June
1940 in the territory that became Yugoslavia lost Italian citizenship. As
obliged by the Treaty, Yugoslavia adopted a special Act on the citizen-
ship of these persons in December 1947.6 The Italian-speaking popula-
tion had a one-year option for Italian citizenship and Yugoslavia could
demand emigration of these persons within one year of the date of the
option. In 1947, an option for Yugoslav citizenship was also given to
those whose citizenship issue was not solved by the Treaty, i.e. to some
100,000 emigrants from the Littoral to Yugoslavia or other countries
before June 1940, who ethnically belonged to one of the Yugoslav na-
tions. The Paris Treaty also established the Free Territory of Trieste, a
project that lasted seven years until it was divided up between Italy and
Yugoslavia by the 1954 London Memorandum of Understanding. The
latter did not regulate citizenship directly, but gave guarantees for the
unhindered return of persons who had formerly held domicile rights
in the territories under Yugoslav or Italian administration, which the
Yugoslav law interprets as a qualified option.7 Remaining unsolved
questions were settled by the 1975 Osimo agreements, which con-
firmed that both states regulate citizenship and provided the possibility
of migration for members of minorities (Kos 1994).8
Yugoslav citizenship was unified and excluded other citizenship. Ac-
quisition of citizenship remained based on ius sanguinis. A victorious
revolutionary communist and national spirit of the immediate post-war
period was expressed in legal provisions concerning naturalisation for
members of Yugoslav nations and those foreign citizens who actively
cooperated in the national liberation struggle, on the one hand, and ex-
clusion and deprivation of citizenship for certain ethnic groups or mili-
tary formations who really or supposedly worked against Yugoslav in-
terests, on the other. The 1964 reform, following the new constitution,
abolished loss of citizenship on grounds of absence (as in previous
Austrian and Yugoslav legal arrangements), relaxed naturalisation of
expatriates (emigrants) and abolished the oath of loyalty upon admis-
sion. An odd characteristic of Yugoslav legislation was that in the areas
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which did not pose a threat to the regime, such as the equality of
spouses, introduced in 1945, gender equality and the position of min-
ors the legislator was already progressive during the period when inter-
national standards were only in the making. Yugoslavia was also party
to certain multilateral treaties concerning citizenship such as the Con-
vention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons of 1954, the Interna-
tional Convention on the Nationality of Married Women of 1957, the
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966, the International Con-
vention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination of
1966, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimina-
tion against Women of 1979 and the Convention on the Rights of the
Child of 1989.9
To better understand the problems related to succession in the field
of citizenship it is important to emphasise that Yugoslavia was a feder-
al state with a so-called mixed system of citizenship. Jurisdiction to
adopt citizenship legislation existed at two levels simultaneously, at the
level of the federal state and at the level of the constituent federal units,
i.e. republics. From the point of view of international public and private
law, the primary citizenship was Yugoslav (Kos 1996a). Internally, how-
ever, all Yugoslav citizens also had republic-level citizenship.10 Chan-
ging the place of residence to another republic or abroad did not affect
the republic-level citizenship. Access to another republic-level citizen-
ship was relatively easy though. At first it was conditional on three
years of residence, but already in 1946 one year of residence sufficed.
In the 1960s a simple declaration was enough for a change of repub-
lic-level citizenship, reflecting a high level of centralised decision mak-
ing.11 The 1974 Constitution, however, brought decentralisation of
power. According to the 1976 Citizenship Act of the Socialist Republic
of Slovenia,12 citizens of other republics received citizenship of Slove-
nia upon application if they had permanent residence in Slovenia. Re-
sidents from other republics, however, had the same rights as Slove-
nian citizens, except for those reserved only for citizens of the republic,
such as voting rights.
10.1.2 Succession and initial determination of citizens of the new state
Since the developments of the late 1980s and early 1990s showed that
it would not be possible to reach a consensual agreement on some
other organisational form for Yugoslavia or on succession, the Republic
of Slovenia unilaterally declared its independence on 25 June 1991. Slo-
venia had no historical heritage of independent statehood or concept of
political membership beyond republic-level citizenship within the for-
mer federation to fall back on. In that respect, Slovenia differs from
some states which came into being following the break-up of former
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federations, such as the USSR. Notably Estonia and Latvia restored
their citizenship laws of half a century earlier, emphasising state conti-
nuity broken by ‘lost’ or ‘occupied’ sovereignty (see Jaerve and Kru¯ma
in this volume). Some other new states adopted a ‘zero-option’ policy,
granting their citizenship to all people actually residing in the republic
either at the time of independence or at the moment the new citizen-
ship law was passed. This policy was more acceptable in those states
where the proportion of the ‘titular’ ethnic population was very high
(Medved 1996; Ziemele 2001; Mole 2001).
At the international level, citizenship in the context of state succes-
sion is addressed by binding and non-binding international instru-
ments, such as the 1961 UN Convention on the Reduction of Stateless-
ness and the 1978 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in
Respect of Treaties, containing large principles but lacking comprehen-
sive regulations.13 The primary concern of the international coverage of
law on citizenship in cases of succession remains focused on reduction
of dual citizenship and the avoidance of statelessness and deals less
with the initial determination of citizens, which is not a concern of the
established (old) states. Although there has been substantial develop-
ment in human rights law, laws concerning the acquisition or loss of
citizenship continue to be primarily considered a sovereign prerogative
of the state.14
In this context, Slovenia regulated citizenship issues through the
Citizenship Act adopted within the scope of the legislation relating to
Slovenia’s gaining of independence. The constitution was adopted six
months later, on 23 December 1991, and does not regulate citizenship,
but leaves it to the law. Since then, the citizenship law has gone
through several changes. The first supplement had already been
adopted in December 1991, followed by further changes in 1992, 1994,
200215 and most recently in 2006.16 Conceptually, the 1991 Act con-
tains two main categories. The first category includes provisions of a
transitional nature, which refer to the initial collective and automatic
determination of the citizens of the new state, complemented by provi-
sions governing the option for Slovenian citizenship.17 The second ca-
tegory regulates the acquisition and loss of citizenship of a standard
(permanent) nature.
As regards the initial overall determination of citizenship, the basic
principle is the continuity of previous citizenship upon state succes-
sion. Art. 39 stipulates that any person, who held citizenship of Slove-
nia and of Yugoslavia according to existing valid regulations, was con-
sidered ex lege to be a citizen of Slovenia on the day when the Act came
into force. This provision established the continuity with the previous
legal order, meaning that all laws and regulations which due to various
legal orders were in force in the territory of Slovenia in the past, in-
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cluding international agreements, are applied within the framework of
this provision. The period in which a person was born determines
which regulations apply for ascertaining citizenship.
The primary rule of the initial determination of citizens was comple-
mented with the optional acquisition of Slovenian citizenship for citi-
zens of other former Yugoslavian republics who had permanent residence
in Slovenia on the day of the Plebiscite for the Independence and
Autonomy of Slovenia on 23 December 1990, and who actually lived in
Slovenia. These two cumulative conditions determined what was con-
sidered the genuine link with Slovenia: the permanent residence con-
nected with social, economic and certain political rights and the actual
living there expressing the criterion of integration, which in practice
meant that the person had to reside in Slovenia, not only have a formal
residence there (Mesojedec-Pervinsˇek 1999: 656-659; Medved 2005:
467). In dimensions of time ‘actual living’ was established by the Su-
preme Court to be at least the period between 23 December 1990 and
the date of issuance of a final decision on citizenship. As for the con-
tent of this notion, which is not legally defined, administrative court
practice did not interpret it to mean continuous physical presence but
also considered living activities in a certain territory, such as where a
person earns a living, resides and fulfils obligations to the state to qua-
lify as such (Policˇ 1993).
The December 1991 supplement on art. 40 specified a further re-
striction, stating that the person’s application is to be turned down if
that person has committed a criminal offence directed against the Re-
public of Slovenia since Slovenian independence or if the petitioner is
considered to form a threat to public order, the security and defence of
the state.18
The legal period for the submission of the application was six
months and expired on 25 December 1991. More than 174,000 per-
sons, or 8.7 per cent of the total population, of which around 30 per
cent were born in Slovenia, applied for citizenship on the basis of art.
40 and 171,125 became Slovenian citizens.
The registration of the former republican citizenship was not carried
out very thoroughly and some persons who firmly believed themselves
to be Slovenian citizens were not considered as such and could not
prove their former republican citizenship in order to acquire Slovenian
citizenship. To address this problem two corrections were made in
1994, concerning the recognition and declaration of Slovenian citizen-
ship. Art. 39a stipulates that a person is considered a Slovenian citizen
if he or she was registered as a permanent resident on 23 December
1990 and has permanently and actually lived in Slovenia since that
date. However, this only applies if the person in question would have
acquired the citizenship of Slovenia according to the previous legal or-
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der. On the other hand, according to the new art. 41, persons younger
than 23 and older than eighteen years who were born in Slovenia can
declare themselves Slovenian citizens if one of their parents was a citi-
zen of Slovenia at the time of their birth, but the parents later agreed
on adopting the citizenship of another republic.
Registered permanent residency posed a problem for those immi-
grants who were not registered, but had a long-time factual residence
in Slovenia. They could not apply for Slovenian citizenship since they
were not legally considered residents.19 The problem of permanent re-
sidency also arose for those who were registered, but did not apply for
or did not acquire Slovenian citizenship. Becoming aliens, they had to
apply for residency status irrespective of how long they had been resi-
dent. The Aliens Act20 did not contain any special provisions for this
group of people.21 It only provided that with respect to the said persons
provisions of the Law should start to apply two months after the expiry
of the time within which they could apply for Slovenian citizenship or
on the date of issuance of a final decision on citizenship. On 26 Febru-
ary 1992, when the Aliens Act started to apply to these persons, admin-
istrative authorities transferred those who did not apply for residency
status from the permanent population register to the foreigners record
without any decision or notification addressed to those concerned to in-
form them of their new legal position.22 This secret ‘erasure’ became
known to the public only much later and the exact numbers of those
affected remain unknown. The state admits that 18,305 persons had
been deprived of their legal residence. In spite of several appeals by the
Ombudsman for human rights,23 non-governmental organisations and
some individuals, it was only in 1999 that the Constitutional Court
found that the Aliens Act had failed to regulate the transition of the le-
gal status of this group of people to the status of foreigners.24 The
Constitutional Court decided that the error should be corrected by the
legislator within six months which resulted in the Settling of the Status
of Citizens of Other SFRY Successor States in the Republic of Slovenia
Act.25 However, in 2003, the Constitutional Court also found this regu-
lation unconstitutional and ordered the Ministry of the Interior to im-
mediately issue decisions to retroactively return the status of perma-
nent residence to those who already had had their status changed.
Moreover, it asked the legislator to pass a new law within six months,
clarifying the criteria for those who, in the period between 1992 and
2003, left Slovenia for shorter or longer periods.26 The polarisation of
the political scene as well as public opinion led to various interpreta-
tions of the Constitutional Court decision. This resulted in a number
of initiatives for referenda, supported by right-wing parties, as well as
in the preparation of two separate acts. After the adoption of the so-
called ‘technical law’ in October 2003, opposition parties succeeded in
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calling a referendum on 4 April 2004. The voter turnout was less than
a third of the 1.6 million electorate, and the Act was rejected by almost
95 per cent. This development succeeded in thwarting the adoption of
any law to comply with the decisions of the Constitutional Court.27
The current right-centre government is now trying to prepare a special
Constitutional Law.
In the meantime, in order to settle the position of some of the peo-
ple who could not or did not wish to apply for Slovenian citizenship in
1991, or whose applications were rejected and who subsequently be-
came aliens or were even ‘erased’, the Citizenship Act was amended in
2002. The new ‘transitional and final provisions’ facilitated acquisition
of Slovenian citizenship for citizens of other republics of the former
Yugoslavia who were registered as permanent residents on 23 Decem-
ber 1990 and who have been living in Slovenia continuously from that
day. Duration of residence, personal, family, economic, social and other
ties with Slovenia, as well as the consequences a denial of citizenship
might have caused, were also taken into consideration. The deadline
for a free application expired on 29 November 2003, with 1,676 per-
sons being naturalised under this provision.
Apart from the two main categories – initial determination of citizen-
ship and optional naturalisation – the Citizenship Act contained a third
category of transitional provisions that were of compensatory or restitu-
tional nature. These provided for reacquisition of citizenship, which was,
according to art. 41, made possible for those who were deprived of Yu-
goslav citizenship and Slovenian citizenship on the basis of the 1945/
46 federal law on the deprivation of citizenship or on the grounds of
absence.28 They and their children could acquire Slovenian citizenship
if they filed an application within one year of the enforcement of the
Act. Since most of these people were living abroad, the application peri-
od was prolonged to two years in 1992. At the same time, a new art.
13a in the section concerning exceptional naturalisation stipulated that,
notwithstanding the conditions for regular naturalisation, an adult may
obtain Slovenian citizenship if he or she is of Slovenian descent
through at least one parent and if his or her citizenship in the Republic
of Slovenia has ceased due to release, renunciation or deprivation or
because the person had not acquired Slovenian citizenship due to his-
torical circumstances. The article also granted the government the right
to give a preliminary opinion on the applications. Due to this extensive
discretion and, inter alia, the violation of the principle of equality be-
fore the law, arts. 41 and 13a were nullified in 1993.29
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10.2 Basic principles of acquisition and loss of Slovenian
citizenship
The characteristics of current legislation are the principle of ius sangui-
nis and only limited application of ius soli, the prevention of stateless-
ness, gender equality in acquisition of citizenship, equality of parents
in deciding the citizenship of their minor children, equality of children
born in wedlock with children born out of wedlock, will of the person
concerned in the process of acquisition and loss of citizenship and pro-
tection of personal data. Further principles are the relative tolerance of
multiple citizenship and the validity of Slovenian citizenship in these
cases, meaning that a dual or multiple citizen is treated as a citizen of
the Republic of Slovenia, while in the territory of Slovenia, unless
otherwise stated by an international agreement. Foreign citizens may
acquire Slovenian citizenship by naturalisation on the basis of resi-
dence or of family ties or because of special interests of the state.30 Fa-
cilitated naturalisation is provided for immigrant children born and
raised in Slovenia and for Slovene emigrants and their descendants.
Discretionary power is provided for in all cases of naturalisation, how-
ever, it may only be exercised if the reasons, including the proof there-
of, are recorded in the written decision.31
10.2.1 Acquisition of citizenship
Slovenian citizenship is acquired by descent, by birth in the territory of
Slovenia, by naturalisation (through application) and in compliance
with international agreement (which is applicable only in cases where
borders have changed).
Under the ius sanguinis principle there are two modes of acquiring
Slovenian citizenship: ex lege and by registration. The registration has a
constitutive character and retroactive effect (ex tunc).
At birth, a natural person obtains Slovenian citizenship ex lege: i)
when both parents are Slovenian citizens, ii) when the child is born in
Slovenia and at least one parent is a Slovenian citizen (in the latter case
the acquisition of the citizenship ex lege is combined with the territorial
principle)32 and iii) when the child is born abroad and one of the par-
ents is a Slovenian citizen while the other parent is unknown, of non-
determined citizenship or stateless.
Children born abroad with one parent of Slovenian citizenship at the
time of the child’s birth can acquire Slovenian citizenship by registra-
tion. Registration can be initiated within eighteen years after birth by
the Slovenian parent without the consent of the other parent or if a
minor is a ward of his or her guardian, who must be a Slovenian citi-
zen.33 As of 1994, children over fourteen years of age have to give their
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consent. Those over the age of eighteen can acquire Slovenian citizen-
ship based on a personal declaration for registration. The age limit for
this procedure was extended from 23 to 36 years of age in 2002. The
November 2006 Act amending the Citizenship of the Republic of Slo-
venia Act, further clarifies the procedure and adds the condition that
those who register their Slovenian citizenship should not previously
have lost it due to release, renunciation or deprivation after they
reached majority.
Acquisition of citizenship by adoption follows the principle of citizen-
ship by descent when at least one of the adoptive parents is a Slovenian
citizen. An adoptee foreigner older than fourteen years has to give his
or her consent.
Ius soli applies for a foundling or a newborn infant in the territory
of Slovenia with no known parentage or if the parents are of unknown
citizenship or stateless. If it is discovered prior to the child reaching
the age of eighteen that the parents are foreign citizens, then Slovenian
citizenship shall cease at the parents’ request.
Those who acquire Slovenian citizenship under above described
principles are regarded as citizens of the Republic of Slovenia by birth.
Foreign citizens may acquire Slovenian citizenship by regular, facili-
tated and exceptional naturalisation.
The conditions that must be fulfilled for regular naturalisation are
very strict. The applicant has to submit a release from current citizen-
ship or a proof that such a release will be granted if he or she acquires
Slovenian citizenship unless the applicant is stateless or can submit
evidence that his or her citizenship is cancelled by naturalisation by
the law of his or her state of origin or that such a release was not
decided upon by this state in a reasonable period of two years.34 In
cases where applicants cannot present proof of expatriation, e.g. be-
cause the voluntary acquisition of a foreign citizenship is considered
an act of disloyalty, the declaration by an applicant that he or she will
renounce his or her current citizenship if granted Slovenian citizen-
ship suffices. However, the applicant usually has to present proof of ex-
patriation before he or she can be naturalised. This may lead to tem-
porary statelessness which can become permanent if after release from
the previous citizenship an applicant is no longer eligible for naturali-
sation, e.g. due to loss of means of subsistence or a prison penalty.
Since the authorities have to check if other conditions are still fulfilled
after the prescribed period within which an applicant must present
proof of release, the 2006 amendments specify that only those condi-
tions that can be verified administratively will suffice. The condition of
a release from current citizenship is waived for citizens of those EU
Member States where reciprocity exists.
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A second condition is that the applicant must have lived in Slovenia
for ten years, of which the five years prior to the application must be
without interruption, and, as added in 2002, the person should have
the status of foreigner. This imprecisely defined status is clarified in
the 2006 amendments as describing those people who have either a
temporary or permanent residence permit, which in practice prolongs
the waiting period for naturalisation. In addition, the applicant should
not have had his or her residence in Slovenia curtailed.
Further requirements are that the person does not constitute a threat
to public order or the security and defence of Slovenia, has fulfilled his
or her tax obligations and has a guaranteed permanent source of in-
come.35 In fact, the latest amendments state that the applicant is re-
quired to have such means of subsistence as will guarantee material
and social security to the applicant and persons he or she has an obli-
gation to support i.e. a basic minimum income for each person. More-
over, the law demands a clean criminal record, meaning, inter alia, that
the applicant should not have served a prison sentence of more than
three months or have been sentenced to a conditional prison term of
more than one year.36 The applicant will also be obliged to take an oath
of respect for the free democratic constitutional order of Slovenia,
which replaces the requirement to sign a declaration of consent to the
legal order of the Republic of Slovenia introduced in 2002. Finally,
there is the required knowledge of the Slovene language, which has
changed substantially. In the early 1990s, it sufficed that the person
could communicate. In 1994, an obligatory examination was instituted.
Many people failed the examination even though they had been edu-
cated in Slovenia. Currently, an obligatory examination at an elemen-
tary level is required unless the applicant went to school or acquired
education at a higher or at a university level in Slovenia or is over 60
years of age and has actually lived in the country for fifteen years or, as
was added in 2006, has acquired an elementary or secondary educa-
tion in the Slovenian language in a neighbouring country where there
are autochthonous Slovene minorities. Exceptions are made for illiter-
ates and for health reasons.
Facilitated naturalisation reflects specific interests of the state and
more recently, the will of the state to better comply with the standards
of the 1997 European Convention on Nationality. This mode of naturali-
sation affects particular groups of persons: Slovenian emigrants and
their descendants, foreigners married to Slovenian citizens, minors and
since 2002 persons with refugee status, stateless persons and those
born in Slovenia and living there since their birth. To these groups of
persons, the 2006 amendments added foreigners who have concluded
their university education in Slovenia. Exemptions from certain require-
ments are provided for these groups of applicants, in particular regard-
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ing the release from current citizenship and the required duration of re-
sidency with a foreign status in Slovenia. For example, an individual of
Slovenian descent or a foreign spouse of a Slovenian citizen can become
a Slovenian citizen after one year of uninterrupted residence. However,
the 2006 amendments show that these two groups of persons are not
treated equally. While the generational criterion (up to the third genera-
tion for direct descent) for descendants of Slovenian emigrants was ex-
tended up to the fourth generation, the period of marriage before a for-
eign spouse of a Slovenian citizen is eligible to apply for naturalisation
was prolonged from two to three years in order to dissuade marriages
of convenience. For those who have lost Slovenian citizenship in accor-
dance with the present Act or prior Acts valid in the territory of Slove-
nia, the residence requirement is limited to six months. Acknowledged
refugees and stateless persons may be naturalised after five years of ac-
tual and uninterrupted residence in the country. For persons born in
Slovenia who have lived there since birth (mainly citizens of successor
states of the SFRY), personal, family, economic, social and other con-
nections with Slovenia as well as the consequences a denial of naturali-
sation may cause are taken into consideration. Foreigners who have
concluded their university education in Slovenia will be eligible to ap-
ply for naturalisation after seven years of residence. For all these cases,
release from current citizenship is not necessarily required.
A minor acquires Slovenian citizenship upon the request of one or
both naturalised parents if the child has lived with that parent in Slove-
nia for at least one year prior to the application. If the child is born in
Slovenia, Slovenian citizenship can be acquired before the age of one
year. Citizenship may also be granted to a child having no parents or
whose parents have lost their parental rights or functional capacity and
who has lived in Slovenia since birth on the grounds of a petition by
the guardian who is a Slovenian citizen and who lives with the child.
The Ministry for Family and Social Affairs has to confirm that the ac-
quisition of citizenship is for the benefit of the child. In all of the above
cases the consent of the child above the age of fourteen is also neces-
sary.37 In the case of adoption, where there is no such relation between
the adoptive parent and adoptee as between parents and children, a
child not older than eight years, living permanently in Slovenia, can ac-
quire citizenship upon the request of the adoptive parents.
In cases of exceptional naturalisation, the interests of the state for ex-
ample in the field of culture, economy, science, sport, and human
rights are decisive and must be confirmed by the government. A per-
son qualifying for exceptional naturalisation may remain a double or
multiple citizen, but has to actually live in Slovenia without interrup-
tion for at least one year with a foreigner’s status before applying for ci-
tizenship. The latter condition does not have to be fulfilled when his or
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her naturalisation benefits the state for national reasons, i.e. when the
person is of Slovene ethnicity. The 2006 amendments clarify the con-
ditions for exceptional naturalisation of persons of Slovene descent, in-
cluding persons belonging to Slovene minorities in neighbouring
countries. Neither residence in Slovenia nor other conditions such as
material and social security or fulfilled tax obligations in a foreign
country are required in these cases.
10.2.2 Loss of citizenship
A Slovenian citizen cannot lose his or her citizenship by mere opera-
tion of law. There are five ways to lose one’s Slovenian citizenship: re-
lease, renunciation, deprivation and loss of citizenship through interna-
tional agreements, with the latter only being applied to cases involving
changes to state borders. Citizenship can also be lost by the nullifica-
tion of naturalisation.
Release is the regular way of losing citizenship by application. It is
the right of any Slovenian citizen who fulfils the stipulated conditions,
such as actual residence abroad and proof that he or she will be
granted a foreign citizenship. Release has to be approved by a public
authority, but discretionary power is limited to specific reasons such as
national security and national interests, reciprocity or other reasons de-
rived from relations with a foreign country.
Renunciation is a qualified option for dual citizens, meaning that
such a person has the right to renounce Slovenian citizenship. It is ac-
corded to individuals up to 25 years of age, born in a foreign country,
residing there and holding a foreign citizenship. Other conditions have
not been foreseen. The Ministry of the Interior has no discretionary
power and may issue a decree stating that Slovenian citizenship of
such a person ceased on the day that such a statement of renunciation
was filed. Minors, up to the age of eighteen years, enjoy a substantially
higher degree of protection regarding the release from and renuncia-
tion of citizenship, compared to the acquisition of citizenship. The con-
sent of both parents is required, regardless of their citizenship. In a
case of dispute, the Ministry for Family and Social Affairs decides in
the best interests of the child. Furthermore, children older than four-
teen years must give their personal consent.
Deprivation of citizenship is the only type of citizenship loss that the
state may initiate. A Slovenian citizen, actually residing in a foreign
country and in possession of a foreign citizenship may be deprived of
citizenship if it is ascertained that this person’s activities are contrary to
the international and other interests of the Republic of Slovenia. Proof
of the existing conditions must be given in the decree on the depriva-
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tion of citizenship, which may be issued by exception in the absence of
the party concerned.
Cancellation of a decree on naturalisation may occur if it is discovered
that naturalisation was granted based on false declarations or deliberate
concealment of essential facts or circumstances on the side of the indi-
vidual in question. It may also be nullified if the person acquired citi-
zenship on the grounds of a foreign state’s guarantee that the person’s
foreign citizenship will cease to exist if the person acquires the Slove-
nian citizenship and evidence of the loss of the previous citizenship
has not been submitted within the prescribed period. Nullification is
not possible if such a person would become stateless.
10.2.3 Dual and multiple citizenship
In general, Slovenian legislation is relatively tolerant of plural citizen-
ship on both entry and exit sides. The ius sanguinis and gender equal-
ity principles contribute to dual citizenship for citizens by birth, both
in Slovenia and abroad, since ius sanguinis transmission of Slovenian
citizenship is not limited to the first or second generation or by any
other requirements. Multiple citizenship is even possible for adopted
persons. Acquisition of the citizenship of another country does not
mean that the Slovenian citizenship is automatically forfeit, neither is
release from current citizenship required for certain groups that qualify
for facilitated and exceptional naturalisation, nor in cases of regular
naturalisation where expatriation would have harsh consequences.
The number of dual and multiple citizens is unknown. In June
1991, there were 15,000 registered dual citizens residing abroad (Kon-
cˇina 1992). After independence the number of dual and multiple citi-
zens substantially increased, both in the country and abroad. In 2005,
it was estimated that around 60,000 Slovenes permanently residing
abroad had Slovenian citizenship. Slovenia grants substantial political
rights to citizens abroad, including franchise in local, parliamentary
and presidential elections. The number of dual citizens in Slovenia is
much larger and is mainly the consequence of specific historical cir-
cumstances in which the new state was created and was partially de-
pendent on the citizenship legislation of other countries, notably Italy.
The transitional provisions regulating the option for Slovenian citi-
zenship did not touch upon dual citizenship and it is estimated that al-
most all people from other republics of the former Yugoslavia are dual
citizens. In 1991, it was also objectively impossible to make this type of
naturalisation conditional on a release from current citizenship. The
outcome of the Yugoslav crisis was unknown and the possibility of a bi-
lateral or multilateral regulation of citizenship did not bear fruit. The
break-up of Yugoslavia did not lead to de iure statelessness, since all
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successor states applied the principle of continuity of former republic-
level citizenship (Kos 1996b; Mesojedec-Pervinsˇek 1999: 655). Never-
theless, the interest in Slovenian citizenship was much higher than ex-
pected in 1991 when the authorities estimated that approximately
80,000 persons would apply for Slovenian citizenship (Mesojedec-Per-
vinsˇek 1997: 32-34). The reasons for such a response are various and
have so far not been well researched. Public discussions emphasise uti-
litarian motives, in particular the possibility to purchase socially owned
housing which was only open to Slovenian citizens. Suspicions that
holders of dual citizenship may be disloyal and that they pose a poten-
tial threat to state security led to a change in the political and public
mood and to legislative attacks on this status, mainly supported by the
Slovene National Party and the Peoples’ Party in the period from 1993
to 1996. While the liberal democratic government also proposed the
abolishment of dual citizenship in 1993, some other proposals openly
called for the retroactive nullification of all decrees under art. 40. In
1995, there was even an official initiative for a referendum on the is-
sue, which was only stopped by the Constitutional Court38 (Cerar 1995;
Dujic´ 1996; Medved 2005: 470-474).
10.2.4 Jurisdiction and procedures
Up to the end of 2006, the Ministry of the Interior had jurisdiction
over naturalisation and loss of citizenship. Following the concept of ter-
ritorial de-concentration of state administration, the 2006 amend-
ments to the Citizenship Act transfer this competence from the Minis-
try of the Interior to local administrative units. Only cases of excep-
tional naturalisation remain under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of
the Interior. Moreover, the Ministry still has a ‘controlling’ role in the
obligatory revision procedure for decisions on naturalisation and loss
of citizenship as well as documents related to the release from prior ci-
tizenship. In this procedure the Ministry can either confirm decisions
made at the local level or make a new decision. A period of nine
months is envisaged for the transfer of decision making.
Legislative competence lies with the government, which specifies the
requirements for regular naturalisation regarding, inter alia, residence,
income and threat to public order, security and defence of the state,
and defines the criteria for the naturalisation on the grounds of na-
tional interest and for the refusal of release from citizenship. A deci-
sion by the Ministry may be appealed and is open to judicial review
(see Policˇ 1997a, 1997b). Fees are relatively low (30,000-35,000 SIT,
i.e. 125-150 euros).
Local administrative units have the authority to establish and register
citizenship.39 Record keeping of citizenship is done in compliance with
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the Births, Deaths and Marriages Registry Act at the register of
births.40 The Ministry of the Interior keeps the central citizenship reg-
ister. Since this register does not constitute a separate database but is
part of the permanent population register, the 2006 amendments pro-
vide that the Ministry of the Interior and local administrative units
shall keep a register of persons who acquired citizenship by naturalisa-
tion and those who lost Slovenian citizenship. This register shall be
computerised and connected to the registers of foreigners and of
births, deaths and marriages. Personal data from this register may be
used by the employees of internal affairs when performing their duties
defined by law and can be forwarded to other users only if these are
authorised by law or upon the consent or request of the individual to
whom they relate. The Ministry of the Interior can forward personal
data of an individual to other states under the condition of reciprocity
only if such data are used for clearly defined purposes (such as settling
citizenship issues or realisation of penal proceedings) and that in that
state personal data protection applies also to foreigners. Slovenian citi-
zenship can be proven by attestation or any other public document of
citizenship issued by an agency with the authority for administering
the official register in which the citizenship of the person is entered, or
by the administrative unit where the person permanently resides. Ac-
cording to the latest change, any administrative unit can issue attesta-
tions of citizenship.
10.3 Current political debates
Until recently, the citizenship agenda was dominated by the heritage of
the dissolution of Yugoslavia. Subsequently, the citizenship legislation
went through a series of adjustments related to the admission of citi-
zens of other successor states of the former Yugoslavia. As has already
been pointed out above, the issue of plural citizenship prevailed in the
mid-1990s. After unsuccessful legislative attempts to abolish dual citi-
zenship there is an acceptance of plural citizenship for this group of
people as a reflection of the historical experience. Since the late 1990s,
the political scene has been dominated by the issue of the ‘erased’. Un-
til now, there have only been partial solutions to resolve the problems
of this group of people, either by regulating their status as foreigners
or enabling them to naturalise. Moreover, despite the more recent criti-
cism by the Commissioner for Human Rights at the Council of Europe
and by the Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) of the
Council of Europe, it is not expected that further attempts, including
the current government’s attempt to introduce a special Constitutional
Law, which requires a two-thirds parliamentary majority, will bear any
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fruit before the next parliamentary elections. Current political debates
have thus shifted the focus to societal integration of naturalised ‘for-
eigners’ and political participation and representation for these ‘new
minorities’. This debate is further enhanced by the realities of more re-
cent immigration and reforms necessary as a result of joining the Eur-
opean Union in May 2004.
In the pre-accession period the eurocompatibility was influenced
more by international trends, such as the 1997 European Convention
on Nationality of which Slovenia is not a party, than by indirect pres-
sure from the EU. This applies in particular to the amendments in
2002, refining and relaxing access to citizenship for recognised refu-
gees, stateless persons and second- and third-generation immigrants.
On the other hand, conditions for naturalisation have been maintained
and tightened. Since 2002, applicants must have the status of foreign-
er, as explained above. This status is an eligibility criterion that may be
waived only in some exceptional cases of naturalisation. Further
changes concern the question of loyalty. In 2002, the declaration of
agreement with the legal order of Slovenia was introduced, which in
2006 was supplanted by an oath of loyalty. In July 2005, the govern-
ment also further specified national interest as a reason for exceptional
cases of naturalisation, in other words, criteria for cultural i.e. ethnic-
affinity based naturalisation of Slovenes living abroad. The Govern-
mental Office for Slovenes around the world may offer an opinion on
the applicant, which has led to criticism and protests from members of
the Slovene diaspora.
In line with this protest, the political discussion focused on legisla-
tion regulating relations between Slovenia and Slovenians abroad, in
particular concerning the legal position of autochthonous minorities
living in neighbouring countries and emigrants and their descendants
with or without Slovenian citizenship. In April 2006, the National As-
sembly passed the Republic of Slovenia and Slovenians Abroad Act.41
The Act is based on art. 5 of the Constitution, the 1996 Resolution on
the Position of Autochthonous Slovene Minorities in Neighbouring
Countries and the Related Tasks of State and Other Institutions in the
Republic of Slovenia42 and the 2002 Resolution on Relations with Slo-
venes Abroad.43 The objectives of this legislation are to arrange rela-
tions of the ‘homeland’ with Slovene diasporas in order to strengthen
national identity and consciousness and promote mutual ties in the
fields of culture, care for the Slovene language, education and science,
sports, economy and regional cooperation. It introduces a new status of
a Slovene without Slovenian citizenship, regulates its acquisition and loss
and provides certain advantages to its beneficiaries. Acquisition of this
status would primarily depend on descent, activity in Slovenian organi-
sations abroad and active ties with the ‘homeland’. The Governmental
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Office for Slovenes around the world will be responsible for issuing
this status. When in Slovenia, the holders of this status will enjoy pre-
ferential enrolment at institutions of higher education, equal access to
research projects and public cultural goods, such as libraries or ar-
chives, as well as equal property rights. They will also enjoy priority in
employment over other third-country nationals. Until now, no one has
applied for, let alone acquired, this ‘quasi-citizenship’ status. The Act
also supports the return of Slovenian expatriates and their children
and also provides for repatriation, meaning immigration of Slovenes,
organised and financed by Slovenia in cases when there is, according
to the assessment of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, a severe crisis,
political or otherwise, in the states where they reside, and if their repa-
triation contributes to the development of the ‘homeland’. The Council
for Slovenians Abroad and the Council for Slovenians in Neighbouring
Countries will function as permanent advisory bodies. The councils are
headed by the Prime Minister, who appoints their members, composed
of representatives of state bodies, institutions, political organisations
and civil society organisations from Slovenia and abroad.44
There are certain parallels between the Slovenians Abroad Act and
the famous and controversial 2001 Hungarian Status Law, the 1997
Law on Expatriate Slovaks and the 1999-2001 failed Polish move to in-
stall a similar law (see Liebich, Kova´cs & To´th, Kusa´ and Go´rny & Pud-
zianowska in this volume). However, the Slovenian Government claims
that the Slovenian law cannot be equated with the Hungarian Status
Law since it does not interfere with the competences of other EU Mem-
ber States or the free movement of workers, nor does it establish Iden-
tity Cards valid in the territory of any other EU Member State.
The most recent political discussion concerned the future develop-
ment of citizenship legislation. A working group was set up to analyse
current citizenship legislation and its implementation and prepare
changes to the Citizenship Act. Due to the complexity of current citi-
zenship legislation there was a tentative suggestion for an overall revi-
sion, but this was hardly to be expected. In fact, when in July 2006 the
Act amending the Citizenship of the Republic of Slovenia Act was pro-
posed, the government claimed that it would not change the aims and
principles of the existing legislation, but it focused instead on require-
ments for naturalisation and some practical aspects, such as clarifica-
tions of imprecisely defined provisions, and on harmonisation with
other legislation, specifically concerning immigration and record keep-
ing.
Nevertheless, the Act was not adopted in a short parliamentary pro-
cedure as initially proposed by the centre-right government but caused
extensive discussion, particularly regarding the 89-word long oath of
loyalty, suggested by the Ministry of Justice. While the Liberal-Demo-
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crats proposed that the text of the oath be simplified, the Social Demo-
crats, another opposition party, argued that the text confuses the con-
cepts of ‘state’ and ‘homeland’ as the latter is not a legal concept and
that taking an oath of loyalty ‘to my new homeland’ shames a civilised
and modern society and is reminiscent of nineteenth century patrio-
tism. Moreover, the Liberal Democrats opposed the transfer of the ju-
risdiction over naturalisation and loss of citizenship from the Ministry
of the Interior to local administrative units, which in the government’s
view is the main novelty of the amended Act. They argued that such an
arrangement could lead to arbitrary decisions in spite of the revision
procedure by the Ministry. While none of the political parties opposed
relaxed naturalisation for ethnic Slovenes, the Liberal Democrats criti-
cised that conditions, such as residence in Slovenia or material and so-
cial security, are waived in these cases.
The Act amending the Citizenship of the Republic of Slovenia Act
was passed by the National Assembly on 24 November 2006. Since
the National Council did not veto the adopted Act in the prescribed se-
ven-day period, the Act came into force at the end of the year 2006.
10.4 Statistics
At the end of 2008, there were 208,484 naturalised citizens or ap-
proximately one-tenth of the total population of Slovenia. Roughly 81
per cent of all naturalised persons acquired citizenship according to
the optional provisions in the immediate post-independence period,
with the corrective provision of 2002 contributing to less than 1 per
cent. The great majority (98.7 per cent) of naturalised citizens origi-
nated in other successor states of the Social Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia, of these 46 per cent from Bosnia and Herzegovina, meanwhile
only 1.3 per cent from other countries. When considering naturalisa-
tion by standard provisions the share of the latter rises to 11 per cent.
These were mainly citizens from Western European countries and
overseas OECD-states. For example, 2,159 were citizens of EU States or
Switzerland, among them 1,024 of Italy and 510 of Germany. These
are followed by previous citizens of the Russian Federation (281) and
of Ukraine (237).
A quarter of all those naturalised according to standard provisions
acquired Slovenian citizenship by fulfilling all conditions. Almost 58
per cent of those were naturalised according to facilitated procedure.
Exceptional naturalisations present a rather large 17 per cent share.
Over 80 per cent of facilitated naturalisations refer to extension of ci-
tizenship to family members, i.e. to spouses and minor children. Eth-
nic-affinity based naturalisations are also significant.
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Table 10.1 Admission to Slovenian citizenship based on supplementary and corrective initial
determination rules (art. 40, 1991, art. 19, 2002) and on standard provisions for
naturalisation by country of origin, 25 June 1991-31 December 2008
Country of origin Art. 40, 1991 Art. 19, 2002 Standard provisions
Total % Total % Total %
Bosnia & Herzegovina 78,918 46.12 825 46.93 16,714 46.96
Croatia 58,531 34.20 319 18.15 7,194 20.21
Serbia & Montenegro 28,537 16.68 540 30.72 6,041 16.97
Macedonia 5,150 3.00 51 2.90 1,617 4.54
Other countries 23 1.30 4,029 11.32
Total 171,136 100 1,758 100 35,595 100
Source: Ministry of the Interior45
Table 10.2 Regular and facilitated naturalisations by groups of persons in Slovenia, 1991-2008
Regular
naturali-
sation
Facilitated naturalisation
Minors Spouses Slovenes
by descent
Born in
Slovenia*
Recognised
refugees*
Reacqui-
sition*
Stateless
person*
Educated
in Slovenia**
Total
9,547 9,691 8,108 1,789 68 25 21 5 8 21,870
*From 2002
**From 2006
Source: Ministry of the Interior
Table 10.3 Regular and facilitated naturalisations in Slovenia per year, 1991-2008
Year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Granted*
30,931 303 320 2,539 1,233 1,781 926 544 2,747 1,893 2,102 1,101 2,092 2,860 2,989 2,440 2,660 1,287 1,114
*Including art. 19, 2002
Source: Ministry of the Interior
The numbers naturalised annually reflect changes in legislation with a
low of 303 persons in 1991 and a high of 2,989 in 2004. The increas-
ing trend after 2001 can mainly be attributed to the corrective measure
added in 2002 to incorporate those whose status was not adequately
regulated in 1991. The decreasing number in 2005 indicates that this
problem is diminishing.
Table 10.4 Reasons for granting exceptional naturalisations in Slovenia
National
interest
Born in
Slovenia
Culture Health
sector
Sport Education/
science
Economy IT
sector
Interest of
the state
Religion Defence Tourism/
traffic
4,884 605 180 157 108 107 99 63 6 13 2 3
Source: Ministry of the Interior
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Ethnic affinity is the dominant ground of national interest for excep-
tional naturalisations, with birth in Slovenia representing the second
largest interest. All other state interests play only a secondary role,
comprising a modest 12 per cent share.
Table 10.5 Exceptional naturalisations in Slovenia per year, 1991-2008
Year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Granted
6,227 47 45 159 218 391 150 628 571 444 274 245 716 446 344 244 464 210 631
Not granted
1,185 3 19 68 36 88 66 14 88 35 27 32 130 57 16 506 n/a n/a n/a
Note: n/a = not available
Source: Ministry of the Interior
Since the peak in 2002, there has been a decreasing trend of excep-
tional naturalisations per year. On the one hand, this is the effect of
the 2002 supplements to the Citizenship Act whereby second- and
third-generation immigrants can be granted citizenship according to a
facilitated procedure. On the other hand, a strikingly high number of
refusals for naturalisation in 2005, mainly ethnic Slovenes living
abroad, can be attributed to the government’s redefinition of national
interest in citizenship acquisition. This is expected to drop again in the
coming years due to the changes in 2006 concerning the naturalisa-
tion of ethnic Slovenes. Nevertheless, a substantial rise in citizenship
acquisition was recorded in the election year 2008.
Table 10.6 Release from Slovenian citizenship per year, 1991-2008
Year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Granted
4,960 12 263 432 365 307 888 423 311 249 352 227 350 304 217 103 90 28 39
Source: Ministry of the Interior
The development of release from citizenship is relatively modest, show-
ing an increase until 1996 and since then a steady decrease to a low
figure of 28 and 39 in 2007 and 2008, respectively; 103 persons alto-
gether were not released from Slovenian citizenship until the end of
2005.
10.5 Conclusions
As a new state, Slovenia went through a process of initial determina-
tion of its citizenry. The question of the initial ‘body’ of citizens and
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simultaneously of legal integration of the majority of ‘non-ethnic’
Slovenes was resolved early in the process of independence and inter-
national recognition, and without great controversy. Several factors con-
tributed to this development. Firstly, although the establishment of Slo-
venia as a nation-state can be considered as a product of the so-called
eastern type of ethno-cultural nationalism, asserting the right to self-
determination and self-governance of the Slovenian ‘nation’, the initial
policy of citizenship rather supported democratic statehood over ‘na-
tionhood’. Citizenship was defined in territorial terms, close to ‘zero-
option’ policies, in order to ensure an even jurisdiction over the terri-
tory and people within the boundaries of the new state. By adopting
such an approach Slovenia could exercise ‘effective governance’, which
supported its claim for international recognition, in combination with
other elements of external conditionality attached to international re-
cognition, notably democracy and respect for minorities. This meant
that although some political groups had favoured, at this juncture, a
more restrictive definition of citizenry and consequently of polity based
primarily on ‘ethnic’ criteria, the timing would have worked against it.
What mattered was the very fact of instituting an autonomous citizen-
ship, a highly visible claim to external sovereignty. Secondly, such an
approach afforded all those affected by state succession the possibility
of participating in the establishment of Slovenia, reflecting confidence
in a harmonious relationship between ‘titular’ nation and ‘other’ citi-
zens. The promise given to permanent residents from other former Yu-
goslav republics that they would receive the Slovenian citizenship, if
they so wished, was seen as fulfilled.46 In order to satisfy e´migre´
communities, which largely supported the independence process and
to remedy injustices caused by deprivation of citizenship under the
previous regime, they were granted preferential treatment regarding
naturalisation.
What might initially have appeared as a progressive principle of
membership based on a civic conception, which could serve as a refer-
ence point for the evolving statehood and an opportunity for defining
national identity by embracing the multiethnic reality, took an ambigu-
ous turn after independence was achieved. There were attempts to
abolish dual citizenship for people from other Yugoslavian successor
states and only reluctantly was it eventually tolerated. Furthermore,
some of those who did not apply for or were not granted Slovenian citi-
zenship were deprived of their legal residence. At the same time, how-
ever, citizenship policy and supplementary or changed provisions on
naturalisation functioned as instruments for regulating the status of
immigrants and citizens of other Yugoslavian successor states whose
status had not adequately been regulated in 1991. In this process, the
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judiciary, in particular the Constitutional Court, played an important
role.
At the same time, Slovenia responded to international standards in
the field by introducing facilitated naturalisation for certain categories
of persons such as second- and third-generation immigrants or recog-
nised refugees. Nevertheless, state interests in naturalisation prevail
over those of the individual. The concept of a nation as a community
of descent means that the principle of ius sanguinis prevails in defin-
ing those entitled to citizenship at birth, that ethnic criteria play a ma-
jor role in naturalisation procedures and that Slovenia is attempting to
establish a special connection with Slovenes residing abroad. It also
supports a notion of imagined community by, for example, explicit re-
quirement of proficiency in the Slovenian language for naturalisation.
Furthermore, even naturalised citizens are often seen as foreigners in
most areas of public life. Current debates point to a need for a stronger
public sense of citizenship in the democratic polity, but do not suggest
any substantial change of the basic philosophy guiding citizenship pol-
icy nor – after the recent amendments – a comprehensive legislative re-
form.
10.6 Epilogue
In April 2007, less than half a year after the most recent amendments,
the National Council of the Republic of Slovenia proposed a bill
amending the Citizenship Act of Slovenia. The National Council is the
40-member ‘upper chamber’ of the parliament, representing social,
economic, professional and local/territorial interests. It is designed to
neutralise the influence of political parties that are involved in legisla-
tive processes, primarily through the National Assembly. The bill was
initiated by Marjan Maucˇec, the representative of local interests in the
National Council and a member of the Slovenian People’s Party (SLS).
He proposed that persons who were over 25 years of age in 1991
should have an opportunity to register as Slovenian citizens by perso-
nal declaration until the age of 45, instead of 36, which was the result
of a 2002 amendment. Moreover there was a proposal to further relax
the conditions for the exceptional naturalisation of persons of Slove-
nian descent, although the 2006 amendments had already facilitated
naturalisation for this particular group. The 2007 proposal foresaw that
ancestors of persons who applied for this type of naturalisation did not
have to originate from the current territory of the Republic of Slovenia.
In the discussion held at the National Assembly’s Committee of Inter-
ior Affairs, Public Administration and Justice, it became clear that
members of the Slovenian diaspora in Argentina, Australia, Brazil and
SLOVENIA: FROM CIVIC TO ETHNIC COMMUNITY? 327
Canada had initiated the proposed amendments. They had been ‘pro-
mised’ by some Slovenian politicians that these amendments would be
accepted. Nevertheless, the proposal was rejected by the Committee,
with the Minister of the Interior arguing that the age prescribed for re-
gistration was already very high compared to some other states and
that the exceptional naturalisation of persons who had at least one par-
ent who held Slovenian citizenship should remain limited to those
whose parents were citizens by descent and not by naturalisation. The
Liberal Democrats (LDS) expressed concern that this argument might
imply a differentiation between citizenship acquired by descent and ci-
tizenship acquired by naturalisation.
Chronological list of citizenship-related legislation in Yugoslavia/Slovenia
Date Document Content Source
1811/1867 Austrian Civil Code (arts.
28-32)
Regulates the citizenship
status of citizens living in
Slovenian territories
placed under Austrian
rule within the Austro-
Hungarian Empire
1879 Law on Hungarian
Citizenship (art. ‘L’)
Regulates the citizenship
status of citizens living in
Prekmurje placed under
Hungarian rule within
the Austro-Hungarian
Empire
1920/1921 Executive regulations to
the Saint-Germain-en-
Laye Peace Treaty (No.
147/1920; No. 122/1921)
Regulates the acquisition
and loss of Yugoslav
citizenship by option and
request
1920 Treaty of Rapallo Provides a one-year right
of option for Italian
citizenship for ethnic
Italians residing in the
former Italian territory
that became part of
Yugoslavia
1923 Italian citizenship
legislation
Regulates citizenship in
the Littoral according to
the operative Italian
citizenship legislation
from 7 June 1923 until
mid-September 1947
1928 Citizenship Act of the
Kingdom of Serbs, Croats
and Slovenes
(No. 254/1928)
Introduces a unified
citizenship throughout
the Kingdom
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Date Document Content Source
1941 German and Hungarian
citizenship legislation
Regulates the citizenship
ofcertaingroupsofpeople
in the German and
Hungarian occupied
territory during the
SecondWorld War
1945/
1946
Citizenship Act of the
Democratic Federative
Yugoslavia (DFY)
(No. 64/1945; No. 54/
1946)
Defines the initial
citizenry of the newly
formed Yugoslavia;
establishes Yugoslav
federal citizenship and
republic-level citizenship of
the six constituent
republics; is confirmed and
amended after the
adoption of the 1946
Constitution of the Federal
People’s Republic of
Yugoslavia (FPRY)
www.sluzbenilist.co.rs
(in Serbo-Croatian)
1945/
1946
Law on the Deprivation
of Citizenship for
Officers and Non-
Commissioned Officers
of the Former Yugoslav
Army Who Do Not Want
to Return to the
Homeland, and for the
Members of the Military
Who Have Served for the
Enemy and Have
Defected Abroad (No.
64/1945; No. 86/1946)
Deprives Yugoslav
citizenship of those
military personnel of the
former army of the
Kingdom of Yugoslavia
whodidnotwant to return
to the ‘new’ Yugoslavia,
those serving in military
formations loyal to the
occupying forces and
those who left Yugoslavia
at the end of the Second
World War; is revoked in
1962 (No. 22/1962)
www.sluzbenilist.co.rs
(in Serbo-Croatian)
1947 Law on Citizenship of
Persons in the Territory
Annexed by Yugoslavia
according to the Peace
Treaty with Italy
(No. 104/1947)
Determines that people
residing in territories
annexed by Yugoslavia on
10 June 1940 lose their
Italian citizenship and
acquire Yugoslav
citizenship; provides a
one-year period for ethnic
Italians to opt for Italian
citizenship and a
possibility for the Slav
population from the
contested borderland
region between
Yugoslavia and Italy to
opt for Yugoslav
citizenship
www.sluzbenilist.co.rs
(in Serbo-Croatian)
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Date Document Content Source
1948/1997 Amendment and
Revision of the Law on
Citizenship (No. 105/
1948); Constitutional
Court Decision:
U-I-23/97
Excludes from the
Yugoslav citizenry, with
retroactive effect, all
citizens of German
ethnicity residing abroad
on the basis of their
‘disloyal conduct toward
the national and state
interests of the peoples
of FPRY’ during and
before the war; is
confirmed as
constitutional in 1997
when applied to
procedures concerning
the ascertainment of
citizenship
www.sluzbenilist.co.rs
(in Serbo-Croatian);
http://odlocitve.us-rs.si
(in Slovenian and
English)
1950 Citizenship Act of the
People’s Republic of
Slovenia (No. 20/1950)
Defines ius sanguinis as
the basic principle for
acquisition of Slovenian
citizenship; specifies
conditions for a newborn
child to acquire
Slovenian citizenship if
the parents hold different
republic-level
citizenships, depending
on their residency
1964 Law on Yugoslav
Citizenship
(No. 38/1964; No. 42/
1964)
Enacted after the 1963
Yugoslav Constitution;
regulates the relationship
between the federal and
republic-level
citizenships; provides for
a united Yugoslav
citizenship; regulates
that only a federal citizen
can have republican
citizenship and that
republican citizenship is
lost with the loss of
federal citizenship
www.sluzbenilist.co.rs
(in Serbo-Croatian)
1965 Citizenship Act of the
Socialist Republic of
Slovenia (No. 11/1965)
Confirms ius sanguinis
as the main criterion for
automatic acquisition of
Slovenian citizenship;
unlike the 1950 Law,
stipulates that both
parents have to agree on
the child’s citizenship if
they hold different
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Date Document Content Source
republic-level
citizenships; determines
that any SFRY citizen has
a right to choose his or
her republic-level
citizenship and is thus
free to choose the
citizenship of any
republic without being
born or residing there;
abolishes the loss of
citizenship on grounds of
absence; relaxes the
naturalisation of
expatriates (emigrants);
abolishes the oath of
loyalty upon admission
1976 Citizenship Act of the
Socialist Republic of
Slovenia (No. 23/1976)
Confirms ius sanguinis
as the main criterion for
automatically acquiring
Slovenian citizenship;
specifies conditions of
citizenship acquisition in
cases in which the
parents do not agree or
do not sign a statement
in the first two months
following the birth of
their child; regulates
acquisition of citizenship
for citizens of other
republics who have
permanent residence in
Slovenia
1976 Law on Citizenship of the
Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia
(No. 58/1976)
Is adopted after the 1974
Yugoslav Constitution;
repeats the provisions
from the 1964 Act on the
relationship between the
various federal and
republic-level
citizenships; adds an
article on how to resolve
possible disputes caused
by the republican laws on
citizenship
www.sluzbenilist.co.rs
(in Serbo-Croatian)
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Date Document Content Source
1991 Citizenship of the
Republic of Slovenia Act
(No. 1/1991-I)
Constitutes the initial
body of citizens and
basic principles of
acquisition and loss of
citizenship; provides for
optional naturalisation of
residents from other
republics of SFRY (art.
40) and reacquisition of
citizenship for those who
were deprived of it on the
basis of prior federal law
(art. 41) in the
transitional period
http://e-uprava.gov.si
(in Slovenian);
www.legislationline.org;
www.coe.int
1991 Act Amending the
Citizenship of the
Republic of Slovenia Act
(No. 30/1991-I)
Supplements art. 40 and
stipulates that the
person’s application for
citizenship is to be
turned down if that
person is considered to
form a threat to public
order, security or defence
of the state or has
committed a criminal
offence directed against
the Republic of Slovenia
www2.gov.si
(in Slovenian and
English);
www.legislationline.org;
www.coe.int
1991 Constitution of the
Republic of Slovenia (No.
33/91-I; No. 33I/1991-I;
No. 42/1997; No. 66/
2000; No. 24/2003; No.
69/2004; No. 69/2004;
No. 69/2004; No. 68/
2006)
Postulates in art. 12 that
citizenship shall be
regulated by law and in
art. 5 (2) that Slovenes
not holding Slovene
citizenship may enjoy
special rights and
privileges in Slovenia, the
nature and extent of
which shall be regulated
by law
www.dz-rs.si
(in Slovenian)
1992 Act Amending the
Citizenship of the
Republic of Slovenia Act
(No. 38/1992)
Regulates naturalisation
for persons of Slovenian
descent through at least
one parent if they lost
their Slovenian
citizenship due to release,
renunciation or
deprivation or if they have
not acquired Slovenian
citizenship due to
historical circumstances
(art. 13.a)
www.2.gov.si
(in Slovenian);
www.coe.int
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Date Document Content Source
1992 Constitutional Court
Decision repealing
Articles 41 and 13.a of the
Citizenship of Slovenia
Act
(No. 61/1992;
Constitutional Court
Decision U-I-69/92-30)
http://odlocitve.us-rs.si
(in Slovenian)
1992 Constitutional Court
Decision repealing
Article 28 of the
Citizenship of Slovenia
Act (No. 61/1992;
Constitutional Court
Decision
U-I-98/91-21)
Provides that the reasons
for a discretionary
decision must be stated
in such a way that it is
evident whether the
administrative authority
in exercising its
discretionary power of
decision has acted
‘within the limits of
authorisation and in
accordance with the
intention of granting
such an authorisation’
http://odlocitve.us-rs.si
(in Slovenian)
1994 Act amending the
Citizenship of the
Republic of Slovenia Act
(No. 13/1994)
Provides for the
recognition and
declaration of citizenship
for residents from other
former Yugoslav
republics; extends the
age limit for citizenship
by registration; tightens
the naturalisation
criteria, specifically as to
language proficiency;
introduces consent of
minors older than
fourteen
www2.gov.si
(in Slovenian);
www.unhcr.org
1994 Decree on Criteria for
Establishing the
Compliance with
Specified Conditions for
Acquiring the Citizenship
of the Republic of
Slovenia (No. 47/1994)
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Date Document Content Source
1996 Resolution on the
Position of
Autochthonous Slovene
Minorities in
Neighbouring Countries
and the Related Tasks of
State and Other
Institutions in the
Republic of Slovenia (No.
35/1996)
Envisages various forms
of aid for these
minorities, taking into
account their specific
needs and interests and
providing them with
concrete aid in the
cultural, language,
informative, economic
and financial areas
www.uszs.gov.si
(in Slovenian)
1999 The Settling of the Status
of Citizens of Other SFRY
Successor States in the
Republic of Slovenia Act
(No. 61/1999; No. 54/
2000; Constitutional
Court Decision U-I-295/
99-13, No. 64/2001)
Regulates the acquisition
of permanent residence
for citizens of other SFRY
successor states
registered as permanent
residents in the territory
of Slovenia on 23
December 1990 or
residing in Slovenia since
25 June 1991
www.uradni-list.si
(in Slovenian);
www.legislationline.org
2002 Act amending the
Citizenship of the
Republic of Slovenia Act
(No. 96/2002)
Extends the age limit for
acquiring citizenship by
registration; adds stricter
criteria for regular
naturalisation, such as
the status of foreigner;
relaxes naturalisation for
refugees, stateless
persons and second- and
third-generation
immigrants
www.uradni-list.si
(in Slovenian)
2002 Resolution on the
Relations with Slovenes
Abroad (No. 7/2002)
Envisages cooperation
with Slovenes abroad in
fields of culture,
language, information,
economy, science and
foreign policy; declares
interest in repatriation, a
status of Slovenes
without citizenship and
citizenship and voting
rights for citizens abroad
www.uradni-list.si
(in Slovenian)
2002 Constitutional Court
Decision: U-I-246/02-28
(No. 36/2003)
Finds the Settling of the
Status of Citizens of
Other SFRY Successor
States in the Republic of
Slovenia Act
unconstitutional
http://odlocitve.us-rs.si
(in Slovenian)
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2006 Relations between the
Republic of Slovenia and
Slovenians abroad Act
(No. 43/2006)
Introduces the status of
Slovenes without
Slovenian citizenship
www.uradni-list.si
(in Slovenian)
2006 Act amending the
Citizenship of the
Republic of Slovenia Act
(No. 127/2006)
Introduces stricter
requirements for regular
naturalisation (material
and social security, clean
criminal record, oath of
loyalty) and
naturalisation of spouses
of Slovenian nationals;
redefines groups of
persons eligible for
facilitated and
exceptional
naturalisation
www.dz-rs.si
(in Slovenian)
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40 Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, 37/2003 and 39/2006. The officially conso-
lidated text was published in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, 59/2006.
41 Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, 44/2006.
42 Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, 35/1996.
43 Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, 7/2002.
44 The Council for Slovenians in Neighbouring Countries is composed of six
representatives of the Slovenian minority in Austria, four from Italy and two from
Hungary and Croatia. The Council for Slovenians Abroad consists of four
representatives of Slovenians living in European states, three from South America
and North America respectively, two from Australia and one from Slovenians
residing in other countries around the world.
45 The Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia does not gather and analyse data on
naturalisation. Tables in this section draw on data provided by the Ministry of the
Interior.
46 This promise was given by all of the political parties and in the Letter of Good Intent
(Official Gazette of the Republic Slovenia, 40/1990) adopted by the Slovenian Assem-
bly prior to the plebiscite on the autonomy and independence on which all perma-
nent residents could vote. Furthermore, the Constitutional Act Implementing the Ba-
sic Constitutional Charter on the Independence and Sovereignty of the Republic of
Slovenia (Official Gazette of the Republic Slovenia, 1/1991-I) in art. 13 specially provided
that citizens of other republics having permanent residence registered in Slovenia on
the day of the plebiscite and who actually lived there should have equal rights and
duties as Slovenian citizens during the transitional period with regards to the acquisi-
tion of Slovenian citizenship. Questions concerning the correct interpretation of this
document, however, have arisen specifically concerning the implementation of the
Aliens Act.
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11 Croatian citizenship:
From ethnic engineering to inclusiveness
Francesco Ragazzi and Igor Sˇtiks1
The politics of citizenship in post-Yugoslav Croatia are deeply marked
by the political climate in which they emerged. The law on Croatian ci-
tizenship was enacted on the day (8 October 1991) that the country’s
declaration of independence from the Socialist Federal Republic of Yu-
goslavia (SFRY) was enacted. The first decade of Croatia’s indepen-
dence was burdened by the 1991-1995 war against Belgrade and mili-
tary involvement in the war in neighbouring Bosnia-Herzegovina, and
dominated by Franjo Tudjman’s overtly nationalist party HDZ2, which
was in power between 1991 and 1999.
The new citizenship legislation cannot, therefore, be analysed sepa-
rately from the process of Yugoslavia’s disintegration. Almost all of Yu-
goslavia’s successor states – with some variation according to their spe-
cific context and at a different pace – used their founding documents,
constitutions and citizenship laws as effective tools to accelerate na-
tion-building and to ‘ethnically engineer’ their populations to the ad-
vantage of the majority ethnic group. Croatia was no exception to this
rule.3 In many ways, citizenship laws in Croatia were one of many in-
struments used to create what could be defined as a ‘transnational na-
tionalism’4, a nationalism that, by taking Croatian ethnicity as its core,
aimed not only to homogenise the national population through the ex-
clusion of non-Croats, but also to include all ethnic Croats in a single
national group, regardless of their place or country of residence. The ci-
tizenship laws proved a vital tool in the attempt to achieve this goal.
This attempt at both deterritorialised inclusion and targeted exclusion
was limited only by general international standards and norms related
to citizenship laws that the Croatian government of the 1990s was ob-
liged to respect.5
With the death of Franjo Tudjman in 1999 and the subsequent elec-
toral defeat of the HDZ, the beginning of 2000 marked a sharp con-
trast with the practices of the previous decade. Owing in part to demo-
cratic changes within Croatian politics and Croatia’s bid for EU mem-
bership, the implementation of the citizenship laws began to
demonstrate more inclusiveness towards ethnic non-Croats, although
the law on citizenship itself remained unchanged. It is through an ex-
amination of these political conflicts and debates and their historical
context that we can best present the normative framework that regu-
lates citizenship in Croatia today.
11.1 The history of citizenship policy in Croatia since 1945
11.1.1 Citizenship in federal Yugoslavia (1945-1991)
The citizenship laws in the Croatian lands (Croatia, Slavonia and Dal-
matia) that preceded the formation of the ‘first’ Yugoslavia in 1918,
date back to the second half of the nineteenth century. The 1879 Law
on Hungarian Citizenship (art. L) was applied in Croatia and Slavonia,
whereas the laws on Austrian citizenship (arts. 28-32) based on the
1811 (1867) Austrian Civil Code were applied in Dalmatia. In 1918, fol-
lowing the founding of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (re-
named the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1929), the citizenship issues that
arose due to the break up of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the
subsequent creation of new states, were largely settled by the post-First
World War peace treaties signed by the new Kingdom with neighbour-
ing countries.6 Yugoslavia only enacted its own law on citizenship in
1928, a law that established a single Yugoslav citizenship.
On 28 August 1945, the recently liberated ‘new’ Yugoslavia, a state
that resurrected itself as a federation on the political map of Europe
after the collapse of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in April 1941, enacted
the Law on Citizenship of Democratic Federal Yugoslavia.7 Art. 35 of
this law provided that everyone who had been a Yugoslav citizen on 28
August 1945 under the 1928 Citizenship Act of the Kingdom of Yugo-
slavia would become a citizen in Democratic Federal Yugoslavia. Yugo-
slav citizenship was primarily based on the principle of descent (ius
sanguinis; see Medvedovic´ 1998: 27-29; Jovanovic´ 1977: 22; Tepic &
Basic 1969: xxxvi). Since it was often impossible to prove former Yugo-
slav citizenship due to the widespread destruction caused by the war,
art. 25 declared that anyone belonging to one of the ‘peoples’ of Yugo-
slavia (that is, to one of the South-Slavic ethnic groups), those born
and raised in the territory of Yugoslavia and the permanent residents
of the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia (FPRY) would be consid-
ered citizens of the FPRY. Enacted in 1948 was an unusually named
law on deprivation of citizenship (which additionally entailed the con-
fiscation of goods): the Law on the Deprivation of Citizenship for Offi-
cers and Non-Commissioned Officers of the Former Yugoslav Army
Who Do Not Want to Return to the Homeland, and for the Members
of Military Forces Who Have Served the Enemy and Have Defected
Abroad (this law was invalidated in 1962).8 Furthermore, in the same
year the law on citizenship was revised in order to exclude from Yugo-
slav citizenship all citizens of German ethnicity residing abroad on the
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basis of their ‘disloyal conduct toward the national and state interests
of the peoples of FPRY.9’
A special act related to Yugoslav citizenship – the Law on Citizenship
of Persons Residing on the Territory Annexed to Yugoslavia According
to the Peace Treaty with Italy10 – was adopted in 1947 following the
Paris Peace Treaty between Yugoslavia and Italy. According to this Law,
anyone who, as of 10 June 1940, had been a resident of the territories
annexed by Yugoslavia would lose his or her Italian citizenship and ac-
quired Yugoslav citizenship. Ethnic Italians had a one-year period to
opt for Italian citizenship – in effect, to opt for whether they wanted to
live in Yugoslavia or Italy. In addition, an equivalent offer of Yugoslav
citizenship was made to the Slavic population from the contested bor-
derland region between Yugoslavia and Italy. The citizenship of these
groups was later defined by the Memorandum of Understanding be-
tween the Government of Italy, the United Kingdom and Yugoslavia,11
which divided the Free Territory of Trieste (1947-1954) between Italy
and Yugoslavia. Subsequently, their status was regulated by the 1975
Osimo Treaty between Italy and Yugoslavia (Medvedovic´ 1998: 32; Jova-
novic´ 1977: 27-31; see also Medved in this volume).
Together with the law on Yugoslav federal citizenship, the republic-
level citizenships of the constitutive republics were established.12 Yugo-
slav citizens were allowed to have only one republic-level citizenship.
This measure had very important practical and political consequences.
According to the Voting Registers Act of 10 August 1946, only citizens
of a particular republic had the right to vote in that republic. Citizens
from other Yugoslav republics who happened to reside on the territory
of that republic were not allowed to vote there. Republican People’s As-
semblies were supposed to be elected only by citizens of these repub-
lics, although some republics, such as Croatia, would later allow both
its citizens and residents to participate in elections of delegates for the
Croatian Parliament (see Hondius 1968: 184). It is important to note
that only republic-level registries of citizens existed in Yugoslavia be-
tween 1945 and 1991.13 During the era of socialist Yugoslavia, three
laws on Yugoslav citizenship were enacted (in 1945/1946, 1964 and
1976), following important constitutional changes in 1945 and 1946,
196314 and 1974. They defined the relationship between federal-level
and republic-level citizenship. Art. 1, para. 2 of the 1945/46 Law on Yu-
goslav citizenship stated that: ‘Every citizen of a people’s republic is si-
multaneously a citizen of FPRY and every citizen of FPRY is principally
a citizen of a people’s republic.’ The 1964 Law provided for a united Yu-
goslav citizenship (art. 1), made republic-level citizenship conditional
upon federal citizenship, and declared that the republic-level citizen-
ship would be lost with the loss of federal citizenship (art. 2, para. 2).15
The 1976 Law on Yugoslav citizenship contained a similar provision
CROATIAN CITIZENSHIP: FROM ETHNIC ENGINEERING TO INCLUSIVENESS 341
and added an article (22) on how to resolve disputes caused by the re-
publics’ laws on citizenship.16 These norms regulated the citizenship
status of a child either according to the citizenship laws in force in the
republic of which the child’s parents were citizens or, if the parents did
not have the same citizenship, according to the citizenship laws of the
republic where the child was born. The norms also offered an option
for parents of different citizenships to agree on the citizenship of their
child. If the parents could not agree, the child was granted a possibility
of naturalising in the republic of his or her birth. Not surprisingly for
the confederated structure that Yugoslavia progressively became after
the late 1960s, these adopted norms show some similarities to the
norms of international law in cases of legal collisions among sovereign
states (Jovanovic 1977: 53).
The republic-level laws on citizenship were fashioned to harmonise
with the federal law on citizenship, but in fact they varied from one re-
public to the other. They were adopted in three waves: in 1950, in 1965
and in the period between 1975 and 1979. In 1950, the Citizenship of
the People’s Republic of Croatia17 provided that the basic principle for
acquisition of Croatian republican citizenship was ius sanguinis. How-
ever, if parents of a newborn child had different republican citizen-
ships, the child could acquire Croatian citizenship if both parents
agreed. If they did not agree and they had residence in Croatia, the
child would automatically acquire Croatian citizenship. If the parents
did not have residence in Croatia but the father had Croatian citizen-
ship, the child would become a Croatian citizen as well.
The 1965 Law on Citizenship of the Socialist Republic of Croatia
brought some changes.18 Croatian citizenship was automatically
granted if a child was born in Croatia and both parents had Croatian ci-
tizenship. In all other cases, parents had to agree on the child’s citizen-
ship. Nevertheless, the law offered a possibility to any SFRY citizen to
opt for Croatian citizenship without being born or residing there and
regardless of his or her ethnicity (UNHCR 1997: 16).
In the 1977 Law on Citizenship of the Socialist Republic of Croatia19
we can observe some new changes related to the acquisition of Croa-
tian citizenship. Ius sanguinis principle remained the automatic criter-
ion for acquiring Croatian citizenship; if both parents were Croatian ci-
tizens, the child would automatically become a Croatian citizen. How-
ever, if only one parent was a Croatian citizen, the parents had to
agree. In cases in which the parents did not agree or did not sign a
statement within two months following the birth of their child, Croa-
tian citizenship was automatically accorded to the child if the parents
had permanent residence in Croatia. If the parents did not have perma-
nent residence in Croatia, the child would acquire Croatian citizenship
if his or her birth was registered in Croatia’s register of births.20
342 FRANCESCO RAGAZZI AND IGOR SˇTIKS
As shown above, citizenship in the socialist Yugoslavia was bifur-
cated into a federal citizenship, on the one hand, and a republic-level
citizenship, on the other hand. According to art. 249 of the last (1974)
SFRY Constitution, citizens possessed a ‘single citizenship of SFRY’
and every citizen of a republic was ‘simultaneously’ a citizen of SFRY.
The third line of the article offered an important right to all federal citi-
zens: ‘a citizen of a republic on the territory of another republic has
the same rights and obligations as the citizens of that republic.’
Yugoslav citizens were thus, in principle, able to choose their repub-
lican citizenship depending on their residency or employment. Never-
theless, since the republican citizenship was of no practical relevance,
citizens usually did not change their republican citizenship status if
they moved to another republic, and often they did not even register
changes of residence. Internal Yugoslav migration established strong
personal and family ties across republican borders, whilst economically
motivated migrations and the resettlement of federal administration
personnel resulted in a considerable number of individuals living out-
side of their republic of origin. This in turn affected the balance be-
tween ethnic groups in Yugoslav republics to a certain degree. From
the moment of Yugoslavia’s dissolution, federal citizenship ceased to
exist and the previously irrelevant republic-level citizenship became the
main criterion for the initial determination of citizenship in the succes-
sor states. The ‘internal’ Yugoslav migrants, residing in a republic
whose citizenship they did not possess and to whose ethnic majority
they did not belong, were the first to suffer the consequences of the
new citizenship regimes.
11.1.2 Croatian citizenship since 1991
The Croatian declaration of independence of 25 June 1991 – which en-
tered into force on 8 October 1991 after a three-month moratorium
brokered by the international community – was based on the referen-
dum on Croatian independence of 19 May 1991. Croatian citizens were
essentially asked to vote – which they did in huge numbers – in favour
of recognising
the Republic of Croatia as a sovereign and independent state
that guarantees the Serbs and members of other nationalities in
Croatia cultural autonomy and all rights of a citizen.21
However, Croatian Serbs generally boycotted the referendum and even
held their own to express their desire to remain part of Yugoslavia.
Six months previously, in December 1990, the new Croatian consti-
tution had proclaimed ‘the Republic of Croatia as the national state of
the Croatian people and the state of members of other nations and
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minorities who are its citizens.’ The new Constitution, adopted after
the first democratic elections in Croatia, replaced the 1974 Constitution
of the Socialist Republic of Croatia, which had defined Croatia ‘as a na-
tional state of the Croatian people, state of the Serbian people in Croatia
[emphasis added] and state of nationalities living on its territory’ (art.
1). Although the referendum question, together with the Constitution
itself, mentioned the rights of ethnic minorities and their equal status
in new Croatia, the constitutional definition of Croatia as primarily an
ethnically Croatian state had a direct impact on the new citizenship
law (which entered into force simultaneously on 8 October 1991).22
The law was conceived on the basis of two major principles: legal conti-
nuity with citizenship of the Socialist Republic of Croatia and Croatian
ethnicity (see Omejec 1998: 99).
All holders of the former Croatian republican citizenship became ci-
tizens of the new state ex lege (art. 30, para. 1). All other residents be-
came aliens overnight, irrespective of how long they had resided in
Croatia. Their naturalisation as Croatians was regulated by art. 8 of the
Law on Croatian Citizenship. According to this article, in order to be
naturalised a resident must have at least five years of registered resi-
dence in Croatia, provided that the following conditions were met: that
he or she had renounced a foreign citizenship or will submit proof that
he or she will be released from a previous citizenship if admitted to
Croatian citizenship; that he or she is proficient in the Croatian lan-
guage and Latin script; that it can be concluded from the applicant’s
conduct that he or she is attached to the legal system and customs of
the Republic of Croatia; and finally, that he or she accepts the Croatian
culture [emphases added].23
The law put those with less than five years of registered residence
and those who were unable to prove that they had been released from
foreign citizenship (i.e. previous republican citizenship)24 in a particu-
larly difficult position. In a context in which Croatia was at war with
the Yugoslav Federation (which initially consisted of the Republics of
Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina and then pro-
gressively shrank to just Serbia and Montenegro) it was virtually im-
possible to satisfy this condition. Only aliens born in the territory,
spouses, emigrants and those whose citizenship was of interest to
Croatia did not have to prove release from their previous citizenship
under the naturalisation procedure. However, the first two categories
have to fulfil more requirements than the latter two. Moreover, all ap-
plicants for naturalisation have to prove that they accept the Croatian
legal system, customs and culture (see section 11.2.1.3 for further de-
tails). Between 1991 and 1993 decisions on applications, which are
made by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, were discretionary, since the
Ministry was not obliged to state its reasons for refusing a request. In
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1993 the Constitutional Court ordered the Ministry in charge to begin
explaining its decisions.25
The ethnocentric features of the 1991 Citizenship Law were con-
firmed again in the transitional provisions, determining the initial citi-
zenry of Croatia and including a special mode of acquiring citizenship
for ethnic Croats who were registered but did not possess Croatian re-
public-level citizenship. They could acquire Croatian citizenship by de-
claration, i.e. by issuing a written statement to the police that they con-
sidered themselves Croatian citizens. Once the police had checked
whether the individual in question had fulfilled the above require-
ments, he or she was then entered into the citizenship registry (see art.
30, para. 2).26 In 1993, the Croatian Constitutional Court rejected the
petition filed by the Social Democratic Union demanding the removal
of the entire art. 30 on the basis of the latter’s discrimination against
non-Croats in the same position. The Court stated that the Croatian Ci-
tizenship Law respected international law on statelessness and that it
did not threaten to ‘leave a person without citizenship’, since all SFRY
citizens had to have a republic-level citizenship. Furthermore, the
Court stated that the Law itself did not explicitly revoke anyone’s citi-
zenship (UNCHR 1997: 17).
Not only does the law lay down a specific procedure of acquiring
Croatian nationality for residents of Croatian ethnicity in the article de-
termining the initial citizenry of Croatia, it also offers facilitated natur-
alisation to emigrants and their descendents, who accept the Croatian
legal system, customs and culture (art. 12). Moreover, it paves the way
for ethnic Croats without previous or current residence in Croatia to
obtain Croatian nationality by declaration (art. 16). There is in fact a
large population of Croats living abroad. Non-resident Croats can be
classified in two categories. The first category is composed of the des-
cendents of emigrants who left Croatian territory. This comprises the
1880-1914 migration, mainly to the Americas. About 600,000 Croats
were believed to be living in North America by 1914 (Holjevac 1968:
23). This flow continued in the 1920s and 1930s. However, it also com-
prises the post-Second World War emigration of about 300,000 people
(Bilandzˇic´ 1985: 9) who fled Communist Yugoslavia, as well as an esti-
mated number of 1,100,000 ‘gastarbeiter’ and their descendents27 who
remained in their mainly European countries of destination (Baskin
1986: 27). The second ‘diaspora’ category is composed of Croats from
Bosnia and Herzegovina, who represent about 16 per cent of the total
population of that country. Despite the fact that they were one of the
‘constitutive peoples’ of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, they
were considered potential Croatian citizens in ‘diaspora’. Indeed, art.
16 facilitated the naturalisation of ethnic Croats living in the ‘near
abroad’ (former Yugoslav republics), especially for those in Bosnia-Her-
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zegovina, while art. 11 facilitated the naturalisation of the Croatian eth-
nic emigrants and their descendents, even if they did not satisfy the
conditions stated in art. 8 regarding proficiency in the Croatian lan-
guage.
Since legal continuity with previous citizenship of the Socialist Re-
public of Croatia was the determining factor for the establishment of
the initial citizenry of the newly independent state, the Republican Re-
gistrar’s Office was supposed to issue certificates on Croatian citizen-
ship. Problems occurred, however, when an individual was registered
but his or her republican citizenship was not Croatian (for instance,
the father’s republican citizenship was sometimes used to determine
the republican citizenship of a child), or if no republican citizenship
was officially recorded. In the former cases, the persons were consid-
ered aliens and had to apply for naturalisation, whereas the latter were
sent to police agencies to have their citizenship determined or were al-
lowed to register as Croatian citizens – according to art. 30, para. 2 – if
they were able to prove Croat ethnic origins (UNHCR 1997). If they
were not able to provide the necessary proof (or were simply of a differ-
ent ethnicity), they were considered aliens by law. But how could some-
one actually prove his or her Croat ethnic origins? Any official docu-
ment released by SFRY or republican authorities in which a person de-
clared himself to be ethnically Croat usually sufficed, but sometimes
more unusual documents, such as Catholic Church certificates (among
South Slavs born south of Slovenia being a Roman Catholic has been
considered the strongest proof of someone’s ‘Croatness’) were also ac-
cepted by state authorities.28
The citizenship status of Croatia’s Serb minority in the Krajina re-
gion was particularly problematic.29 Given the fact that in 1991 the
Croatian Serb militia, with the help of the Yugoslav federal army, took
control of almost one-third of Croatia’s territory (mostly in the Krajina
region but also in Central and Eastern Slavonia), the citizenship status
of the ethnic Serb population living in these regions remained unre-
solved for almost a decade. Croatian Serb refugees, who fled or were
forced to leave Krajina during and after the Croatian military takeover
in 1995 and found themselves in Serbia or Bosnia-Herzegovina (in the
Serb entity), were in a particularly difficult situation. They were all leg-
ally Croatian citizens but did not possess a certificate of Croatian citi-
zenship (domovnica) and, therefore, could not claim all their rights as
Croatian citizen. Up until the political changes in 2000, the Croatian
authorities imposed numerous obstacles to prevent ethnic Serb refu-
gees from acquiring valid documents (certificates on citizenship, pass-
ports, etc.) testifying to their nationality – the goal being to make their
return to Croatia and the restitution of their goods impossible (see re-
port on Croatia in Imeri 2006: 129-131).
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With the death of Croatia’s President Franjo Tudjman and the subse-
quent defeat of his party (HDZ) in the 2000 parliamentary elections,
Croatia declared its willingness to quickly satisfy all the conditions ne-
cessary for EU membership. As a consequence, the situation regarding
citizenship policy has significantly improved. Although there have as
yet been no changes in the text of its citizenship law, the administrative
implementation reveals a greater degree of inclusiveness towards eth-
nic non-Croats – without, however, withdrawing privileges offered to
ethnic Croats outside the country. Today, Croatian Serb refugees face
no significant obstacles in acquiring proof of Croatian citizenship,
although some issues related to the citizenship policies of the 1990s
remain unresolved.30 The EU stated that the return of these refugees
to Croatia and the full restitution and reparation of their material goods
was an important political condition for Croatia’s membership talks.
11.2 Acquisition and loss of Croatian citizenship: Current legal
provisions
11.2.1 Acquisition of Croatian citizenship
The 1991 Law on Croatian Citizenship as amended in 1992 offers four
modes of acquiring Croatian citizenship:
1. acquisition by descent;
2. acquisition by birth on the territory of the Republic of Croatia;
3. acquisition through naturalisation;
4. acquisition through international treaties.
The last of these is not explicitly discussed in the citizenship regula-
tions, since the treaties themselves regulate the modalities for acquir-
ing Croatian citizenship. The only treaty of interest here is the agree-
ment on dual citizenship signed by Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina on
29 March 2007 but not yet ratified (see section 11.2.3 below).
11.2.1.1 Acquisition by descent
As regulated in art. 4 and art. 5, the principle of descent – ius sangui-
nis, the dominant principle for the acquisition of Croatian citizenship
– applies when (1) both parents are Croatian citizens at the time of a
child’s birth, irrespective of the place of birth; (2) one parent is a Croa-
tian citizen and the child is born in the Republic of Croatia; (3) one par-
ent is a Croatian citizen and the other parent is stateless or of un-
known citizenship and the child is born abroad; (4) one parent is a
Croatian citizen and the other parent is a foreign citizen or of un-
known citizenship and the child is born abroad, provided that the
child, before turning eighteen, either (a) has been registered as a resi-
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dent in the territory of the Republic of Croatia or (b) has been regis-
tered with Croatian authorities, abroad or in Croatia; (5) one parent is a
Croatian citizen and the other parent is a foreign citizen or of un-
known citizenship and the child is born abroad, even if the child does
not comply with the above mentioned conditions, if he or she would
otherwise be left stateless; finally (6) a stateless child, or a child of for-
eign citizenship, has access to Croatian citizenship if he or she is
adopted by Croatian citizens. There is no provision in the law specify-
ing the number of generations that can benefit from the acquisition of
citizenship by descent. Moreover, those born abroad who do not satisfy
the above conditions can acquire citizenship through two other provi-
sions: art. 11 (concerning emigrants) and art. 16 (concerning ethnic
Croats who do not reside in the Republic of Croatia).
11.2.1.2 Acquisition by birth on the territory
As is common practice in all European states, art. 7 adds a residual di-
mension of ius soli in order to prevent statelessness: a child who was
born or found on the territory of the Republic of Croatia acquires Croa-
tian citizenship if both of his or her parents are unknown or of un-
known citizenship or if they are stateless persons. However, the child
loses his or her Croatian citizenship if by the time he or she is fourteen
both of his or her parents are recognised as foreign citizens.
11.2.1.3 Acquisition by naturalisation
Naturalisation has been pointedly used to grant Croatian citizenship to
former citizens of SFRY who did not fulfil the criteria of art. 30 para. 1.
and para. 2 that regulate the initial determination of the Croatian citi-
zenry (see section 11.1.2 for further details). Following the description
of Omejec (1998), Croatian citizenship legislation foresees two modes
of acquiring Croatian citizenship through naturalisation: ‘regular’ and
‘facilitated’ naturalisation. It also considers the case of minors, and the
case of individuals who can be ‘reintegrated’ into the Croatian citi-
zenry.
Regular naturalisation
In order to obtain Croatian citizenship, an alien is required to fulfil the
following requirements contained in art. 8. The foreign national must:
1. be at least eighteen years old when submitting his or her request;
2. have renounced any foreign citizenship, or submit proof that he or
she will be released from other citizenships;
3. have had registered residence in the territory of the Republic of
Croatia for at least five years;
4. be familiar with the Croatian language and the Latin alphabet.
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5. Moreover, it must be concluded from his or her behaviour that he
or she respects the legal order, the customs and the culture of the
Republic of Croatia. This particular provision (art. 8.1.5) of the law
has been often used in the past by the Ministry of Interior (the Min-
istry in charge of determining the validity of naturalisation applica-
tions) to deny Croatian citizenship to ethnic non-Croats with long-
term residence in Croatia.
Facilitated naturalisation
The procedure of facilitated naturalisation is used when, in spite of the
fact that some of the conditions listed above are not fulfilled, there is
an intention to admit an alien into the Croatian citizenry. There are
several grounds on which an alien can be naturalised in this way:
1. Art. 9 allows for granting citizenship to aliens who were born in
the Republic of Croatia, have had five years of residence prior to
their application and for whom it can be concluded from their beha-
viour that they have respected the legal order, the customs and the
culture of the Republic of Croatia. Hence, this specific group of ap-
plicants does not have to fulfil conditions 1, 2 and 4 of the regular
naturalisation procedure.31
2. Art. 10 allows for the spouse of a Croatian citizen with permanent
residency in the Republic of Croatia to obtain Croatian citizenship,
provided that it can be concluded from his or her behaviour that he
or she respects the legal order, the customs and the culture of the
Republic of Croatia.
3. Emigrants, their descendants and their spouses are similarly
granted citizenship following art. 11, even if they do ‘not meet the
prerequisites from art. 8, paragraph 1, points 1-4’. An emigrant is
defined as a ‘person who has emigrated from Croatia with the in-
tention to live permanently abroad’. There is no specification in the
law as to the number of generations entitled to apply through art.
11. This opens a possibility to all emigrants and their descendents
to acquire Croatian citizenship. Candidates have to show documents
proving the emigration from the territory of the Republic of Croatia,
and the connection to the original emigrant (through birth and
marriage certificates).
4. According to art. 12, any foreign citizen, as well as his or her
spouse, can be granted Croatian citizenship by the competent min-
istry if this is deemed to be in the interest of the Republic of Croatia
(upon condition, as always, that it can be concluded from his or her
behaviour that he or she respects the legal order, the customs and
the culture of the Republic of Croatia).
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Naturalisation of minors
The Law on Croatian Citizenship does not allow minors to acquire
Croatian citizenship independently of their parents. According to art.
13, there are three possibilities for a child to acquire Croatian citizen-
ship through naturalisation: (1) if both parents acquire citizenship by
naturalisation; (2) if only one parent acquires citizenship by naturalisa-
tion and the child lives in the Republic of Croatia; or (3) if only one par-
ent acquires citizenship by naturalisation and the other is a stateless
person or a person of unknown citizenship and the child is living
abroad. Finally, according to art. 14, a child adopted by a Croatian citi-
zen with parental effect can be naturalised according to the facilitated
procedure even if he or she does not meet the prerequisites defined in
art. 8.1.1-4.
Reacquisition of Croatian citizenship
On top of the legal dispositions for the naturalisation of aliens, there
are provisions for reacquisition of citizenship by former Croatian citi-
zens who have lost it. There are two main possibilities for ‘reintegrat-
ing’ people into the Croatian citizenry. According to art. 15, Croatian ci-
tizenship can be granted again to an individual who had to renounce
his or her Croatian citizenship for another citizenship in order to ‘con-
duct a profession or a business’, even if he or she does not meet the
prerequisites of art. 8.1.1-4. Another case concerns individuals who
have lost their citizenship as minors. According to art. 23, children of
Croatian citizens whose citizenship has been revoked (art. 20) or re-
nounced by their parents while they were minors (art. 22) can regain
citizenship if they reside for one year in the territory of the Republic of
Croatia and issue a written statement stating that they consider them-
selves Croatian citizens.
Acquisition by declaration
Art. 16, quite problematically, grants citizenship to any ‘member of the
Croatian people who does not have a place of residence in the Republic
of Croatia […] if he or she meets the prerequisites of art. 8.1.5 of this
Law and if he or she issues a written statement that he or she consid-
ers himself or herself to be a Croatian citizen.’32
11.2.2 Loss of Croatian citizenship
According to art. 17, there are three principal ways in which Croatian
citizenship can be terminated: (1) release,33 (2) renunciation or (3)
through international treaties. The last of these, as is the case for the
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acquisition of citizenship, is not explicitly discussed in citizenship reg-
ulations for the above-mentioned reasons.
11.2.2.1 Release
Release from citizenship by the state authorities, is regulated by art. 18
and art. 19. Release from citizenship cannot be obtained by a Croatian
citizen who at the moment of the request is charged and prosecuted ex
officio, or as long as he or she has not served his or her sentence. In ad-
dition, the citizen must be at least eighteen years old, must have ful-
filled his military service obligations, must have paid taxes and must
have fulfilled any obligations to his or her spouse, parents and chil-
dren. Moreover, proof of a foreign citizenship or evidence that the for-
eign citizenship will be granted must also be submitted. The price of
this procedure is, however, unusually high for an ordinary Croatian ci-
tizen. It is currently fixed at 3,600 kunas, i.e. approximately 500 euros,
which is just below the average monthly wage in Croatia.34
11.2.2.2 Renunciation
According to Omejec (1998: 122), the purpose of the right to renounce
Croatian citizenship is to not restrict the freedom of choice of those in
possession of dual citizenship. Croatian citizens have the right to re-
nounce citizenship if they are over eighteen, have a foreign citizenship
and reside abroad. The children of these citizens, if they are minors,
are considered in the same way as their parents, although they can re-
claim their lost citizenship, as explained above.
11.2.2.3 Lapse or withdrawal of citizenship
The Croatian citizenship regulations do not specify cases in which citi-
zenship is lost against the will of the person affected. Contrary to most
countries, there are no provisions concerning, for example, treason or
service in a foreign army.
11.2.3 Dual citizenship
The question of dual citizenship is rather ambiguously treated. Two ar-
ticles are in fact in partial contradiction. On the one hand, art. 2 expli-
citly states that Croatian citizens may have another citizenship, even if
it is not recognised by the Republic of Croatia: ‘the citizen of the Re-
public of Croatia who has foreign citizenship is, before the state autho-
rities of the Republic of Croatia, to be considered a Croatian citizen ex-
clusively’. On the other hand, art. 8 specifies that a foreign national
who intends to acquire Croatian citizenship has to renounce his or her
current citizenship (art. 8.1.2). In practice, members of the Croatian
‘diaspora’ in the US, Canada, Australia, Germany and other countries
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have been able to obtain Croatian citizenship quite easily and maintain
their other citizenship. The same is true for citizens of Bosnia and Her-
zegovina.35
11.3 Current political debates and planned changes
Since its adoption in 1991, the Croatian Law on Citizenship has been
heavily criticised, particularly by NGOs and international human rights
agencies, as well as by some non-nationalist political parties, for its eth-
nic overtones, open discrimination against ethnic non-Croats and Croa-
tia’s policy of granting its citizenship to ethnic Croats abroad, particu-
larly to those living in the ‘near abroad’ in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In spite
of these occasional calls for changes to the text of the law, the 1991
Law, although amended, is still in force. Nevertheless, with the accel-
eration of Croatia’s membership negotiations with the EU, changes to
the law itself were announced by government officials in relation to
Croatia’s adoption of the European Convention on Nationality.
The Croatian Parliament (Hrvatski Sabor) was supposed to adopt the
European Convention on Nationality in 2006. Art. 5 of the Convention
explicitly forbids discrimination on ethnic, religious or racial grounds,
and since the Council of Europe had already required Croatia to change
its law on citizenship, it was made clear by the Croatian authorities
that the law – especially the controversial points regarding unequal
treatment of individuals of non-Croat ethnicity regarding the residency
requirement – would be rewritten. If the Convention had been
adopted, it would have been more difficult for ethnic Croats perma-
nently residing outside Croatia to obtain citizenship without satisfying
the usual requirements of current residence in Croatia. Some other
provisions that discriminate against non-ethnic Croatian residents
should likewise have been removed. However, the ruling conservative
party (HDZ, Croatian Democratic Union) blocked the adoption of the
Convention in the Sabor – even though the adoption of the Convention
had actually been proposed by a government dominated by the HDZ –
fearing it would automatically and detrimentally influence relations be-
tween Croatia and the Croat ethnic diaspora, in particular Bosnia-Her-
zegovina’s Croats. Interestingly, at almost the same time in 2006, Italy
adopted a law granting Italian citizenship to a number of descendants
of Italian ethnic origin who live in the Slovene and Croatian territories
that were annexed by Italy in the inter-war period or during the Second
World War. This move provoked a fierce reaction from both Slovenia
and Croatia. Some senior Croatian politicians (many from the HDZ)
complained that Italy had deliberately created citizens with a ‘double
loyalty’, clearly forgetting that granting Croatian citizenship to ethnic
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Croats from Bosnia-Herzegovina – one of three constituent peoples in
that country – resulted in precisely the same kind of ‘double loyalty’. 36
It is certain that the HDZ had in mind a controversial Croatian elec-
toral law that creates a special electoral constituency for the Croatian
diaspora. The vast majority of votes in this constituency come from the
Bosnian Croats, who vote predominantly for the HDZ and other na-
tionalist parties. The outcome of recent parliamentary elections in
Croatia (November 2007) clearly reveal all of the particularities of the
current situation in Croatia. The HDZ eventually won the elections by
a tiny margin thanks, in large part, to the votes from the diaspora con-
stituency,37 the majority of which came from Bosnia-Herzegovina. This
electoral unit had been boycotted by the largest opposition party, the
Social-Democratic Party and other non-nationalist and left-leaning par-
ties, which continue to demand changes in the electoral law. One can
thus witness parallel attempts to, on the one hand, preserve the ethno-
centric character of the state – most obviously by maintaining strong
ties to and influence on Croatian ethnic population in Croatia’s ‘near
abroad’ – and, on the other, to demonstrate a high degree of political
inclusion of ethnic minorities in conformity with the democratic
norms of the EU. After the 2007 parliamentary elections, and in har-
mony with this new euro-compatible face of Croatia, one of the highest
positions in the government was offered to a member of the largest
ethnic Serb party in Croatia for the first time since 1991.
11.4 Statistical developments
It is very difficult to obtain comprehensive statistical data related to citi-
zenship matters in independent Croatia. After several enquiries direc-
ted at the Croatian Ministry of Interior, the authors received the follow-
ing response in June 2008:
In the period between 2002 and 2007, 53,095 requests for ac-
quisition of Croatian citizenship were favourably resolved, and
11,321 requests were denied. During the same period, the re-
quests for acquisition of Croatian citizenship submitted by 7,057
persons were suspended or rejected.
We would like to underline that we are communicating the
above-cited data with reservations, and that we cannot be held
responsible for their accuracy. We do not have the technical facil-
ities necessary to generate exact statistical data. In the above-
mentioned period, there were no unified parameters for the sta-
tistical treatment of data related to the acquisition of Croatian ci-
tizenship. As for the period between 1991 and 2001, we are un-
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able to communicate the required data. During this period, no
statistical data was produced in relation to the resolved requests
for acquisition of Croatian citizenship, because there was no
adequate informational system for this database.
It is difficult to assess the reliability of this statement. On the one
hand, the first years of independence in the Republic of Croatia were
marked by war and considerable administrative reorganisation. This
gives credence to the Ministry’s claims. On the other hand, the highly
politicised question of Croatian citizenship, as well as the ‘ethnic engi-
neering’ aspect of the citizenship policies are obviously something that
the Croatian government does not want to see quantified. The authors
find the statement that between 1991 and 2001 (ten years!) there was
‘no adequate informational system for this database’ surprising. The
fact that another author (Omejec 1998) was able to obtain some data
for that period and that these data were quoted in an UNHCR report
(1997), confirms that some statistical data must be available.
In the period from October 8, 1991, to June 30, 1995, the Minis-
try of Internal Affairs of RC [Republic of Croatia] resolved
557,379 requests for determination of Croatian citizenship ac-
cording to art. 30 para. 1 LCC [Law on Croatian Citizenship]. Ac-
cording to the analysis, these cases mostly involved citizens of
the former SFRY with a residence in SRC [Socialist Republic of
Croatia] who were not registered in the citizens’ registry of SRC
or were registered after February 29, 1978 yet did not have a citi-
zenship recorded in the ‘republican citizenship’ section, and
their citizenship was disputable. There is no data regarding how
many of the 557,379 requests submitted on the grounds of art.
30 para. 1 LCC were denied. In the same period (October, 8,
1991 – June, 3, 1995) the MIA of RC resolved 394,910 requests
for subsequent registration on the grounds of art. 30 para. 2
LCC. These cases mostly involved ethnically Croatian individuals
who were not citizens of SRC, but who had a residence on its
territory and submitted a statement that they considered them-
selves to be Croatian. Therefore, in the period from October 8,
1991, to June 30, 1995, 952,331 procedures for determination of
Croatian citizenship were executed on the basis of art. 30 LCC
(Omejec 1998: 116).38
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11.5 Conclusions
The Croatian case confirms that the dominant paradigm of ethnic citi-
zenship has not been radically challenged in the Balkans, except in
those countries (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and, to a large extent,
Macedonia) that are under direct international supervision and where
the UN and the EU have strong civilian, police and military missions.
Since 2000, however, we have generally witnessed a greater degree of
inclusiveness and less discrimination on ethnic grounds, as well as an
increased sensitivity to the political aspirations of ethnic minorities
(most clearly in the EU candidate countries, Macedonia and Croatia).
Nonetheless, in countries such as Slovenia, Croatia and Serbia, where
the EU is not in a position to directly control lawmakers or the beha-
viour of the state apparatus, the pressure coming from Brussels is
mostly concentrated not on eventual changes in citizenship legislation,
but rather on the administrative practice and political life of the coun-
tries in question.
In order to satisfy the political conditions for EU membership, Croa-
tia is demonstrating – even in the behaviour of its leading conservative
politicians – more political inclusiveness towards the Serb minority
and, in general, is acting as a democratic state that does not discrimi-
nate on an ethnic basis (as was the case during the 1990s). Neverthe-
less, it continues to do everything it can to preserve the strong ties it
has established with its diaspora (again, primarily in Bosnia-Herzegovi-
na) and here Croatian citizenship granted to ethnic Croats abroad plays
a crucial role. The diaspora voting machine, based mainly in the Croat-
populated Western Herzegovina, has been repeatedly used by the main
Croatian right-wing party (HDZ) at the time of elections as a political
chip in Croatian internal politics. Nevertheless, we can conclude that,
beyond electoral campaigns, Croatia’s bid for EU membership relegates
the question of Croatian ethnic diaspora from the political sphere to
the spheres of educational, cultural and social ties.
Since Croatia seems to be on a fast track to joining the EU, it is im-
portant to point out that Croatia’s membership will automatically create
more than 500,000 EU citizens permanently residing in a non-EU
country. The Croatian policy of granting citizenship to ethnic Croats in
Bosnia-Herzegovina will thus indirectly affect all other EU Member
States as well.
To sum up, the case of Croatia demonstrates how sticks and carrots
employed by the EU could alter relations between a nationalising state
and its internal minorities as well as between a kin state and its ethnic
diaspora in the ‘near abroad’. At the same time, it shows how the latter
relations can be preserved – even if they remain politically dormant –
within the institutional framework of the EU. We thus witness parallel
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attempts to integrate a country into the supranational institutions of
the EU, democratise its political life and clearly show political and so-
cial inclusiveness towards ethnic minorities, but also to maintain a
transnational ethnic community by using ethno-centric citizenship
laws.
Chronological list of citizenship-related legislation in Yugoslavia/Croatia
Date Document Content Source
1811/
1867
Austrian Civil Code (arts.
28-32)
Regulates the citizenship
status of citizens living in
Dalmatia placed under the
Austrian rule within the
Austro-Hungarian Empire
1879 Law on Hungarian
Citizenship (Article ‘L’)
Regulates the citizenship
status of citizens living in
Croatia and Slavonia
placed under Hungarian
rule within the Austro-
Hungarian Empire
1928 Law on Citizenship of the
Kingdom of Yugoslavia
Establishes a single
Yugoslav citizenship
throughout the Kingdom
1945/
1946
Law on Citizenship of the
Democratic Federal
Yugoslavia (No. 64/1945;
No. 54/1946)
Defines the initial citizenry
of the newly formed Yugo-
slavia; establishes Yugo-
slav federal citizenship
and republic-level citizen-
ship of the six constituent
republics; is confirmed
and amended after the
adoption of the 1946 Con-
stitution of the Federal
People’s Republic of Yugo-
slavia (54/1946)
www.sluzbenilist.co.rs
(in Serbo-Croatian)
1945/
1946
Law on Deprivation of
Citizenship for Officers
and Non-Commissioned
Officers of the Former
Yugoslav Army Who do not
Want to Return to the
Homeland, and for the
Members of Military
Forces Who Have Served
for the Enemy and Have
Defected Abroad
(No. 64/1945; No. 86/
1946)
Deprives Yugoslav
citizenship of those
military personnel of the
former army of the
Kingdom of Yugoslavia
who did not want to return
to the ‘new’ Yugoslavia and
those serving in military
formations loyal to the
occupying forces who left
Yugoslavia at the end of
the Second World War; is
revoked in 1962 (No. 22/
1962)
www.sluzbenilist.co.rs
(in Serbo-Croatian)
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Date Document Content Source
1947 Law on Citizenship of
Persons Residing in the
Territory Annexed by
Yugoslavia according to
the Peace Treaty with Italy
(No. 104/1947)
Determines that persons
residing in territories
annexed by Yugoslavia on
10 June 1940 are to lose
their Italian citizenship
and acquire Yugoslav
citizenship; provides a
one-year period for ethnic
Italians to opt for Italian
citizenship and a
possibility for the Slav
population from the
contested borderland
region between Yugoslavia
and Italy to opt for
Yugoslav citizenship
www.sluzbenilist.co.rs
(in Serbo-Croatian)
1948 Amendment and Revision
of the Law on Citizenship
(No. 105/1948)
Excludes from the
Yugoslav citizenry all
citizens of German
ethnicity residing abroad
on the basis of their
‘disloyal conduct toward
the national and state
interests of the peoples of
FPRY’
www.sluzbenilist.co.rs
(in Serbo-Croatian)
1950 Citizenship of the People’s
Republic of Croatia
(No. 23/1950)
Defines ius sanguinis as
the basic principle for
acquisition of Croatian
citizenship; specifies
conditions for a newborn
child to acquire Croatian
citizenship if the parents
hold different republic-
level citizenships,
depending on their
residency
1964 Law on Yugoslav
Citizenship
(No. 38/1964;
No. 42/1964)
Enacted after the 1963
Yugoslav Constitution;
regulates the relationship
between the federal and
republic-level citizenships;
provides for a united
Yugoslav citizenship;
regulates that only a
federal citizen can hold
republican citizenship, and
that the republican
citizenship is lost with the
loss of the federal
citizenship
www.sluzbenilist.co.rs
(in Serbo-Croatian)
CROATIAN CITIZENSHIP: FROM ETHNIC ENGINEERING TO INCLUSIVENESS 357
Date Document Content Source
1965 Law on Citizenship of the
Socialist Republic of
Croatia
(No. 13/1965)
Confirms ius sanguinis as
the main criterion for
automatically acquiring
Croatian citizenship; unlike
the 1950 Law, stipulates
that both parents have to
agree on the child’s
citizenship if they hold
different republic-level
citizenships; guarantees
that any SFRY citizen has a
right to choose his or her
republic-level citizenship
and is thus free to choose
citizenship of any republic
without being born or
residing there
1976 Law on Citizenship of the
Socialist Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia
(No. 58/1976)
Is adopted after the 1974
Yugoslav constitution;
repeats the provisions
from the 1964 Law on the
relationship among the
federal and republic-level
citizenships; adds an
article on how to resolve
possible disputes caused
by the republican laws on
citizenship
www.sluzbenilist.co.rs
(in Serbo-Croatian)
1977 Law on Citizenship of the
Socialist Republic of
Croatia (No. 32/1977)
Confirms ius sanguinis as
the main criterion for
automatically acquiring
Croatian citizenship;
specifies conditions of
citizenship acquisition in
the case in which the
parents do not agree or do
not sign a statement
during two months
following the birth of their
child
1991 Law on Croatian
Citizenship
(No. 53/1991)
Defines the citizenship of
the Republic of Croatia;
determines the initial body
of citizens according to the
principles of legal
continuity and Croatian
ethnicity; defines all
modes of acquiring and
losing nationality after
independence
www.nn.hr (in Croatian);
www.legislationline.org
(as amended in 1992)
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Date Document Content Source
1992 Law on Modifications and
Amendments of the Law
on Croatian Citizenship
(No. 28/1992)
Corrects the text of the
1991 Law; amends
inconsistencies and legally
problematic provisions;
specifies the
administrative procedures
www.nn.hr (in Croatian)
1993 Decree of the
Constitutional Court of the
Republic of Croatia U-I-
206/1992, U-I-207/1992,
U-I-209/1992, U-I-222/
1992 of 8 December 1993
(No. 113/93)
Orders the Ministry of
Interior to justify its
decisions in case of the
refusal of requests made
through the regular
naturalisation procedure
(art. 8)
www.nn.hr (in Croatian)
Notes
1 The authors thank Iris Goldner for her useful comments.
2 Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica – Croatian Democratic Union.
3 For a detailed analysis of the citizenship legislation and practices in other former
Yugoslav states since 1991, see Sˇtiks 2006. For a study of Slovenia’s citizenship
legislation, see also Medved in this volume.
4 For more on Croatia’s particular brand of ‘transnational nationalism’, see Ragazzi
2009; for the notion of transnational nationalism, see Basch, Glick-Schiller &
Szanton Blanc 1995 and Kastoryano 2006.
5 International law itself does not question the right of sovereign states to enact their
own nationality policy. However, international law, declarations and treaties do seek
to impose certain rules and thereby influence the behaviour of states when it comes
to citizenship and nationality legislation and administrative practice. Art. 15 of the
1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that ‘everyone has the right to a
nationality’ and that ‘no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied
the right to change his nationality.’ The European Commission for Democracy
through Law (also known as the Venice Commission), the Council of Europe’s
advisory body for constitutional issues, adopted The Declaration on Consequences of
State Succession for the Nationality of Natural Persons in September 1996. It states
that, besides respecting the principle that every person has a right to a nationality
and the general prevention of statelessness, states should ‘respect, as far as possible,
the will of the person concerned.’ It also repeats that ‘in all cases of State succession,
the successor State shall grant its nationality to all nationals of the predecessor State
residing permanently on the transferred territory.’ In a similar fashion, art. 18 of the
1997 European Convention on Nationality, prepared by the Council of Europe,
declares that, in the case of succession, states should take into account ‘the genuine
and effective link of the person concerned with the State’ and ‘the habitual residence
of the person concerned at the time of State succession.’
6 The most important treaties for citizenship issues in the Croatian lands were the
Peace Treaty of St.-Germain-en-Laye with the Republic of Austria, signed on 10
September 1919, and the Trianon Peace Treaty with Hungary, signed on 4 June
1920.
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7 Official Gazette of Democratic Federal Yugoslavia 64/1945. The law was confirmed and
amended on 5 July 1946 (see Official Gazette of the Federal People’s Republic of Yugosla-
via (FPRY) 54/1946). The law was further amended and revised in 1947 (see Official
Gazette of the FPRY 104/1947) and twice in 1948 (see Official Gazette of the FPRY 88
and 105/1948).
8 Official Gazette of the FPRY 86/1948 and 22/1962.
9 Official Gazette of the FPRY 105/1948.
10 Official Gazette of the FPRY 104/1947.
11 Official Gazette of the FPRY Supplement No. 6/1954.
12 This was not the case in two other socialist multinational federations. Republic-level
citizenship was established in Czechoslovakia only in 1969 and the first Soviet
republic that enacted its own citizenship law was Lithuania in November 1989.
13 The fact that only republic-level registers existed at the moment of Yugoslavia’s
break-up would prove to be very important, because all Yugoslav republics would
adopt a policy of legal continuity between previous republic-level citizenship and
citizenship of the new state. Only those granted Yugoslav citizenship at a Yugoslav
embassy who were residing abroad were not included in the republic-level registers.
Once they established their residence in Yugoslavia, they were also entered into the
register of the republic in which they resided.
14 In the 1963 Constitution, the FPRY was renamed the Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (SFRY).
15 Official Gazette of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) 38/1964 (cor-
rected version in 42/1964).
16 Official Gazette of the SFRY 58/1976.
17 Official Gazette of the People’s Republic of Croatia 23/1950.
18 Official Gazette of the Socialist Republic of Croatia 13/1965.
19 Official Gazette of the Socialist Republic of Croatia 32/1977.
20 Obviously, between 1965 and 1977 the automatic acquisition of republic-level
citizenship was not a rule if only one parent had Croatian citizenship, even if a child
was born in Croatia (on changes in the Croatian law on republic-level citizenship and
administrative practices between 1950 and 1991, see the report on Croatia in
UNHCR 1997).
21 Official Gazette of the Republic of Croatia 21/1991.
22 Official Gazette of the Republic of Croatia 53/91; modifications and amendments in Of-
ficial Gazette of the Republic of Croatia 28/92. These amendments were mainly correc-
tions of inconsistencies in the law, or legal clarifications of its provisions, which were
written and adopted hastily in the context of Croatia’s declaration of independence
from SFRY and its open conflict with Belgrade. Some changes were obviously made
after complaints were received from the ground about the implementation of the law.
An important amendment was that the renunciation of foreign citizenship required
for naturalisation was eased (see note 24).
23 These ‘conditions’ were imposed on ethnic non-Croats coming from other Yugoslav
republics. They also provided a basis for the Ministry in charge to refuse Croatian
citizenship to certain individuals, non-Croats from other republics, but also to some
Croatian Serbs (see 11.2.1.3 for further details).
24 The 1992 amendments, however, facilitated access to Croatian citizenship for those
who, for various reasons, are unable to obtain release from their previous citizenship.
Following these amendments, applicants have to state that they will renounce their
previous citizenship, if granted Croatian citizenship.
25 Official Gazette of the Republic of Croatia 113/1993.
26 The 1991 Law additionally required ten years of residence for this group, which was
not in accordance with art. 8 and art. 16 and was therefore corrected in the
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amendments adopted only seven months later on 8 May 1992. Applicants merely
had to prove that they were registered as residents (see Official Gazette of the Republic
of Croatia 28/1992).
27 Guestworkers, or ‘workers temporarily employed abroad’, according to the official
Yugoslav terminology.
28 If a person did not declare himself or herself an ethnic Croat in official documents
such as a birth certificate or a marriage certificate, or if a person had declared
ethnicity as Yugoslav and/or was born in a so-called ‘mixed marriage’, the state
authorities (the Ministry of the Interior) established a person’s membership of the
Croatian people by using Catholic Church certificates (if available) and even passed
judgement on the ‘Croatness’ of a person’s family name. This was certainly a
somewhat delicate matter since a large percentage of ‘Croatian’ family names are
shared by Serbs and other South Slavic groups (see also the report on Croatia in
Imeri 2006: 127).
29 A significant number of the Croatian Serbs continued to live in territory controlled
by the Croatian authorities. They managed to regulate their status either smoothly
(i.e. as holders of the former Croatian republican citizenship they were automatically
registered into the new registries of citizens), or in some cases, with considerable
difficulties. Numerous reports testify to cases of violations of their right to Croatian
citizenship in the 1990s. See, for instance, reports on the issue published in Dika,
Helton and Omejec 1998 and also the report on Croatia in Imeri 2006.
30 For more details on the present situation and descriptions of some concrete cases,
see the report on Croatia published in Imeri (2006: 97-123). The report points out
that, for instance, the status of persons of non-Croat ethnic origin who were
permanent residents of Croatia before the 1991 Law on citizenship still awaits
regulation.
31 This article was modified by art. 4 of the Law on Modifications and Amendments of
the Law on Croatian Citizenship (Official Gazette of the Republic of Croatia 28/1992),
deleting the five years of permanent residence requirement demanded in the first
version of the law. As the law stood in 1991, those born in the country who could ap-
ply for facilitated naturalisation had to fulfil a longer residence requirement than
those applying for regular naturalisation. To obtain permanent residence one first
has to prove five years of temporary residence, according to the new Law on Aliens.
In practice this would have thus meant that a person born in the country had to
prove ten years of residence in the country, whereas those applying for regular natur-
alisation only had to prove five. However, the modification does not imply that those
born in the country do not have to fulfil any residence requirement; they now have
to prove five years of registered residence just as those applying for regular naturali-
sation. It is important here not to confuse this modification with another important
modification of residence requirements introduced by art. 13 of the same amend-
ments, which deleted the ten years residence required in art. 30 para. 2 of the 1991
Law defining a specific procedure of acquiring Croatian nationality by declaration for
ethnic Croats (see note 26). The authors would like to thank Iris Goldner for this
clarification.
32 It also adds that ‘the statement from paragraph 1 of this Article shall be given before
the competent authority or before the diplomatic or consular office of the Republic of
Croatia abroad’.
33 ‘Revocation’ in the text of the law.
34 For more information on the procedure, see: www.mup.hr. The average net salary in
2007 was 4,841 kuna per month (see Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical informa-
tion 2008. www.dzs.hr).
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35 Art. 4 of the Law on Citizenship of Bosnia-Herzegovina allows Bosnian citizens to
hold a citizenship of another country provided there is a bilateral agreement. The
question of the dual (Croatian and Bosnian) citizenship of many citizens of Bosnia-
Herzegovina was regulated by the agreement on dual citizenship signed by Croatia
and Bosnia-Herzegovina on 29 March 2007. The ratification is still pending.
36 See ‘Talijani u RH i Hrvati u BiH nemaju ista prava?!’ [Italians in Croatia and Croats
in Bosnia-Herzegovina Do Not Have Equal Rights?!], www.tportal.hr, 10 March 2006.
37 Art. 45 of the 1990 Constitution granted Croats abroad the right to vote. This
provision was enacted for the first time during the 1995 elections, during which the
ruling party, the HDZ, decided that the seats attributed to the ‘diaspora’ should
represent 10 per cent of the representatives, namely twelve seats. After many
debates, this was changed in 1999 and the seats were apportioned according to voter
turnout. This secured only six seats for the ‘diaspora’ vote in the 2000 and 2007
elections.
38 The UNHCR report quotes the same data, but adds that ‘a total of 412,137 requests
were submitted to the Ministry of Internal Affairs between 8 October 1991 and 31
December 1995 under article 30 paragraph 2.’ This slightly changed the total
number of processed requests through art. 30, paras. 1 and 2, available in Omejec
(1998) and fixed it at 969,553 at the end of 1995 (UNHCR 1997: 16). Indeed, Jasna
Omejec is quoted as a co-author of the national report on Croatia published in
UNHCR. Although published in 1998, her own article was obviously written before
the UNHCR report published in 1997.
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Part IV
Mediterranean post-imperial states

12 Malta’s citizenship law:
Evolution and current regime1
Eugene Buttigieg
Malta’s legal regime on citizenship is relatively young as it came into
being on the day of Malta’s acquisition of independence from British
rule in 1964. Throughout these years, however, particularly over the
past two decades, it has undergone extensive alterations marking
changes in the governing principles. This chapter first traces the evolu-
tion of the citizenship laws during these years, noting the important
policy changes, their possible causes and implications. It then explores
the different modes of acquisition and loss of citizenship under the
current regime. Finally, statistical data is produced to highlight the ex-
tent to which persons seeking to acquire or reacquire Maltese citizen-
ship by registration or naturalisation benefited from these legislative
changes, apart from the non-quantifiable number of persons who
through these legislative changes acquired or reacquired citizenship
automatically.
12.1 Historical background
Malta was a British colony from 1800 until 21 September 1964 when it
acquired independence from British rule. All persons born in Malta
during this period were automatically British subjects according to Brit-
ish law. It was thus only on Independence Day, 21 September 1964,
that Malta acquired its first provisions conferring and regulating Mal-
tese citizenship. The Constitution of Malta, that entered into force on
Independence Day, contained provisions conferring Maltese citizenship
that were typical of independence constitutions drafted by the British
for their colonies. The Constitution contained a section, chapter III, on
citizenship, that conferred Maltese citizenship automatically on all per-
sons who were born in Malta and were citizens of the United Kingdom
and Colonies before 21 September 1964, provided that one of the par-
ents was also born in Malta; thus a combined application of the ius soli
and ius sanguinis principles. This was necessary to avoid imposing
Maltese citizenship on children born in Malta to British military per-
sonnel families and British nationals stationed in Malta, while Malta
was a British colony. Persons born abroad also acquired Maltese citi-
zenship on 21 September 1964 provided the father and a paternal
grandparent were both born in Malta.
On the other hand, persons born on or after the date of indepen-
dence acquired Maltese citizenship by mere birth in Malta irrespective
of whether or not any of their parents were born in Malta; in other
words on the strength of the ius soli principle only. In practice, this
meant that children born of foreign parents in Malta acquired Maltese
citizenship by birth even if they were not of Maltese descent.
Chapter III of the Constitution also established that a Maltese citizen
should have no other citizenship. Adults in possession of another citi-
zenship had to renounce it by 21 September 1967. If a minor who was
a Maltese citizen possessed any other citizenship, upon reaching his or
her eighteenth birthday, he or she would have had to renounce any
other citizenship within a year if he or she wished to retain Maltese ci-
tizenship. Moreover, Maltese adults who acquired the citizenship of
any other country would have automatically forfeited Maltese citizen-
ship while foreigners who acquired Maltese citizenship by registration
or naturalisation would have had to renounce any other citizenship
held by them within six months from registration or three months
from naturalisation.
Not unlike the general policy worldwide at the time, in the case of
children born abroad, the question whether the child would acquire
Maltese citizenship or not depended on whether it was the father or
the mother who possessed Maltese citizenship at the time of birth. If
the father was Maltese (by birth in Malta, by registration, or by natura-
lisation) though not the mother, the child would acquire Maltese citi-
zenship but if the father was non-Maltese even though the mother was
Maltese the child would not acquire Maltese citizenship. Thus, a Mal-
tese mother could not transmit her citizenship to her child born out-
side Malta unless she was unmarried. Likewise, consistent with the in-
ternational trend at the time, while the foreign wife of a Maltese citizen
was entitled to become a citizen of Malta by registration, a foreign hus-
band of a Maltese citizen was not.
The first law that complemented the Constitution on citizenship
matters was the Maltese Citizenship Act (chapter 188 of the Laws of
Malta) that was enacted the following year in 1965. This regulated in
particular the acquisition of Maltese citizenship by registration and nat-
uralisation. The law was prejudiced in favour of Commonwealth citi-
zens as the latter could acquire Maltese citizenship by registration after
five years of residence in Malta, while other foreigners required six
years of residence in Malta to acquire Maltese citizenship by naturalisa-
tion. The next development in this field was the enactment of the Im-
migration Act (chapter 217 of the Laws of Malta) in 1970 that laid
down rules providing for the control of immigration into Malta.
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12.1.1 The 1989 amendments
Although throughout the years various amendments were made to all
these laws, necessitated inter alia by Malta’s transformation into a re-
public on 13 December 1974, the first major reform in the citizenship
laws took place in August 1989 when chapter III of the Constitution,
the Maltese Citizenship Act and the Immigration Act (via Acts XXIII,
XXIV and XXV of 1989 respectively) were radically amended to indi-
cate a clear change of policy regarding citizenship by (i) making an ex-
ception to the prohibition against dual citizenship for emigrants born
in Malta and who had spent at least six years abroad2 – this had signifi-
cant implications as, especially in the 1950s and 1960s, well over
100,000 Maltese citizens (more than one fourth of the current popula-
tion) had emigrated to countries such as the United Kingdom, Austra-
lia, Canada and the United States to seek employment and thereby ob-
tained a second citizenship (ii) shifting to a rule based more on ius
sanguinis than on ius soli (iii) allowing Maltese mothers to transmit
their citizenship to their children born abroad (iv) granting the same
rights to foreign husbands of citizens of Malta as foreign wives of citi-
zens of Malta by allowing them to be registered as citizens of Malta
and (v) reintroducing acquisition of citizenship by adoption.
This change in policy was due to the influence of changing interna-
tional trends favouring ius sanguinis over ius soli and a greater inter-
national acceptance of dual and multiple citizenship as well as the in-
creasing recognition at the international level of the need to safeguard
gender equality in the citizenship laws. Malta has always participated
actively in international fora and endorsed international instruments in
this field and has moulded its policy accordingly. Moreover, the govern-
ment had been elected in 1987 on the strength of an electoral mandate
that included the promise to allow expatriates to regain their lost citi-
zenship retrospectively by acquiring dual citizenship and that citizen-
ship laws would guarantee gender equality. A number of overseas asso-
ciations representing expatriates also exerted pressure for this conces-
sion to expatriates to be extended to further generations.
As a result of these amendments, Maltese emigrants were now al-
lowed to hold dual citizenship. Art. 27(3) of the Constitution was
amended to enable Maltese emigrants born in Malta to hold dual citi-
zenship, provided of course that the country of which they were citi-
zens recognised the concept of dual citizenship. This applied retrospec-
tively. A Maltese citizen born in Malta who, as the law stood at the
time, had automatically lost his Maltese citizenship upon emigrating
and acquiring the citizenship of the country to which he had emi-
grated, would now be deemed never to have lost his Maltese citizen-
ship, provided he had spent at least six years in that country. Thus, his
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dual citizenship would be backdated to the date when he acquired the
foreign citizenship. This also affected children born of a Maltese emi-
grant father who had lost his Maltese nationality because he had ac-
quired another nationality. Since the dual nationality would be back-
dated so that the father is deemed never to have lost his Maltese citi-
zenship, children who were born of fathers who had ‘lost’ their
Maltese citizenship at the time of their birth and who were therefore
deemed not to be Maltese citizens, also acquired Maltese citizenship
with this amendment, effective from their date of birth, once their
fathers were reinstated in their previous status as citizens of Malta.
It should be noted that under the current legislation, only Maltese
persons habitually resident in Malta have voting rights in national gen-
eral elections and voting does not take place abroad in Malta’s embas-
sies or consulates. So this extension of citizenship to expatriates does
not signify any right to participate in the process of democratic self-
determination of the country.
As stated above, under the Constitution, anyone born in Malta auto-
matically became a citizen of Malta by mere birth in the country. How-
ever, with the 1989 amendments to the Constitution this has changed,
as these amendments limit such acquisition by adding the ius sangui-
nis to the ius soli criterion in establishing that, as from the coming
into force of these amendments on 1 August 1989, a person born in
Malta will acquire Maltese citizenship only if at least one of the parents
is a citizen of Malta or was born in Malta and emigrated and enjoys
freedom of movement in Malta in terms of art. 44 of the Constitution.
The amendments also removed gender inequality in two respects: (i)
in relation to Maltese mothers of children born abroad and (ii) with re-
spect to foreign men married to Maltese women.
Prior to 1989 Maltese citizenship was transmitted to the children
only if the father was a Maltese citizen. However, with these amend-
ments it now suffices that either of the parents is a Maltese citizen (by
birth in Malta, by registration, or by naturalisation). The Maltese
mother just as the Maltese father may now transmit citizenship to her
children born abroad.
Before the 1989 amendments to the Constitution, while a foreign
woman married to a citizen of Malta or to someone who became a citi-
zen of Malta was entitled to acquire Maltese citizenship by registration,
a foreign husband of a female Maltese citizen was not. This was there-
fore discriminatory against foreign husbands as compared to foreign
wives. The amendments extended this right to foreign husbands of
Maltese citizens so that they are now on a par with foreign wives of
Maltese citizens. Moreover, this right now extends even to the widow
or widower of a person who was a citizen of Malta at the time of death
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or would have been on 21 September 1964 had he or she lived till that
day.
Another significant change in policy is related to the acquisition of
citizenship by adoption. Until 1976 it was possible under Maltese law
to acquire Maltese citizenship through adoption, i.e. a person lawfully
adopted by a citizen of Malta would acquire Maltese citizenship by that
adoption. This was no longer possible following a legislative amend-
ment on 1 January 1977. In 1989, the amendments to the Constitution
reintroduced this facility for the acquisition of citizenship through
adoption, subject to the proviso that the child adopted must be under
ten years of age on the date of adoption.
In 1989, the distinction made in the Maltese Citizenship Act be-
tween Commonwealth citizens and other foreigners for the acquisition
of Maltese citizenship by residence in Malta, a remnant of British in-
fluence, was abolished, so now any person may be naturalised as a citi-
zen of Malta if he or she has resided in Malta for at least five years.
The 1989 amendments to the Maltese Citizenship Act also extended
naturalisation to any person who, being descended from a person born
in Malta, is a citizen of a country other than the one in which he or
she resides and whose access to the country of which he or she is a citi-
zen is restricted.
12.1.2 The 2000 amendments
In 2000, further changes were made to the citizenship laws (via Acts
III and IV of 2000) building on and fine-tuning the 1989 amend-
ments, in particular by now completing the shift in policy towards dual
and multiple citizenship.3 One major legislative change was designed
to dissuade marriages of convenience whereby foreigners were marry-
ing Maltese citizens simply to acquire the benefits of Maltese citizen-
ship since, according to the prevailing law, marriage with a Maltese citi-
zen immediately entitled the foreign spouse to apply for Maltese citi-
zenship.
The detailed provisions on citizenship in chapter III of the Constitu-
tion were transferred to the Maltese Citizenship Act that thereby be-
came the main law regulating citizenship while the Constitution now
only contains the general principles on citizenship in art. 22.
Dual citizenship that was hitherto permitted only exceptionally in
the case of Maltese emigrants has now become the rule, following the
amendments of 2000, as Maltese citizens are now allowed to hold dual
or even multiple citizenship.4 Thus, as from the entry into force of the
amendments on 10 February 2000, Maltese citizens who acquire an-
other citizenship do not lose their Maltese citizenship. Moreover, since
minors holding another citizenship only lost their Maltese citizenship
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if they did not renounce the foreign citizenship by their nineteenth
birthday, all citizens of Malta having another citizenship who were
minors on that date or had not reached their nineteenth birthday by
that date were able to retain both citizenships after their nineteenth
birthday. Likewise, foreigners who acquire Maltese citizenship by natur-
alisation or registration are no longer required to renounce their other
citizenships.
Not only was there this complete shift in policy in favour of multiple
citizenship but these provisions were made applicable retrospectively to
persons born in Malta or abroad and who had Maltese citizenship by
birth or descent but had lost this citizenship when they acquired an-
other citizenship, provided they had resided outside Malta for an aggre-
gate period of at least six years. In such cases, they would be deemed
never to have lost their Maltese citizenship; with this provision they re-
gained their lost citizenship automatically.5 On the other hand, those
who had lost their Maltese citizenship because they had acquired an-
other citizenship before this date but had not resided abroad for such
an aggregate period of time or their Maltese citizenship had been ac-
quired by registration or naturalisation not by birth or descent may re-
gain Maltese citizenship only by registration (and so not automati-
cally).6 Irrespective of where they are currently residing they may sub-
mit an application to be registered as citizens of Malta.
Building on the reform of 1989 that had extended citizenship to chil-
dren born to Maltese mothers abroad, the law was further changed to
entitle such children born between 21 September 1964 (date of inde-
pendence) and 1 August 1989 (date of coming into force of the 1989
amendments) to be registered as Maltese citizens, irrespective of
whether or not they reside or resided in Malta while allowing them to
retain their other citizenship.
As stated above, with a view to discouraging marriages of conveni-
ence, the law was amended to provide that foreigners married to Mal-
tese citizens may apply for Maltese citizenship on the strength of their
marriage only if they have been married for at least five years and no
longer immediately following the marriage.7
Another legislative change related to the position of foundlings. Un-
til 2000, a new-born infant found abandoned in Malta was deemed to
have been born in Malta but could not acquire Maltese citizenship as
long as the identity and nationality of the parents remained unknown.
As stated above, since 1989 it has become an essential pre-requisite for
Maltese citizenship that at least one of the parents is a citizen of Malta.
So this meant the child would be stateless. But in 2000 the Maltese Ci-
tizenship Act was amended to the effect that, notwithstanding that the
nationality of the parents was unknown, such a child would be deemed
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to be a citizen of Malta until his or her right to any other citizenship is
established.8
Malta’s accession to the European Union in 2004 did not necessitate
nor lead to any changes in the country’s laws and policies on citizen-
ship.
12.2 Current modes of acquisition and loss of citizenship
12.2.1 Modes of acquisition of citizenship
Acquisition by ius soli and/or ius sanguinis9
Every person born in Malta before the date of independence (21 Septem-
ber 1964), who until then was a citizen of the United Kingdom and
Colonies and either of whose parents was born in Malta, automatically
acquired Maltese citizenship on the date of independence. Moreover,
even a person born outside Malta before the date of independence auto-
matically acquired Maltese citizenship on the date of independence if
he or she was a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies until the
date of independence and his or her father and a paternal grandparent
were both born in Malta.
On the other hand, for those who were born in Malta on or after the
date of independence but before 1 August 1989, the mere fact of being
born in Malta was enough to entitle that person to automatically ac-
quire Maltese citizenship at birth. The only exception is in the case of
someone born in Malta during this period where both parents are non-
Maltese with the father enjoying diplomatic immunity. Those born out-
side Malta during this period acquired citizenship at birth only if at the
time of birth the father10 was a citizen of Malta whether by birth in
Malta, by registration or by naturalisation.
However, following the 1989 amendments, for persons born on or
after 1 August 1989, birth in Malta no longer sufficed to entitle the per-
son to acquire Maltese citizenship at birth: one of the parents must
also have been a citizen of Malta at the time of his or her birth. For
those born outside Malta on or after 1 August 1989 citizenship is also
acquired automatically at birth if, at the date of birth, one of the par-
ents was a citizen of Malta whether by birth in Malta, by registration or
by naturalisation. Thus, the essential requirement now is descent, not
birth on Maltese territory.
An exception to this rule is made in the case of newborn infants
found abandoned anywhere in Malta who would as a result be state-
less. Such infants are deemed to have been born in Malta and are con-
sidered citizens of Malta, even though the identity and citizenship of
the parents are unknown, until such time as their right to any other ci-
tizenship is established.
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A person who became a citizen of Malta on 21 September 1964 or at
birth but subsequently lost this citizenship, having acquired or retained
the citizenship of another country, reacquired citizenship automatically
and retrospectively following the entry into force of the amendments of
2000 on 10 February 2000, that removed the prohibition of dual and
multiple citizenship for Maltese citizens, if he or she resided outside
Malta for an aggregate period of at least six years. By virtue of these
amendments they are deemed retrospectively to never have lost their
Maltese citizenship.11
Acquisition by adoption12
Since 1 August 1989, Maltese citizenship may also be acquired automa-
tically by adoption when a person is lawfully adopted (under Maltese
law) on or after this date with one of the adopting parents being a citi-
zen of Malta at the time of adoption, provided that the person adopted
is under ten years of age on the date of adoption.
For persons whose adoptions took place prior to this date but after 31
December 1976, adoption did not automatically lead to acquisition of
Maltese citizenship even if the adopters were citizens of Malta. This
was because during this period adoptions were considered by law as
without effect as far as Maltese citizenship is concerned. Persons
adopted during these years would have to apply to be naturalised as
citizens of Malta, a mode of acquisition that is discussed below.
Although the granting of citizenship in these cases is subject to the dis-
cretion of the minister responsible for matters related to Maltese citi-
zenship (hereinafter ‘the minister’), it has, since 1987, been generally
granted on humanitarian grounds as a matter of policy.
Adoptions that took place before 1 January 1977 did lead to auto-
matic acquisition of Maltese citizenship by the adopted person on
adoption but, in the case of a joint adoption, as in the case of any other
birth outside Malta at the time, it had to be shown that at least the
male adopter was a citizen of Malta. It would not have sufficed if only
the female adopter were a citizen of Malta.
Spousal transfer of citizenship13
A non-Maltese person married to a citizen of Malta may, after five years
of marriage, acquire Maltese citizenship by applying to be registered as
a citizen of Malta, provided the spouses are still married and living to-
gether (if the Maltese spouse is still alive) at the time the application
for citizenship is made. However, if the couple were to separate de iure
or de facto after five years of marriage the foreign spouse may still ap-
ply for Maltese citizenship provided the spouses had lived together dur-
ing those five years of marriage. Moreover, if the Maltese spouse dies
before the fifth year of marriage, the foreign spouse may still apply for
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Maltese citizenship following the lapse of the fifth year from the date
of marriage, provided that up to the time of death the spouses were liv-
ing together.
Citizenship may also be acquired, if, although at the time of mar-
riage both spouses were non-Maltese, subsequently one of the spouses
acquires Maltese citizenship through some other mode of acquisition.
The other spouse would now be entitled, subject to the conditions
mentioned above, to apply to be registered as a citizen of Malta on the
strength of the marriage.
A foreign spouse is entitled to apply to be registered as a citizen of
Malta even where the marriage took place before the date of indepen-
dence so that at the time of marriage neither of the spouses was a citi-
zen of Malta, if on independence the other spouse either (i) became, or
would have become were it not for his or her death, a citizen of Malta
on the date of independence or (ii) became a citizen of Malta after in-
dependence.
Acquisition by registration14
Apart from the special case of spousal transfer of citizenship, there are
other instances where a person may acquire Maltese citizenship by re-
gistration.
Former citizens who, having lost their citizenship before 2000 be-
cause of the possession or acquisition of another citizenship as pre-
scribed by the law prevailing at the time, fail to qualify for automatic
reacquisition of this citizenship either because they had not spent the
requisite six years abroad or because they were formerly citizens of
Malta by registration or naturalisation and not by birth, may neverthe-
less apply to be registered as citizens of Malta.
Furthermore, an emigrant who was formerly a citizen of Malta by
birth or descent but ceased to be a citizen of Malta after emigrating
may also reacquire citizenship by registration if he or she returns to
Malta and takes up permanent residence.
Likewise, persons born outside Malta before 1 August 1989 who are
not citizens of Malta because their mother rather than their father was
a citizen of Malta by birth, registration or naturalisation, may also ac-
quire Maltese citizenship by registration.
Citizenship is acquired by registration only if the applicant takes an
oath of allegiance to the country and in some instances, such as in the
case of the spousal transfer of citizenship, provided the granting of citi-
zenship to the applicant is not contrary to the public interest. With this
mode of acquisition, citizenship takes effect from the date of registra-
tion and not retrospectively.
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Acquisition by naturalisation15
Any person, including stateless persons, may apply to acquire Maltese
citizenship by naturalisation if he or she has resided in Malta during
the year immediately preceding the date of application and for a
further aggregate period of at least four years over the past seven years
immediately preceding the date of application, provided he or she has
an adequate knowledge of the Maltese or English language, is of good
character and is deemed to be a suitable citizen of Malta.
In practice, however, unless the applicant is of Maltese descent, as
described below, the Department for Citizenship and Expatriate Affairs
follows a strict policy of granting naturalisation only where the appli-
cant has resided in Malta for quite a number of years and has children
born in Malta. Every case is dealt with on its own merits and the Minis-
ter enjoys a non-reviewable discretion as explained below; but while in
the past residence alone would not have been a ground for naturalisa-
tion, today the general policy is to consider favourably requests for nat-
uralisation by residents who have been residing in Malta for a substan-
tial number of years and have formed a family here. Income and prop-
erty are not determining factors. Nor is any exception made to this
long-term residence rule for labour migrants.
However, no residence conditions apply where the applicant was
born abroad of a father that was likewise born abroad but the paternal
grandfather and great-grandparent were both born in Malta. In such
cases the person born abroad may apply for naturalisation merely on
the strength of his or her Maltese descent. It should be noted, though,
that the policy is that applications under this category would normally
be accepted only if the applicant resides in Malta.
Likewise, no residence conditions apply where the applicant had
been a citizen of Malta by birth before he or she emigrated from Malta
and ceased to be a citizen of Malta or if he or she had emigrated before
the date of independence and failed to obtain Maltese citizenship on
independence merely because he or she had ceased to be a citizen of
the United Kingdom and Colonies on the date of independence. There
have been few applications under this category as most persons that
fall under this category already enjoy dual citizenship.
Again, no residence conditions apply to persons who prove descent
from a person born in Malta and who are citizens of a country other
than the country of their residence and who are denied access to the
country of which they are citizens. They may apply to acquire Maltese
citizenship by naturalisation merely on the strength of their Maltese
descent. However, there have been few instances of naturalisation un-
der this category because not many persons would qualify under it, as
it requires the applicant to produce all the birth and marriage certifi-
cates starting from his or her own birth up to the ancestor who was
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born in Malta. If the link is broken or cannot be proven by documen-
tary evidence or if the birth certificate of the ancestor born in Malta
cannot be traced, the application for citizenship would not be success-
ful. Persons in this category are usually persons of Maltese descent re-
siding in North African countries who may generally encounter great
difficulties to trace the documents in these countries that would prove
this descent.
Special rules apply for those who are and have always been stateless
but were born in Malta of parents who are not citizens of Malta. In
such cases the person is entitled to naturalisation as a citizen of Malta
only if he or she has been ordinarily resident in Malta for a period of
five years up to the date of his or her application and has not been con-
victed in any country of an offence against the security of the state or
sentenced to a punishment depriving personal liberty for a term of not
less than five years.
If the stateless person was not born in Malta but either of his or her
parents was a citizen of Malta at the date of his or her birth, he or she
is entitled to naturalisation as citizen of Malta only if he or she has
been ordinarily resident in Malta for a period of three years up to the
date of his or her application and has not been convicted in any coun-
try of an offence against the security of the state. So once again, where
Maltese descent can be shown, the conditions for naturalisation are
less stringent than where only the connection by birth on Maltese terri-
tory can be proved.
As in the case of citizenship by registration, where citizenship is ac-
quired by naturalisation, it takes effect from the date upon which the
applicant was naturalised.16 All applications are made to the Minister
and there is no right of appeal against the decision of the Minister on
any such application nor is such a decision subject to review in any
court.17 However, in the Cabinet Citizenship Guidelines that were is-
sued in 1987, it is stated that all applications for citizenship by the fol-
lowing persons are given favourable consideration:
a. former citizens of Malta;
b. children born abroad of returned migrants;
c. foreign citizens born in Malta to a parent who is a citizen of Malta;
d. children born to parents who were non-Maltese but who later ac-
quired Maltese citizenship; and
e. those born abroad but of Maltese descent.
It is stated that, on the other hand, applications from those who do not
fall under any one of these categories will only be given favourable con-
sideration if there are humanitarian grounds.18
Since the drawing up of these guidelines in 1987, significant
changes have been made to the Maltese Citizenship Act in 1989 and
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2000, as shown above. Hence those falling into categories (a) and (b)
have practically all been re-instated as Maltese citizens or are now Mal-
tese citizens automatically in view of the dual citizenship amendments
to the law. Moreover, following these amendments, persons falling un-
der category (c) may re-acquire Maltese citizenship simply by registra-
tion.
Though refugees in Malta are granted some rights they have no right
to Maltese citizenship nor are there any provisions in the law that facil-
itate the granting of citizenship to refugees.19
Since, as stated above, the law prescribes that one of the conditions
for naturalisation is that there should be evidence of the applicant’s
good character and suitability for citizenship, apart from being sup-
ported by documents attesting to the applicant’s place of residence,
birth and Maltese descent, the application in question must also be
sponsored by persons that are deemed trustworthy (such as lawyers,
notaries, magistrates, judges, members of parliament, police officers,
medical practitioners, parish priests, etc.) who, having had occasion to
assess the applicant in the course of exercising their profession or voca-
tion, are thereby able to vouch for his or her integrity. As in the case of
citizenship by registration, the applicant is required to take an oath of
allegiance to the country before he or she may be naturalised.
12.2.2 Modes of loss of citizenship
Acquisition or retention of another citizenship no longer leads to the
denial or forfeiture of Maltese citizenship as dual and multiple citizen-
ship is now fully acknowledged by Maltese law.20 This also means that
in the case of mixed marriages, the children can acquire the citizenship
of both parents. The only ways in which citizenship may be lost are de-
tailed below.
Renunciation of citizenship21
Any citizen of Malta who is also a national of another country may re-
nounce citizenship by making a declaration to this effect and upon re-
gistration of this declaration he or she would cease to be a citizen of
Malta. It is a condition for renunciation that the Maltese citizen should
also be a national of another country so that acceptance of the renun-
ciation would not lead to the person becoming stateless. Such renun-
ciation may be refused if it is made during any war in which Malta is
engaged or if in the opinion of the Minister it would otherwise be con-
trary to public policy.
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Deprivation of citizenship acquired by registration or naturalisation22
A citizen of Malta who acquired his or her citizenship by registration
or naturalisation may be deprived of this citizenship by order of the
Minister if the Minister is satisfied that:
a. the registration or naturalisation was obtained by means of fraud,
false representation or the concealment of any material fact; or
b. the citizen has shown himself or herself by act or speech to be dis-
loyal or disaffected towards the President or the government of Mal-
ta; or
c. the citizen has, during any war in which Malta was engaged, unlaw-
fully traded or communicated with an enemy or been engaged in or
associated with any business that was to his or her knowledge car-
ried on in such a manner as to assist an enemy in that war; or
d. the citizen has within seven years after becoming naturalised or
being registered as a citizen of Malta, been sentenced in any coun-
try to a punishment depriving personal liberty for a term of not less
than twelve months; or
e. the citizen has been ordinarily resident in foreign countries for a
continuous period of seven years and during this time has neither
been at any time in the service of Malta or of an international orga-
nisation of which the government of Malta was a member nor given
notice in writing to the Minister of his or her intention to retain ci-
tizenship of Malta.
However, in all of these cases a person shall be deprived of his or her
citizenship only if the Minister is satisfied that it is not conducive to
the public good that the person should retain his or her citizenship
and in the case referred to in (d) above only if it appears to the Minis-
ter that that person would not thereupon become stateless.
Before the Minister issues an order depriving a person of his or her
citizenship, the person concerned must be given notice in writing in-
forming him or her of the ground on which the order will be issued
and of his or her right to an inquiry. If the person requests an inquiry
the Minister will have to refer the case to a committee of inquiry ap-
pointed by the Minister but presided over by a person with judicial ex-
perience.
12.3 Statistical developments
These legislative amendments, particularly the shift to dual and multi-
ple nationality, and the 2007 amendments described below (see section
12.4) are reflected in the statistical developments in the period 1990-
2008. Statistics from the Department for Citizenship & Expatriate Af-
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Table 12.1 Acquisition of Maltese nationality by registration for 1998-2008 according to the
grounds for registration
Acquisition by registration 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
By virtue of marriage via
art. 4 or art. 6
107 75 162 682 354 240 267 197 197 228 160
Resettling permanently in
Malta after having
emigrated and ceased to
be citizens of Malta via art.
4(4)
4 4 – – – – – – – – –
Being children born abroad
to female citizens of Malta
via art. 5(2)(a)
– – 173 241 221 192 210 268 180 179 184
Being former citizens of
Malta via art. 8
– – 177 139 109 64 37 25 29 21 25
Minor children of Maltese
descent
– – – – – – – – – 5 62
Persons of Maltese des-
cent
– – – – – – – – – 27 163
Total 111 79 512 1,062 684 496 514 490 406 460 594
Source: Department for Citizenship & Expatriate Affairs
Figure 12.1 Number of naturalisations and registrations in Malta, 1990-2008
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fairs for the years 1990-2008 show that the number of citizenships ac-
quired by registration rose sharply from the year 2000 onwards (see
Figure 12.1, which also shows that the change in policy regarding dual
and multiple citizenship in 2000 had a greater effect on registrations
than naturalisations). From an annual average of 111 in the 1990s the
number of registrations shot up to 512 in 2000 and 1,062 in 2001 and
has remained in the region of 500 a year ever since.
The figure of 1,062 in 2001 remains the highest figure ever recorded
for citizenship registrations in Malta. This increase is attributed by the
National Statistics Office (NSO) in the Demographic Review 2001 to the
removal of the prohibition against dual and multiple nationality by the
legislative amendments that entered into force in February 2000. The
figure remained high in 2002 when 684 registrations were recorded.23
This might be attributed to the fact that until 2002 Australian law pro-
hibited dual and multiple nationality24 and this prevented the many
Maltese emigrants residing in Australia from taking advantage of the
changes in the Maltese legislation in 2000 and registering for Maltese
citizenship. When Australia changed its law on 4 April 2002 and re-
moved the prohibition, this resulted in a surge of registrations in 2002
by persons who were now able to retain both Maltese and Australian ci-
tizenship.25 In 2003 and 2004, the number of registrations decreased
to 496 and 514, respectively,26 and remained at this level up to 2007.
The 2007 amendments, described in section 12.4. below, have again
served to trigger an increase in citizenship registrations, though not to
the level of the 2000 amendments since they affect more remote gen-
erations, raising the number of registrations to 594 in 2008.
Table 12.1 gives a breakdown of the figures for acquisition by regis-
tration for 1998-2008 according to the grounds for registration and
shows that it was mostly (i) foreign spouses; (ii) children born abroad
to female citizens of Malta; and (iii) former citizens of Malta who had
lost their citizenship because of the possession or acquisition of an-
other citizenship that took advantage of the change in policy regarding
dual and multiple citizenship to acquire citizenship by registration.
The last two grounds, ‘minor children of Maltese descent’ and ‘persons
of Maltese descent’ are the new grounds introduced by the 2007
amendments.
12.4 Recent reforms
In 2007 important amendments to the Maltese Citizenship Act were
passed by the House of Representatives (Act X of 2007) bringing three
significant changes to Malta’s citizenship law.
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First, in response to repeated requests by the Maltese diaspora, dual
citizenship has been extended to second and subsequent generations
of Maltese born outside Malta and living abroad. The 1989 amend-
ments to the Act had introduced dual citizenship for those who had
been Maltese citizens by birth in Malta but who had emigrated and gi-
ven up their Maltese citizenship, in order to enable them to reacquire
Maltese citizenship. The 2000 amendments went a step further by ex-
tending dual citizenship to those who had been Maltese citizens by
descent (i.e. because at least one of their parents was born in Malta)
rather than by birth in Malta and who had subsequently lost this citi-
zenship upon acquisition of citizenship in another country. This made
it possible for children of Maltese emigrants born abroad to acquire or
retain Maltese citizenship provided one of their parents had been born
in Malta. However, this still excluded the offspring of these children,
i.e. second and subsequent generations, from citizenship, because in
their case, neither parent, though Maltese, had been born in Malta.
The 2007 amendments extend dual citizenship to these generations,
as the ius soli requirement was moved even further up the line of an-
cestry; provided that somewhere along the applicant’s direct line of
Maltese ancestry there is an ascendant who was born in Malta of a par-
ent likewise born in Malta, applicants would be entitled to Maltese citi-
zenship even though neither of their parents had been born in Malta.
Following the entry into force of the 2007 amendments on 1 August
2007 (LN 178 of 2007), art. 5 of the Citizenship Act now provides that
those born outside Malta on or after the date of independence are en-
titled to apply for registration as citizens of Malta if they prove
(through documentary evidence such as birth, marriage and death cer-
tificates) that they are the direct descendants of a Maltese ascendant
born in Malta of a parent likewise born in Malta. However, if the appli-
cant has parents, grandparents and other ancestors who are still alive
and are also direct descendants themselves in this sense, they would
also have to apply for Maltese citizenship under the new provision, as
otherwise the Maltese citizenship link would have been broken down
the line. If any of these ascendants entitled to Maltese citizenship died
before 1 August 2007 or if a parent dies within three years from this
date without applying for citizenship, he or she would still be deemed
to have acquired citizenship for the purposes of this provision and so
the line of Maltese citizenship throughout the generations would not
be considered broken (i.e. a three-year grace period).
It has been reported that since the 1989 amendments, the Citizen-
ship Department has confirmed the right to dual citizenship for 12,250
applicants, a number that is expected to increase following this 2007
amendment, though not to the same extent, as obviously second-gen-
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eration and subsequent-generation Maltese are not as attached to Malta
as first-generation Maltese.27
The second amendment, which came into force on 6 July 2007,
makes an exception to the rule that a spouse of a citizen of Malta may
acquire citizenship only five years after the marriage. A new provision
in art. 10 provides that the Prime Minister may, by means of a notice
published in the Government Gazette, authorise the Minister to grant
a certificate of naturalisation to the spouse of any citizen of Malta with-
out any residence requirements when either the spouse or the said citi-
zen has rendered ‘exceptional services’ to Malta or humanity.
A third amendment that entered into force on 1 August 2007 recti-
fied an anomaly in the Act. Hitherto, those who were born outside Mal-
ta before the date of independence were deemed to have automatically
acquired Maltese citizenship on the date of independence only if they
were citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies up to that date and
their father and a paternal grandparent were both born in Malta. Con-
versely, those with a non-Maltese father whose mother and a maternal
grandparent had both been born in Malta could acquire citizenship
only by satisfying a five-year residency requirement. The amendments
now redress this anomaly by introducing new provisions in art. 3 that
remove this residency requirement and entitle such persons irrespec-
tive of any residency period to be registered as Maltese citizens because
of their mother’s and a maternal grandparent’s birth in Malta. More-
over, the first amendment concerning dual citizenship for second and
subsequent generations described above also benefits those born
abroad before the date of independence who prove that they are des-
cendants in the direct line of an ascendant born in Malta with a parent
likewise born in Malta.
Apart from these legislative amendments, a policy decision has re-
cently been taken that benefits a small category of foreigners who,
while themselves not qualifying for Maltese citizenship in terms of the
Maltese Citizenship Act, have children who are Maltese citizens be-
cause they were born in Malta before 1989, when the law as it stood
then conferred citizenship on them, notwithstanding that they were
not of Maltese descent. Maltese citizenship has been extended on the
basis of a policy decision to these parents if they have been residing in
Malta for fifteen years.28
12.5 Conclusions
The main motive for the acknowledgement of dual and multiple citi-
zenship was to do justice to the thousands of Maltese citizens who had
lost their citizenship when, due to economic circumstances, they had
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been forced to emigrate to seek work overseas and thereby acquired for-
eign citizenship. By extending citizenship to the third generation, the
link to the diaspora has been extended beyond former Maltese citizens.
Not only have Maltese diaspora regained their legal ties to their or their
ancestors’ homeland but, following Malta’s accession to the European
Union, they may now also partake of the benefits of European citizen-
ship. Throughout the years, through its participation in international
fora debating nationality issues Malta has regularly reviewed and re-
vised its nationality policies in line with evolving concepts so that gen-
der inequalities and other forms of discrimination prevailing in the law
have now been mostly redressed bringing the legal regime in line with
international trends.
However, although Malta has signed, though not yet ratified, the
European Convention on Nationality, the Maltese Citizenship Act has
yet to fully embrace the principle of non-discrimination between its na-
tionals incorporated in art. 5(2) of the Convention as the provisions on
deprivation of citizenship in art. 14(2) of the Act discriminate against
persons who acquired citizenship by registration or naturalisation.
Maybe this is one reason why Malta has yet to ratify the Convention
that it signed on 29 October 2003, though it should be noted that art.
5(2) of the Convention does not have a mandatory effect but only con-
stitutes a ‘declaration of intent’ by the signatories.29 This discrimina-
tory issue has not been the subject of any public debate or controversy
in Malta.
Following accession to the European Union, although accession it-
self did not necessitate changes in Maltese citizenship laws as the laws
were already in consonance with internationally accepted norms, the
fact that Maltese citizenship now automatically confers European citi-
zenship rights on holders of Maltese citizenship means that Maltese
authorities must now consider the wider implications of any policy
changes relating to the acquisition and loss of citizenship, particularly
in relation to its immigration policy.
Chronological list of citizenship-related legislation in Malta
Date Document Content Source
1964 Constitution of Malta
(chapter III)
Contains provisions
conferring and regulating
Maltese citizenship based
on a combination of the
ius soli and ius sanguinis
principles and prohibiting
dual or multiple
citizenship
http://docs.justice.gov.mt
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Date Document Content Source
1965 Maltese Citizenship Act,
chapter 188 of the Laws of
Malta
Introduces more detailed
provisions and regulates in
particular the acquisition
of Maltese citizenship by
registration and
naturalisation
http://docs.justice.gov.mt
1974 Act LVIII amending the
Maltese Citizenship Act
and the Constitution of
Malta
Amendments necessitated
by Malta’s transformation
into a republic
http://docs.justice.gov.mt
1975 Act XXXI amending the
Maltese Citizenship Act
Slightly amends provisions
on naturalisation
http://docs.justice.gov.mt
1977 Act IX amending the
Maltese Citizenship Act
Prohibits acquisition of
citizenship by adoption
http://docs.justice.gov.mt
1989 Act XXIII amending the
Constitution of Malta and
Act XXIV amending the
Maltese Citizenship Act
Introduces an exception to
the prohibition against
dual citizenship for
expatriates; shifts to a rule
based more on ius
sanguinis than on ius soli
by providing that mere
birth in Malta would no
longer suffice to confer
citizenship at birth but
must be accompanied by
Maltese descent of at least
one of the parents;
amends some of the
provisions that were
resulting in gender
inequality; reintroduces
acquisition of citizenship
by adoption; removes the
distinction between
Commonwealth citizens
and other foreigners for
naturalisation purposes;
extends the grounds for
naturalisation
http://docs.justice.gov.mt
2000 Act III amending the
Constitution of Malta and
Act IV amending the
Maltese Citizenship Act
Allows dual and multiple
citizenship; introduces
restrictions in the
provisions on spousal
transfer of citizenship to
discourage marriages of
convenience; transfers the
detailed provisions on
citizenship in chapter III of
the Constitution to the
Maltese Citizenship Act
http://docs.justice.gov.mt
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Date Document Content Source
that thereby becomes the
main law regulating
citizenship while the
Constitution now only
contains the general
principles on citizenship;
makes further
amendments to redress
gender inequality;
introduces provisions to
improve the position of
foundlings
2007 Act X amending the
Maltese Citizenship Act
Introduces the right to
dual or multiple
citizenship for second- and
subsequent- generation
Maltese born outside
Malta and living abroad;
introduces an exception to
the five-year rule for
spouses of Maltese
citizens who render
‘exceptional services’ to
Malta or humanity;
extends citizenship by
registration to persons
born abroad before 1964 of
a non-Maltese father if
their mother and a
maternal grandparent were
both born in Malta
http://docs.justice.gov.mt
Notes
1 The author would like to thank Joseph Mizzi, Director at the Department for
Citizenship and Expatriate Affairs, and Joseph Treeby Ward, former Director, for
their valuable information and helpful comments on earlier drafts.
2 Hitherto only minors were allowed to have dual citizenship until their nineteenth
birthday.
3 These legislative changes were preceded by the White Paper on Proposed Legislation
to Amend the Citizenship and Immigration Laws, Office of the Prime Minister
(OPM), 10 August 1998 that explained the proposed amendments.
4 Art. 22 of the Constitution and art. 7 of the Maltese Citizenship Act.
5 Maltese Citizenship Act, art. 9.
6 Ibid., art. 8.
7 Ibid., arts. 4 and 6.
8 Ibid., art. 5.
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9 Ibid., arts. 3-5, 17.
10 Except in the case of illegitimate children where the national status of the mother
becomes relevant – ibid. art 17.
11 Ibid., art. 9.
12 Ibid., art. 17.
13 Ibid., arts. 4 and 6.
14 Ibid., arts. 8 and 9.
15 Ibid., art. 10.
16 Ibid., art. 12.
17 Ibid., art. 19.
18 These guidelines currently appear on the website of the relevant ministry, the
Ministry for Justice and Home Affairs, www.mjha.gov.mt.
19 However, recently a government minister (Minister for the Family and Social
Solidarity, Dolores Cristina, as reported in The Times of 18 June 2005 on p. 19) an-
nounced that the government is considering a change in policy in this regard in fa-
vour of granting citizenship to refugees who have been living in Malta for ten years
so as to enable them to integrate better into society. So far, however, there has been
no official change in policy on these lines.
20 Maltese Citizenship Act, art. 7 and art. 22(2) of the Constitution.
21 Maltese Citizenship Act, art. 13.
22 Ibid., art. 14.
23 Demographic Review 2002, National Statistical Office (NSO) 2003.
24 Art. 17 of Australia’s law on citizenship did not allow dual citizenship so that citizens
of Australia would lose citizenship if they acquired another citizenship voluntarily
through registration.
25 Ministry for Justice and Home Affairs, Annual Report 2001-2002.
26 Demographic Review 2003, NSO 2004.
27 Home Affairs Minister Borg, House of Representatives, sitting of 13 February 2007
and press conference of 15 May 2007. However, for the second and subsequent
generation Maltese living in a non-EU country, such as Australia, the US and
Canada, and the much smaller communities still living in Egypt and Tunisia, there is
the added attraction that Maltese citizenship brings with it the right to travel, study,
live and work in any EU country.
28 Home Affairs Minister Borg, House of Representatives, sitting of 13 February 2007.
29 Explanatory Report to the European Convention on Nationality, point 45.
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13 Nationality and citizenship in Cyprus since
1945: Communal citizenship, gendered nationality
and the adventures of a post-colonial subject in
a divided country
Nicos Trimikliniotis
Mapping out the complex historical, structural, politico-legal and cul-
tural setting that has generated a specific mode of nationality in the
context of Cyprus is no easy task. In fact, we cannot speak of a nation-
ality policy as such; such a policy has never been formally declared or
publicly discussed, save for times in which the media hysterically criti-
cised the granting of nationality.1 It is, however, possible to deduce a
policy from the practices since independence (Trimikliniotis 2005).
In an area of 9,251 km,2 the total population of Cyprus is around
754,800, of whom 666,800 are Greek-Cypriots (living in the Cyprus
Republic-controlled area). Upon independence in 1960, Turkish-
Cypriots constituted 18 per cent of the population, whilst the smaller
‘religious groups’, as referred to in the Constitution, consisting of Ar-
menians, Latins, Maronites and ‘others’ (such as Roma), constituted
3.2 per cent of the population. It is the third largest island in the Medi-
terranean; its geographical position, in the far eastern part of the Medi-
terranean Sea, historically adjoining Europe, Asia and Africa has been
both a blessing and a curse. Invaders and occupiers for centuries
sought to subordinate it for strategic reasons, followed by British colo-
nial rule.
It became an independent Republic in 1960. In the post-colonial
years, there was inter-communal strife and constant foreign interven-
tion of one kind or another, until 1974 when a coup by the Greek junta
and EOKA B2 was used as a pretext for an invasion by the Turkish
army and the subsequent division of the island (Hitchens 1997; Atta-
lides 1979). Turkey still occupies 34 per cent of the territory, whilst
200,000 remain displaced and 80,000 Turkish-Cypriots remain in the
northern, occupied territories. Attempts to resolve the Cyprus problem
have not been successful. Following the overwhelming rejection of the
UN plan to resolve the problem by the Greek-Cypriots and the over-
whelming endorsement on the 24 April 2004 by the Turkish-Cypriots,
Cyprus has entered the EU with the Cyprus problem in a state of lim-
bo. Cypriot policymakers still hope that the policy of accession to the
EU will eventually act as a catalyst in the effort to find a settlement,
but in the immediate aftermath of the referenda the two sides were di-
vided about how to proceed (Hannay 2005; Palley 2005).3 The election
of Demetris Christofias as President of the Republic of Cyprus in Feb-
ruary 2008 has given new impetus to solving the Cyprus problem. Di-
rect negotiations between Christofias and Talat, the two community
leaders, began in September 2008.
To evaluate the question of nationality and citizenship, one is forced
to view the ever-present ‘Cyprus problem’ in the historical and politico-
social context of the island and the wider troubled region of the near
Middle East. While the ‘Cyprus problem’ persists and the de facto divide
continues, the politics of ‘citizenship’ has not been ‘frozen’ in time. Ci-
tizenship has played a central role in political discourse, both during
and following the referendum on the UN plan in April 2004. The par-
ticular construction of the Cyprus Republic was such that the struggle
for legitimacy was elevated to the primary struggle for control of the
state. In this conflict the two communal leaderships – the Greek-Cy-
priots and the Turkish-Cypriots – sought to materialise their ‘national
aspirations’: For Greek-Cypriots the aim for Enosis (union with Greece)
and for the Turkish-Cypriots the goal of Taksim (partition) would con-
tinue post-independence. The very concept of citizenship was not only
ethnically/communally defined by the Constitution, but it was also a
sharply divisive issue between the Greeks and Turks, acquiring strong
ethnic and nationalistic overtones (see Tornaritis 1982; Chrysostomides
2000; Trimikliniotis 2000).
13.1 History of nationality policy since 1945
13.1.1 The national subject under the colonial spell: ‘Modernising’ the millet
system, divide and rule and the rise of irredentist nationalism
Following the opening of the Suez Canal in 1864, the UK persuaded
the Ottomans to cede Cyprus to the UK.4 The British colonialists took
over from the Ottoman rulers by order of Council on 7 October 1878.
They immediately embarked on a programme of ‘modernisation’ from
above and from outside by introducing an administrative system super-
seding Ottoman law with English law. Britain formally annexed Cyprus
in 1914, following Turkey’s support for Germany in the First World
War; in 1923, under the Treaty of Lausanne, Turkey formally relin-
quished all its claims to Cyprus and it became a Crown Colony in
1925.
In the historical setting prior to the modern era,5 ‘identity’ was not
based on ‘ethnicity’: The notion of ‘citizenship’ did not exist under Ot-
toman rule outside the millet system. This implied that the Ottomans
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basically recognised the religious leaders of the flock and were co-oper-
ating with them in the administration (Katsiaounis 1996; Kyrris
1980).6 With the annexation of Cyprus by Britain, Cypriots became ‘na-
tives of the colony’, but the essential characteristics of the Ottoman
millet system, a system that was based on communal organisation and
leadership along the lines of faith, were the bases upon which the
faith-groups would be ‘modernised’ as ethnic communities. Hence, the
Muslim community and Christian-orthodox community millets were
gradually ‘modernised’ by the British administrator. There was a trans-
formation of the quasi-medieval community elites into ‘ethno-commu-
nal’ elites: on the one hand, the traditional religious leader of the Chris-
tian Orthodox flock, the archbishop, became the leader of the Greek
community and, on the other, the old Ottoman administrators, who re-
presented the fusion of the political and religious order of the sulta-
nate-caliphate at local level, were transformed into the new political lea-
dership of the Turkish community. The Cypriot ‘natives of the colony’
were thus gradually ethnocised. Nevertheless, the leaders of the autoce-
phalous Greek-orthodox Church retained their ‘ethnarchic role’ (i.e. po-
litical leadership of the flock), despite the serious challenge from the
mass secular movement AKEL (the Progressive Party for the Working
People) from the 1940s onwards (Katsiaounis 2007). Moreover, the old
Ottoman administrators were eventually transformed into the Kemalist
elite, following the rise of Mustafa Kemal to power in the Turkish Re-
public (which succeeded the Ottoman empire).7
13.1.2 Moments of (in)dependence: Ethno-communal citizenship and the
nationalising of legally divided subjects (1959-1963)
The establishment of the Cyprus Republic marks an important devel-
opment in the history of Cyprus, as the island became an independent
republic for the first time since antiquity, albeit in a limited way (see
Attalides 1979; Faustmann 1999). The anti-colonial struggle had
started in the 1930s.8 The four-year armed campaign by the Greek-Cy-
priot EOKA (1955-59) for Enosis and the Turkish-Cypriot response for
Taksim brought about a regime of ‘supervised’ independence by three
foreign ‘guarantor’ nations (UK, Turkey and Greece). The Cyprus Con-
stitution, adopted under the Zurich-London Accord of 1959, contains a
rigorous bi-communalism, whereby the two ‘communities’, Greek-Cy-
priots, who made up 78 per cent of the population, and Turkish-Cy-
priots, who accounted for 18 per cent of the population, share power in
a consociational system. Citizenship is strictly ethno-communally di-
vided. There are also three other minority groups who have the consti-
tutionally recognised status of ‘religious groups’: the Maronites, the Ar-
menians and the Latins. In addition, there is a small Roma commu-
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nity, registered mostly as part of the Turkish-Cypriot community, but
never recognised as a minority group (Trimikliniotis & Demetriou
2009).
13.1.3 The ‘national’ rift: Collision and division between Greek-Cypriots and
Turkish-Cypriots (1963-1974)
In 1963, following a Greek-Cypriot proposal for amendment of the
Constitution, the Turkish-Cypriot political leadership ‘withdrew’ from
the government. Since then, the administration of the Republic has
been carried out by the Greek-Cypriots. Inter-communal strife ensued
until 1967. In 1964, the Supreme Court ruled that the functioning of
the government must continue on the basis of the ‘law of necessity’,
or, better yet, the ‘doctrine of necessity’, in spite of the constitutional
deficiencies created by the Turkish-Cypriot withdrawal from the admin-
istration.9 The short life of the consociation did not manage to gener-
ate a strong enough inter-communal or trans-communal citizenship.
This brief period of peaceful inter-communal political co-existence was
tentative; we cannot therefore speak of a ‘nationality policy’ as such,
above and beyond the politics of the Cyprus conflict and the separate
national aspirations of Greek and Turkish Cypriots, who continued to
work towards Enosis and Taksim respectively, even after independence.
Although de iure the Republic continued to exist as a single interna-
tional entity, in practice there were two de facto regimes in the enclaves,
each group controlled, one for the Greek-Cypriots and one for the Turk-
ish Cypriots – a situation aptly called ‘the first partition’ by one scholar
(Droussiotis 2005). The fierce fighting between 1963 and 1967 was fol-
lowed by efforts to reconciliation until 1974, but these efforts failed.
13.1.4 The de facto partition: 1974-2003 following the invasion and
occupation
Since 1974 the northern part of Cyprus, some 35 per cent of its terri-
tory, has been under Turkish occupation and outside the control of the
Cyprus government. Some 100 Greek-Cypriots inhabit the northern
territory, whilst only a few hundred Turkish-Cypriots continue to live in
the government-controlled south (ECRI 2001, 2006; Kyle 1997) How-
ever, since the end of May 2003 the regime in the occupied territories
has allowed Turkish-Cypriots to visit the Republic-controlled south on
the condition that they return before midnight and the Greek-Cypriots
to visit the north, on the condition of passport inspection and with re-
strictions on their stay.
During this 30-year period the de facto partition meant that in effect
there were two separate ‘stories’ about nationality: the story of the
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Greek-Cypriots, who lived in the reduced territory of the internationally
recognised Republic of Cyprus, and that of the Turkish-Cypriots, who
lived under an unrecognised regime, the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern
Cyprus’, which relied heavily on Turkey to maintain it. Turkish-Cypriots
are entitled to citizenship/nationality of the Cyprus Republic and tens
of thousands obtained a passport. However, the vast majority did not
have access to the authorities and was not allowed to cross over to the
‘other side’ by the occupying regime; up to April 2003 there were few
opportunities for ordinary Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots to
meet; while Greek-Cypriots did not have access to the occupied terri-
tories, Turkish-Cypriots were not allowed by the regime in the north to
enter the area controlled by the Republic.
The period between 1974 and 2003 was characterised by the at-
tempts of the break-away regime to consolidate partitionism in Cyprus
(Dodd 1993). In spite of the efforts to reach an agreement on a solu-
tion based on the ‘High Level Agreements’ of 1977 and 197910 the
Turkish side continued its route towards separatism. The ‘Turkish Re-
public of Northern Cyprus’ (TRNC), a regime recognised only by Tur-
key, was declared.
The constitution of the TRNC provides for an ethno-religious-based
nationality and citizenship to a large extent reproducing the provisions
of the Cyprus Republic (Dodd 1993). However, TRNC nationals cannot
make use of the nationality of an unrecognised state. Hence, many
Turkish-Cypriots sought passports from Turkey (see Kadirbeyoglu in
this volume) and the Republic of Cyprus – particularly after accession
to the EU. In the late 1990s, the TRNC leadership attempted to crimi-
nalise the access to the passport of the Republic of Cyprus, but such ef-
forts were subsequently abandoned as the numbers of Turkish-Cypriots
seeking passports grew and there was a reversal of this policy once the
Annan Plan (version 1) was first introduced in late 2002. In fact, many
Turkish-Cypriot politicians now criticised the authorities of the Repub-
lic of Cyprus for failing to respond quickly enough to ensure the swift
and full provisions of access to citizenship, passports and the public
goods that are available to the nationals of the Republic of Cyprus.
During the post-1974 period the Republic of Cyprus attempted to re-
inforce its legitimacy claiming that Turkish-Cypriot citizens enjoy full
and equal rights under the Republic’s Constitution, such as general ci-
vil liberties and the rights provided by the European Court of Human
Rights (ECHR) as well as other human rights, save for those provi-
sions, that have resulted from (a) the ‘abandoning’ of the governmental
posts in 1963-1964 and (b) the consequences of the Turkish invasion.
The ‘doctrine of necessity’ would apply to allow for the effective func-
tioning of the state, whilst the relevant provisions of the Constitution
would be temporarily suspended, pending a political settlement (for
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more on this, see Chrysostomides 2000; Loizou 2001). However, Turk-
ish-Cypriot citizens of the Republic had been denied their electoral
rights since 1964, a matter that was found to be in violation of the Eur-
opean Convention on Human Rights,11 save for the European Parlia-
ment elections in 2004. A new law was passed to at least partially re-
medy the situation before the parliamentary elections in May 2006.
All of the Republic of Cyprus governments have maintained that
Turkish-Cypriots are entitled to full citizenship rights and the national-
ity of the Republic. The children of Cypriots who now reside in the oc-
cupied territories or abroad and were born after 1974 are entitled to na-
tionality (as with Greek-Cypriots and ‘others’). The bureaucratic ele-
ments involved are due to the non-recognition of any documentation
such as e.g. birth certificates from the TRNC.12 The policy regarding
the treatment of Turkish-Cypriots, who are Cyprus Republic nationals,
is rather contradictory. This reflects the complexity of the Cyprus con-
flict and the constant conflict for legitimacy and recognition. Inevitably,
‘the discourse of recognition’ (Constantinou & Papadakis 2002) spilled-
over into nationality politics, making a mess of the official policy of
‘rapprochement’. Ultimately, the consequences of the situation resulted
in failing to properly treat ordinary Turkish-Cypriots as ‘strategic allies’,
in the context of independence from the Turkish-Cypriots’ nationalistic
leadership, who are perceived as ‘mere pawns of Ankara’.
Even today, the Republic of Cyprus seems to be failing to address
certain basic matters: Since Turkish is an official language of the Repub-
lic, allowing Turkish-Cypriots to communicate with government offi-
cials in their own language and making the laws, regulations and
forms available in Turkish is a matter that could have been resolved,
without much difficulty, and would protect the Republic from claims
of discrimination and unconstitutionality (Trimikliniotis & Demetriou
2008). Moreover, the enjoyment of all rights, including the right to
property (of those Turkish-Cypriots who fled their homes in 1963,
1967 and 1974), could have been handled with greater sensitivity and
care, so that the Turkish-Cypriots, who are Cypriot citizens, would feel
more welcome. At the same, time one has to appreciate the context,
particularly the massive displacement of 100,000 Greek-Cypriots from
the north, many of whom are housed in Turkish-Cypriot properties.
13.1.5 New issues for nationality/citizenship policies
In the 1990s and early 2000, a number of key issues opening up the
issue of citizenship and nationality and requiring a declared and con-
sistent policy emerged.
First, the arrival of migrant workers, who today make up 15 per cent
of the total working population of the island, is a significant factor al-
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tering the ethnic make up of the population. Although the initial de-
sign was that they be ‘temporary’, they seem to be a permanent feature
of Cypriot society (Matsis & Charalambous 1993; Trimikliniotis 1999;
Trimikliniotis & Pantelides 2003; Trimikliniotis & Demetriou 2007).
Second, the arrival of Turkish-Cypriot Roma from the poorer (occu-
pied) north in the south between 1999 and 2002 created a panic that
they were being ‘flooded’ with ‘gypsies’. In spite of the fact that we are
dealing with a group of Cypriots, who moved to the south, the reaction
of the authorities, the media and the public at large displayed a hostile
attitude as if they were undesirable ‘alien citizens’. Studies indicate that
there is wide-spread resentment by the local Greek-Cypriot residents to
the Turkish-speaking Roma coming to their neighbourhood in Limas-
sol and ‘causing trouble’. There is evidence of discrimination against
Roma in the Republic (Spyrou 2003; Trimikliniotis 2003; Trimiklinio-
tis & Demetriou 2009), as they are generally viewed with suspicion by
Greek-Cypriots, but also by Turkish-Cypriots. The arrival of large num-
bers in the south was greeted with fear and suspicion,13 particularly
when the then Minister of Justice and Public Order alleged that they
may well be ‘Turkish spies’,14 whilst the Minister of the Interior as-
sured Greek-Cypriots that the authorities ‘shall take care to move them
to an area that is far away from any place where any people live’, in re-
sponse to the racially motivated fears of local Greek-Cypriot residents.15
The socio-economic position of this generally destitute group renders
them particularly vulnerable and dependent on welfare; the rights that
derive from their citizenship status were thus mediated by the way var-
ious state authorities approached them (e.g. their lifestyle and harass-
ment means that many do not have the necessary documents for
claiming nationality such as birth certificates, identity cards, etc.).
Hence the failure to take into account the socio-economic conditions of
the Roma may result in the denial of the right to obtain a passport, as
was found in cases investigated by the Cyprus Ombudsman.16
Third, the opening of the ‘borders’ which allowed many thousands
of Turkish-Cypriots to visit the south were generally greeted by both
Turkish-Cypriots and Roma residing in the south with relief and
optimism.17 However, there was a tense atmosphere generated in the
run up and aftermath of the referendum on the Annan plan to reunite
the island on the 24 April 2004, the rejection of which by the Greek-
Cypriots has given rise to nationalist sentiments in the south (see Had-
jidemetriou 2006). The political atmosphere has drastically changed
since the presidential election in February 2008 and the beginning of
new negotiations to resolve the problem.
The fourth issue concerns the children of settlers who are married
with Turkish-Cypriots. This is a highly controversial issue as it brings
out the conflict over the nature of the Cyprus problem: the Turkish pol-
CYPRUS: POSTCOLONIAL CITIZENSHIP IN A DIVIDED COUNTRY 395
icy of colonising the north seems to be a major obstacle to a solution.
There is a misguided conflation of the internationally condemned pol-
icy by an aggressor country, with the fact that we are also dealing with
some basic rights and humanitarian issues relating to the rights of
children and individuals who marry, found families and continue with
their lives. The granting of nationality rights to children and spouses
of Turkish-Cypriots is a major political issue which has increasingly ta-
ken up the headlines and is discussed in the last section of this chap-
ter. Moreover, the condemnation of a war crime (colonisation) must
not be conflated and confused with issues regarding the conditions of
sojourn and living conditions of poor undocumented workers, who are
primarily present to be exploited as cheap foreign labour.
Finally, the issue of gender has become an important issue as re-
gards citizenship. The position of women in the processes of nation-
building and nationalism raises the crucial question of a gendered Cy-
priot nationality, in what one scholar referred to as ‘the one remaining
bastion of male superiority in the present territorially divided state’
(Anthias 1989: 150). This last ‘bastion’ was formally abolished with an
amendment of the citizenship law in 1999 (No. 65/99), which intro-
duced entitlement to citizenship for descendants of a Cypriot mother
and a non-Cypriot father. The apparent reluctance of Cypriot policy-
makers to amend the citizenship law, allegedly due to the concern
about upsetting the state of affairs as it existed prior to 1974, cannot
stand closer examination. After all, there have been seven amendments
to the citizenship law prior to the amendment No. 65/99. It is appar-
ent that the issue of gender equality had not been a particularly high
political priority. Besides, in the patriarchal order of things, the role of
Cypriot women as ‘symbolic reproducers of the nation’, particularly in
the context of ‘national liberation’, as transmitters of ‘the cultural stuff’,
required that potential association and reproduction of women with
men outside the ethnic group be strictly controlled (Anthias 1989: 151).
13.1.6 The rise of trans-communal subjectivity: Challenging the ethno-
communal boundaries
On 23 April 2003 there was a sudden decision by the authorities of the
unrecognised TRNC, to partially lift the ban on freedom of movement.
This has taken most by surprise (Demetriou 2007), as the TRNC was
abandoning the long-term vigorous opposition to Greek-Cypriot and
Turkish-Cypriot contacts. The Turkish-Cypriot leadership allowed the
possibility for a course of action the peace and rapprochement move-
ment had been advocating for years; yet the move was certainly a sur-
prise. The issue of ‘passport control’ between the check points became
an issue of tension between Greek-Cypriot politicians and media and
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their Turkish-Cypriot counterparts. However, this bureaucratic measure
which attempts to force on people the issue of ‘recognition’ has become
part of the ‘struggle for legitimacy and recognition’ between the two po-
litical regimes, even though it is up to states and international organi-
sations to recognise them.
Cross-boundary contacts and interaction opened up new possibilities
for nationality policy, as the barbed-wire at last became penetrable. The
fluidity of the situation allows greater scope for citizens’ initiatives aim-
ing at reunification (see Demetriou 2006, 2007) and has opened up
the debate on reconciliation in Cyprus (Kadir 2007; Sitas, Latif & Loi-
zou 2007; Trimikliniotis 2007). The current measures cannot be a sub-
stitute for a settlement; it is an awkward state of limbo, whereby the
‘nationals’ are divided along ethnic lines, even though all Turkish-Cy-
priots are entitled to citizenship in the Republic of Cyprus and many
thousands have actually acquired citizenship and passports. The con-
tact since 2003 has created a pattern whereby a consistent number of
persons cross over for work, leisure or other activities, estimated at
about 20 per cent of the population.18 The Third ECRI Report on Cy-
prus notes that a large number of Turkish-Cypriots has been issued
with Cyprus passports (35,000), identity cards (60,000) and birth certi-
ficates (75,000), all of which are relevant figures as far as Cypriot citi-
zenship is concerned (ECRI 2006: para. 78). Interestingly, according to
the Demographic Survey Report (PIO 2006: 12), the population of Cy-
prus is estimated at 854,300 at the end of 2005 (compared to 837,300
at the end of the previous year), of whom 766,400 live in the terri-
tories under the control of the Republic. Turkish-Cypriots are said to be
87,000 persons, Greek-Cypriots 656,000 and foreign citizens 110,000.
The same report estimates, on the basis of data from Turkish Cypriot
sources, that about 58,000 Turkish Cypriots have emigrated since
1974. The number of ‘illegal settlers from Turkey’ is said to be ‘most
probably in the range of 150-160 thousand, which is estimated on in-
formation of significant19 arrivals of Turks in the occupied area’ (PIO
2006: 11). The study by Hatay (2005) shows significantly lower figures
for settlers and higher numbers for Turkish-Cypriots. The population
issue remains a hotly contested issue, not only between the two com-
munities, but also within the Turkish-Cypriot community (see Hatay
2008; Faiz 2008).
13.2 Modes of acquisition and loss of citizenship
Following the annexation of Cyprus by the UK,20 all Ottoman citizens
who were born in or normally resided in Cyprus became British sub-
jects.21 From that day on the basic law regarding the granting of na-
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tionality in Cyprus was the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act
of 1914 and later the 1948 British Nationality Act. Post-independence
art. 198 of the Constitution of the Cyprus Republic, and Annex D of
the Treaty of Establishment, which was annexed to the Constitution,
regulated the initial determination of the citizenry and the granting of
citizenship/nationality. Annex D was implemented with independence,
as required by art. 195, which provides for the general principle of in-
ternational law that all residents of the former colonial territory would
automatically become citizens of the Republic (Tornaritis 1982: 35; Loi-
zou 2001: 441).22 Art. 198.1(b) provided that:
any person born in Cyprus, on or after the date of the Constitu-
tion coming into force, shall become a citizen of the Republic if
on that date his father has become a citizen of the Republic or
would but for his death have become such a citizen under the
provisions of Annex D of the Treaty of Establishment.
This was the case until the enactment of the main Law on Citizenship
in 1967.23 In 2002, a new Law on the Population Data Archives No.
141(I)/2002 unified all provisions regarding the archiving of births and
deaths, registration of residents, registration of constituent voters and
the registration of citizens. It also introduced special provisions for the
issuing of passports and travel documents and refugee identity cards to
refugees. The new Law has so far been amended four times; however,
none of these changes affected the acquisition and loss of citizen-
ship.24 Together with Annex D this law currently regulates the acquisi-
tion and loss of Cypriot citizenship.
Cypriot policy-makers have followed the ‘mixed’ principle that com-
bines ius soli and ius sanguinis (Tornaritis 1982: 38-39). However, ius
sanguinis is far more important in the regulations than ius soli, as Cy-
priot descent is the primary criterion for acquisition of citizenship as will
be shown further down. Citizenship can be acquired automatically, via
registration and naturalisation, but at the core of citizenship policy re-
mains the notion that all persons of Cypriot descent are entitled to apply.
13.2.1 Acquisition by descent
A person born in Cyprus or abroad on or after 16 August 1960 auto-
matically acquires Cypriot citizenship provided that at the time of his
or her birth either of the parents was a citizen of the Republic or, in
the case that the parent(s) were deceased at the time of his or her birth,
either of them was entitled to acquire citizenship had he or she not
been deceased. In cases of permanent residents abroad, this provision
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is not applicable unless the child’s birth is registered in the prescribed
manner.25 Moreover, there are two exceptions to this general rule:
Firstly, the current law provides that children born to parents, one of
whom unlawfully entered or resides in the Republic, do not automati-
cally become citizens of Cyprus even if the other parent holds or would
have been entitled to Cypriot citizenship. They can become citizens
only following a decision of the Council of Ministers.26 This amend-
ment was apparently directed against Turkish nationals who settled in
the north at a time when it was deemed politically ‘necessary’ or ‘expe-
dient’ by policymakers. However, it is obviously discriminatory against
persons who have Turkish-Cypriot descent from one parent and is con-
trary to the Constitution and international obligations of the Republic.
Whether children of Turkish nationals should be granted Cypriot ci-
tizenship is a hot political issue and there are conflicting accounts of
what categories of persons are affected. Media reports and right-wing
politicians seem to concur that the issue at stake is the granting of citi-
zenship to children who have one Cypriot parent and another who is a
settler. However, ministry officials claim that persons falling under this
category are invariably granted nationality, albeit in a manner that does
not cause strong reactions.27 In any case, making a child’s nationality
conditional on the status of ‘legality’ or ‘illegality’ of the parents, or
even worse of one of the two parents, not only violates the rights of
children, as provided for in the UN Convention for the Rights of the
Child, but also constitutes discrimination against the children who are
victimised by the political situation and whom the Republic has an ob-
ligation to protect and respect. Due to the lack of transparency, it is not
possible to assess the implementation of this law. The Third ECRI Re-
port on Cyprus (2006: 8) notes that the Cyprus Ombudsman is cur-
rently investigating ‘the conformity of this procedure with national and
international standards’. Moreover, it notes that ‘citizenship has been
granted by this procedure to children whose Cypriot parent was a Turk-
ish Cypriot and whose other parent was a citizen of Turkey’; however,
it also states that ‘decisions to grant nationality have resulted in intoler-
ant and xenophobic attitudes in public debate’.
Secondly, sect. 109(3) of law 141(I)/2002 expressly prescribes that
the above provisions for acquisition of citizenship do not come into
force in cases where a person is born in Cyprus or abroad between 16
August 1960 and 11 June 1999, if his or her claim is based solely on
his or her mother’s citizenship, or the fact that she was entitled to citi-
zenship of the Republic. However, the law stipulates that the person
(or if the person is a minor, his or her father or mother) may submit
an application to the minister to be registered as a citizen of Cyprus.
The Equality Body of Cyprus examined a complaint claiming discrimi-
nation on the grounds of sex/gender and nationality (and indirectly
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ethnic or racial origin) for descendants of women of Cypriot origin
born between 16 August 1960 and 11 June 1999.28 The Equality Body
(the Ombudsman in its capacity as the Equality and Anti-discrimina-
tion Body) considered that the said provision was indeed discrimina-
tory; however, in a rather obscure decision, it refused to take any
further action, due to the ‘transitory nature of the provision, to counter
the situation and the expectations that had formed up to 1999 on the
basis of the regimen of acquiring citizenship’.29 In any case, they are
entitled to obtain nationality via registration.
Another mode of acquisition (sect. 109(3)) is provided for persons
born on or after 16 August 1960 and who are of Cypriot origin, i.e.
descendants of a person who:
a. became a British citizen on the basis of the Cyprus (Annexation)
Order-in-Council between 1914 and 1943; or
b. was born in Cyprus between 5 November 1914 and 16 August 1960
during which time his or her parents were ordinarily resident in
Cyprus.
These persons are entitled to be registered as citizens provided that
they are adults and of sound mind,30 apply to the minister31 via the de-
signated means and provide an official confirmation of loyalty to the
Republic, according to the format provided in the Second Table an-
nexed to the law.32
13.2.2 Acquisition via registration
The following persons are entitled to be registered as Cypriot citizens
upon application to the relevant Minister:
1. Citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies or a country of the
Commonwealth,33 who are of Cypriot descent,34 provided that they:
L ordinarily reside in Cyprus and/or resided for a continuous peri-
od of twelve months in Cyprus or a shorter period that the min-
ister may accept under special circumstances of any specific case,
immediately before the date of the submission of their applica-
tion, or are serving in the civil or public service;
L are of good character;
L intend to remain in the Republic, or depending on the circum-
stances, continue serving in the civil or public service (sub-sect.
110(1)); and
L sign an official confirmation of loyalty to the Republic.
2. Spouses or widowers/widows of persons who were citizens of the
Republic, or spouses of persons who, had they not been deceased,
would have become or would have the right to become citizens of
the Republic, provided that they:
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L ordinarily reside in Cyprus and/or resided there for a period not
less than three years;35
L are of good character;
L intend to remain in the Republic, or depending on the circum-
stances, continue serving in the civil or public service of the Re-
public or the educational service of the Republic or the Police
Force of the Republic even after registration as citizens of the Re-
public (subsect. 110(2)); and
L sign an official confirmation of loyalty to the Republic.
3. Underage children of any citizen. In this case the application for ci-
tizenship has to be submitted by the parent or the guardian of the
child.
A person who has renounced his or her citizenship of the Republic or
has been deprived of it may not be registered as citizen of the Republic
according to sect. 110, but may still be registered with the approval of
the minister (subsect. 110(4)). Persons who have been registered under
this section become citizens of the Republic from the date of their re-
gistration (subsect. 110(5)).
This provision places Cypriot descent at the core of the right to ac-
quire citizenship; spouses and under-age children who are resident in
Cyprus can apply but their application is treated as dependent on the
person of Cypriot origin. Moreover, there is an issue of how the rights
of spouses and dependents are implemented. In fact, the practice of
the immigration authorities to deport migrants who have been living
in Cyprus for several years continued in spite of criticism from legal
circles, human rights NGOs, from the Ombudsman and from the
Commissioner for Legislation.36 Within a time span of only a few
weeks, the Court cancelled deportation orders on numerous in-
stances.37
13.2.3 Acquisition via naturalisation (πολιτογράφηση)
A non-Cypriot who resides lawfully in the Republic may acquire citi-
zenship via discretionary naturalisation if he or she fulfils all of the fol-
lowing conditions formulated in Table 3 annexed to the law (subsect.
111):
a. he or she has lawfully resided in the Republic of Cyprus for the en-
tire duration of twelve months immediately preceding the date of
application;
b. over and above the twelve months referred to above, an additional
continuous period of seven years in the period immediately prior to
this, the applicant must have ordinarily resided in the Republic, or
have been serving in the civil or public service of the Republic, or a
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bit of both, for periods amounting in total to no less than four
years;
c. he or she is of good character; and
d. he or she intends to reside in the Republic.
The law also provides for acquisition of citizenship via naturalisation
for students, visitors, self-employed persons, athletes and coaches, do-
mestic workers, nurses and employees who reside in Cyprus with the
sole aim of working there as well as spouses, children or other depen-
dent persons. The prerequisites are that they must have ordinarily re-
sided in the Republic for at least seven years and one year in the period
immediately prior to the application their stay must be ‘continuous’.38
There are also exceptional situations where citizenship may be
granted.39
One must bear in mind that all of the above are based on the discre-
tion of the Council of Ministers and the Minister of the Interior. More-
over, given that there has been a policy that migrant worker permits
cannot be extended beyond four years, the chance of acquiring citizen-
ship for these groups is rather slim, unless they are married to a Cy-
priot or are granted leave to stay on other exceptional grounds. Cypriot
authorities are very reluctant to grant citizenship to migrants. The Cy-
prus government failed to transpose Directive 203/109/EC by 23 Janu-
ary 2006. The law was passed in February 2007; following criticism by
NGOs and strong trade union opposition, the restrictive criteria origin-
ally foreseen for granting long-term migrants this special status, which
included proficiency in Greek language, history and civilisation, were
eventually dropped by the parliament.
The naturalisation procedure has been criticised in the Second ECRI
Report on Cyprus as the conditions apparently ‘leave a wide margin of
discretion to the Naturalisation Department as concerns decisions to
grant citizenship’; moreover the same Report claims that ‘there have
been complaints that these decisions are sometimes discriminatory’
(ECRI 2001: 9). The same practice was criticised by the Third ECRI
Report (2006: 8), which also notes that ‘decisions are still excessively
discretional and restrictive’ but that ‘this is reflected not only in the use
made of public order considerations, but also in the application of resi-
dency and language requirements’.
The ‘Cyprus problem’ is often quoted as a ‘national priority’ and is
invoked by Greek-Cypriot authorities as the reason for their reluctance
to open up citizenship rules so as not to alter the demography, particu-
larly in the context of the Turkish policy of settlement in the occupied
northern territories. However, this does not withstand close scrutinity
as numerous amendments were made to facilitate various population
policies that benefit what is perceived as ‘the Greek-Cypriot interest’.
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Several decisions by the Ombudsman have criticised a number of
practices of the Population Data Archives regarding the process of
granting citizenship. In particular, criticism is directed at the restrictive
approach of the Director of the Population Data Archives as regards
the acquisition of citizenship via registration and naturalisation; parti-
cularly critical are the decisions regarding the rejection of applications
for citizenship based on marriage with Cypriots.40 Moreover, the deci-
sions also highlight considerable delays in the processing of the appli-
cations, prejudice based on the religion of the applicant and the exer-
cising of administrative discretion in the interpretation of the regula-
tion that excludes those who have entered the country illegally from
acquiring citizenship.41
Overall, the implementation of the rules on naturalisation and with
the wide margin of discretion provided for by the legislation, is an is-
sue of concern regarding the fairness of these policies. There is little
encouragement and information for persons entitled to be naturalised
and there are bureaucratic obstructions that make the application for
naturalisation unattractive and cumbersome. One can explain this pol-
icy as a mixture of the colonial legacy and the keenness of the authori-
ties to hold on to their ‘sovereignty’ concerning entry, sojourn, resi-
dence and citizenship, particularly as the protracted Cyprus conflict is
often invoked as a pretext. The consequence is a restrictive regime that
requires reform if it is to observe international law standards on the
subject.
13.2.4 Renunciation and deprivation of citizenship
Any adult citizen of sound mind who is also a citizen of another state
may renounce his or her citizenship by submitting a confirmation of
renunciation, and the minister will take the appropriate action for the
registration of such confirmation (sect. 112).
Deprivation of citizenship is possible, only for citizens who acquired
citizenship via registration or naturalisation, via an Order of the Coun-
cil of Ministers (sect. 113) under the following circumstances:
a. When it is established that the registration or certification of citi-
zenship was obtained by deceit, false pretences or concealment of a
material fact (subsect. 113(2)).
b. If the Council of Ministers (subsect. 113(3)) is satisfied that:
L through deeds or words this person has demonstrated a lack of
loyalty to the laws of the Republic;42 or
L in a war fought by the Republic this person was illegally involved
in an exchange with the enemy, has contacted the enemy or was
in any way involved in any operation in which he knowingly as-
sisted the enemy; or
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L within five years from naturalisation, he or she is convicted in
any country of a crime carrying a sentence of one year or more.
c. If the Council of Ministers (subsect. 113(4)) is satisfied that the nat-
uralised citizen has ordinarily resided in foreign countries for a con-
tinuous period of seven years.
The Council of Ministers cannot deprive a person of citizenship unless
it is satisfied that it is not in the public interest that the said person re-
mains a citizen of the Republic (sub-sect. 113(5)).
It is apparent that the above is contrary to art. 5 of the 1997 Eur-
opean Convention on Nationality, which Cyprus is yet to sign. In fact,
the Second and Third ECRI Reports on Cyprus recommend that Cy-
prus signs and ratifies this Convention. In any case, there is a com-
plaint before the Equality and Anti-discrimination Body arguing that
the above provision is contrary to the general prohibition of discrimina-
tion as laid down in art. 1 of Protocol 12 to the European Convention
on Human Rights, which has been ratified by the Republic of Cyprus.
It is apparent that the decisive element in the granting of citizenship
is Cypriot descent which is combined with birth to form the various ca-
tegories of rights provided. First, we can identify the following cate-
gories of persons of Cypriot descent:
1. Greek-Cypriots (and the three religious groups) born in the area
controlled by the Republic of Cyprus: this category is not really an
issue as citizenship is granted automatically.
2. In principle, the same ought to apply to Turkish-Cypriots born in
Cyprus and to children who have at least one Cypriot parent. Turk-
ish-Cypriots born in the occupied territories are automatically en-
titled to citizenship provided that they submit documents of their
parents or grandparents issued by the Republic of Cyprus or the co-
lonial authorities (TRNC documents are not recognised). However,
in practice, art. 109 of the Law referred to above may result in a
more discretionary regime for persons, one of whose parents is a
Turkish national, even if they reside in the area under control of the
Republic.
3. Persons of Cypriot origin born abroad, who have one Cypriot par-
ent, are entitled to citizenship.
4. Persons of Cypriot origin born abroad between 16 August 1960 and
11 June 1999 and whose entitlement to Cypriot citizenship is solely
based on their mother being Cypriot (or being entitled to Cypriot ci-
tizenship) are not entitled to citizenship. They may, however, apply
to acquire citizenship via registration.
5. Children born in Cyprus to non-Cypriot migrants who legally en-
tered and reside in Cyprus and have acquired or would have been
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entitled to acquire Cypriot citizenship via naturalisation are entitled
to citizenship.
‘Collateral’ policies have been developed to use tax incentives and na-
tional service ‘discount’ for men (six months if under 26 and three
months if over 26 instead of the 25 months of normal national service)
to attract Greek-Cypriots from abroad to live in Cyprus.
Second, those who are not of Cypriot origin can only acquire citizen-
ship via naturalisation or registration. Therefore,
1. Non-Cypriots who legally entered and reside in Cyprus are not en-
titled to acquire Cypriot citizenship. But they can acquire citizen-
ship by discretionary naturalisation, providing that they fulfil the re-
quired qualifications.
2. Children born in Cyprus to migrants who do not hold Cypriot citi-
zenship or have a right to acquire it are not entitled to citizenship.
13.3 Current debates: The challenges of gender equality,
migration, Europeanisation and reunification
13.3.1 Europeanisation
There is little doubt that the language of ‘Europe’ has become domi-
nant in Cyprus as there is an orientation of political discourse and
rhetoric towards Europe as a reference point.43 The question is whether
the process of Europeanisation has touched upon citizenship and na-
tionality. One issue is European citizenship itself, which affects the di-
vided Cypriot citizenship. A number of key issues relate to the right to
the free movement of workers in the EU; for instance, the fact that Cy-
prus has not yet regulated same-sex marriages and extra-marital rela-
tionships has resulted in various forms of discrimination against les-
bian, gay, bisexual and transsexual Union citizens, thus constituting ef-
fective obstacles to free movement. Another problem is the regulation
of the ‘Green line’ that divides the country (see Trimikliniotis 2008).
European Citizenship has different aspects relevant to the potential
for transformation of the citizenship/nationality issue in Cyprus. First
it may provide an all encompassing identity that has the potential to
overcome the ethnic divide between Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cy-
priots. It is argued that ‘shared cultural experience’ between Greek-Cy-
priots and Turkish-Cypriots – many times suppressed by nationalists in
the past ‘in order to focus on ethnic differences’ – could become a new
focus as there are common aspects of identity that can unite the two
communities. According to this optimistic view, EU membership may
emphasise the shared culture and help in finding a solution to the Cy-
prus problem (Botswain 1996: 94). Moreover, EU Citizenship may
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have a positive impact on human rights as the EU is expected to act as
a guarantor of rights, such as the freedom of movement, settlement
and ownership of land as provided in the Treaty of Rome and in line
with the ‘acquis communautaire’. ‘Citizenship’ would underpin rights
(communal/individual) thus assisting in creating a better climate of
trust and security through the European Court of Justice, the European
Court of Human Rights, the Council of Europe and the EU in gener-
al.44 The European Conventions of the Council of Europe and other in-
ternational instruments for ‘minority rights’ (Thornberry 1994),
although technically outside the acquis, could arguably be a useful me-
chanism from which Turkish-Cypriots stand to gain;45 however, Turk-
ish-Cypriots are not a ‘minority’ but a ‘community’ in a consociation re-
gime.
Moreover, matters are, in practice, far more complicated. Since the
rejection of the UN plan in April 2004, the Europeanisation issues
have not acted as a constructive force: the issue of EU accession has be-
come yet another point of contestation between Greek-Cypriots and
Turkish-Cypriots and the question of what kind of future ‘European so-
lution’ there will be for the Cyprus problem, is becoming a dominant
question. Inevitably, the questions of citizenship have been more or
less put on hold as they are subordinate to the solution of the Cyprus
problem. It is, however, highly likely to return in the near future as it
remains one of the key issues in the Cyprus problem.
13.3.2 Reunification, partition and settlers: Nationality turns into a hot
political issue
This is perhaps the greater challenge in the adventures of national-
ity in Cyprus. We have already referred to some of the issues as re-
gards the period 1974-2004 and the challenges of migration. How-
ever, the central question arises out of the latest efforts to resolve
the Cyprus problem, which resulted in the UN plan known as ‘the
Annan Plan’.
The issue of who is entitled to nationality is a hot political issue. In
the northern territories the policy of Turkey is to ‘replace’ Turkish-Cy-
priot e´migre´s with Turkish settlers from the mainland or to distort the
demographic balance of the Cyprus population by giving TRNC nation-
ality to a large number of settlers.46 In the area under the control of
the Republic of Cyprus it is estimated that there are between 15,000 to
20,000 Pontian Greeks from the former Soviet Union, a few of whom
were granted nationality, after residing for a period of seven years in
Cyprus.47 The demographic study conducted by the Ministry of the In-
terior in 2000 found that there were 10,000-12,000 Greek Pontians re-
siding in Cyprus at the time. However, there have been changes since;
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in any case, Pontian organisations claim to represent 40,000-45,000
Greek-Pontians residing in Cyprus.
The UN proposal for resolution contains specific provisions over the
number of settlers who would be granted nationality. This has proven
to be a particularly sore point for the Greek-Cypriots, who eventually
rejected the plan. In fact, it is widely believed that one of the reasons
the Greek-Cypriots voted ‘NO’ to the plan was the fear over the ‘large
numbers’ of settlers who would eventually be allowed to remain.48
Nevertheless, these provisions were seen by Greek-Cypriots as proble-
matic in that they were alleged to allow for a ‘perpetual inflow of set-
tlers’, in spite of the 5 per cent cap for any future migration from Tur-
key and Greece.49
In the ‘main articles’ of the Foundation Agreement of the Annan
plan (art. 3) there is reference to ‘a single Cypriot citizenship’ regulated
under federal law as well as the ‘internal constituent state citizenship
status’ to be enjoyed by ‘all Cypriot citizens’; moreover, the plan lays
out a set of complicated rules about preserving the ‘identity’ (see ap-
pendix 1). The acquisition of citizenship is regulated by an agreed con-
stitutional law which essentially deals with the issue of settlers from
Turkey. Moreover the plan envisages a federal law on ‘aliens and immi-
gration’ (Foundation Agreement, Attachment 5, Law 1) as well as a fed-
eral law for international protection and the implementation of the
Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967
Protocol on the Status of Refugees (Foundation Agreement, Attach-
ment 5, Law 2) which, in the event of a settlement, would replace the
current laws on immigration and refugees.
The plan was rejected by the Greek-Cypriots, but remains relevant to
current and possible future negotiations as the most comprehensive
plan ever to be negotiated, and is therefore a valuable source of ideas
on the formation of a bizonal, bicommunal federation (see Trimiklinio-
tis 2009). In the absence of a solution, prior to the referendum and
soon after, a number of public debates erupted that centred on the
question of nationality policy. The question of moving towards an effec-
tive right to nationality by providing passports for the Republic of Cy-
prus has been relevant particularly since accession. For the Greek-Cy-
priot post-referendum political arena, an issue that became a hot politi-
cal issue was the question of granting the right of nationality to
children of Turkish-Cypriots who married Turkish settlers. Right-wing
media attacked the cabinet decision to grant nationality rights to 703
persons one of whose parents was a Turkish settler.50 The government
was forced to go on the defensive with the Minister of the Interior
claiming that ‘the legislation does not allow the granting of nationality,
either to settlers or an alien from another country, who has entered the
Republic illegally.’51 The media as well as some members of the coali-
CYPRUS: POSTCOLONIAL CITIZENSHIP IN A DIVIDED COUNTRY 407
tion partners52 stated that because ‘invasion, colonisation and changing
the demographic character of a country’ is a ‘war crime’, granting na-
tionality to the offspring of colonisers is never justified. In fact, there
are allegations that there is an unofficial moratorium on the subject to
freeze the applications of children of settlers married to Cypriots; a
practice that has been criticised by human rights organisations.53
The current situation in Cyprus leaves the nationality policy regard-
ing this category of persons in a state of limbo. In practice, pending a
resolution of the problem, the Cyprus problem will always predominate
and colour the nationality policy. The greatest challenge for Cypriot pol-
icymakers is to adopt a nationality and citizenship policy that enhances
the possibility for reunification and thus does not consolidate and in-
directly officially endorse partition.
13.4 Statistical developments since 1985: The ‘politics of
numbers’ and the ‘numbers game’
Table 13.1 shows that the anomaly of the Cyprus problem has had a
massive impact on the numbers of citizenship acquisitions. The largest
figure involves Turkish-Cypriots. Most of these acquired citizenship
after 23 April 2003 when the checkpoints were opened – although
Turkish-Cypriots had a right to Cypriot citizenship before that date,
they could not make use of this right due to the war and the de facto
partition since 1974. Between 1995 and 3 March 2009, 101,778 Turk-
ish-Cypriots have acquired birth certificates of the Republic of Cyprus;
83,372 have acquired identity cards and 54,595 passports. Moreover, the
numbers of applications for citizenship more than doubled since Cy-
Table 13.1 Acquisitions of Cypriot citizenship by modes, 1985-3 March 2009
Mode of acquisition Number
1 Naturalisation 5,395
2 Spousal transfer of citizenship 12,824
3 Transfer to children whose parents obtained citizenship 5,160
4 Registrations of persons of Cypriot descent 2,250
5 Persons who acquired citizenship on grounds of origin, e.g. expatriate
Cypriots
23,932
6 Turkish-Cypriots who acquired passports of the Republic of Cyprus
since 1995
54,595
7 Turkish-Cypriots who acquired identity cards of the Republic of Cyprus
since 1995
83,372
8 Turkish-Cypriots who acquired birth certificates of the Republic of
Cyprus since 1995
101,778
Sources: Personal Communication of the Civil Registry Migration Department and the
Population Data Archives, 3 March 2009
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prus acceded to the EU and there is a backlog of some hundreds of ap-
plications pending.
The second largest group of people granted Cypriot citizenship were
Cypriot by descent or by origin (2,250 for category 4 and 23,932 for ca-
tegory 5). This figure reflects the favourable conditions for return mi-
gration to Cyprus, which has enjoyed a steady improvement of the liv-
ing standards and relative stability despite the conflict and the continu-
ing division. Moreover, it illustrates the importance of the ties with
Cyprus and the ethnic connections amongst the Cypriot diasporic com-
munities abroad. Finally, it may reflect the relative success of various
population policies aimed at encouraging expatriates to return to Cy-
prus. However, it is difficult to verify how far these incentives influ-
enced the decision to migrate to Cyprus. It has to be noted that this ca-
tegory includes an unknown number of Turkish-Cypriots.
The third largest category comprises of those who acquire citizen-
ship by marriage, a total of 12,824 persons. Research shows that the
large majority of these are foreign women married to Cypriot men (ra-
tio 7:1) and that there is a preference for certain nationalities (Fulias-
Souroulla 2008).
The next largest group are naturalised persons (category 1). The
number of naturalisations is rather small considering that that there
are 138,000 non-Cypriots residing in Cyprus,54 which includes how-
ever over 70,000 EU citizens.55 The number of non-Cypriot natura-
lised migrants is even smaller since an unknown share of those natura-
lised are persons of Cypriot origin born in the Commonwealth prior to
1960 and who could only acquire Cypriot citizenship by naturalisation
as well as those who renounced or were deprived of Cypriot citizenship
to acquire another citizenship (e.g. German). In any case, about half of
those who acquire citizenship by naturalisation are Greek Pontians re-
siding in Cyprus: it is estimated that about 400 Greek Pontians were
granted Cypriot citizenship in 2004 and about 500 in 2005.56
13.5 Conclusions
The mechanics of acquisition, renunciation and deprivation of citizen-
ship in the Republic of Cyprus revolves around Cypriot descent: per-
sons of Cypriot origin are basically entitled to citizenship, whilst per-
sons of non-Cypriot descent may be allowed to apply if they have re-
sided in Cyprus for seven years to acquire citizenship via registration
and naturalisation mechanisms. The reference of one of the very few
Cypriot legal scholars dealing with the subject, Criton Tornaritis (1982:
39), that Cyprus has adopted a ‘mixed principle combining ius soli and
ius sanguinis’ is not very helpful as Cypriot descent forms the core.
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Although, we cannot locate a declared policy on citizenship/national-
ity as such in the Republic of Cyprus, what we do find instead is a
practice that derives from the long-standing Cyprus conflict as well as
international developments such as accession to the EU, economic de-
velopment and migration, and to some extent changing attitudes, parti-
cularly as regards the question of gender. Other factors are also of rele-
vance, such as population control, economic and welfare issues, social
policy, etc. As for the unrecognised Turkish Republic of Northern Cy-
prus, the issue of citizenship is totally subsumed in its own ‘struggle
for recognition’ and it is a mirror image of the country it broke away
from and yet can never escape from, the Republic of Cyprus.
In the context of Cyprus, nationality policy is inevitably subordinated
to the unique historical conjunctures that perpetuate the island’s pro-
tracted ethno-national conflict. In fact, the question of nationality goes
to the heart of the existence of the country’s very own ‘nation-state dia-
lectic’ (see Trimikliniotis 2000, 2005): the challenge for a citizenship
that manages to transcend the ethno-national conflict and the ethno-
communal divide is perhaps the greatest challenge of all for this coun-
try’s European aspirations for a re-united and peaceful future. The ne-
gotiations between the two community leaders resumed in September
2008 and have raised hopes for a resolution of the dispute in a man-
ner that will reunite the island on the basis of a bi-zoned, bi-communal
federation with a single sovereignty, territory and nationality. This solu-
tion would radically transform the nationality issues as we have known
them.
Chronological list of citizenship-related legislation in the Republic of Cyprus
Date Document Content Source
1960 Constitution of the
Republic of Cyprus
Regulates initial
determination of Cypriot
citizenry after
independence (Annex D);
regulates acquisition of
citizenship (art. 198)
www.kypros.org;
www.legislationline.org
1967 Citizenship Law No. 43/
1967
Regulates acquisition and
deprivation of citizenship;
defines person’s descent
on his or her father’s side
as basic criterion for
citizenship acquisition
www.legislationline.org;
www.coe.int
1972 Citizenship (Amendment)
Law No. 1/1972
Extends the minister’s
discretion regarding
deprivation or renunciation
of citizenship, if the
www.coe.int
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Date Document Content Source
minister is of the opinion
that the aim of such a
declaration is to avoid
military service or criminal
prosecution
1983 Citizenship (Amendment)
Law No. 74/1983
Extends entitlement to
citizenship to persons born
in Cyprus prior to
independence and whose
father was of Cypriot
descent; deleted subsect. 4
(d), which entitles ‘persons
born in Cyprus, who are not
entitled by birth to acquire
any other citizenship’, to
Cypriot citizenship
www.coe.int
1996 Citizenship (Amendment)
Law No. 19(I)/1996
Extends the right to
citizenship via registration
to persons whose father
was a British subject on the
basis of the Annexation of
Cyprus Orders of Council
1914-1943 or was born in
Cyprus between 1914-1960
1996 Citizenship (Amendment)
Law No. 58(I)/1996
Regulates the
naturalisation procedure
for persons of non-Cypriot
descent residing and
working in Cyprus
(conditions included: nine
years of residence out of
the previous thirteen years,
plus twelve months of
continuous residence
immediately prior to
application)
1996 Citizenship (Amendment)
Law No. 70(I)/1996
Introduces facilitated
naturalisation for reasons
of public interest
irrespective of residence
rules
1997 Citizenship (Amendment)
Law No. 50(I)/1997
Extends the right to apply
for naturalisation to
spouses, children or other
dependent persons
1998 Citizenship (Amendment)
Law No. 102(I)/1998
Deletes a section in the
Second Table of the main
law which empowered the
Council of Ministers to use
discretion for extending
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Date Document Content Source
citizenship to persons of
Cypriot descent
1998 Citizenship (Amendment)
Law No. 105(I)/1998
Empowers the minister to
grant citizenship to
spouses or widows/
widowers married to a
Cypriot for at least two
years
1999 Citizenship (Amendment)
Law No. 65(I)/1999
Extends the right to
citizenship to any person of
Cypriot descent (i.e.
regardless of whether the
father or the mother is
Cypriot); makes automatic
acquisition of citizenship
conditional on lawful entry
and stay in the Republic
(effectively this covers
children one of whose
parents is a Turkish settler)
1999 Citizenship (Amendment)
Law No. 128(I)/1999
Deletes the subsection
empowering the Minister of
the Interior to register the
wives or widows of Cypriots
as citizens provided that he
or she is satisfied that they
meet the required
conditions
2001 Citizenship (Amendment)
Law No. 168(I)/2001
Extends the period of
marriage before spouses or
widows/widowers can
acquire citizenship by
registration to at least three
years
2002 Population Data Archives
Law No. 141(I)/2002
Unifies the Citizenship Law
with various other
population issues, such as
archives, elections,
registration, identity cards,
passports and deaths, into
one law called Population
Data Archives Law No. 141
(I)/2002
2004 Annan Plan: Foundation
Agreement
Comprehensively
restructures population
issues including citizenship
www.cyprus-un-plan.org
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Notes
1 This occurred when the government decided to grant citizenship to children of
Turkish-Cypriots married to settlers in 2004 and 2005.
2 This was an illegal terrorist organisation launched allegedly to campaign for Enosis,
i.e. union with Greece; it carried out bombings, murders of civilians and tried several
times to assassinate President Makarios (Droussiotis 1994).
3 These are two contrasting approaches regarding the refenda on 24 July 2004 and
they have implications on how to proceed if a solution is to be found.
4 In return for protection from the expansionist aims of Russia and an annual
payment to Turkey of the sum of £12,000.
5 The ‘modernisation’ began before the British arrived in Cyprus; however, it was
intensified with the arrival of the British colonists at the end of the nineteenth and
the beginning of the twentieth century (see Katsiounis 1996).
6 Such were the privileges granted to the Cypriot Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus
that the archbishop of Cyprus had direct recognition from the Sultan, as Ethnarchic
leader, the millet bashi.
7 The beginning of the twentieth century saw a conflict between the ‘traditionalists’
and the ‘modernists’ in the Turkish-Cypriot community; a battle that was decisively
won by the modernists (Anagnostopoulou 2004).
8 In the 1940s, the Left had risen and competed with the church for leadership of the
anti-colonial movement (Katsiaounis 2000). By the mid 1950s the church re-
established its authority with EOKA. EOKA (Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston –
National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters) was the Greek-Cypriot nationalist organi-
sation which started a guerrilla campaign against British colonial rule aimed at self-
determination and union with Greece (Enosis). The political leadership of EOKA was
the church.
9 The case was Attorney General of the Republic v Mustafa Ibrahim and Others
(1964), Cyprus Law Reports 195 (see also Nedjati 1970; Loizou 2001).
10 These agreements set the basis for a bi-communal and bi-zonal federal Republic
following the invasion.
11 See Aziz v. Republic of Cyprus, ECHR, Application No. 69949/01. The full text of
the judgement is available on the website of the European Court of Human Rights:
www.echr.coe.int.
12 Hence the requirements to produce documents relating to birth of their Cypriot
parents prior to 1974.
13 M. Hadjicosta, ‘Fears over gypsy influx’, The Cyprus Weekly, 13-19 April 2001.
www.domresearchcenter.com.
14 J. Matthews, ‘More gypsies crossing from north as Koshis warns about spies’, The Cy-
prus Mail, 3 April 2001. www.domresearchcenter.com.
15 Apparently, the Minister of the Interior at the time, Mr. C. Christodoulou, now
Governor of the Central Bank, said that he would not reveal the options discussed,
because, ‘in this country, when it comes to illegal immigrants or gypsies (moving
into an area), everyone reacts’. See ‘Our reaction to gypsies raises some awkward
questions’, The Cyprus Mail, 10 April 2001. www.domresearchcenter.com.
16 A Turkish-Cypriot woman filed a complaint because her application to be registered
in the Republic’s Citizens Record was rejected, on the basis that the birth of her
mother had not been recorded in the Republic’s archives. The complainant’s mother
had been born to Roma parents who failed to register her birth. It was also noted
that the complainant was inconvenienced for several months due to ill advice by
government officers as to the procedure with regard to her registration. In addition,
she complained about the rejection of her application to enrol her child in school
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because the child did not have a birth certificate from the Republic. Following the
Commissioner’s report on the matter, her child was finally enrolled in school.
17 They thought that they could no longer be singled out, targeted and harassed and
there was a general feeling of optimism and rapprochement (Trimikliniotis 2003).
18 Research by the college of Tourism in April 2004 is indicative.
19 The term ‘significant’ is not explained in the Demographic Report of 2005.
20 The Cyprus (Annexation) Order-in-Council 1914, No. 1629 Statutory Rules and
Orders Rev. (1948), vol. V, pp. 577-578. The order can also be found in Cyprus,
(1920), Handbook No. 65 in the series, London: HMSO.
21 The Cyprus (Annexation) Order-in-Council 1917, No. 1374 S.R & O. and The Cyprus
(Annexation) Order-in-Council 1914, No.1629 S.R & O. Rev. (1948), vol. V, pp. 578-
582.
22 The provisions of Annex D are quite detailed governing different categories of
persons and set out the basic structure of citizenship acquisition that was to follow
also in the subsequent legislation on the subject (Tornaritis 1982: 33-41).
23 Law No. 43/67, as amended by Laws No. 1/72, 74/83, 19(I)/96, 58(I)/96, 70(I)/96,
50(I)/97, 102(I)/98, 105(I)/98, 65(I)/99, 128(I)/99, 168(I)/2001.
24 With laws No. 65(I)/2003, 76(I)/2003, 62(I)/2004 and 13(I)/2006.
25 Sects. 109(1) and (2) of Law No. 141(I)/2002 provide for the procedure and the
appropriate forms. In cases where the applicant is under age, the application can be
made by a parent.
26 Art. 109 Population Data Archives Law No. 141(I)/2002. This clause was first
introduced by Law 65(I)/1999 that came into force on 11 June 1999.
27 This information was provided by the officer of the Population Data Archives of the
Ministry of the Interior, Christiana Ketteni, on 15 December 2006. She stated that
the standard practice of the Council of Ministers is to approve ten to fifteen
applications each time there is a meeting of the Council of Ministers. Moreover, she
claimed that the people affected by the Council of Ministers’ discretion are ‘persons
who have a Cypriot grandparent’, but it remained unclear how this category could
fall under art. 109.
28 It was alleged that discrimination is ongoing as the specific provision has resulted in
the perpetual and future discrimination of this category of persons and their
descendants since the principle of anti-discrimination is not only momentarily
applied, but it is also forward looking. It is likely that this provision is in violation of
the laws against discrimination and, in particular, Law No.142(I)/2004, which
transposes the anti-discrimination acquis and more importantly Protocol 12. See File
No. 62/2005 of the Ombudsman’s Report.
29 See File No. 62/2005 of the Ombudsman’s Report.
30 The Greek text refers to ‘πλήρης ικανότητα’, which literally translated means ‘full
ability’, but it must be construed as meaning of ‘sound mind’, which was the old
British formulation.
31 The relevant minister is the Minister of the Interior.
32 A number of Tables are annexed to the Law. The First Table specifies the fees for
issuance of passports; the Second Table includes the format of making a formal oath
of allegiance to the Republic of Cyprus; the Third Table describes the conditions for
naturalisation.
33 For subsect. 110, ‘a country of the Commonwealth’ includes every country excluding
the Republic of Cyprus, on the date of entering into force of the Law, which is a
member of the British Commonwealth and includes the Republic of Ireland and any
other country that has been declared by an Order of the Council of Ministers as a
Commonwealth Country for the purposes of this section.
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34 For the purposes of subsect. 110, a person of Cypriot descent is defined as any
person born in Cyprus and whose parents ordinarily resided in Cyprus at the time of
his or her birth and includes every person that descends from these persons.
35 There are also specific provisions allowing the minister to take measures after less
than three years, but it is restricted to a minimum of two years. Also, for the
purposes of this subsection ‘ordinary residence’ requires at least six months stay in
Cyprus but in any case the total residence in Cyprus during the preceding three
years prior to submission of the application must not be less than two years.
36 L. Leonidou, ‘Authorities in the dock over treatment of immigrants’, The Cyprus Mail,
15 January 2006.
37 Some indicative cases are the following: Lali Jashiashvili & Costas Hadjithoma v. The
Ministry of the Interior and the Immigration Officer and Nebojsa Micovic v. The
Republic of Cyprus through the Chief Immigration Officer, where the Supreme
Court cancelled the deportation order against nationals living with their families and
working in Cyprus since 1998. Another case involved the deportation order issued
against the Pakistani national Mahmoud Adil when his asylum application was
rejected. The deportation order was cancelled by the Court on 13 January 2006 based
on the argument that the immigration authorities should have taken into account the
fact that the appellant was married to a Polish (and therefore EU) citizen.
38 Introduced by amendment 58(1)/1996.
39 Introduced by amendment 70(1)/1996.
40 See relevant Ombudsman Reports, Files No. 2599/2005, 1958/2005, 2059/2005,
2368/2005, 2599/2005, 2780/2005.
41 See Ombudsman Report, File No. 727/2006.
42 The Greek term used is νομιμοφροσύνη.
43 One scholar termed this as ‘the Europeanisation of political thinking’ (Theophylactou
1995: 121), whilst another scholar interpreted this as the embracing of a ‘Euro-centric
ideology’ by the Greek-Cypriot political elite (Argyrou 1996: 43).
44 It is sometimes assumed that possible ‘weaknesses’ in the settlement would
gradually be somehow eliminated by the operation of the acquis and via access to the
European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights.
45 Minority rights for ‘old’ ethnic minorities have a significantly long tradition of
protection under various treaties and authorities, even from the last century, though
these were very restricted and at the whim of the great powers (Hannum 1996: 50-
74). However, art. 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights guarantees the
right to private and family life (which has been interpreted as to include ethnic
identity) and art. 9 guarantees ‘the right to freedom of thought, conscience and
religion’. More specifically, art. 27 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights refers
to the rights of ‘ethnic, religious or cultural minorities’ to ‘enjoy their own culture, to
profess and practice their own religion, or use their own language’, but these are set
to be extended in other areas of freedom (Hannum 1996: 62-63). However, the
European ‘regime’ on ethnic minority groups’ protection, is problematic, as there is a
distinct lack of enforcement mechanisms. These rights are heavily dependent upon
the nation-states for implementation; in any case the mechanisms for
implementation are very weak if not irrelevant (Hannum 1996).
46 The veteran Turkish-Cypriot leader has often been quoted saying: ‘A Turk leaves,
another Turk comes’.
47 It appears that in the days of the collapse of the USSR, Greek-Cypriot policy-makers
toyed with the idea of bringing to Cyprus Greek-Pontians rather than other migrants,
due to their ethnic origin, in part to unofficially and quietly ‘redress’ the Turkish
settler policy. Officially this was never admitted by right-wingers, and nationalists
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regularly referred to the Pontians as the alternative to ‘an Afro-Asian’ new minority
(see Trimikliniotis 1999).
48 Obviously there was scare mongering and exaggeration by the Greek-Cypriot ‘No
campaign’ about the figures and misinformation about the actual provisions. Palley
(2005) has a chapter devoted to the subject and puts forward the case for the Greek-
Cypriot side and the reasons for the Greek-Cypriot rejection as regards this issue.
49 The provisions were depicted by Greek-Cypriot anti-Annan critics as rewarding the
policy of colonisation. However, this is a highly complex issue which requires a
detailed analysis and a resolution that bears in mind the principles of justice and
international law, as well as the humanitarian, the individual rights and the personal
dimensions of the problem.
50 See G. Psyllides, ‘Citizenship for settler children: Christou hits back’, Cyprus Mail, 1
July 2004.
51 Minister Andreas Christou quoted in Politis, 7 June 2004. Also see the explanations
of the legal regulations in section 2.1 of this chapter.
52 See Cyprus Mail, 1 July 2004. Palley (2005) deals with the legal and political issues of
the settlers. Also see Hannay (2005).
53 In a press release dated 2 July 2004, the human rights NGO ‘KISA’ (Action for
Equality, Support and Anti-racism) expressed concern over the intolerant and racist
attitudes developing around the issue of granting nationality to these children.
54 Data provided by the Civil Registry Migration Department and the Population Data
Archives on 3 March 2009. I would like to thank Andros Ktorides for his help in
obtaining the data and for his lucid analysis. Of course, the argumentation and
conclusions are mine.
55 This figure was provided by the Civil Registry Migration Department and the
Population Data Archives (3 March 2009). However, different numbers are produced
by the Ministry of Labour and Social Insurance: according to their data only 49,639
EU citizens were residing in Cyprus in July 2008 (see Total Aliens and Europeans
Data 2008, www.mlsi.gov.cy).
56 This figure was provided by Christiana Ketteni, an official of the Population Data
Archives, Ministry of the Interior who was asked to comment on the categories,
figures and the underlying policies (15 December 2006).
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14 Changing conceptions of citizenship in Turkey1
Zeynep Kadirbeyoglu
International migration and globalisation are factors which affect citi-
zenship practices throughout the world. Increasing tolerance of multi-
ple citizenship is, amongst other things, one of the results of these
trends. This chapter analyses the Citizenship Law in Turkey and argues
that the most important changes in the law were made to accommo-
date the needs and wishes of the emigrants who – even up to the third
generation – maintain vibrant ties with their home countries. The
chapter starts with the history of citizenship in Turkey. The following
section outlines the amendments to the current law that regulates the
acquisition and loss of citizenship. Subsequently, the main forms of ac-
quisition and loss of citizenship in Turkey are mapped out. A final sec-
tion looks at the statistics of people acquiring and losing citizenship in
Turkey.
14.1 History of Turkish citizenship law
14.1.1 From the Ottoman Empire to the founding of the Republic
An analysis of the history of Turkish citizenship should begin with the
last period of the Ottoman Empire. Whereas, prior to the 1869 Otto-
man Citizenship Law (Tabiyet-i Osmaniye Kanunu), the subjects of the
Ottoman Empire were divided along religious lines, the new law recog-
nised all residents of the Ottoman territories as nationals of the
Empire. It was based on the ius sanguinis principle, but allowed for
non-Ottoman children born in the Ottoman territories to apply for
citizenship in the Empire when they reached adulthood (I˙c¸duygu,
C¸olak & Soyarık 1999).
The first constitution of the Republic of Turkey (1924) granted Turk-
ish nationality to all residents of the Republic irrespective of race or re-
ligion. The nationality law of the Republic was accepted in 1928 and,
like its Ottoman predecessor, it was based on ius sanguinis but was
complemented by a territorial understanding (I˙c¸duygu et al. 1999:
193). Aybay (2001: 45) argues that behind this decision was the desire
to extend Turkish nationality to as many people as possible.2
I˙c¸duygu et al. (1999: 195), for example, argue that the notion of na-
tionality was not defined solely in terms of ethnic background since
the new Turkish nationality was ‘open to non-Turkish Muslim groups
[…] so long as they were willing to assimilate culturally and linguisti-
cally into the Turkish culture.’ However, the analysis of groups that
were given the right to settle in Turkey reveals that in practice the abil-
ity to enjoy full citizenship rights was related to ethnicity and religion
(Kiris¸c¸i 2000: 1).
Specifically, in accordance with the Law on Settlement adopted in
1934,3 Turkey provided refugee and immigrant status to groups such
as Muslim Bosnians, Albanians, Circassians, Tatars, etc., but declined
to accept the settlement of groups such as Christian Orthodox Gagauz
Turks and Shi’a Azeris. This policy effectively pre-screened those apply-
ing for citizenship and helped Sunnis settle in Turkey, in spite of offi-
cial statements that only those of Turkish descent and culture would be
so favoured (Kiris¸c¸i 2000).4
At the beginning of the twentieth century, Anatolia (Asia Minor) was
a heterogeneous piece of land and was home to Rum (an Orthodox
Christian Greek speaking group), Armenian, Kurdish, Jewish, Circas-
sian, Laz and some other ethnic or religious groups. The spread of na-
tionalism from Western Europe, its birthplace, to the Ottoman lands
led to conflicts and to the disappearance of heterogeneity by way of the
forced migration of Armenians during the First World War and the po-
pulation exchange with Greece in 1923. During the War of Indepen-
dence there was a clear reference to the multicultural nature of Anato-
lia. However, after the Sheikh Said uprising of 1925,5 there was no
longer any reference made to the ‘peoples of Turkey’ and thus all citi-
zens of Turkey were expected to adopt Turkish identity (Ergil 2000:
125). This was a fabricated umbrella identity and was instituted
through education and cultural policies but carried the name of one of
the ethnic groups (the Turks). The group which was not willing to
identify with this were the Kurds. Their struggle for autonomy, and
sometimes secession, led to a battle between the PKK (Kurdistan Work-
ers Party) and the army. At the height of this armed conflict, the Presi-
dent at the time, Suleyman Demirel, began a discussion on constitu-
tional citizenship, which was intended to create a new common iden-
tity (I˙c¸duygu et al. 1999: 192). However, these discussions were short-
lived and did not lead to any policy changes.
14.1.2 The impact of Turkish emigration to Western Europe
The current law that regulates the acquisition and loss of Turkish citi-
zenship was put into effect in 1964.6 This period also marks the begin-
ning of the migration of guest-workers to Western Europe. As of 2005,
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3.1 million Turkish citizens were living in Europe. Together with an-
other 530,000 Turkish citizens living in other parts of the world, Tur-
key’s emigrant population numbers an approximate 3.6 million
(TCCSGB 2005).
In order to understand the economic significance of these emigrants
for Turkey, we should first examine the initial goals of the process of la-
bour force exportation to Western European countries. According to
Sayarı (1986) the main goals included fighting the rising unemploy-
ment within Turkey and bolstering foreign exchange reserves in order
to cover trade deficits. A secondary goal was to increase the skill level
of workers who would, then, through remittances, be able to increase
the level of investment in small and medium-sized companies in the
emigrants’ home towns in Turkey (Sayarı 1986). The remittances were
very important for Turkey. During the 1980s, 24 per cent of Turkey’s
imports were covered by the cash remittances and foreign exchange de-
posits of Turkish workers abroad (Kumcu 1989).
Germany was the main destination for guest-workers from Turkey.
Turkish workers in Germany were encouraged to maintain their ties to
Turkey and not to undergo ‘Germanisation’7 so that a constant flow of
remittances could be guaranteed (Hunn 2001). Migrants were encour-
aged to remit their savings by means of special interest rates given to
foreign currency saving accounts in Turkey and by certain privileges
that were extended to emigrants who wished to import goods to Turkey
(Sayarı 1986). Lately, in addition to remittances, direct investments by
the second generation of Turkish emigrants, especially in the textiles
industry, are increasing in importance (Faist 1998: 213). In addition to
the economic investment, it is expected that Turkey will enjoy political
benefits thanks to the migrants living in Western Europe. The lobbying
potential of migrants living in European countries has been seen as an
asset by governments in Turkey.8
The realisation that Turkish workers are not temporary guests in
their host countries has led to significant amendments to the citizen-
ship law in Turkey. The motives of politicians and bureaucrats have
been shaped by the demands of emigrants who faced problems related
to military service, property ownership, and lack of political rights in
their countries of immigration. A fairly organised and quasi-official
process was used to communicate the needs of citizens living abroad
to the Turkish officials.
The first amendment to the law took place in 1981 and legalised dual
citizenship as long as the person acquiring a second nationality in-
formed the government (Keyman & I˙c¸duygu 2003); otherwise, public
authorities could withdraw his or her Turkish citizenship. Further-
more, the amendment initiated gender equality in the transfer of citi-
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zenship to children; as a result women can also transfer their citizen-
ship to their children through ius sanguinis.
The change in article 23/III of the Citizenship Law made it possible
to release individuals from Turkish nationality if they wished to acquire
another country’s citizenship.9 In subsequent years, many individuals
who acquired a new citizenship reacquired their Turkish citizenship
immediately after renouncing it. This was supported and encouraged
by Turkish authorities and embassies. This method of circumventing
German Citizenship Law – which prohibits dual citizenship – was leg-
ally possible only until 2000. The pre-2000 law maintained only that
the person naturalising in Germany should not have another national-
ity. Yet, the new law made it possible for German officials to withdraw
German citizenship from those who had taken up another citizenship
following their naturalisation in Germany – hence those who had be-
come dual citizens ‘illegally’.10 Based on this clause, the German Gov-
ernment declared that 48,000 people of Turkish origin who had natur-
alised in Germany since 2000 had lost their German nationality be-
cause they had become ‘illegal dual citizens’.11 These people were to
have their German nationality withdrawn but could stay in Germany
as permanent residents and reapply for naturalisation there provided
they were willing to renounce their Turkish nationality.12
This did not have a significant impact on the public debate in Turkey
but was strongly opposed by Turkish associations in Germany. These
associations blamed the Turkish Government for not responding even
though they had encouraged these 48,000 people to reacquire Turkish
nationality. Even though the spokesperson for the German Ministry of
the Interior claimed that they had compiled a list of those who were ‘il-
legal’ dual citizens from the records collected at borders and in govern-
ment offices, there were claims that the Turkish authorities had sub-
mitted the list because of threats that their EU application process
would not be supported.13 There is evidence that the German regional
authorities have been contacting those they suspect of holding two
passports by mail and asking them whether they had acquired a second
nationality. The results of these inquiries and bureaucratic confusion
are yet to be seen.
The 1981 change was debated in a secret session by the National Se-
curity Council because it was initiated by the Ulusu Government,
which was established following the military coup.14 The amendment
also facilitated the processes for stripping individuals of their citizen-
ship.15 The clause added to the law stated that those who are outside
the borders of Turkey and who have been charged with endangering
the internal or external security of the country will have their Turkish
citizenship withdrawn unless they return within three months during
regular periods and one month under emergency rule.16
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Following this coup, 227 people had their Turkish citizenship with-
drawn by means of this clause. However, in February 1992, the Parlia-
ment removed this clause after hearing arguments that the clause had
permitted a violation of human rights.17 Those who wished were
allowed to reacquire their citizenship and to have their property rein-
stated or receive compensation for the value of confiscated property.18
Parliamentary debates on issues of citizenship and/or problems of
Turkish citizens living abroad have not been restricted to amendments
of the laws pertaining to citizenship. The events in Solingen, where
five Turkish emigrants died as a result of an arson attack on their
house, were debated in the Turkish Parliament on 8 June 1993. During
these debates, the ANAP (centre right party) group spokesperson em-
phasised the importance of having the right to vote in Germany. He
claimed that there are individuals who, despite having lived in Ger-
many for the last 30 years, are still denied the right to vote. According
to this argument, the right to vote is the key to finding a long-term so-
lution to the problems faced by Turkish persons residing in Germany.
He claimed that under the current circumstances dual citizenship
rights were of greater importance and the Turkish Government ought
to propose that Germany put this issue on its agenda.19
The SHP (centre-left party) group spokesperson claimed that in addi-
tion to the security aspects surrounding the Solingen events, political
and legal issues should also be debated. He stated that obtaining equal
rights in the political, economic and social spheres by obtaining Ger-
man citizenship would not automatically prevent these attacks, but that
extreme right parties would be more cautious about taking an anti-im-
migration stance as immigrants would form part of the electorate. His
argument was that as long as Germany banned dual citizenship, the
goal of the Turkish State should be to encourage emigrants to natura-
lise in Germany while maintaining their rights in Turkey.20
Following this logic, the amendment to the Turkish Citizenship Law
in 1995 instituted the so-called ‘pink card’ or the privileged non-citizen
status.21 In the statement giving reasons for this amendment, the gov-
ernment stressed the fact that it was a result, among other factors, of
the actions of countries that refused to accept multiple citizenship.
The proposal for this amendment was drafted by Rona Aybay (a pro-
minent law professor specialising on citizenship issues) after he had at-
tended meetings in Germany at the invitation of the Tu¨rkische Ge-
meinde in Deutschland (TGD).22 Once accepted in 1995, the amend-
ment created a privileged non-citizen status. This status permits
holders of a pink card23 to reside, to acquire property, to be eligible for
inheritance, to operate businesses and to work in Turkey like any citi-
zen of Turkey. Pink card holders were only denied the right to vote in
local and national elections.24 Aybay states that the head of the TGD,
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Hakkı Keskin, a very old friend of his, invited him to find a solution to
citizenship-related problems faced by Turkish people living in Ger-
many.25 He makes it quite clear that the main issue was how to devise
a mechanism that would allow people living in Germany to acquire
German citizenship without losing their rights in Turkey.26 This was
the motivation behind the creation of the special non-citizen status.27
During the parliamentary debates when this amendment was dis-
cussed, the spokesperson of the ANAP group argued that this law was
what all factions of Turkish emigrants in Germany had been demand-
ing for years. He claimed that these emigrants wanted to have political
rights in Germany and that this amendment would ease their difficul-
ties in acquiring German citizenship. He also mentioned that Turkish
emigrants would become a key electoral group in Germany, with some
influence in the tight electoral competition between the two major par-
ties.28 Another MP emphasised the benefits of this amendment by re-
ferring to the possibility of Turkish people becoming elected represen-
tatives in Germany and, therefore, politically strengthening the posi-
tion of Turkey.29
Some MPs raised their concern about whether this amendment
would enable the ‘Armenians, Jews, Rum, etc.’30 (who had renounced
their Turkish citizenship in order to acquire another citizenship) to
come back to Turkey and reclaim property that had been confiscated
when they changed their citizenship. This is telling in that it demon-
strates that the tolerance for dual citizenship and special rights for
those who had renounced their citizenship was intended to apply ex-
clusively to Turkish emigrants who had left the country under specific
conditions; the amendment was never intended to include the minori-
ties who left Turkey before 1981, and explicitly stated that the privileged
non-citizen status would apply only to those who had acquired Turkish
citizenship by birth and who had relinquished it by being granted per-
mission by the Council of Ministers.31 This way of renouncing Turkish
citizenship was made possible only after the amendments to the citi-
zenship law in 1981.
Despite good intentions, the special non-citizen status was criticised
by groups who were dissatisfied with its implementation. The TGD or-
ganised a summit in July 2000 and produced a declaration pertaining
to the problems and expectations of the Turkish citizens living in Ger-
many. The declaration stated that there were many problems in the
practical use of the pink card in Turkey as the bureaucracy was not in-
formed about it. Therefore, people who had renounced their Turkish ci-
tizenship were facing problems in their interactions with the bureau-
cracy in Turkey.
During the same summit there was a call for Turkey to stop releas-
ing its citizens and to make it impossible for Turkish citizens to re-
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nounce their citizenship through new legislation. This would enable
Turkish citizens to enjoy dual citizenship through an exception in the
new German Law which states that in cases where the country of ori-
gin does not permit its citizens to relinquish their original citizenship,
Germany might allow dual citizenship. This instance shows how the
demands of immigrant organisations have changed depending on the
situation in Germany.
14.1.3 Policies towards historic Turkish groups abroad
Emigrants were not the only group who influenced the amendments to
the citizenship law in Turkey. The disintegration of the USSR and the
increasing numbers of arranged marriages in Turkey alerted authori-
ties and the amendment in 2003 requires spouses to wait for three
years before spousal transfer of nationality is possible.32 The second
amendment that same year made it possible for citizens of Northern
Cyprus to easily acquire Turkish citizenship (see Trimikliniotis in this
volume).33 In 2003, a total of 2,403 Cypriots acquired Turkish citizen-
ship.34 The latest amendment was passed in 2004 and concerned a
minor issue relating to the pink card.
As can be seen from the amendments that were outlined above,
apart from the one attempting to prevent arranged marriages, there is
no debate about immigrants in Turkey. The focus has been on emi-
grants from Turkey who live in Western Europe. Politicians in Turkey
feel little need to respond to immigrant issues because these are not
yet politicised, which is a common feature of countries that have only
recently begun receiving economic immigrants.
Prior to the 1980s, immigrants accepted to Turkey have been predo-
minantly from among peoples considered to be ‘of Turkish descent and
culture’ and they were settled using the Law on Settlement.35 The Law
on Settlement allowed for two types of migration to Turkey: those who
were settled by the state and those who settled themselves (Dog˘anay
no date). According to Dog˘anay this law was considered insufficient
during the last two decades and it was amended to accommodate those
forced to migrate to Turkey from Bulgaria in 1989 (see Smilov & Jileva
in this volume). Many of the Bulgarian Turks who arrived with the first
wave of migration in 1989 were granted Turkish nationality. When
these migrants could reacquire their Bulgarian nationality and pass-
ports in 2000 (hence become dual citizens), Turkish politicians encour-
aged them to vote in the elections in Bulgaria in order to strengthen
the political party representing ethnic Turks and play a positive role in
establishing cooperation between two countries on the way to EU
membership. Some Bulgarian Turks, who had not been able to natura-
lise in Turkey, were sent back to Bulgaria towards the end of the
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1990s.36 Special laws were enacted in order to regulate the settlement
of other groups known to have ethnic Turkish origin such as Afghan
immigrants and Ahiska Turks who migrated from Russia.37
There are not many organised immigrant groups in Turkey able to
place significant pressure on the government. Two of the few immi-
grant groups that made it to the media, for instance, were the Network
of Foreign Spouses and Muslim immigrants such as Bulgarian Turks.
The Network of Foreign Spouses referred to ideals of fairness and de-
manded more rights for individuals who are foreigners in Turkey.38
The pragmatic nature of the debates on citizenship and the reactive
policy style hinders the politicisation of, and reciprocation of tolerance
towards, immigrants in Turkey.39 In other words, if values that under-
lie the promotion of dual citizenship for Turkish emigrants were
brought into the public sphere, they could lead to demands of recipro-
city for immigrants in Turkey.
14.2 Modes of acquisition and loss of Turkish citizenship
The law currently regulating the acquisition and loss of Turkish citizen-
ship was put into effect in 196440 and was amended as described in
the previous section. There are three broad principles through which
Turkish citizenship can be acquired or lost: change of status can be
brought about ex lege, by a decision of the authorities and through op-
tion.
14.2.1 Ex lege acquisition of citizenship
The acquisition of citizenship for children of Turkish mothers or
fathers is automatic whether the child is born in Turkey or abroad.
This rule is clearly based on ius sanguinis. Children of non-Turkish ci-
tizens born in Turkey become Turkish citizens automatically if they
cannot acquire the citizenship of their parents (the ius soli exception).
Marriage to Turkish citizens does not automatically transfer citizen-
ship. There is a waiting period of three years after which the spouse
can acquire Turkish citizenship by option. However, those who lose
their original citizenship due to marriage automatically become Turk-
ish citizens. Turkish citizenship is extended to children of women who
marry a Turkish citizen, if the child’s father is dead, unknown or state-
less or if the mother has custody over the child.
426 ZEYNEP KADIRBEYOGLU
14.2.2 Acquisition of nationality through the decision of authorities
There are three types of acquisition within this category. The first is
the regular mechanism through which naturalisation takes place and
is regulated by art. 6 of the Law. The conditions for application are the
following. The person should:
a. be an adult (eighteen years or older);
b. have five years of residence in Turkey;
c. have decided to settle in Turkey;
d. have good moral conduct;
e. not have a threatening illness;
f. speak sufficient Turkish;
g. have a job or revenue to support himself or herself and dependents.
The second mechanism, exceptional acquisition, can apply to the fol-
lowing categories of persons without enforcing requirements b) and c):
the adult children of those who have lost Turkish citizenship, those
who are married to a Turkish citizen and their adult children, those
who are of Turkish descent, their spouse and their adult children, those
who are residents of Turkey with the intention of marrying a Turkish
citizen and those who have or will serve Turkey as industrialists, scien-
tists or artists (achievement-based acquisition of nationality).
The third path, which is reacquisition, applies to all those who have
renounced their Turkish citizenship in the past for various reasons. In
all three types of acquisition the procedure for naturalisation is lengthy
and goes through the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Prime Minis-
ter. The decision to grant citizenship is given by the Council of Minis-
ters.
14.2.3 Acquisition through option
Children who lost their Turkish citizenship when their parents re-
nounced their citizenship can choose to reacquire their citizenship
upon reaching adulthood. As mentioned above, foreign spouses also
can acquire their partner’s Turkish nationality by option three years
after the marriage. There is no residency requirement for the naturali-
sation of spouses as long as they remain married.
14.2.4 Loss of citizenship ex lege
This is valid only for women who wish, upon marriage, to automati-
cally receive the foreign citizenship of their husbands. Although Turk-
ish nationality law calls this a loss by law, it is in fact an optional loss
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since it occurs only if there is a declaration by the individual to the re-
levant authorities.
14.2.5 Loss through a decision of the authorities
The first method through which Turkish citizenship can be lost is to re-
nounce it (i.e. to ask for a permission to exit). This path of loss is
mostly used by citizens who wish to naturalise in countries that do not
accept dual citizenship. The release from citizenship may be granted
by the Ministry of the Interior by declaration if certain conditions are
satisfied. The procedures do not permit renunciation if it results in sta-
telessness.
The second method is the nullification of Turkish citizenship for peo-
ple who have acquired it in the last five years and who have submitted
false information in their application. The third method is the withdra-
wal of Turkish citizenship from individuals because of specific actions,
such as working against the interests of Turkey in a foreign country de-
spite warnings, acquiring another citizenship without informing the
Turkish authorities, working for a foreign state which is at war with
Turkey, not responding to a call to military service for three months
and residing abroad for more than seven years and not showing any in-
terest in maintaining ties with Turkey.
14.2.6 Loss through option
This mode of loss applies to children who acquired Turkish citizenship
when their mothers naturalised in Turkey. They can renounce their
Turkish citizenship within a year of reaching adulthood as long as this
does not result in statelessness. Furthermore, women who acquired
Turkish citizenship upon marriage can renounce it upon divorce.
14.3 Statistics
In this section, I will undertake a preliminary analysis of the statistics
on the acquisition and loss of citizenship. The statistics on acquisitions
through the law are shown in Table 14.1. The data for the years 1997-
1999 are missing yet it is possible to conclude that following the disin-
tegration of the Soviet Bloc there has been a steady rise in the number
of women who acquired Turkish citizenship through spousal transfer.
Consequently, the change in 2003 of the law on spousal transfer of citi-
zenship led to a sharp decline in numbers in the following year.
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Table 14.1 Automatic acquisition of Turkish citizenship, 1990-2008
Year
Through
mother or
father
Through
adoption
Through
ius soli
Through
marriage
Total
1990 187 – 5 491 683
1991 118 – 7 1,067 1,192
1992 339 – 7 1,057 1,403
1993 344 – 9 1,380 1,733
1994 434 – 25 1,590 2,049
1995 290 – 25 1,148 1,463
1996 104 – 3 933 1,040
2000 259 1 41 5,384 5,685
2001 230 n/a 57 7,630 7,917
2002 231 n/a 52 8,416 8,699
2003 659 n/a n/a 6,912 7,571
2004 885 n/a n/a 528 1,413
2005 598 n/a n/a 1,261 1,859
2006 507 n/a n/a 1,798 2,305
2007 422 n/a n/a 2,721 3,143
2008 342 n/a n/a 3,820 4,162
Note: n/a = not available
Source: General Directorate of Population and Citizenship, Ankara
The statistics on acquisition through the decision of authorities are
shown in Table 14.2 below.
Table 14.2 Acquisition of Turkish citizenship through a decision of the authorities, 1990-2008
Year Regular Acquisition Exceptional acquisition Reacquisition Total
1990 119 785 n/a 904
1991 1,172 475 n/a 1,647
1992 888 452 n/a 1,340
1993 634 439 n/a 1,073
1994 949 467 n/a 1,416
1995 1,229 710 n/a 1,939
1996 955 3,927 n/a 4,882
2000 633 736 13,004 14,373
2001 1,161 3,917 28,317 33,395
2002 745 14,564 8,330 23,639
2003 1,236 12,938 3,040 17,214
2004 1,276 6,434 1,999 9,709
2005 816 4,650 864 6,330
2006 987 2,161 2,006 5,154
2007 718 1,358 979 3,055
2008 824 2,383 1,348 4,555
Note: n/a = not available
Source: General Directorate of Population and Citizenship, Ankara
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The statistics provided by the General Directorate of Population and Citi-
zenship reveal that in the category of regular acquisition by a decision of
the authorities, 60 per cent were Greek heimatloss41 in 1991 whereas 9
per cent were Iranian citizens. Between 2000 and 2003, approximately
50 per cent of this same category were Bulgarians. Between 1990 and
1993, the majority of those who acquired Turkish citizenship on excep-
tional grounds had previously held Iraqi citizenship (31 per cent for
1990, 32 for 1991, 23 for 1992 and 34 per cent for 1993). The largest
group within this category were Bulgarians (they constituted 82 per cent
of the total exceptional acquisition in 2002 and 84 per cent in 2003).
Table 14.3 shows the statistics on the numbers of withdrawals of
Turkish citizenship (the third method explained in section 2.5 above).
It should be noted that within the group of people who lost their Turk-
ish nationality between 2000 and 2005 there is no case of loss result-
ing from failure to reside in the country during the preceding seven
years. The majority of people whose citizenship was withdrawn were
those who did not return to the country to fulfil their military service
despite being called up by the authorities – for instance, out of 1,920
people who lost their Turkish citizenship in 2000, 1,868 were in this
category. This figure is 2,689 out of 2,735 in 2001, 2,193 out of 2,316
in 2002, 5,077 out of 5,489 in 2003, 1,975 out of 2,367 and 178 out of
464 in 2005.
The number of Turkish citizens whose nationality was withdrawn
because they did not inform the Turkish authorities that they were ac-
quiring another citizenship increased between 2000 and 2005. The
numbers are 42 for 2000, 24 for 2001, 81 for 2002, 272 for 2003, 246
for 2004 and 242 for 2005. The application of this rule is random at
best since there are many people in this situation who have maintained
their Turkish citizenship for many years. The increase in the numbers
Table 14.3 Loss of Turkish citizenship by a decision of the authorities, 2000-2008
Year Withdrawal of citizenship
2000 1,920
2001 2,735
2002 2,316
2003 5,489
2004 2,367
2005 464
2006 n/a
2007 n/a
2008 n/a
Note: n/a = not available
The General Directorate of Population and Citizenship reported there was no record for
this category for the years 2006-2008.
Source: General Directorate of Population and Citizenship, Ankara
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in this category cannot really be explained with the available data or in-
formation. The only possibility is the sensitisation of the authorities as
a result of events that led to the withdrawal of the Turkish citizenship
of a member of parliament who had sworn allegiance to the US by be-
coming a citizen there prior to the elections in Turkey.
Statistics on loss of citizenship are also published for those who have
subsequently reacquired their Turkish citizenship (see Table 14.4 be-
low). Up until 2002, individuals who renounced their Turkish citizen-
ship could easily reacquire their original citizenship following naturali-
sation in Germany. However, the realisation that a new law can lead to
nullification of their German citizenship if it is discovered that they
have reacquired their original citizenship has led to a sharp drop in the
number of individuals who have reacquired Turkish citizenship there-
after.
Table 14.4 Previous loss of citizenship by those who have reacquired Turkish citizenship accord-
ing to three main categories, 2000-2004
Reason for Loss 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Permission to exit 12,635 27,576 8,027 2,874 1,828
Inappropriate conduct 29 71 58 85 121
Loss by option 340 670 245 81 50
Total 13,004 28,317 8,330 3,040 1,999
Note: The General Directorate of Population and Citizenship reported no data for the years
2005-2008
Source: General Directorate of Population and Citizenship, Ankara
14.4 Conclusions
The findings suggest that maintaining vibrant economic links with citi-
zens living abroad (especially those living in Germany) has been a con-
stant concern for Turkish governments despite the severe neglect for
the social problems faced by these groups. The research results show
that there are a number of organisations and actors, especially within
Germany, that pressure the policymakers in Turkey to accommodate
their need to integrate into their host country without having to relin-
quish their rights to land ownership and inheritance in Turkey. The
main amendments to the Law on Citizenship in Turkey were made as
a result of the realisation that the guest-workers were in fact perma-
nent residents in their host countries. The most interesting finding is
the interaction between the Turkish and German governments and the
attempts of the former to formulate legislation based on the develop-
ments in Germany.
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Turkish governments have demonstrated a willingness to address
the practical problems faced by the Turkish people living abroad. In
many cases the intentions were sincere even though official actions to
solve the problems were either slow or non-existent. However, this in-
ability did not stem from apathy towards the real problems or the aim
of strategically using the issue for political gain. It was rather the result
of a general lack of political incentives, as those living abroad who still
possess the right to vote in Turkey cannot practically do so unless they
return to Turkey during elections.42
As outlined in the sections above, there is a very pragmatic debate
concerning citizenship in Turkey. The principles of citizenship acquisi-
tion and loss are seldom discussed and immigrants have not been a
real concern of policymakers, either because they are not mobilised or
because the issue is not politicised. Foreigners, like Bulgarian Turks or
those coming from Central Asia, are not considered part of these im-
migrant groups since, in most cases, they acquired Turkish citizenship
based on their cultural, linguistic and religious backgrounds.
There are many cases of immigrants who find ways to work in Tur-
key and leave the country every three months (this applies to many
Bulgarian Turks who do not have citizenship). Many foreigners who do
not need a visa to enter Turkey are employed in Turkey illegally. Even
some Western European citizens who reside in Turkey without a work
permit resort to this method. Very few of these immigrant groups have
organised and begun trying to pressure the Turkish state. Bru¨cke, a
German-Turkish bridging organisation, and the Association of Foreign
Wives are exceptions. Hence, if in the next five to ten years immigra-
tion issues become more important and appear in the public sphere
we might begin to see more pressure applied to Turkey.43
14.5 Epilogue
The history of Turkish Citizenship Law, which was recounted above,
shows that there have been numerous changes to the law since 1964.
Most of these changes regarded two issues: they either addressed the
interests of emigrants from Turkey or adapted the Turkish regulations
to international standards. As a consequence of these amendments,
the law has been transformed into a patchwork full of inconsistencies,
which is one of the reasons why the Turkish government decided to
propose a new Nationality Law. Moreover, this new law aims to harmo-
nise the Turkish regulations with those of the European Convention on
Nationality (Tiryakioglu 2006).
Hence, the new law mainly attempts to reduce inconsistencies.
Moreover, there are also three substantive changes to the acquisition
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and loss of citizenship. The most important change concerns the with-
drawal of citizenship from males who have not served in the military
and those citizens who have acquired another country’s citizenship
without informing the authorities. The law, as it currently stands, sti-
pulates that these two types of actions are punishable by the withdra-
wal of Turkish citizenship. The new law eliminates this possibility and
restores the citizenship of those who have lost their citizenship as a re-
sult of these clauses. The second major change, which will be imple-
mented by 2010, will abolish preferential treatment of those applicants
for naturalisation who are of Turkish origin by applying a five-year resi-
dency requirement for all applicants. The third substantive change is
the three-year residency requirement for those who wish to reacquire
their Turkish citizenship following loss through renunciation or with-
drawal as a result of inappropriate conduct. The new law on citizenship
was accepted in the parliament on 29 May 2009 (No. 5901/2009 on
Turkish Citizenship).
Finally, the Turkish government recently adopted a new law that fa-
cilitates voting by Turkish citizens abroad. Even though Turkish citi-
zens residing abroad were able vote in Turkey’s general elections, there
was no practical method for doing so other than the setting up of ballot
boxes at the borders for emigrants who travelled to and from Turkey.
This situation changed with Law No. 5749 (adopted on 13 March
2008), which clarifies the methods through which Turkish citizens liv-
ing abroad can vote in general elections, presidential elections, and re-
ferenda in Turkey. There are now four different ways to vote: by regular
mail, at the borders (during a 75-day period prior to the election date as
practised during previous elections), at the consulates abroad (over a
period of 45 days prior to the election date), and electronically (over a
period of 30 days prior to the election date). The Constitutional Court
cancelled the possibility of voting through mail ballots because it vio-
lates the secrecy of voting.
Chronological list of citizenship-related legislation in Turkey
Date Document Content Source
1869 Ottoman Nationality
Regulation
Recognises all residents of
the Ottoman territories as
nationals of the Empire
1924 Constitution of the
Republic of Turkey
Grants Turkish nationality to
all residents of the Republic
irrespective of race or
religion
1928 Law No. 1312/1928:
Turkish Citizenship Act
Based on ius sanguinis but
complemented by a
territorial understanding
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Date Document Content Source
1934 Law No. 2510/1934 on
Settlement
Provides refugee and
immigrant status to groups
such as Muslim Bosnians,
Albanians, Circassians,
Tatars, etc.
www.ifc.org
1961 Constitution of the
Republic of Turkey
Renewed following the
coup; states that children
born to Turkish mothers or
fathers are Turkish and that
it is not possible to revoke
the citizenship of
individuals unless they have
been disloyal to the country;
determines that children
born to Turkish mothers
and foreign fathers acquire
citizenship based on the
citizenship law
www.legislationline.org;
www.hri.org
1964 Law No. 403/1964:
Turkish Citizenship Act
Based on the principles
outlined in art. 54 of the
1961 Constitution
www.coe.int
1981 Law No. 2383/1981
amending Law No. 403/
1964
Legalises dual citizenship
provided that the person
acquiring a second
nationality informs the
government
www.legislationline.org
1982 Constitution of the
Republic of Turkey (as
amended in 1987, 1995,
2001)
Keeps the same principles
regarding citizenship as the
1961 Constitution
www.tbmm.gov.tr
(in Turkish)
1989 Law No. 3540/1989
amending Law No. 403/
1964
Amends two articles of the
law regulating the process
of acquisition of Turkish
citizenship, specifically
regarding the procedure for
conditional naturalisation;
determines that persons
who fail to fulfil a
requirement within two
years following
naturalisation are likely to
lose their citizenship
1992 Law No. 3808/1992
amending Law No. 2383/
1981
Removes the clause stating
that those who are outside
the borders of Turkey and
who have been charged with
endangering the internal or
external security of the
country will be stripped of
Turkish citizenship unless
they return within three
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Date Document Content Source
months during regular
periods and one month
under emergency rule
1995 Law No. 4112/1995
amending Law No. 403/
1964
Institutes the privileged
non-citizen status (also
known as the ‘Pink Card’)
www.legislationline.org
1999 Law No. 4465/1999 Ratifies an agreement
between the Turkish
Republic and the Republic
of Northern Cyprus on
facilitating the
naturalisation of Cypriots in
Turkey
2003 Law No. 4866/2003
amending Law No. 403/
1964
Introduces a waiting period
of three years for acquisition
of citizenship by spouses
2003 Law No. 4862/2003
amending Law No. 403/
1964
Introduces facilitated
acquisition of Turkish
citizenship for citizens of
Northern Cyprus
2004 Law No. 5203/2004
amending Law No. 403/
1964
Clarifies the rights linked to
the privileged non-citizen
status; states that holders
retain social insurance
rights but lose voting rights,
the right to be elected and
the right to be employed in
the civil service
2008 Law No. 5749 amending
Law No. 298/1961 on
Elections and Voter
Registration
Allows Turkish citizens
living abroad to vote by mail
(repealed by the
Constitutional Court),
electronically, at the border
or at consulates
2009 Law No. 5901 Turkish
Citizenship Law
Eliminates the possibility to
withdraw citizenship from
males who have not served
in the military and those
citizens who acquired
another country’s
citizenship without
informing the authorities
Notes
1 The author wishes to thank Esra Derle, Selc¸uk Ug˘uz and O¨zlem Atikcan for their
help in facilitating access to resources.
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2 It should not be forgotten that this was taking place in the context of sharp declines
in the size of the population of Anatolia as a result of the First World War.
3 Law No. 2510/1934 on Settlement.
4 Sunni Islam, which is considered to be the mainstream, differs from Shi’a Islam.
5 The Sheikh Said uprising was one of the first important rebellions against the state.
The Sheikh gathered support on the basis of tribal and religious allegiance, and
hence the insurgency was not exclusively one of Kurdish nationalism (Robins 1993:
660).
6 Law No. 403/1964 on Turkish Citizenship.
7 Turkish authorities were counselling emigrants not to lose their socio-cultural
identity and to maintain ties with Turkey. Germanisation, according to this
perspective, would distance emigrants from Turkey.
8 Parliamentary Minutes, 7 June 1995, Period 19, Legislative Year 4, Volume 88, 89-
109.
9 Law No. 2383/1981 on Turkish Citizenship.
10 German Citizenship Law, art. 25. The only exceptions to the strict ban on dual
citizenship are those who have a second passport from a European Union country
and those who have applied for permission.
11 Y. O¨zdemir, ‘Ankara-Berlin Kıskacında: C¸ifte Vatandas¸lık Gerc¸eg˘i’ [Caught between
Ankara and Berlin: the Truth about Dual Citizenship], Evrensel [daily newspaper],
26 January 2005. This move came at a critical juncture in German politics whereby
expelling these citizens impacted on the number of voters. According to one
estimate, approximately 20,000 out of 600,000 German-Turkish voters were dis-
enfranchised in the general elections of 2005 (Deutsche Welle, 17 September 2005,
www.dw-world.de).
12 Radikal [daily newspaper], 11 February 2005.
13 Y. O¨zdemir, ‘Ankara-Berlin Kıskacında: C¸ifte Vatandas¸lık Gerc¸eg˘i’ [Caught between
Ankara and Berlin: the Truth about Dual Citizenship], Evrensel [daily newspaper], 26
January 2005.
14 After the military coup Bu¨lend Ulusu was given the responsibility of forming a
technocratic government (www.tbmm.gov.tr). Until the Advisory Council was formed
the National Security Council (NSC) sanctioned all decisions of the government. The
members of the NSC were the four generals and one admiral who staged the coup.
The minutes of the 13 February 1981 meeting of the National Security Council (38th
Meeting, Volume 1, 1981) indicate that the members of the Council voted in favour
of debating all amendments related to Turkish Citizenship Law in a secret session.
The debate lasted for approximately two hours.
15 Cumhuriyet, 15 February 1981.
16 Law No. 2383/1981 amending Law No. 403/1964 on Turkish Citizenship.
17 Law No. 3808/1992 amending Law No. 2383/1981. In between these two amend-
ments there is Law No. 3540/1989, which amended two articles of the law regulating
the process of acquisition of Turkish citizenship.
18 Parliamentary Minutes, 27 May 1992, Period 19, Legislative Year 1, Volume 12, 53-55.
19 Parliamentary Minutes, 8 June 1993, Period 19, Legislative Year 2, Volume 36, 189-
192.
20 Ibid., 203-206.
21 Law No. 4112/1995 amending Law No. 403/1964 on Turkish Citizenship.
22 The Turkish Immigrants Union (later to become Almanya Tu¨rk Toplumu – TGD)
was established in 1985. It is an umbrella association with around 200 members,
including the German Turkish Academics Association Union, German Turkish
Students Association Union and various occupational organisations. TGD promotes
the interests of the Turkish population of Germany vis-a`-vis both the German and
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the Turkish governments, attempts to influence public opinion, and to secure rights
through legislative changes (www.tgd.de).
23 The pink card is the document given to the people who have the special non-citizen
status.
24 Law No. 4112/1995 amending Law No. 403/1964 on Turkish Citizenship.
25 Interview with Rona Aybay, 20 August 2002.
26 People who have acquired Turkish citizenship by means other than birth do not have
the right to a pink card.
27 Parliamentary Minutes, 8 June 1993, Period 19, Legislative Year 2, Volume 36, 203-
206.
28 Parliamentary Minutes, 7 June 1995, Period 19, Legislative Year 4, Volume 88, 89-
90.
29 Ibid., 96.
30 Speaker of the RP (Refah Partisi – religious right wing party) group (Parliamentary
Minutes, 7 June 1995, Period 19, Legislative Year 4, Volume 88, 103). Many other
MPs voiced their concern on this issue as well.
31 Art. 29 of Law No. 4112/1995 amending Law No. 403/1964 on Turkish Citizenship.
This provision is against the principle of non-discrimination between citizens by
birth and by naturalisation incorporated in the 1997 European Convention on
Nationality. Turkey has not signed this Convention.
32 Law No. 4866/2003 amending Law No. 403/1964 on Turkish Citizenship.
33 Law No. 4862/2003 amending Law No. 403/1964 on Turkish Citizenship. The
citizens of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) have always enjoyed
preferential treatment in Turkey. Law No. 4465/1999 further strengthened this by
attempting to provide TRNC citizens with all the social and economic rights of
Turkish citizens except voting rights. Since TRNC is not a recognised state (except by
Turkey) TRNC citizens could travel abroad only with a Turkish passport (except for
the UK and USA which recognised the TRNC passport as an identity card and issued
visas for TRNC citizens on a blank page and not the passport itself). TRNC citizens
could obtain a Turkish passport without becoming a citizen of Turkey. They also had
the right to be dual citizens and Law No. 4465/1999 states that there shall be a fast-
track process for the citizenship applications of those TRNC citizens who want to
acquire the citizenship of the Republic of Turkey. Dual citizenship has also existed
for those Turkish citizens who settled in the TRNC. Those with five years residence
are granted TRNC citizenship provided that they fulfil certain conditions (Law No.
25/1993 TRNC Nationality Law). Yet the TRNC Council of Ministers can also grant
TRNC citizenship on a discretionary basis. The TRNC government was accused of
such discretionary behaviour prior to the 2003 elections in order to influence the
election results (Hylland 2003).
34 Data used in this paper related to citizenship in Turkey were provided by the General
Directorate of Population and Citizenship, Ankara.
35 Law No. 2510/1934 on Settlement. The Council of Ministers was in charge of
determining which groups were considered to be of Turkish descent. Groups such as
Pomacks, Roma and Albanians have also been settled in Turkey by being assigned
this status (S¸ahin no date).
36 ‘Sofya’da bir Kurultay’, Milliyet [daily newspaper], 16 July 2000; ‘Soydas¸a Green
Card’, Milliyet, 4 March 1997; ’Menderes: ‘‘C¸ifte Vatandas¸lık Kolaylas¸tırılsın’’’, Milli-
yet, 24 February 1997.
37 Law No. 2641/1982 and Law No. 3835/1992 respectively.
38 The majority of the women in this association were Germans and they did not want
to naturalise in Turkey because they would lose their German citizenship.
39 For a classification of policy styles, see Richardson (1982).
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40 Law No. 403/1964 on Turkish Citizenship.
41 The term Greek Heimatloss is used to refer to those Greek citizens of Western Thrace
(of Turkish origin) who were expelled from Greek citizenship.
42 Voting during general elections in Turkey has been a widely debated issue. Legally it
is possible for Turkish people living abroad to vote during elections from the country
where they reside. However, due to practical problems, such as setting up ballot
boxes in other countries and the insecurity of mail ballots, this has never been
practised. Fuat Boztepe, who is the head of the department in charge of workers
abroad at the Ministry of Labour, stated that the greatest problem occurs in countries
where there are a significant number of workers and the host country does not allow
ballot boxes to be put in public spaces. Given the number of people who could vote,
setting up ballot boxes only in the consulates and embassies does not provide a
solution (interview with Fuat Boztepe, Head of the Department of External Relations
and Services for Workers Abroad at the Turkish Ministry of Labour and Social
Security, 14 May 2003).
43 Ahmet I˙c¸duygu, Bilkent University, Department of Political Science, confirmed this
possibility (interview: 15 May 2003).
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‘A call to kinship’? Citizenship and migration
in the new Member States and the accession
countries of the EU
Wiebke Sievers
When the black British poet John Agard (2000) warns his readers to
‘remember the ship in citizenship’, he is implying that citizenship is
not a fixed institution but something that should be adaptable to
changes in the population. Agard explicitly refers to black immigration
to Britain. In fact, his poem entitled ‘Remember the Ship’ was first
published in 1998, 50 years after the SS Empire Windrush arrived at
Tilbury, an event that has come to epitomise the beginning of black im-
migration to Britain. Commemorating this event, Agard demands: ‘citi-
zenship shall be / a call / to kinship / that knows / no boundary / of
skin’ (Agard 2000: 259). Of course, the poem implies a wider under-
standing of citizenship than what has been discussed in the present vo-
lume, including specific questions that address equal participation in
the community. Nevertheless, if we only look at citizenship regulations,
it is obvious that these have changed dramatically in recent years and
that immigration has played a major role in these changes, albeit not
always in the way Agard envisages. Thus, Britain has used citizenship
regulations in order to reduce the immigration of blacks, in particular,
from its former colonies when it introduced a new nationality law in
1981 (see Dummett 2006: 568-570). Moreover, the NATAC study has
shown that many recent changes in citizenship laws of the fifteen pre-
2004 EU Member States were in response to immigration, even if
there is no single clear trend. While some countries, including Austria,
Denmark, France, Greece, the Netherlands and the UK raised their re-
quirements for naturalisation, others, such as Belgium and Portugal,
have liberalised access to their nationalities for immigrants and their
descendants (see Baubo¨ck, Ersbøll, Groenendijk & Waldrauch 2006:
23-25).
This is probably the most striking difference between the citizenship
regulations in the fifteen ‘old’ Member States and those in the twelve
new EU Member States and the two accession countries discussed in
this book. Most of these are only just now starting to become countries
of immigration. Yet, migration was also a very important issue con-
cerning their citizenship regulations over the past two decades, albeit
in different ways. These specific links between citizenship and migra-
tion shall be discussed in more detail in this summary. The first sec-
tion will analyse policies of initial citizenship determination, which
have often implied discrimination against long-term resident popula-
tions and their descendants, in particular those in Estonia and Latvia
but also those in the former Yugoslavia. Subsequently, I will look at the
legal regulations that specifically target emigrants, and the interactions
between these and the citizenship regulations in the emigrants’ current
countries of residence. Finally, I will focus on various naturalisation
regulations and their implications for the new immigrants who began
to settle in these countries in the 1990s.
1 Excluding long-term residents and their descendants: Initial
determination of citizenship in Estonia, Latvia, Slovenia
and Croatia
All of the newly formed states have to figure out how to determine
who their citizens are. The majority of new states solve this puzzle by
declaring those born or residing in their territory their citizens (see
Brubaker 1992: 277). However, in order to prevent both the imposition
of citizenship onto citizens of other states born or living in their coun-
tries and creating stateless persons abroad, emerging states usually dis-
tinguish between those who automatically become their citizens on the
day of their establishment and those who can apply for citizenship
within a certain period of time after that date. In Cyprus, for example,
residence in the country was the decisive element in this process. Only
those who had a special connection to the country1 and had ordinarily
resided on the island of Cyprus for any period of time in the five years
before the day of independence automatically became citizens on that
day, whereas those of Cypriot origin who were not residing in the
country could apply for citizenship. In Malta, by contrast, birth in the
country was considered more important. Only those citizens of the
United Kingdom and the colonies who were born in Malta and one of
whose parents was also born there, as well as those born outside Malta
whose father and one of whose paternal grandparents were born in
Malta, automatically became citizens of Malta. Those born in Malta of
parents who were not born there had to apply for citizenship. In addi-
tion, both Cyprus and Malta made provisions for those who were natur-
alised under former regulations and women married to citizens of their
countries (see Trimikliniotis and Buttigieg in this volume).
While Cyprus’ and Malta’s initial determinations of who their citi-
zens are do not seem to have created too many problems, the situation
was quite different in the post-communist states that were established
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or re-established in the 1990s. The regulations that determined the in-
itial citizenry in these countries, which resulted from partitioning or
secession, turned former internal migrants into international migrants.
Their legal statuses became unclear in countries like the Czech Repub-
lic, Slovakia and Slovenia, difficult in Croatia and extremely proble-
matic in Estonia and Latvia.
The Czech Republic, Slovakia and the former Yugoslav republics
decided to base their criteria for citizenship on the existing republic-le-
vel citizenship introduced in Yugoslavia just after the Second World
War, and in Czechoslovakia in response to the Slovak national move-
ment of the late 1960s. These existing regulations stipulated that all ci-
tizens of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia automatically were citizens of
their respective states and of one of the federal republics within this
entity. Although it was very easy to change the republic-level citizen-
ship in both states, internal migrants usually did not bother because
there was (almost) no benefit from such a change. As a consequence,
65,000 Slovaks applied for Czech republic-level citizenship in 1992
when Slovakian threats to break away became a realistic possibility. De-
spite this run on applications, many Czechs and Slovaks ended up with
the citizenship of the state in which they were not residing and, in
some cases, where they had not even been granted permanent resi-
dence. Moreover, although each state gave the citizens of the respective
other state the option to apply for its citizenship, there is some indica-
tion that it was particularly difficult for many Roma who had moved
from the Slovak to the Czech part of Czechoslovakia after the Second
World War to fulfil some of the requirements. It took about a decade
and several legislative corrections to sort out these and similar pro-
blems (see Barsˇova´ and Kusa´ in this volume).
The situation was comparable in Slovenia, where citizens of the
other Yugoslav republics, registered as residents in Slovenia on the day
of the referendum for independence (23 December 1990), were
granted the option to apply for Slovenian citizenship within six months
after independence, i.e. by 25 December 1991. A total of 171,125 per-
sons (or about 8 per cent of the total population at the time) were
granted Slovenian citizenship under this regulation. Despite the fact
that this was a more inclusive approach to the initial determination of
citizenry than in the other Yugoslav successor states, it nevertheless ex-
cluded those long-term residents who had never bothered to register
their residence in Slovenia, which was not rare since Slovenia was the
only one of the Yugoslav republics that recorded in- and out-migration
and there was no immediate benefit to registering. Moreover, those
who had registered their residence in Slovenia but did not apply for,
nor acquire, Slovenian citizenship became aliens and had to apply for
residency status even if they had resided in the country for years. If,
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for various reasons – including the lack of information, the difficulty of
obtaining documentation in the period of Yugoslavia’s break-up, con-
fusing procedures, etc. – they had not applied for residency by the day
when the Aliens Act became law (23 February 1992), they were auto-
matically transferred from the register of residents to the aliens record
without even being notified of this change in their status, which later
became known as erasure. This erasure meant that they lost all of their
civil, social and political rights that had been granted to them under
the Yugoslav legal framework, such as the rights to work, healthcare
and social benefits. The government admitted that it had deprived
more than 18,000 persons of their residency status. However, this fig-
ure probably excludes those affected who left Slovenia before the mat-
ter became publicly known. Despite pressure from several NGOs and
the ombudsman for human rights, who pointed out this problem in
his first report in 1995, it was only in 1999 that the Constitutional
Court ordered the legislature to eradicate this mistake. For various rea-
sons, the legislature has yet to follow up on this directive. However,
7,000 of those affected by this act have since been granted Slovenian
citizenship under the 1999 Act Settling the Status of Citizens from
other Yugoslav Successor States before it was declared unconstitutional
in 2003. The same constitutional court decision ordered the Slovenian
state to reissue permanent residence permits to those deleted from the
population register whose status had yet to be determined at the time.
Finally, this group was granted the right to apply for facilitated natura-
lisation by 23 November of the same year. Another 1,767 persons ac-
quired Slovenian citizenship under this provision (see Medved in this
volume; Sˇtiks 2006: 490-491).
Like Slovenia, Croatia decided to follow the principle of legal conti-
nuity. Hence, all citizens of the Yugoslav republic of Croatia automati-
cally became citizens of the new state when it became independent on
8 October 1991. Unlike Slovenia, however, Croatia did not grant citi-
zens of other Yugoslav republics/successor states residing in Croatian
territory the right to opt for Croatian citizenship. As a consequence,
these residents, who had sometimes been living in Croatia for years or
were even born there, automatically became aliens on the day of inde-
pendence, thereby losing all citizenship rights they had held under the
Yugoslav legal framework. This most likely affected a much larger
group of persons than the erasure in Slovenia, which had similar im-
plications, but the exact figures of those excluded from Croatian citi-
zenship by this action remain unknown. Only a specific group among
these was granted privileged access to Croatian citizenship in the tran-
sitional provisions regulating the initial determination of who was
Croatian: namely, just resident ethnic Croats. They could acquire citi-
zenship by issuing a written statement to the police that they consid-
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ered themselves Croatian citizens. All other residents who had become
foreigners and who wanted to acquire the citizenship of their state of
residence had to apply for naturalisation. The naturalisation procedure,
in line with the general spirit of the 1991 Law, required abiding by
Croatia’s legal system, customs and culture. This gave the Ministry of
Interior wide discretion in rejecting applications, which, according to
several reports, seems to have resulted in discrimination against all
non-ethnic Croats but in particular against Serbs. Administrative prac-
tice has become less discriminatory since Franjo Tudjman’s death and
subsequent political changes. However, the Croatian government has
yet to adopt a new and less discriminatory law (see Ragazzi & Sˇtiks in
this volume; Human Rights Watch 1995).
The initial determination of citizenship was most problematic in Es-
tonia and Latvia because both states had created a large number of sta-
teless persons in the process. Originally founded in 1920, the three
Baltic states of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania were first occupied by the
Soviet Union in 1940 and, after a short period of German occupation,
they became part of the Soviet Empire in 1944. During the period of
Soviet annexation, which was also a period characterised by rapid in-
dustrialisation, especially in Latvia and Estonia, a large number of Rus-
sian workers moved to these two countries. When the Baltic states re-
gained their independence in 1990, these internal migrants ‘secure in
their Soviet citizenship’ became ‘international migrants of contested le-
gitimacy and uncertain membership’ (see Brubaker 1992: 269).
In principle, these three Baltic states followed the notion of state
continuity, which means that they reinstalled the 1940 institutions and
laws, including their respective citizenship legislation. However,
Lithuania had already enacted a new nationality law in 1989, using the
authority in nationality matters granted by the Soviet authorities dur-
ing the final days of the Soviet Union. This law was the outcome of ne-
gotiations between Lithuanian nationalist forces, which intended to re-
install the pre-1940 citizenship laws, and the Soviet government,
which opposed the exclusion of Russians and Poles who lived in
Lithuanian territory. Departing from the pre-1940 citizenship laws, it
only regarded those pre-1940 nationals and permanent residents and
their children and grandchildren who resided in Lithuania and did not
hold another citizenship as citizens. Hence, emigrants and expatriates
were excluded, a decision that Lithuania has been at pains to change
ever since, as will be shown in the following section. At the same time,
all of those persons who had held permanent resident status in Lithua-
nia for at least two years prior to the adoption of the law and who had
a legal source of income in the country, could declare their intention to
become nationals within two years following enactment of the law.
This meant that Lithuania gave immigrants who had arrived during
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the Soviet period the possibility of acquiring Lithuanian nationality.
About 90 per cent of all non-Lithuanians seized this opportunity de-
spite the fact that they had to renounce their USSR citizenship in the
process, which at that time was not an easy option (see Kru¯ma in this
volume; Budryte 2005: 149ff).
Unlike Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia decided to reestablish their pre-
1940 citizenry in 1991 and 1992, respectively, by restoring the national-
ity laws that were in force prior to their annexation. According to these
regulations, all of those who were Estonian nationals prior to 16 June
1940 and Latvian nationals on 17 June 1940 and their descendants had
a right to Estonian and Latvian nationalities, respectively, regardless of
whether they resided in the country or not. By contrast, those who ar-
rived after these dates and had lived in these countries ever since, had
to go through the normal naturalisation procedures regardless of the
amount of time they had spent in their country of residence. As a con-
sequence, about one-third of the populations residing in these two
countries, again, mostly Russian immigrants who arrived as workers
during the time of Soviet occupation, became aliens or, even worse, sta-
teless, since the state of their nationality, the Soviet Union, had ceased
to exist. This also meant that they had no right to participate in refer-
enda on their constitutions, nor could they vote or run in the first elec-
tions, plus they were prohibited from seeking a number of public posi-
tions, all of which enhanced their exclusion (see Kru¯ma and Ja¨rve in
this volume).
The differing approaches towards the Russian long-term residents in
these three countries have often been explained by the fact that the
numbers were much higher in Latvia and Estonia than in Lithuania. It
is true that the share of the titular ethnic group declined from 90 to 61
per cent in Estonia and from 77 to 52 per cent in Latvia between 1939
and 1989 (these are self-ascriptions gathered in the censuses). Based
on these figures, both countries argued that a strict stance on national-
ity was necessary in order to guarantee the survival of their ethnic na-
tions and cultures. However, a large percentage of the non-titular eth-
nic groups in Latvia automatically acquired citizenship in 1991 since
they were (descendants of) persons who were citizens or permanent re-
sidents in 1940 (see Aasland & Fløtten 2001: 1025). This explains why
the percentage of aliens and stateless was lower in Latvia than in Esto-
nia in 1993 (28 vs. 32 per cent).
This ratio changed drastically in subsequent years, as the naturalisa-
tion policies were very different in the two countries, with the require-
ments being far stricter in Latvia than in Estonia. The Estonian law
adopted in 1992 required two years of permanent residence prior to ap-
plication (as of 30 March 1990) and one year after an application had
been filed, as well as a language exam. More than 87,000 persons were
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naturalised under these conditions between 1992 and 1995, when a
new Citizenship Act came into law. The 1995 Act increased the re-
quired period of permanent residence to five years prior to, and one
year after, application, introduced a test of applicants’ knowledge of the
Estonian Constitution and the Citizenship Act and upgraded the lan-
guage exam. As a consequence, the naturalisation figures dropped
sharply, decreasing from more than 22,000 who were granted citizen-
ship in 1996 (under the 1992 Law) to 8,000 naturalised in 1997 (un-
der the 1995 Law). Despite international criticism, especially while it
prepared for its accession to the EU, and several attempts to encourage
naturalisation, the naturalisation figures have remained low and have
only slightly increased since Estonia’s EU accession in 2004. Neverthe-
less, the share of stateless persons decreased from 32 to 9 per cent be-
tween 1992 and 2008, albeit not all of this was due to their being nat-
uralised. While a similar share of the stateless left the country, a smal-
ler share acquired Russian citizenship but remained in Estonia.
However, the numbers of stateless persons applying for Russian citi-
zenship has increased dramatically since the Estonian government
decided to relocate a Soviet war memorial in April 2007, an event
which not only initiated riots by mostly Russian-speaking youths but
also considerably increased Estonians’ mistrust of all Russian speakers.
Moreover, there is some danger that older cohorts will continue to re-
main stateless, since the language exam prevents them from naturalis-
ing (see Ja¨rve in this volume).
In Latvia, the naturalisation requirements were far stricter from the
outset. The law, which was restored in 1991 and in force until 1994,
imposed sixteen years of residence among other requirements. Thus, it
is not surprising that not a single person was naturalised under these
conditions. The first proposals for a new Citizenship Act remained very
strict. They foresaw first applications for citizenship for the year 2000,
limiting the numbers to 0.1 per cent of the previous year’s total num-
ber of Latvian nationals. In practice, this would have meant that under
these regulations about 1,000 stateless persons could have become nat-
uralised in 2000, a ridiculously small number considering that Latvia
had 673,398 stateless persons and foreigners in 1993. While the parlia-
ment adopted this proposal, the president never signed it. This was
due to international pressure, mainly from the Council of Europe,
which threatened not to admit Latvia if the law was adopted. It took an-
other year before a new Citizenship Law was enacted in 1994.
Although this law was more liberal with regard to the naturalisation re-
quirements than the first proposal (five years of permanent residence
and a language exam, among other requirements), it retained the so-
called window system which limited the number of persons allowed to
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naturalise per year. This system was adopted since the legislators ex-
pected a run on Latvian citizenship.
However, the expected run on Latvian citizenship never materialised.
In fact, the number of applications was so low and the pressure from
abroad so high that the law was amended again in 1995. These amend-
ments did not affect the naturalisation requirements but addressed the
problem of the large number of stateless persons residing in Latvia
from two different angles. Firstly, they added a new category to those
regarded as Latvian nationals: those who were permanently residing in
Latvia, were duly registered and had completed their educations in a
school where Latvian is at least one of the languages of instruction.
This category has been interpreted to include some former USSR na-
tionals. Secondly, they introduced a special non-citizen status for for-
mer USSR citizens who had become stateless, which guaranteed the
holders of this status almost all of the same rights that nationals have
except for electoral rights at the national level. After these amendments
were enacted, the numbers of applications for naturalisation further
decreased (from 4,543 in 1995 to 2,627 in 1996), with the disinterest
in Latvian citizenship being attributed to the fact that persons were
happy with the rights they had thus far been granted.2 It is only after
the window system was abolished in 1998 that the numbers of applica-
tions for Latvian citizenship increased significantly. Nevertheless, the
number of non-citizens and foreign nationals remains high in Latvia,
constituting 20 per cent of the total population in 2008 – the same as
in 2005 (compared to 28 per cent in 1993). Moreover, only about half
of the former non-citizens and foreigners have thus far acquired Lat-
vian citizenship, while the rest have either become citizen of another
country or have left the country (see Kru¯ma in this volume).
2 Reaching out to emigrants and expatriates: Restitution
laws, dual nationality and status laws
Apart from the decision made by Estonia and Latvia to deny a large
group of residents the right to opt for their citizenships, the most de-
bated citizenship issues in the countries under discussion in this vo-
lume were most probably Romania’s decision to restore citizenship to
those living in the former territories of Greater Romania and Hun-
gary’s decision to grant kin minorities in the former Hungarian terri-
tories a quasi-citizenship status. This was mainly because these laws
were perceived as infringing upon the territorial sovereignty of neigh-
bouring states, which unleashed an international debate. However, Ro-
mania and Hungary were not the only two countries that reached out
to former citizens and ethnic kin beyond their borders. Most of the
446 WIEBKE SIEVERS
countries under discussion in this book introduced similar policies, al-
beit mainly addressing emigrants and their descendants, whose coun-
tries of residence are distant, large and powerful enough not to feel im-
mediately threatened by these regulations. In the following sections, I
will focus on these regulations, which roughly fall into three categories:
post-communist restitution laws, special regulations that allowed ex-
patriates to reacquire or maintain their original citizenship and quasi-
citizenship regulations that have granted a number of social rights to
ethnic kin residing in other countries.
2.1 Restitution laws
Restitution laws have, in principle, been meant to right communist (or
older) wrongs. Many post-communist countries adopted such laws but
they often only had symbolic value, which should nevertheless not be
underestimated. Czechoslovakia first adopted such legislation in 1990
and the Czech Republic renewed it in 1999 (since the first regulation
expired in 1993). Although the introductory phrases of this law imply
that it aims to ‘assuage the legacy of certain wrongs that occurred in
the period 1948 to 1989’, the law applies, in practice, to all those who
lost Czechoslovak citizenship in the communist period. Moreover,
although Czech law prohibits dual nationality (expressly exempting
only Slovaks from this rule), the restitution law did not require appli-
cants to renounce any other nationality. Nevertheless, the number of
those who applied for Czech citizenship under this law has remained
relatively low probably because the law was only introduced after the
date for the application for restitution of property expired (the right to
property restitution was limited to Czechoslovak citizens). Another ex-
ample of this restitution law, which mainly had symbolic relevance, is
the Polish right to repatriation, which was first introduced in the
1990s and then reformulated in a separate Repatriation Act adopted in
2000. This Act is addressed to ethnic Poles who were residing ‘in the
East […] due to deportations, exile and other ethnically motivated forms
of persecution’. Again, this law applies to all ethnic Poles residing in
the defined areas since they did not have to provide proof of deporta-
tion or persecution – which would probably also have been difficult.
Nevertheless, it only attracts a small number of repatriates (see Liebich
in this volume).
Unlike the Czech and Polish laws, the Bulgarian restitution law
adopted in 1990 not only had symbolic value but also had a real im-
pact. This law served to restore citizenship to the more than 300,000
members of the Turkish minority who were deprived of this status and
forced to resettle in Turkey in the final stages of the communist regime
after years of ethnic repression. A large number of these refugees had,
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in the meantime, been granted Turkish citizenship and some of them
had also actually remained in Turkey. But the law restoring their Bul-
garian citizenship did not demand the renunciation of other citizen-
ships nor did it require resettlement to Bulgaria. However, the resent-
ment against the former communist regime in Bulgaria, which found
expression in the restitution law, has since been supplanted by ethnic
nationalism. As a consequence, the openness of the citizenship law, in
particular to those residing in Turkey, has come under criticism. The
debate was sparked off by the fact that all Bulgarian nationals, regard-
less of their place of residence, have the right to vote. Mobilised by the
MRF, the Bulgarian party historically associated with the Turkish min-
ority, Bulgarians residing in Turkey have made extensive use of this
right. This situation was first criticised as undemocratic during the par-
liamentary elections of 1994. Protests escalated prior to the European
parliamentary elections in 2007, in advance of which the radical na-
tionalist party Ataka suggested changing the citizenship laws so that
only ethnic Bulgarians could hold dual nationality. While this sugges-
tion was not accepted in Bulgaria, it is a normal practice in many coun-
tries as will be shown below (see Smilov & Jileva in this volume).
Restitution assumed a wider meaning in Romania, Latvia and Esto-
nia. Romania’s restitution policies started on a note that was similar to
Polish and Czech laws. A decree adopted in Romania as early as 1989
not only guaranteed repatriation to all Romanian citizens residing
abroad but also granted former Romanian citizens residing abroad the
right to reacquire Romanian citizenship by repatriating without requir-
ing them to renounce their other nationality. This implicit toleration of
dual nationality was a novelty in Romanian law at the time. A second
decree issued in 1990 further extended the group of former citizens
who were allowed to reacquire Romanian nationality by also waiving
the residency requirement. However, it was only with the adoption of
the new citizenship law in 1991 that restitution acquired something
more than mere symbolic significance in Romania. This law explicitly
included a third group of former Romanian citizens now granted the
right to reacquire citizenship, namely those who resided in the terri-
tories of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, which belonged to Roma-
nia before they were occupied by the Soviet Union in 1940-1941 and
annexed in 1944. Like the Baltic states, the Romanian government ar-
gued that this annexation had been illegal. While this particular law
did not address migrants, it encouraged migration between Moldova,
Romania and other EU countries. Moreover, several EU agencies
warned that this policy of citizenship restitution could become a way of
circumventing EU immigration controls when Romania acceded to the
EU in 2007. This was one of the reasons why the Romanian govern-
ment brought the naturalisation process to a halt and introduced more
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requirements for the reacquisition of citizenship for this particular
group of people. While at least 100,000 largely Moldovan citizens reac-
quired their citizenship in the first decade after the introduction of the
law, this number dropped to fewer than 3,000 reacquisitions between
2001 and 2007. Since the nationality law was amended in September
2007 the number of nationality restitutions has increased. More than
3,807 restitutions were granted within a year. However, between
500,000 and 900,000 applications by Moldovans alone are said to be
awaiting a decision (see Iordachi in this volume).
A similarly broad understanding of restitution was applied in Esto-
nia and Latvia; it restored nationality to all pre-1940 citizens and their
descendants even if they had emigrated after that date. Moreover, while
both countries in principle prohibit dual nationality, their regulations
are often unclear and sometimes even openly tolerate dual nationality
where emigrants are concerned. Thus, the Estonian regulations state
that Estonians can be deprived of their nationality if they acquire the
nationality of another state; this provision, nevertheless, does not apply
to those who acquired Estonian nationality by birth. It therefore re-
mains unclear whether 1940 nationals by birth and their descendants
are still considered nationals even if they hold another nationality.
Moreover, the state has been quite tolerant of dual nationality in cases
of resumption by those who lost Estonian nationality as minors (see
Ja¨rve in this volume). The restored nationality law in Latvia, by con-
trast, still explicitly demanded the renunciation of other nationalities
for emigrants and their descendants. Only one group was excluded
from this requirement in the transitional regulations of the restored
law: refugees and those who were deported between 1940 and 1990
could register as citizens until 1 July 1995. The new nationality law
adopted in 1994 extended this exemption from the general prohibition
of dual nationality to all 1940 nationals and their descendants. Under
this law, only those who had acquired a new nationality after Latvia’s
independence were required to renounce that nationality. In 2007, the
Constitutional Court officially confirmed Latvia’s unofficial policy of
prohibiting dual nationality only in cases of naturalisation. Since then,
there have been several discussions about also extending dual national-
ity to those who have recently left the country (see Kru¯ma in this vo-
lume).
2.2 Other special regulations allowing emigrants to acquire citizenship
A second group of countries openly reached out to emigrants and ex-
patriates by adopting special regulations in order to renew or maintain
ties with these particular groups. As mentioned above, this holds true
for Lithuania. Lithuania was the only one of the three Baltic states that
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had expressly excluded expatriates from its initial citizenry in 1989 by
making permanent residence in the country a requirement for the ac-
quisition of nationality for 1940 nationals and their descendants. More-
over, the law did not provide for dual nationality, primarily because the
Lithuanian nationalist forces did not want Lithuanian citizens to keep
their USSR citizenship. Both of these rules were amended in the
course of the 1990s in response to pressure from expatriate commu-
nities and criticism from the Council of Europe. However, Russian
speakers were also interested in dual citizenship. These opposing
forces might explain the special development of the Lithuanian citizen-
ship regulations in the course of the 1990s. The first new citizenship
law adopted after independence lifted the residence requirement for
1940 nationals as well as their children and grandchildren. Regarding
the prohibition of dual nationality, early exceptions had already been
introduced when the 1989 Law was amended in 1991. In 1993, those
who had been deported from Lithuania or had left during the occupa-
tion were allowed to recover their nationality without having to re-
nounce another one. In 1994, the Constitutional Court declared that
1940 nationals and their descendants were the only group exempted
from losing Lithuanian nationality when acquiring another nationality.
Based on this ruling, the nationality law was again amended in 1995.
Since then, all 1940 nationals and their children have been considered
nationals unless they had returned to their ethnic homeland (according
to this rule an ethnic Pole who had relocated to Poland after 1940
would not be allowed to keep both citizenships). Further pressure from
expatriate groups led to an extension of this regulation to grandchil-
dren and great-grandchildren of 1940 nationals in the new citizenship
law that was enacted in 2003.3 However, all of these special regulations
on dual citizenship for expatriates were declared unconstitutional by
the Constitutional Court in 2006. The Court argued that the Constitu-
tion allowed dual nationality only in exceptional cases. How this relates
to its earlier judgement regarding 1940 nationals and their descen-
dants remains unclear (Kru¯ma in this volume; Budryte 2005: 152ff.).
Other countries used similar methods in order to renew or maintain
links to expatriate communities in the 1980s and 1990s. In 1989, Mal-
ta allowed emigrants born in Malta and who had spent at least six years
abroad to hold dual nationality.4 A large number of Maltese citizens
had left Malta for the UK, Australia, Canada and the US in the 1950s
and 1960s. Following the previous regulations, they automatically lost
their Maltese citizenship when acquiring the citizenship of their new
country of residence. The 1989 amendments applied retroactively, i.e.
Maltese emigrants who had lost their Maltese citizenship when they ac-
quired the citizenship of their country of residence were now deemed
to have never lost it. In 2007, Malta extended the right to dual nation-
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ality to second and subsequent generations residing abroad. Unlike
Lithuania, Malta proceeded to make dual citizenship the rule in 2000.
This means that foreigners applying for Maltese citizenship no longer
have to renounce their other nationalities (see Buttigieg in this vo-
lume).
Of course, it takes two states for these regulations to have any im-
pact. If the emigrants’ state of residence prohibits dual nationality, a
change of law in the country of origin will not be enough of an incen-
tive for former citizens to reacquire their citizenship. The Maltese
changes are a good case in point: while in the 1990s only about 200
persons annually reacquired their Maltese nationality by registration,
this number increased to more than 1,000 in 2002 when Australia be-
gan allowing dual nationality. How many former Maltese citizens auto-
matically reacquired their Maltese citizenship because of this legal
change in their country of residence is unknown (see Buttigieg in this
volume).
However, there is no automatic guarantee that the legal regulations
of other states are respected, as has been made evident in the Turkish
case. Turkey introduced toleration of dual citizenship in 1981 with a
view to maintaining links with Turkish workers who have moved to
Western Europe, particularly Germany, since the 1960s. Moreover, the
Turkish state encouraged former Turkish nationals to reacquire their
Turkish nationality after having renounced it in order to acquire Ger-
man and Austrian nationality, for example, although these two states
prohibited dual nationality acquired through naturalisation. While this
was known in the countries of residence, the German state had no le-
gal basis that would have allowed it to stop this practice, mainly be-
cause the German constitution did not permit withdrawing German
nationality from German citizens residing in the country; this was in
response to the Third Reich’s massive denaturalisation of German
Jews. This changed in 2000 when Germany introduced a new nation-
ality law, which also granted the German state the right to withdraw
German nationality from those who had acquired another nationality
without the authorities’ consent. More than 40,000 German-Turkish
dual nationals lost their German nationality as a result of this new reg-
ulation (see Kadirbeyoglu in this volume).
2.3 Quasi-citizenship regulations for expatriates
Several countries in our sample adopted laws that provided co-ethnics
with a form of quasi-citizenship by granting them a set of rights usual-
ly reserved to citizens, including privileged access to education and em-
ployment. The most important and most debated of these was the in-
troduction of the so-called Status Law in Hungary in 2001. Granting
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quasi-citizenship to ethnic Hungarians residing in neighbouring coun-
tries, this law was met with heavy criticism (until 2003 when the most
debated provisions were deleted), particularly in Slovakia, despite the
fact that Slovakia had already introduced a similar law in 1997. So had
Bulgaria in 2000, Slovenia in 2006 and Poland in 2007 (see Kova´cs &
To´th, Kusa´, Medved, Go´rny & Pudzianowska and Smilov & Jileva in
this volume).
While all of these countries introduced a form of quasi-citizenship
in order to establish and maintain links with co-ethnics abroad holding
the citizenship of their country of residence, Turkey introduced a simi-
lar regulation in order to encourage citizens residing abroad to acquire
the nationality of their respective country of residence. When several
Turkish emigrants were killed in xenophobic arson attacks in Mo¨lln in
1992 and Solingen in 1993, the Turkish government decided to encou-
rage its nationals abroad to acquire the nationality of their country of
residence, arguing that a large Turkish electorate would at least prevent
parties from openly mobilising against immigrants. The main reason
for Turkish nationals not acquiring German nationality was the fact
that they had to renounce their Turkish nationality and thus the right
to property and inheritance in Turkey. That is why the Turkish govern-
ment introduced a quasi-citizenship status in 1995, which has become
known as the ‘pink card’ (reflecting the colour of the document given
to such status holders). This status grants former Turkish nationals all
the rights of citizens except the right to vote. While the numbers of
Turkish citizens granted German citizenship has increased signifi-
cantly since the introduction of the pink card, the number of applica-
tions for the pink card has remained low. This implies that other fac-
tors were responsible for the increase in naturalisations (see Kadirbeyo-
glu in this volume; Caglar 2004; the statistics compiled by Harald
Waldrauch for the NATAC project as published on www.imiscoe.org).
All of the states discussed here have reached out to their expatriates
and kin minorities in the last two decades. As the following section will
show, this attitude contrasts strongly with the lack of attention paid to
immigrants as potential future citizens.
3 Excluding recent immigrants: Naturalisation requirements
As mentioned above, the countries discussed in this book have only re-
cently begun to attract immigration. As a consequence, these new im-
migrants have not really become an issue in their respective citizenship
regulations. Granted, all of them have regulations for the acquisition of
citizenship by naturalisation, the requirements of which are in princi-
ple similar to those in the fifteen pre-2004 EU Member States. All of
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the countries under discussion here require a specific period of resi-
dence in the country, ranging from five (in nine countries) to ten years
(in Lithuania and Slovenia). However, unlike many of the ‘old’ Member
States, six of the new Member States do not count all of the years from
the date of entry but rather count from the date when the respective
person was granted a residency permit, which certainly increases the
required period of residency significantly. Moreover, all of these coun-
tries demand a clean criminal record, thirteen out of the fourteen
countries require command of the national language, ten demand
proof of some kind of legal income, seven demand that the applicants
swear an oath of loyalty and three conduct a test on the country’s con-
stitution (also see Dumbravaˇ 2007: 462 for the new Member States;
Waldrauch 2006: 134-159 for the fifteen pre-2004 Member States).
Only rarely are there any clear indications that specific changes in
the citizenship laws are motivated by recent immigration. One example
is Romania’s tightening of its naturalisation requirements in 1999 and
2003. In 1999, the Romanian government not only increased the resi-
dence requirement from five to seven years, but also introduced tests
on an applicant’s knowledge of the Romanian language, elementary
norms of Romanian culture and civilisation. In 2003, the residence re-
quirement was further increased to eight years (but reduced to five
years for foreign spouses of Romanian nationals). Moreover, the law
now also demands knowledge of the national anthem and a declaration
of loyalty. This marked increase in requirements, particularly in the
cultural domain, is not unlike recent developments in West European
countries such as Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK.
Malta, Cyprus and Poland have the lowest number of legal require-
ments. For example, Poland – the only post-communist country which
has not introduced a new citizenship law since the fall of the Iron Cur-
tain – officially demands only five years of permanent residence, which
in practice comes to at least ten years of residence in the country. How-
ever, this does not mean that these are the most open countries but
rather that their authorities exercise broad discretion in deciding who
can become a citizen. Again, Poland is an interesting case in point: ap-
plications for naturalisation in Poland have to include additional infor-
mation on the parents’ nationality, sources of income, the applicants’
most recent job, knowledge of the Polish language and services ren-
dered to Poland (or Polish diaspora organisations, etc.). However, the
citizenship law does not contain any requirements that explain why
these documents are necessary to make a decision on an applicant.
Nor are there clear rules for their evaluation. Practice indicates that not
only Poland but also Cyprus and Malta select future citizens based on
their ancestry (see Buttigieg, Trimikliniotis and Go´rny & Pudzianowska
in this volume).
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Moreover, even in those countries where the requirements are very
similar to those in the pre-2004 EU Member States, the focus is rarely
on new immigration, which becomes obvious when we look at regula-
tions that address specific groups. Apart from the three countries men-
tioned above where descent is important in practice although not men-
tioned in the law, five countries offer facilitated naturalisation to co-eth-
nics by reducing the residence requirement from ten years to one in
the case of Slovenia (see Medved in this volume), from eight years to at
least one year for ethnic Hungarian descendants of former citizens
(see Kova´cs & To´th in this volume) and from five years to no residence
requirement at all in Bulgaria, Croatia and Turkey (see Iordachi,
Ragazzi & Sˇtiks and Kadirbeyoglu in this volume). Hence, eight of the
fourteen countries apply ethnic preferences in one way or another.
There are only two other groups of foreigners who enjoy preferential
treatment in a large number of these countries: those regarded as
being of interest to the country because of their special merits and the
spouses of nationals.
However, in their most recent amendments, and in order to prevent
marriages of convenience, Slovenia and Malta have already raised the
number of years that spouses are required to reside in the country be-
fore they can naturalise (see Medved and Buttigieg in this volume).
Special regulations for other groups of immigrants are rare: Bulgaria,
the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Hungary have reduced residence re-
quirements for refugees (see Smilov & Jileva, Barsˇova´, Medved and Ko-
va´cs & To´th in this volume), while Croatia, Slovenia, Lithuania and
Hungary have special regulations for foreigners born in their countries,
but these usually address very specific groups, such as residents from
other former Yugoslav republics in Slovenia and Croatia (see Ragazzi &
Sˇtiks, Medved, Kru¯ma and Kova´cs & To´th in this volume). In the Czech
Republic, all foreigners born within its borders are treated somewhat
more favourably than other foreigners, as they do not necessarily need
to meet the five-year residency requirement to qualify for naturalisa-
tion. The Czech Republic is also the only country that has made an at-
tempt to introduce special regulations for second-generation foreigners
born in the Czech Republic of immigrant parents, but the legislative
process was hampered by the parliamentary elections of 2006. A new
draft bill containing regulations for this particular group is expected to
be presented in 2009 (see Barsˇova´ in this volume and Dumbravaˇ
2007: 459).
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4 Conclusions
This chapter’s discussion of migration and citizenship legislations in
the new Member States, Croatia and Turkey has shown that the trends
in these fourteen countries are comparable. Returning to Agard’s ear-
lier quotation we might be able to summarise that the main trend has
been ‘a call to kinship’, although this call has not been addressed to im-
migrants but to kin minorities and former citizens in neighbouring
states and to emigrants and expatriate communities in more distant
countries. Furthermore, long-term residents were often subject to se-
vere discrimination in the process of the establishment and re-estab-
lishment of states after the end of the communist period. Since immi-
gration is a comparatively recent phenomenon in all of the countries
under discussion, these new immigrants have not really become an is-
sue with regard to citizenship regulations. In that respect, the citizen-
ship legislations in the twelve new Member States, Croatia and Turkey
differ markedly from those in the pre-2004 EU Member States, where
most of the recent changes in citizenship laws were motivated by im-
migration.
However, as Dumbravaˇ (2007) rightly points out, we should not fall
into the trap of describing these differences in terms of restrictive East-
ern European laws and liberal Western European laws (for a different
opinion on this matter, see Howard 2009). Firstly, several of the pre-
2004 Member States also have regulations that facilitate citizenship ac-
quisition for expatriates and co-ethnics, including Germany, Greece,
Italy, Ireland, Spain and Portugal. Both the Western European and the
above-described Eastern European regulations can, in principle, be
used to enter any other Member State, since citizenship in one EU
Member State automatically implies EU citizenship. There is, for ex-
ample, some indication that Argentine citizens acquire Italian citizen-
ship to be able to live and work in Spain. Hence, European concerns
about national citizenship regimes are not only raised by Eastern Eur-
opean policies but also by analoguous Western European regulations.
Secondly, as pointed out above, citizenship in Western Europe has
moved in opposite directions in recent years, with some formerly liber-
al countries, such as Denmark or the Netherlands, dramatically raising
their naturalisation requirements (see Baubo¨ck, Ersbøll, Groenendijk &
Waldrauch 2006: 23-25). Thirdly, there are specific trends that are si-
milar in all of these countries. For instance, dual citizenship has be-
come more accepted throughout the European Union. However, the
reasons for the growing tolerance of dual nationality differ; in Western
Europe this is mostly linked to facilitating naturalisation for immi-
grants, while in the twelve new Member States and two accession
countries under discussion tolerance of dual citizenship is mainly re-
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served for co-ethnics and emigrants residing abroad. As a consequence,
there has been a tendency to regard only the former as liberal,
although the latter reforms also liberalise access to citizenship and
may lead to a general acceptance of dual citizenship in the long run, as
the case of Malta shows.
Notes
1 British subjects, according to the Cyprus (Annexation) Orders, and persons born in
Cyprus on or after 5 November 1914, as well as descendants in the male line of both
of these groups (see annex D to the Treaty concerning the Establishment of the
Republic of Cyprus, sect. 2, para. 2, available at www.fco.gov.uk).
2 The most important reasons for the lack of interest in naturalisation were that
people did not know Latvian, that they wanted to avoid military service and that it
was easier for non-citizens than for Latvians to receive a Russian visa. The third
point has since been further simplified; in 2008, Russia decided to grant visa-free
travel to former USSR citizens who reside in Estonia and Latvia and have not
acquired another citizenship (see Kru¯ma in this volume).
3 Grandchildren of 1940 nationals also had a right to nationality under the previous law
but were required to renounce other nationalities when they wanted to exert that right.
4 Before that date only minors were allowed to have more than one nationality until
their nineteenth birthdays.
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